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Since the 1990s post-Zionist academics have transformed the anti-Zionist ideology of 
the fringe political group Matzpen, rooted in pre-1948 ideology of Brit Shalom, the 
Canaanites, and the Communists, into a mainstream de-legitimizing critique of Israel.  
Utilizing the tools of the critical, neo-Marxist paradigm depicting Israel as an 
imperialist, colonialist movement, these scholars have produced a ferocious critique 
of all facets of Israeli history and society hand-tailored to undermine the Jewish 
state’s legitimacy. ‘New historians’ have argued that Israel, helped by Western 
imperialism, overwhelmed the Palestinians and ethnically cleansed them.  ‘Critical 
sociologists’ have depicted Israeli society as controlled by an Ashkenazi, capitalist 
elite that has subjugated minorities, women, the working classes. ‘Critical political 
scientists’ have produced voluminous research casting Israel as a fascist-like, 
apartheid state. And revisionist scholars have argued that Israel has turned the 
Holocaust into a civil religion glorifying power; has used its lessons to oppress the 
Palestinians; and has fed a collective paranoia that has made Israelis impervious to 
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This work seeks to analyse the transformation of anti-Zionist tendencies 
espoused by fringe political groups in Mandate Palestine’s Jewish community (or the 
Yishuv) and Israel’s early years into a major academic force that has affected 
mainstream discourse in contemporary Israeli society and has significantly 
contributed to eroding Israel’s international legitimacy by casting it as a colonialist, 
apartheid entity.  
Excluding the ultra-orthodox opposition, three Jewish groups rejected the idea 
of creating a Jewish state: Brit Shalom, the Canaanites and the Communists. While 
each espoused a different ideology, all shared a common vision of creating a bi-
national state where Jews and Arabs would coexist in harmony. These different 
strands of anti-Zionism were consolidated and nourished by the fringe Matzpen group 
after the creation of the State of Israel, only to morph into the more prominent post-
Zionism of the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Extant studies of anti-Zionist ideology have primarily focused on the pre-1948 
era.  In spite of its miniscule size, Brit Shalom and its political offshoot, Ihud, has 
been the subject of a relatively large number of studies mostly focused on the 
ideology of bi-nationalism as developed by Hebrew University president Judah L. 
Magnes and his intellectual mentors Ahad Ha’am (aka Asher Ginsburg) and Martin 
Buber. While the studies differ in scope and interest, they all highlight the Brit-Ihud’s 
principled rejection of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine in favour of a vaguely defined 
cultural-political entity. Ahad Ha’am’s much invoked ‘cultural centre’ tasked the 
Palestinian Jews with creating a cultural and education entity to serve the Diaspora 
Jews. Buber’s ‘dialogual community’ was derived from the contention that a spiritual 
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community - ruled by a consensus achieved through discourse - was morally superior 
to a state based on power.   Apprehensive about the Zionist quest for sovereign power, 
Buber broke with David Ben-Gurion and other Zionist leaders denouncing them as 
power-hungry politicians ‘who serve Hitler’s God after he was given a Hebrew 
name’.1 Starting with the classic study by Susan Lee Hattis, the Bi-national Idea in 
Palestine during Mandatory Times, this body of work suggests that Brit Shalom 
turned the ‘dialogue community’ into the more serviceable formula of a bi-national 
state for Arabs and Jews.2 
A number of biographies of Magnes added a personal dimension to Brit 
Shalom’s bi-national quest.  A former congregation rabbi in the US, Magnes was an 
elitist, a pacifist, and non-conformist with a long history of radical views.  Daniel 
Kotzin, one of his biographers, noted that, in spite of the failure to find Arab partners 
and hostility from fellow Jews, Magnes showed extreme perseverance. Indeed, even 
the self-acknowledged ‘disconnection’ and ‘estrangement’ from the community did 
not dissuade him from the bi-national mission. His sense of destiny also included the 
Hebrew University (founded in 1925), which he viewed not only as a cultural and 
secular-spiritual centre but also as a buffer against the alleged political abuses of 
                                                          
1
 Yoram Hazony, The Jewish State: the Struggle for Israel's Soul (New York: Basic 
Books, 2001), p. 244 
2
 See, for example, Susan Lee Hattis, The Bi-national Idea in Palestine During 
Mandatory Times, (Haifa: Shikmona, 1970); David Goldberg, To the Promised Land: 
A History of Zionist Thought (London: Penguin, 1996); Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, A 
Land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 
1994); Steven J. Zippertstein, Elusive Prophet. Ahad Ha’am and the Origins of 
Zionism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 29; Joseph Heller, From 
Brit Shalom to Ihud (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2003; Hebrew); Shalom Ratsabi, 
Between Zionism and Judaism: The Radical Circle in Brith Shalom, 1925-1933 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002). 
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Zionism. As he put it in an address to students, ‘only the Hebrew University can fight 
the power of totalitarianism’.3 
Writings on the American Council on Judaism (ACJ), Magnes’ foremost 
supporter, offer interesting insights into the financial influence of anti-Zionist 
American Jews. As the Hebrew University’s philanthropists, the AJC exercised an 
outsized influence on the intellectual discourse in the Yishuv. In a move that would 
have a huge importance for the continuation of anti-Zionism, Magnes added Buber 
and many of his academic acolytes from Germany to the small liberal arts faculty, 
where they came to exert considerable influence well beyond 1948 - even as the state 
took over financial support of higher education.4 
The cultural antecedents of the equally tiny Canaanite movement were 
documented in a number of studies. In addition to James Diamond’s definitive history 
of the movement, a number of thematic writings have dealt with the linguistic and 
anthropological underpinning of the group. Yonatan Ratosh, the group’s chief 
ideologue and proselytizer, was credited with securing a high profile for the Canaanite 
ideas.   Moreover, unlike the foreign pacifist Magnes and the German professors, the 
‘Young Hebrews’ - the original name of the Canaanites, were native sons well versed 
in the vernacular of Zionism.  Still, like Brit Shalom, they found it hard to find a 
credible formula to replace the national sovereignty ethos of Zionism.  Switching 
from a Hebrew nation to a pan-Semitic one they arrived at a bi-national design but 
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 Daniel Kozin, Judah L. Magnes: An American Jewish Nonconformist (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2010), pp. 166, 273; Hazony, The Jewish State, pp. 244-
45.  
4
 Thomas A. Kolsky, Jews against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).  
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struggled to find a proper balance between the Jews and the Arabs for the proposed 
entity, not to mention the total lack of interest on the part of the Arabs.5 
Compared to the volume and sophistication of the research on Brit Shalom and 
the Canaanites, the corpus of writings on the Communist Party of Mandate Palestine 
is relatively small and limited to historical accounts. These writings, however, are 
unanimous in the conclusion that the party had a hard time with developing a bi-
national formula that would satisfy both its Jewish and Arab members. The reality of 
nationalism trumping Marxist universalism weakened the party and was compounded 
by the Soviet pressure to accept Jewish sovereignty in 1948.6 
The post-1948 history of anti-Zionism, as noted above, attracted only scanty 
scholarly attention, not least because this ideology virtually disappeared from the 
intellectual and political scene during the new state’s first decades. With the exception 
of Uri Avnery,7 a journalist and polemicist, and a tiny group of former communists 
who formed the Israeli Socialist Organization, commonly known as Matzpen, the 
anti-Zionists languished in seemingly obscurity. The literature on the group suggests a 
number of reasons for this state of affairs: the triumph of Jewish sovereignty, the 
implacable enmity of the Arab states and the Palestinians, and the fractious nature of 
the movement that, despite its minuscule size, produced numerous and difficult to 
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follow splits and regroupings. Despairing of the failure of Arabs and Jews to 
subordinate national differences to socialist ideals, by the early 1970s most of the 
founding activists had resettled abroad.8 
But if the socialist revolution eluded Matzpen, the Brit Shalom-Ihud ideology, 
along with traces of Canaanism, proved more durable. The Hebrew University fought 
a successful battle to implement a virtually unfettered form of academic freedom, 
utilizing its strong bonds with the parliamentary opposition to derail the proposal of 
the Labour government to create a measure of state supervision of higher education. 
Enshrined in the 1958 Higher Education Act, this virtually unlimited academic 
freedom was tailor-made to assure Magnes’s vision of a professoriate serving as a 
‘secular priesthood speaking truth to power’. As a result, the faculty could engage in 
political battles of the day under the guise of academic freedom - an arrangement that 
had no equivalents in Western public universities.9 
           In a forceful display of this freedom, a group of Hebrew University professors 
became deeply involved in the so-called Lavon Affair in the 1950s. The scandal 
originated in a failed attempt of the Israeli intelligence to foment anti-American unrest 
in Egypt. The-then minister of defence, Pinhas Lavon, was allegedly framed by the 
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IDF’s military intelligence directorate and was subsequently fired by David Ben-
Gurion from the chairmanship of the Histadrut, the Israeli Trade Union. The 
professors, including Buber, launched an all-out campaign against the prime minister 
accusing him of dictatorial tendencies and demanding his resignation. Ostensibly a 
dispute about good political governance, this exceptionally venomous attack on the 
prime minster reflected a longstanding conflict between Ben-Gurion and Buber. 
Though a committed secularist, Ben-Gurion was reluctant to view the foundation of 
the state in exclusively historical-materialistic terms. To him Zionism was ordained 
by the messianic vision of a Jewish state - a Biblical tradition deeply rooted in 
Judaism. To Buber this vision was not only a vulgar misrepresentation of religious 
tenets but a crass attempt to ‘make the political factor supreme’. Charges that Ben-
Gurion was a messianic leader on the order of Shabbati Zvi, the seventeenth century 
false messiah, were, of course, not new.  But while Buber was satisfied with decrying 
the spiritual folly of messianic Zionism, some of the university’s professors went 
much further.10 
The eminent historian Jacob Talmon, for example, used his acclaimed work on 
totalitarian democracy to warn about the utopian impulse of Ben-Gurion’s Zionism.   
In this view, utopianism ‘postulates a definite goal and a preordained finale to history, 
for the attainment of which you need to recast and remould all aspects of life and 
society in accordance with some explicit principle’. In his many public appearances 
Talmon took to lamenting that utopianism was cursed because it could be perverted 
into an ‘instrument of power and hypocrisy’. Some scholars linked Talmon’s dark 
prophecies on the future of Israeli democracy to the Brit Shalom tradition.  According 
to one account, Talmon was a ‘tormented historian’, a ‘kind of martyr in constant 
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anguish of the martyrdom of Jewish people and secret of Jewish survival’. Though a 
nominal Zionist, his suspicion of the Zionist leaders was much in line with that of 
Magnes. Talmon amplified this interposition in a subsequent discussion of the Lavon 
Affair, recalling that the professors were ‘amazed’ by the response from the public 
that wanted them to participate in political affairs and concluding that there was a real 
‘hunger for leadership’ and, moreover, in the ‘depth of their hearts, the masses had 
more respect for learning than for politics’.11 
In a well-received essay historian Bernard Wasserstein argued that Talmon’s 
vision of utopian ideas going rogue was very close to Hannah Arendt’s contention, in 
her seminal The Origins of Totalitarianism, that both Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union were launched by a messianic-utopian creed. Though Israel was not one of the 
case studies in Talmon’s research, his public attacks on Ben-Gurion alluded to the 
possibility that he didn’t consider Zionism immune to sliding into totalitarianism.12 
The 1962 trial of Adolf Eichmann gave Arendt another opportunity to link 
arms with Buber and his followers. Primarily remembered for her controversial 
depiction of Eichmann as epitomizing the ‘banality of evil’, Arendt’s book on the trial 
was also in line with Buber’s position that Zionism tried to ‘nationalize’ a universal 
catastrophe for political gain. In a series of dramatic appeals to Ben-Gurion, Buber 
argued that since Eichmann committed crimes against humanity he should be tried in 
an international court of law.13 
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Not surprisingly, Matzpen used the Buber-Arendt argument to legitimize its 
criticism of the alleged political misuse of the Holocaust. But the anti-Zionist climate 
prevailing among a segment of the Hebrew University - where some Matzpen 
members studied and did considerable recruitment - did little to move the group out of 
its marginality. According to Yoram Hazony, author of the foremost study of the post-
Zionist phenomenon in the state of Israel, it took a few decades before Matzpen’s 
anti-Zionism penetrated the public discourse under the softer cover of post-Zionism. 
In his view this transformation was all the more remarkable given that the post-
Zionists were a ‘minority, even within the Israeli academic and literary circles’. 
Hazony traces this change to the Buberite tradition, carried on by the ‘leading lights’ 
of the Hebrew University and their students who ‘continued to refine the very same 
historical and philosophical theories that had constituted the conceptual undercarriage 
of Jewish anti-Zionism’.14 
Hazony came close to positing a formal connection between historic anti-
Zionism and the new generation of academic post-Zionists but did not track the 
dissemination of anti-Zionist values in a systematic way. He argued that ‘academics 
hostile to the [Zionist narrative] are teaching at all of Israel’s leading universities’ 
where they were ‘conducting a systematic struggle... against the idea of the Jewish 
state, its historic narrative, institution and symbols’.15 
Certainly, a more comprehensive and methodologically rigorous research is 
needed to understand the transformation of a marginal academic anti-Zionism into the 
rather prominent phenomenon of post-Zionism. Value transmission is hardly a black 
box where inputs are automatically converted into outputs; while some scholars were 
                                                          
14





influenced by the Buberite tradition, others rejected it. Indeed, many distinguished 
scholars at the Hebrew University and beyond have fought the post-Zionists, a fact 
that Hazony acknowledged. 
There is also a glaring lack of a chronological-contextual analysis of the 
proliferation of academic post-Zionism. The 1982 Lebanon War is often mentioned as 
the catalyst for this phenomenon, but other events that served as game changers in the 
post-Zionist march towards respectability were omitted or used parenthetically out of 
their time frame.  Finally, there seems to be no systematic analysis of the academic 
fields most affected by the post-Zionists. While the ‘New Historiography’ is invoked 
on numerous occasions, little has been said about sociology, political science and the 
signature post-Zionist critique of the Holocaust - a subject that has attracted less 
attention overall. 
The present study will seek to fill this lacuna in the study of academic post-
Zionism by adopting a rigorous approach based on a central thesis.  It will argue that 
the anti-Zionist themes were preserved and nurtured by the Matzpen group and its 
supporters whose influence increased after several traumatic events: the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, the 1982 Lebanon War, and the Palestinian Intifada (1987-92). Yet it 
was only after these ideas had penetrated the liberal arts faculties that anti-Zionism - 
reconfigured as post-Zionism - obtained the crucial academic legitimacy required for 
a respectable presence in the a mainstream discourse.  
Because of its stealth and gradualism, I was oblivious to the spread of 
Matzpen notions.  After a professors exposed me to the scope of the movement in 
social science literature, I used my new awareness to cofound a group that monitored 
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the writings and activities of faculty members whose affinity to Matzpen ideology 
was quite remarkable though they self-identified as post-Zionists.  
Having collected and analysed a large number of these writings, I realized that 
post-Zionism was essentially an adaptation of anti-Zionism to a sovereign existence.  
Clearly, it was impossible to “undo” the Jewish state, but post-Zionism could “prove” 
the anti-Zionist of old right by rejecting and delegitimizing the foundational claims of 
the State of Israel. 
While a number of former Matzpen members obtained academic posts in 
Israeli universities, it was clear that their presence was only marginal to the spread of 
the post-Zionist phenomenon. Rather, it was the growing cadre of critical, neo-
Marxist scholars since the early 1980s that made post-Zionism a household name. 
Indeed, the speedy diffusion of the once marginal ideology is not possible to 
comprehend without an understanding of the neo-Marxist, critical scholarship 
paradigm that competed and/or replaced the traditional, positivist scholarship in the 
humanities and the social sciences in Israeli universities.  
To begin with, my original research revealed that academics who defined 
themselves as post-Zionists were also avid practitioners of the paradigm that 
originated in liberal arts in Western Europe and the United States.  As a matter of fact, 
many took great pride in rejecting the traditional positivist paradigm that, in their 
opinion, served the narrative of the “hegemonic Ashkenazi elite” in Israel at the 
expense of the “oppressed” member of the society – Jews from Arab speaking 
countries, Palestinians, women and the working class.    
The importance of this synergy created by the neo- Marxism, critical 
scholarship and post-Zionism cannot be overstated. Whereas the positivist paradigm 
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considered Zionism and its creation, the State of Israel, a legitimate and just solution 
to the ‘Jewish problem’, the rival paradigm deemed the Zionist enterprise an 
illegitimate exercise in colonialist imposition and described Israel as a state ‘born in 
sin’. 
Equally important, critical, neo-Marxist scholars have followed in the 
footsteps of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian communist imprisoned by Benito Mussolini 
in the mid-1920s. In his famous Prison Notebooks Gramsci urged intellectuals and 
academics to use their work to change societal values in order to create a more 
progressive society.16 While positivist faculty is limited by the paradigmatic 
requirement of objectivity and neutrality, Israeli scholars-activists have used their 
positions to imbue societal discourse with progressive values a la Gramsci. By 
creating a seamless transition between research and activism, they have turned the 
campus into an extension of their political work. In principle, rules and regulations 
have been put in place to prevent this occurrence, but the expansive definition of 
academic freedom in Israel has encouraged the proliferation of post-Zionist 
scholarship.  Not surprisingly, activist faculty have led virtually every domain of civil 
protest, especially in the field of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Concentrating on academic post-Zionism is not meant to negate other political 
and societal forces that helped to mainstream the anti-Zionist message. As is well 
known, intellectual discourse is impossible to be neatly divided into an academic 
component as opposed to the contribution of lay observers, be it writers, poets, public 
intellectuals and others. Still, given the academics’ prominence in this process, and by 
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way of making the research manageable, this dissertation will include only a few non-
academic sources that had a major impact on academics analysed in the study. 
The organization of this dissertation reflects the research strategy outlined 
above.  Chapter 1 provides a theoretical discussion of the two competing paradigms in 
social science - the positivist and the critical, neo-Marxist. The validity claims 
embedded in the paradigms shape the legitimacy construct in the membership- 
territory, authority system and distributive justice system domain and explain why 
Israel, once conceptualized as a Western liberal democracy, has been more recently 
portrayed as a colonial, apartheid-type state.  While the analysis of the two paradigms 
is necessarily general, every effort was made to emphasize the facets relevant to 
understanding the post-Zionist phenomena.  In particular, the post-Zionists, like their 
Matzpen predecessors, have focused on the validity claims that underlie membership- 
territory of various groups.  By adopting the neo-Marxist, critical scholarship reading 
of memberships- territory legitimacy, they could reject the right of Jews to both 
territory and nationhood.    
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the three anti-Zionist ideologies in the pre-
1948 period and their subsequent consolidation under the umbrella of Matzpen and its 
supporters.  Though post-Zionist ideas infiltrated virtually every liberal arts discipline, 
their impact is most visible in the four scholarly fields - history, sociology, political 
science, and Holocaust studies.   Accordingly, Chapters 3 analyses the impact of post-
Zionist thinking on revisionist Israeli historiography known as ‘New Historiography’. 
Chapter 4 examines how ‘critical sociology’ has conceptualized the Israeli 
society as an oppressive Ashkenazi male hegemony dominating minorities and 
women.   
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Chapter 5 describes how critical political scientist defined the authority system 
as a non-democratic regime at best and an apartheid state at worst.  
Chapter 6 looks at how neo-Marxist, critical approaches redefined the 
meaning of the Holocaust - from a unique evil perpetuated upon the Jews - to a 
universal proclivity to “superfluous violence” exercised by hegemonic elements 
against the weak.  
Finally, since post-Zionists scholars have embraced the Gramscian mandate of 
combining scholarship and political activism, it is only fitting that Chapter 7 provides 
a chronological-thematic analysis of their political work, including a leading role in 
the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction movement. 
To further the parsimony achieved by picking four fields, I decided to limit the 
number of scholars surveyed in each to a handful of undisputable intellectual leaders 
with broad influence in their discipline and beyond.   Methodologically, a systematic 
analysis of key texts of the scholars is in order rather than the alternative of 
interviewing them.  The concluding chapter summarizes the conclusion derived from 




Chapter 1 Israel in the neo-Marxist, Critical Scholarship  
 Analysing a paradigm requires the uncovering of its underlying meta-
assumptions. Because such assumptions are deeply entrenched, the community of 
scholars often takes them as self-evident. As a result, their underlying frame of 
reference is rarely revealed, obscuring the great philosophical debates about the nature 
of social reality that generated the meta-assumptions in the first place. 
 Arguably, the first step in clarification is to elucidate the three elements that 
define the study of social reality. The first element is ontological in nature, pertaining 
to the assumptions that concern the essence of the discussed phenomenon. 
Philosophers and scholars have vied with a basic ontological question of whether 
‘reality’ is objective and imposed on individual consciousness from the outside, or 
whether it is produced by individual cognition. In other words, the issue is whether 
reality exists independently in the world or is a product of the mind and cannot be 
separated from an individual prism. 
 The second element is epistemological, reflecting questions about the nature 
of knowledge. The contending assumptions here focus on the type of knowledge that 
social research can uncover; whether it is ‘hard’ and can be transmitted in a tangible 
form or ‘soft’, that is spiritual or transcendental.  In a related manner, there is debate 
about how valid is obtainable knowledge and how to sort ‘true’ form ‘false’ 
knowledge. Epistemological assumptions divide those who think that knowledge can 
be empirically obtained and those who believe it to be experienced. 
 The third element touches upon human nature as it interacts with the 
environment. Neither ontological nor epistemic, the question boils down to how 
human beings interact with the social environment surrounding them. The answer pits 
those who consider these interactions deterministic, driven mainly by the socio-
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economic background of individuals and those who argue for ‘free will’, that is a 
more flexible and undetermined encounter between people and their environment. 
 While these debates are essentially philosophical, they have had a profound 
impact on the methodologies employed in research. If scholars subscribe to the view 
that reality is external and hard, easily deducible and measured, they would search for 
regularities in order to form universal laws that explain and govern such reality.  For 
those who subscribe to the view that reality is soft and subjective the social world is 
relativistic, requiring no application of scientific rigor and universal laws for its 
understanding. 
 Since the debates highlight two mutually exclusive perceptions of social 
reality, they contributed to the evolution of two distinct paradigms in the social 
sciences and humanities. The first is positivist paradigm (also known as objectivist or 
traditional), which dominated the social sciences in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  The second is the neo-Marxist, critical paradigm which, unlike its relatively 
homogeneous positivist counterpart, was made up of a complex and somewhat 
confusing set of critical approaches. 
The Positivist Paradigm 
 The positivist paradigm requires that theories be based on empirical 
observations, but there have been disagreements about the nature of verification.   
David Hume was associated with the scientific induction approach that postulated that 
empirical observations can be generalized into statements that can be proclaimed true 
or probably true. Karl Popper rejected this ‘naïve empiricism’ in favour of the concept 
of falsifiability, stating that verification equals falsifiability.  In other words, theories 
that cannot be falsified should not be considered scientific, a determination that he 
had extended to Marxism. Kuhn elaborated on both in The Structure of Scientific 
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Revolution, arguing that in routine times a set of agreed concepts were used to analyse 
a situation. They form the entire constellation of beliefs, values, and methodologies 
shared by the members of a community of practitioners. As long as the paradigm went 
unchallenged, its normality was widely accepted. In the wake of a severe crisis - that 
is when anomalous results appeared, the dominant paradigm was subject to 
questioning and overthrown. With the new paradigm enthroned, its revolutionary 
character became accepted as normal and routine.17 
 The fortunes of the positivist paradigm in American social sciences were 
closely linked to the American Social Science Council whose policy goal was to boost 
behaviourism. The Council offered substantial grants to study numerous aspects of 
human behaviour in a wide range of disciplines, but it was most interested in 
analysing political change. As Popper noted, the ultimate dream of the humanities was 
to emulate the natural sciences: ‘If it is possible for astronomy to predict eclipses, 
why should it not be possible for sociology to predict revolutions?’18 This was hardly 
surprising as post-war administrations struggled with their new role of a superpower. 
To prevent Third World countries from sliding into the Soviet sphere of influence, 
Washington encouraged social science experts to study the process of political change 
with a view of staving off communist competition. 
 This scientific model of change attracted Talcott Parsons, David Easton, 
Gabriel Almond and other political scientists eager to formulate clearly defined laws 
of political development. In 1966, in his American Political Science Association 
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presidential address, Almond called such a prospect ‘exhilarating’.19 Indeed, the 
positivist paradigm seemed to be well suited to formulate universal laws of political 
change. Emulating Newtonian physics, social scientists claimed that human history 
had a discernible and predictable way of evolving; the resulting laws of changes were 
said to develop through a linear progression from a lower to a higher state.20 
 In looking for ways to explain how societies progress from a ‘lower to a 
higher state’, political scientists had relied on the discursive perspective developed by 
anthropologists and sociologists. Ralph Linton postulated that in order to survive, a 
group legitimizes assorted beliefs into a collective belief system that form the 
parameters of the social order of the group.21 Borrowing from Ferdinand Tönnies and 
Max Weber, among others, Mary Douglas likened this process to a normative debate, 
or discourse, through which a group worked out the three cardinal axes necessary for 
collective existence. The discourse generates normative validity claims that are 
‘reasoned elaborations’ on which the social order rests. The three axes that need to be 
legitimized by the group are: 1) the principles for granting membership, known as 
membership legitimacy; 2) the principles upon which the authority system rests, 
known as authority system legitimacy; 3) the principles that inform the distribution of 
resources known as distributive justice legitimacy.22 
 With regard to membership legitimacy, Weber postulated that societies evolve 
from a state Gemeinschaft where the ‘admission ticket’ is based on kinship, to the 
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advanced stage of Gesellschaft which rests on a complex formula such as ‘feelings of 
interdependence’ and ‘community of fate’. He pointed out that the Gesellschaft 
legitimacy developed alongside the nation-state where loyalty to the state trumped the 
more primordial kinship ties. Obviously, Gesellschaft legitimacy is easiest to attain 
when a homogenous ethnic group resides in a well-defined territory; in cases of 
polycentric nationalism, where disparate ethnic groups reside under one national roof, 
tensions can complicate the membership discourse. A dominant ethnic group can treat 
members of other groups as inferior or, conversely, try to homogenize them by 
suppressing ethnic expressions.  Religious divisions have added vast complication to 
the membership formula: since religion is still the basis of full inclusion, religious 
minorities are treated as ‘second class citizens’.23 
 Notwithstanding such complications, behaviourists furnished empirical 
evidence that the process of modernization moves societies along the Gemeinschaft-
Gesellschaft trajectory. Karl Deutch, a leading expert in political communication, 
devised a series of quantitative indices of modernization such as levels of literacy, 
communication and industrialization to demonstrate that in more advanced societies, 
primordial forms of attachment have been replaced by the more inclusive concept of 
national identity.  A number of behaviourally-oriented scholars of the Middle East 
suggested that the ‘secularization process… is fundamental’ and irreversible.  One 
leading scholar found evidence of ‘the growing irrelevance of Islamic standards and 
criteria’.24 
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 Weber’s concept of the legitimacy of the authority system alluded to a similar 
linear progression. He identified three pure validity claims:  
• Traditional: based on the sanctity of tradition and those who exercise authority 
in the name of tradition;  
• Charismatic: resting on a certain individual and the political order that was 
revealed to him;  
• Legal-rational: derived from the belief in the legality of the process that vests 
individuals with authority. 
Weber’s writings generated an enormous critical literature and numerous suggestions 
for updating his taxonomy.  One popular view holds that legal-rational legitimacy can 
only ensue when it is underpinned by the consent of the governed.  Although Weber 
did not discuss the mechanism for generating such consent, it has been increasingly 
accepted that the democratic process is the best way to obtain such legitimacy.25 In 
turn, the vast literature on democracy indicates that the system is extremely complex; 
it entails both structural-functional elements as well as the less tangible notions of 
political culture. 
 The realm of individual political attitudes that reflect political cultural traits is 
assumed to be a key to sustaining a successful democratic system; it was in this realm 
that Weber’s progression towards the higher end legal-rational legitimacy apparently 
played out. In their landmark study, The Civic Culture, Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Verba measured political attitudes in five countries, finding ample evidence to suggest 
that societies move through three states: subject, participatory and civic.  The authors 
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suggested that civic culture, most prevalent in the West, corresponded to Weber’s 
legal-rational legitimacy.26 
 Underpinning the membership and authority system axes is the critical issue of 
distributive justice - part of the larger question of social justices defined as a series of 
‘reasons or criteria for assigning particular things to particular individuals’.27 This 
politically sensitive issue has been adjudicated in numerous ways, but three pure 
formulas can be identified: 1) Ascriptive: traditional claims form the base on which a 
hereditary social class justified its hold on a disproportionally high share of resources.  
2) Utilitarian: productive claim whereby economically meritorious individuals can 
expect to gain a share proportional to their market merits. 3) Egalitarian: principles 
that mandated an equal distribution of resources. 
 The prescriptive claims that inform traditional societies’ economies result in a 
large inequality of wealth and status while keeping economic growth at a minimum.  
As conceptualized by Adam Smith, the transition to market economy was made 
possible when individuals with market skills replaced the ascriptive heredity class as 
the agents of wealth production.  However, capitalism created its own disparity of 
wealth in addition to debilitating boom and bust cycles, leading Karl Marx to issue his 
highly influential critique of capitalism.  In his magnum opus, The Capital and The 
Communist Manifesto, co-authored with Friedrich Engels, Marx argued that social 
justice demanded an equal distribution of resources.  To force distributive equality, he 
called the state to seize command of the means of production. Starting with the 
Bolshevik revolution, an increasing number of countries have boasted some variant of 
a command economy. 
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 In the post-WWII world, the Third World could either choose the Western 
market model or embrace the ostensibly egalitarian system entrenched in the Soviet 
bloc. In spite of considerable efforts by Washington to block the spread of 
communism, market economy was not a popular choice in many underdeveloped 
countries.  Still, American positivists believed that the laws of distributive justice 
were bound to follow the economic trajectory of the West. Walt Rostow, a prominent 
liberal economist and a harsh critique of Marx, articulated this theory in his influential 
The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.  He postulated that 
traditional societies were bound to reach a takeoff position that would eventually 
catapult them into a Western- style high consumption stage.28 
 Rostow’s theory became part of the developmental model, the single most 
popular application of the positivist paradigm in the social sciences. Parsons provided 
the scaffolding for the model by applying the functional-structural view to the orderly 
evolution of the social system. He postulated that the four functional parts of the 
system - pattern maintenance, integration, goal attainment and adaptation - could 
preserve its homeostasis, making for a relatively smooth transition from one stage to 
another.  Built into the functional-structural model was the assumption that Western 
polity - built on Gesellschaft membership, legal-rational legitimacy and market 
economy - was universally appealing and worth emulating. In the words of one 
observer, the modern Western society was ‘the pinnacle of human achievement’.29 
 As noted earlier, Washington policy makers overseeing the expanded domain 
of international relations were eager for theoretical guidance. The developmental 
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model was very popular as it promised a road map of orderly change that would avoid 
the pitfalls of communism in the volatile Third World. However, by the end of the 
1960s it had become quite clear that the expectations of political change offered by 
the positivist paradigm did not come through: tribal and ethnic-based rivalries were 
tearing societies apart and brutal dictatorships sprouted where democracy was 
expected to flourish; the economies of many underdeveloped countries were in 
shambles, leading to social upheaval supported by Moscow.  One disillusioned State 
Department official grumbled that the nation-building vision was nothing less than 
‘hubris’ of those who believed ‘that American professors could make bricks without 
the straw of experience’.  Another observer wondered how ‘so long as we assumed, a 
la Hegel, Marx, or W. W. Rostow, that the non-Western world would inevitably 
follow the same developmental path as the West’.30  Combined with other factors, the 
discredited developmental model played a crucial role in opening the entire positivist 
paradigm to challenges from the neo-Marxist, critical scholarship.    
The Neo-Marxist, Critical Scholarship Paradigm 
 By far, the most important variant of this paradigm was associated with the 
Frankfurt School of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Walter 
Benjamin, joined later by Jurgen Habermas. Upon relocating to the United States, 
Frankfurt School scholars revived interest in Georg Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci who 
strove to provide a more subjective rendition of Marxist view of the process of 
political change. Lukacs sought to bring out the more humanist and softer side of 
Marx, stressing the role of cultural factors such as consciousness, ideas, art and 
literature in promoting change. Likewise, Gramsci, an Italian communist, criticized 
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rigid Marxist structural determinism; he contended that a softer, subjective approach 
to human consciousness can produce changes in material conditions without the high 
cost of a revolution as per the Soviet example. Gramsci believed that capitalist 
regimes control peoples’ consciousness through ‘hegemonic ideology’ whereby the 
ruling classes seek to perpetuate their hegemony by creating ‘a belief system which 
stresses the need for order, authority and discipline’.31 
 Using the New School of Social Research in New York as a base, Frankfurt 
School scholars determined to promote their ideas in the United States.  Starting in the 
1950s they produced a series of provocative studies that became de rigueur in critical 
circles.  In his The Dialectics of Enlightenment, Adorno casts doubt on the notion of 
reason and science, not least because ‘the impartiality of scientific language’ deprived 
the powerless from the ability to make themselves heard and masked the power of the 
existing order with ‘a neutrality sign’.32 For his part Marcuse unveiled the much 
discussed condemnation of the capitalist-driven, technological and materialist 
Western society in his One Dimensional Man.33 
 This early critique of capitalism and modernism was bolstered by a trend of 
literary criticism known under its umbrella term of post-modernism. In the early 
1960s literary critics introduced tools like phenomenology and hermeneutics to 
deconstruct the ‘true’ meaning of texts, but the real political colouration came from a 
trio of French neo-Marxists - Michele Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan.  
They argued that texts concealed power relations in society and needed to be 
deconstructed and critiqued, notably because power elites who authored official 
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narratives suppressed the voices of minorities and other powerless segments of 
society. In this view, deconstructing their hidden voices was an important step 
towards empowerment and, over the long term, a change in the legitimacy norms of 
society. 
 Jurgen Habermas, a student of Adorno and a rising neo-Marxist star in 
Germany, helped to bridge the gap between the Frankfurt School and the French 
critical scholars.  Abandoning the classic attention to the material base of capitalism, 
he focused entirely on communication in post-capitalist society, which he termed 
communication society (Kommunikatzionsgemeinschaft).  The key to success in such 
society is linguistic competence, which, in his opinion, correlates with power and 
class. To Habermas this unequal distribution of power created the ‘communicative 
distortion’ thus preventing the achievement of an ‘ideal speech situation’, a condition 
where parties to communication arrive at a genuine consensus not affected by material 
‘give outs’. Much as Marcuse, Habermas achieved iconic status with his book 
Legitimation Crisis where he predicted that capitalism would face a crisis of 
legitimacy because its ability to produce ‘material bribery’ would wane.34 
 The third group that contributed to the new paradigm was comprised of 
Marxist economists - Raul Prebish, Fernando Henrique Cardozo, Enzo Falleto, Samir 
Amin, Andre Gunder Frank and Emanuel Wallerstein - who were highly critical of the 
developmental model, especially as it applied to Latin America.  They launched the 
dependency movement (dependencia) that blamed Western capitalism and 
imperialism for leaving much of the underdeveloped world in a state of economic 
dependency.  The dependencistas worked hard to reverse the developmental equation: 
not only did they refuse to consider Western-style democracies and their market 
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economies a model worth emulating but they blamed capitalist countries for keeping 
the Third World periphery in a state economic dependency and backwardness.   
Wallerstein, in particular, achieved prominence with his one-world system analysis - 
described as ‘knowledge movement’ to alter the nineteenth century positivist methods 
of conceptualizing economic development that legitimized capitalism as the highest 
stage of human achievement resulting in large inequalities. One-world system theory 
was adopted by Peter Taylor to create the highly influential field of political 
geography.35 
 While the different strands of the paradigm made for a certain lack of 
coherence, they all shared common core assumptions. Ontologically, the new 
paradigm opted for nominalism, i.e. the notion that there is no concrete social reality 
but rather a stream of concepts, names and labels. For the nominalists, the external 
world does not exist beyond such cognitive conventions that serve as organizing and 
descriptive tools. Epistemologically, the paradigm was based on anti-positivism in the 
sense that it denied the possibility of finding and formulating laws of human 
behaviour. To the contrary, neo-Marxist, critical scholars posited that the social world 
was relativist, as it could only be understood from the point of view of individual 
perceptions.  As a result, social science was deemed to be subjective to the point that 
no objective knowledge of any validity could be expected. In a corollary of this view, 
the paradigm founders considered human nature to be voluntaristic and free-willed 
rather than deterministic in its interaction with the environment. 
 Methodologically, these core assumptions led to the rejection of empirical 
observations and rigorous statistical analysis.  Frankfurt School scholars led the attack 
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on positivist philosophy in the United States, describing American social sciences in 
general and behaviourism in particular as ‘naïve, pedestrian, hypnotized by fact and 
intellectually lazy’. Moreover, ‘they mocked the idea that data is “out there” ready for 
“immediate interpretation” and ridiculed the “myth” of scientific objectivity’. Other 
neo-Marxists called social scientists ‘butterfly collectors’ who set up categories, laws 
and generalization and chastised them for rigid adherence to methodology.36 
 Imre Lacatos, a Hungarian communist who studied under Georg Lukacs and a 
contemporary of Popper at the London School of Economics, added to the anti-
positivist momentum. He attacked Popper for his notion that empirically-based 
falsification was possible and was also involved in a bitter debate with Kuhn.  Lacatos 
had ideological reasons for trying to discredit Popper, a former communist-turned-
liberal whose book Open Society and its Enemies made him a hero in liberal circles.  
Lacatos was particularly unhappy with Popper’s determination that Marxism could 
not qualify as scientific theory but his own theory that allegedly made it possible to 
make a distinction between science and pseudo-science took aim at market economy.  
Lacatos and his students used the theory to determine that the work of Milton 
Friedman was pseudo-science because, in their view, it could not predict a testable 
novel phenomenon. Several years later, Friedman received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics for original theory, but in spite of the fiasco, Lacatos has remained very 
popular in neo-Marxist, critical circles. Paul Feyerabend, whose collabouration with 
Lacatos accelerated his already considerable disenchantment with empirical science, 
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legitimized the ‘rebellion against method’ often described as ‘scientific anarchism’ or 
‘anything goes’.37 
          With objectivism and empiricism discredited, the practitioners of the new 
paradigm developed an alternative research and validation regimen. Some of the 
methodology was ideographic, embracing soft techniques that emphasized life history 
and subjective accounts as a primary source of knowledge. Researchers were 
encouraged to get ‘inside the situation’ of using impressionist accounts in the form of 
oral history, diaries and other subjective records.  In the words of one observer, ‘the 
ideographic method stresses the importance of letting one’s subject unfold its nature 
and characteristics during the process of investigation’.  Stretching the ideographic 
method even further, academics who hailed those from a particular social background, 
ethnic group, or geographic region, were said to have a ‘privileged knowledge’ of the 
topic under consideration. Gendering was also highly important as women were 
considered most capable of researching ‘women issues’.38 
 Not unrelated to ideography was the notion that human experience could only 
be understood in terms of identity categories such as white males, African-American 
females, and gay persons of colour and so on. The group’s characteristics were 
assumed to give individuals a distinctive identity, making probing individual opinions 
redundant. A companion idea known as essentialism minimizes the differences within 
the identity group while maximizing them among the categories. Because the neo-
Marxist, critical paradigm aimed at reversing historical power relations, ‘white men’ 
were castigated for being dominant whereas former victims of domination including 
women were considered in a sympathetic way. While this classification created two 
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main categories - oppressors and victims - the complex consideration of power 
triggered a fierce inter-paradigmatic struggle for victim status, and perhaps more to 
the point, for the ‘compensatory preferential treatment’ that victim groups expected.39 
 Additional assumptions that made it easy to forgo rigorous empirical 
verification were built into the paradigm.  One was ‘presentism,’ which is a ‘belief in 
the primacy of the present and refusal to be guided by a vision either of the past or the 
future. Of course, this was a repudiation of positivist historical research on the ground 
that the past was not knowable and thus all of its versions should be considered 
equally valid.  Still, because of the activist agenda of the paradigm practitioners, the 
version likely to be accepted was naturally determined by political conditions of the 
moment. 
 Presentism went hand in hand with the ‘postness’, that is, postmodernism, 
post-structuralism and post-colonialism along with feminism, which were different 
forms of a critique of scientific positivism. Finally, there was the assumption that 
reality could be understood through its representation, making texts the primary target 
of research. However, since texts were considered with great suspicion because of 
their assumed role in perpetuating elite dominance, they needed to be deconstructed in 
ways that uncovered the true reality.  Such ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ gave critical 
scholars extraordinary leeway in deciding what reality was, without the need to check 
facts. With so much emphasis on text, neo-Marxist, critical scholarship developed a 
style of research where citing of received authorities in the field, most notably 
Foucault,  were most important, while empirical inquiry and verification were given a 
low priority.40 
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       The attack on positivism went hand in hand with disdain for the norms of 
academic neutrality and objectivity that was built into the traditional paradigm.  
Keenly aware of the normative base of all social theory, Weber warned scholars to 
stay above the political fray and adhere to a scrupulous professional objectivity. But 
neo-Marxist academics declared their fealty to radical humanism, defined as an effort 
to develop a radical social theory of change from a subjective perspective, as 
intermediate step towards societal change. Indeed, they promised to liberate humans 
from the ‘predicament of constrains which existing social arrangements place upon 
human development’ and transcend ‘spiritual bonds and fetters which tie them to 
existing social patterns and release their full potential’.41 To achieve that, they 
pledged to fight what Marx called ‘false consciousness’ - the mistaken perception of 
reality that the proletariat allegedly harboured because of the ideological 
manipulation of elites. Significantly, the new paradigm allowed its adherents to write 
off individual beliefs as ‘false consciousness’ because they did not consider the 
collective belief system to be made up of individual preference, a major requirement 
of behaviourally-oriented positivism. To the contrary, considering groups to be social 
constructs, critical scholars could claim to be spokespersons for assorted identity 
group. As a self-appointed revolutionary vanguard, the new academic cadres felt 
entitled to lead society by dint of their moral mandate. In the words of one 
practitioner, the ‘moralist needs no evidence other than his senses to judge something 
right or wrong, and no elaborate scientific calculus to ascertain what the proper 
course of action should be’.42 Indeed, the call for action came from Gramsci who 
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urged academics to use their work to expedite political change and undermine the 
legitimacy of the existing status quo.43  
The Rise of Radical Professoriate 
 The political turmoil in the 1960s gave faculty imbued with a Gramscian-like 
mission of changing society a competitive edge. The behavioural tradition of value-
free inquiry was put on the defensive and social advocacy took over. In a 
programmatic article in the American Political Science Review, Christian Bay urged 
his colleagues to take up social concerns.  David Easton called to make the discipline 
more relevant to ‘real’ political needs and pleaded for a post-behavioural revolution; 
for Easton, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of behaviourism, this was an extraordinary 
about-face.44 
 The rapid expansion of the university system in the 1970s offered a large 
cadre of New Left and Vietnam-era activists an unprecedented job market; with a 
steady source of employment and the legitimacy that came from joining the 
professoriate, the new faculty could combine teaching and research with Gramsci’s 
mandate of changing society. The neo-Marxist sociologist and a Gramsci disciple, 
Alvin Gouldner, developed a new blueprint to expedite societal transformation. In a 
1970 work, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, he suggested that sociologists 
turn away from seeking empirical truth and engage in generating progressive values, 
expecting academics - in conjunction with other intellectuals - dubbed the New 
Class, to use their professional advantage to challenge societal norms and values and 
                                                          
43
 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notes, p. 433. 
44
 Christian Bay, ‘Politics and Pseudopolitics. A Critical Evaluation of Some 
Behavioral Literature’, American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), pp. 39-51; 
David Easton, ‘The New Revolution in Political Science’, American Political Science 
Review, 63 (1969), pp. 1051-61. 
34 
 
replace them with new ones.45 Arnold Kaufman, a UCLA professor and an architect 
of the Vietnam era teach-ins, was a close second, urging his colleagues to embrace 
radical liberalism and challenge the old legitimacy norms, which, in his view 
represented the money elites.  Kaufman’s teach-ins became an important vehicle for 
delegitimizing the Vietnam War, first on the campuses and then among the general 
public.46 
 Empirical evidence supported the expectations of Gouldner and Kaufman. 
Starting in the 1970s, a series of surveys of liberal arts faculty revealed a very high 
percentage of Democratic-voting professors whose political opinion tended to 
gravitate to left and radical left.  A 1984 study of the Carnegie Foundation revealed 
that only five percent of social science faculty described themselves as conservatives.   
Radicalism was especially strong in departments of philosophy, sociology and 
anthropology but also affected political science and history. Seymour Martin Lipset, 
the author of many of the surveys of college faculty, began an article by stating that 
‘almost all the Western writers who have identified the emergence of the New Class 
- a socially liberal or radical, highly critical intelligentsia - locate its principal base in 
the academy’.47 
 Taken together, these methodological and applied imperatives produced a 
serious challenge to the legitimacy parameters derived from the positivist paradigm. 
To neo-Marxist academics the idea that at some historical end-point the Western 
model of nation-state, liberal democracy and a market economy would be universally 
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accepted was anathema. Weber’s membership legitimacy claims spanning the 
Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft trajectory was distasteful to the academic disciples, who 
like Marx considered them a form of ‘false consciousness’ inflicted on the masses by 
their bourgeois masters. The updated version held that nations were actually invented 
by a cadre of intellectuals and nation-building entrepreneurs who fabricated history 
and manipulated cultural symbols to create the myth of a national origin and 
‘interdependence of faith’. Eric Hobsbawm, a Marxist professor at Birkbeck College, 
University of London, had first articulated the idea of nationalism as an ‘invented 
traditional’ in the late 1940s but it took him a few more decades to co-edit a highly 
influential book by the same name.48 Hobsbawm, a Jewish refugee from Nazi 
Germany, was naturally perturbed by Hitler’s use of hyper-nationalism, but as a life-
long anti-Zionist, he also sought to inculcate himself from the ‘temptations of Jewish 
nationalism’. Hobsbawm’s view was made even more popular because critical 
scholars found it perfectly suited to their needs to deconstruct the official narrative 
on the issue. Benedict Anderson span off the theme of invented tradition into a 
hugely successful book, Imagined Communities, which, together with Ernest 
Gellner’s work on Nations and Nationalism challenged Weber’s national legitimacy 
formula. The paradigm was able to present nationalism and nation-building as a 
contrived or even falsified belief system with dubious legitimacy claims.49 
 In yet another update to Marx’s thesis of nationalism-as-false-consciousness, 
neo-Marxist scholars claimed that a critical mass of lower class and dispossessed 
people would be able to liberate themselves from nationalism and patriotism, 
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described as constructs of ‘particularism’, and move on to a universal, one-world 
community.50 
 Weber’s authority system legitimacy in general and the liberal democratic 
model in particular, fared even less well in the opinions of neo-Marxist scholars. As 
noted earlier, the new paradigm rejected the idea that a collective belief was an 
equivalent to the sum-total of individual beliefs. Gouldner, who had previously 
disputed Weber’s plea for value-free inquiry, implied that a ‘totalized’ belief system 
could be best represented by an intellectual vanguard. Thus empowered, critical 
scholars rejected the legitimacy of the Western model of liberal democracy and its 
participatory progression as documented by Almond and Verba.  Without the need to 
produce empirical proof they could argue, as Michael Parenti did, that such a model 
was a sham that covered up the real inequalities in power and economic status.51 
 Such a rephrasing of what constituted a legitimate authority system was 
clearly related to the issues of distributive justice.  To recall, the positivist paradigm 
accepted the legitimacy of utilitarian-meritorious claims that underpin market 
economy, but neo-Marxist considered capitalism to be of questionable legitimacy 
because it failed to address issues of equality.  As a matter of fact, by the 1960s, neo-
Marxist scholars had developed an advanced version of principles of distributive 
justices based on the highly influential work of John Rawls. Rawls argued that 
economic growth should be regulated in such a way as to advance the wellbeing of 
the poorest members of a given society thus imposing a normative limit on what 
could be a morally acceptable limit of inequality in an economic system.  Humanistic 
economy pioneered by Johan Galtung and John Burton added moral requirements 
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that went well beyond egalitarianism; in this view, any economic system should be 
responsive to human needs, including human dignity and human rights.52 In a 
measure of its success the Galtung-Burton formula inspired the UN International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1976. 
 With neo-Marxist critical scholarship making strides in social sciences 
departments, it was only a question of time before Middle East studies - a bastion of 
traditionalist historians known as Orientalists, incorporated much of the same 
thinking.    
Middle East Studies and the Neo-Marxist Paradigm 
Talal Asad, a Hull University anthropologist, used the genealogical method 
pioneered by Michele Foucault to conclude in the early 1970s that the anthropological 
study of the Middle East was influenced by the colonially-driven construct of Western 
scholars and colonial functionaries.  He was particularly interested in the way 
Europeans had defined their colonial subjects as ‘non-Westerns’, notably with regard 
to customs and behaviour labelled as ‘cruel’. Asad concluded that ‘it was not the 
concern with the indigenous suffering that dominated their thinking, but the desire to 
impose what they considered civilized standards of justice and humanity on a subject 
population - that is the desire to create new human subjects’.53 
Asad and his colleagues, Roger Owen from Oxford University (currently at 
Harvard University) and Sami Zubaida from the University of London, began holding 
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seminars on critical approaches to Middle East studies. Like Asad, Zubaida upheld 
that Western culture was pervaded by racism towards non-Western people because of 
the colonial history of encounters with the ‘natives’. The Hull group, which sought ‘to 
expose some of its basic preconceptions, particularly as they related to the use made 
of its authority to support certain colonialist, imperialist, and Zionist enterprises’, 
began publishing papers on the subject and in 1975 launched the Review of Middle 
East Studies, a journal dedicated to offering ‘a critical appreciation of the Middle East 
and its history’. Asad’s critical approach attracted limited attention and an occasional 
rebuke; the prominent anthropologist Clifford Geertz dismissed him as a ‘Marxist’ 
who switched from ‘material-reductionism’ to ‘power-reductionism’ - his name for 
critical scholarship.54 
Yet it was only in 1978, when Edward Said, a professor of English and 
Comparative Literature at Columbia University published his celebrated Orientalism, 
that Asad’s critique, renamed the postcolonial perspective received a broad exposure. 
In the introduction to the book Said thanked Michele Foucault and Samir Amin, an 
Egyptian radical, for inspiring him to adopt the critical approach but relegated Asad to 
a footnote. Said’s forceful claim that European colonialism distorted Western 
perception of the Middle East made the book an academic bestseller, propelled by 
Foucault’s popularity in the United States.55 While traditional historians like Bernard 
Lewis criticized Said’s post-colonialism as misguided scholarship at best and a 
political exercise at worse, the fortunes of positivist scholars declined with the 
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collapse of the developmental model. To make matters worse, the Iranian revolution 
discredited many of the experts who vouched for the stability of the shah’s regime. 
For Said and his followers this was a prime example of how, bereft of ‘privileged 
knowledge’ of the region and misled by developmentalism, traditionalist scholars 
missed the precipitous decline of the shah’s legitimacy. Worse, they attributed the 
regime’s fall to U.S. pressure for a Western-style political system and market 
economy. 
With the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) increasingly dominated by 
scholars from the region itself, Said’s post-colonialist perspective was disseminated in 
record time. This trend was very much in line with his reasoning that ‘privileged 
understanding’ comes from ‘indigenous experience’; he welcomed this ‘nativist’ 
generation, urging them to provide an antidote to ‘cultural Western domination’ and 
predicting that the new MESA would provide a more accurate view of the region.  
The large network of MESA-sponsored conferences, journals and centres - many 
supported by Arab money - spread the paradigm, leading one observer to boast that 
the new epistemic community made serious inroads into the study of the Middle East.   
Said himself regarded the change as a triumph of his vision, writing that ‘the formerly 
conservative Middle East Studies association underwent an important ideological 
transformation’. But as one critic stated, ‘indigenization has changed MESA from an 
American organization interested in the Middle East to a Middle Eastern one that 
happens to meet in the United States’. Another critic accused MESA professors of 
being short on research and long on polemics and argued that Arab money behind 
many of the Middle East centres had prejudiced their findings.56 
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Implementing Gramsci’s imperative, MESA became highly politicized and 
activist with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leading the agenda. A 1990 survey of 
Middle East studies found that some 70 per cent of the courses touched on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the number of books and articles on the issue skyrocketed in 
the 1990s.57 Said, of course, framed the Palestinian question in the broader context of 
the post-colonialist theory; but he was also a member of the Palestinian National 
Council, the PLO’s ‘parliament’. Other prominent MESA members - Rashid Khalidi 
and Hisham Sharabi - were also actively associated with the PLO.  
Reversal of Fortunes: Israel in the Post-colonialist Perspective  
Under the positivist paradigm Israel enjoyed good scholarly reviews, not least 
because it was considered a successful example of the developmental model.  Israel’s 
political system - considered on par with Western democracies - was often favourably 
compared to the authoritarian regimes of its Arab neighbours.  Although the economy 
was heavily socialist, Israel was never grouped with socialist Third World countries. 
Positivism also benefited Israel’s international legitimacy in the sense that the 
paradigm was closely linked to realism and neo-realism, schools of thought that 
considered the sovereign state the major international actor and deemed power and 
self-interest the guiding force in the international system with international 
institutions, non-government organizations, non-sovereign groups and other sub-state 
actors given lesser weight. Seen through this perspective, Israel was the winner of the 
1948 war and the Palestinians, who defied the UN Partition Resolution 1947, were a 
losing belligerent. In the upheaval that followed WWII, the Palestinian refugees were 
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only one of the many populations that were moved around, eliciting no immediate 
demand for action on their behalf from the international community. 
Unsurprisingly, neo-Marxist, critical scholars had a very different assessment 
of Israel’s legitimacy, especially with regard to its international standing. United 
against realism and neo-realism, they rejected power relations; standing somewhere 
between realism and idealism, the paradigm’s interpretation of international reality 
became known as neo-Gramscianism with scholars like Robert Cox and Stephen Gill 
rejecting realism for postulating the existence of an ‘anarchic’ world that propelled 
powerful states into a hegemonic position and embraced a ‘problem-solving’ 
approach.  Most important, this approach denied the ontological centrality of states, 
opting instead for a formula derived from historical materialism that ‘identifies state 
formation and interstate politics as moments of the transnational dynamics of capital 
accumulation and class formation’. As opposed to positivism, it rejected the 
‘separation between subject and object… and the adoption of a dialectic 
understanding of reality as a dynamic totality and as a unity of opposites’.  As a result, 
the neo-Gramscian view posited that hegemony was not a projection of the power of 
state (or group of states) but rather a class relationship; a class that managed to 
legitimize its interests through international institutions was considered hegemonic. 
As the globalization process legitimized a neoliberal historic class bloc, the only way 
to ensure working class interests was to create a counter-hegemonic working class 
bloc and international institutions that would ensure its interests.58 
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The post-colonialist perspective in Orientalism was quintessentially neo-
Gramscian with Zionism viewed as an integral part of the ‘colonialist-imperialist’ 
expansionism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, a few years before the 
book’s publication Galtung derided the Balfour Declaration and the UN partition 
resolution as belonging ‘to the more tragic mistakes of recent history’, blaming the 
continuation of the conflict on Israel which, in his words, ‘was conceived in sin, was 
born in sin, and grew up in sin’. George Haddad was equally scathing. ‘The Jewish 
problem could have been solved by other means’, he wrote. ‘The claim to Palestine 
was eventually decided not by notions of legitimacy and obvious rights, but by power 
politics in which colonial interests and the capitulation of the big powers to Zionist 
manipulation and Jewish pressure played a decisive role’. Small wonder that he 
blamed the British, the Zionists, and the international community as culpable for the 
tragedy of Palestine, whose ‘Arab inhabitants... were not in any way responsible for 
starting the conflict’.59 
If one corollary of neo-Gramscianism was the branding of Israel as a 
colonialist aggressor, another was to portray Palestinians as the ultimate victim of 
colonialism. The attention given to non-state actors, combined with emphasis on Non-
Government Organization (NGOs) and rapid expansion of Humanitarian International 
Law (HIL) made it easy for the paradigm practitioners to describe Israel as an 
imperialist creation that has kept the Palestinians in a state of colonial servitude. 
As long as the charges against Israel were levelled mostly by Palestinian 
scholars, they were largely ignored by the Israeli liberal arts community. Things 
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changed when Israeli academics were increasingly swayed by the new thinking, 




Chapter 2 Squaring the Circle: A Non-Jewish State for the 
Jews?  
 The rise of the modern Zionist movement in the late 19th century and the wave 
of immigration it spawned were firmly rooted in the national awakenings in Europe. 
Watching from the sidelines, Jews wondered whether they could re-establish 
sovereignty in the Land of Israel, then part of the Ottoman Empire, where a Jewish 
community had maintained an uninterrupted existence since biblical times. 
It was Theodor Herzl, a journalist and playwright from Vienna, who put 
political Zionism on a broader footing.  In his 1896 small tract, The Jewish State (Der 
Judenstaat), which attracted considerable attention in the Jewish world, Herzl argued 
that Jews were one people deserving a state of their own in their ancestral homeland 
that would redress their anomalous exilic position and gain them legitimacy in the 
world; indeed, a reborn Jewish state would benefit not only the Jews but also 
humankind. Not content to leave the matter to the realm of literary endeavour, in 1897 
Herzl convened the first Zionist Congress, which led to the foundation of the World 
Zionist Organization (WZO) and later, the Jewish Agency. 
Despite his passionate national advocacy Herzl’s notions about the identity of 
the proposed state were, ironically, devoid of a Jewish cultural or religious context.  
Indeed, in a novel Altneuland (New Old Land), published in 1902, he described the 
state as multilingual, pluralistic, technologically advanced and European in nature. 
The ancient Temple would be rebuilt in Jerusalem according to modern principles, 
along a Palace of Peace that would serve as an international tribunal.  Altneuland was 
designed to be a home of both Jews and Arabs who would interact on equal footing. 
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Rashid Bey, representing the Arabs, expresses joy at Palestine’s economic progress 
and sees no reason for conflict between the two groups.60 
While Altneuland might have looked like a good way to solve the problems of 
Jewish-Arab coexistence, it was essentially utopia. The socialist Zionists arriving in 
Palestine at the turn of the 20th century shared few of the Western-cosmopolitan 
characteristics of Herzl’s ideal Jew, were eager to embrace Hebrew, and gravitated 
towards agrarian socialism. These early pioneers assumed that this new identify was 
in harmony with the Biblical-Hebraic origins of the ancient Hebrews and would pave 
a path to coexistence with the Arab population in the prospective Jewish homeland, or 
state.  
Brit Shalom and the Bi-National Idea  
Much to the dismay of mainstream Zionism, German Jews proved reluctant 
Zionists. This highly assimilated community eagerly embraced the ‘Jewish 
Reformation’, a movement to modernize traditional orthodoxy and place the Jewish 
faith within the bounds of German cultural enlightenment. Only a small circle of 
German Jews felt the need to acknowledge the national distinction of the Jews and 
even a smaller number followed Herzl to the World Zionist Organization. One of 
them was Martin Buber, a scholar and philosopher who became the first editor of the 
Zionist publication Die Welt. According to a noted scholar of the subject, it was Buber 
who imbued German Zionism with a unique blend of ‘Western ideas with radical 
Palestino-centrism’.61 In other words, Buber wanted to create a Semitic - Jewish-Arab 
nation - that would serve as an exemplary humanistic society where both peoples 
                                                          
60
 Theodor Herzl, Altneuland (Haifa: Haifa Publishers, 1960; Hebrew), pp. 69-74. 
61
 Hagit Lavsky, Before the Catastrophe: The Distinctive Path of German Zionism 
(Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1996), pp. 148, 259, 263. 
46 
 
would have the freedom to coexist in peace and harmony. Clearly, Zionism that he 
once denounced as ‘power hysteria’ did not fit the bill of ‘Zion of the soul’.  
A number of Buber biographers and his own writings illustrate the diverse and 
often contradictory intellectual traditions that brought him to view Jewish settlement 
in Palestine in such a way. Buber was brought up in a traditional religious Jewish 
family but early on in life suffered a crisis of faith that apparently brought him to the 
study of Kant, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche during his stay in Vienna in 1896. Under 
their influence, Buber developed the notion of religion as an existential encounter 
with God, a theme central to his famous 1923 essay I and Thou.  By definition, this 
existential-universalistic reading of religion freed Buber from the nationalist 
definition that inspired his Zionist peers.62 
If religion was an existential relationship between an individual and God, its 
spiritual nature was best illustrated, in Buber’s view, by the existence of spiritual 
communities such as the Hassidic communities in Eastern Europe. In fact, his 
fascination with Hassidism as a mystical-spiritual community predated his I and Thou 
evolution but did not negate it, as some critics would later claim. According to 
Gershom Scholem, an associate of Buber and a foremost authority on Hassidism, 
Buber saw in the admonition to experience joy in the world as it is an expression of 
the existential imperative of being in touch with the Here and Now.63 
Buber’s admiration for the Hassidic community had more than a passing 
influence on shaping his views on the political structure of the Land of Israel, or 
Palestine as it was named by the Romans, and renamed by the British, who occupied 
the country towards the end of  the First World War. Hassidism prompted Buber to 
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immerse himself in the study of some Christian communities and Christian mystics 
whose insights he taught in the ‘New Community’ - a Berlin-based utopian society. 
Drawing on this experience, Buber developed the notion of a ‘dialogue community’, 
based on interpersonal ‘dialogical relations’, a sort of communitarian-socialist- 
pacifist utopia. While he only formalized his idea in Paths in Utopia in 1946, there 
were indications that Buber considered such a relationship to be of great importance 
to Arab-Jewish interaction as early as the 1920s.64 
More to the point, Buber’s unique understanding of Judaism led him to inquire 
into the proper relations between religion and politics. Like many philosophers and 
theologians before him he wrestled with the issue of what should be the proper 
boundary between religion and politics.65 His answer was a non-dogmatic ‘religious 
humanism’ in the Jewish prophetic tradition that, in his view, judged politics by 
religious-transcendental criteria rather than political expediency.66  
Applied to issues of a sovereign Jewish existence in Palestine, Buber’s theory 
raised two issues. The first pertained to the moral grounds that Jews used to justify 
arriving in a place largely settled by Arabs; the second raised the question of whether 
the use of force to control them was permissible. While Buber decreed that Jews have 
a legitimate right to live in Palestine, he ruled out the use of force as antithetical to 
prophetic Judaism.  Instead, he proposed a ‘dialogue bi-national community’, a form 
of voluntary Jewish-Arab coexistence along the lines suggested in his writings on 
voluntary communal living. Later on, Scholem, by then a prominent Buberite, 
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suggested that by teaching Arab children to read and write and by ‘educating the 
population,’ Jews could establish communication with the local Arabs.67 
 Arguing that Jews and Arabs should lead a bi-national existence was one 
thing. Persuading the Palestinian Arabs that there was a common basis for such a 
union was quite another. It was here that Buber could draw upon the circle of his 
academic friends and followers, including noted Orientalists like Shlomo Goitein, 
Ludwig Mayer and Joseph Horowitz to propagate the idea that Jews in Palestine were 
an integral part of the Orient. As Hazony pointed out, Buber was most anxious to 
distance himself from Herzl’s vision of the Jewish state as an ‘alien outpost’ of 
Western culture.  Horowitz, a prominent Orientalist and a colleague of Buber at the 
University of Frankfurt who travelled to the region, became well aware of the 
growing Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration. By fusing the Jewish community 
to the Orient, Buber and his friends hoped to make it more ‘palatable’ to the Arabs.68 
Even before fully articulating his views on the legitimacy of the Zionist 
endeavour, Buber felt compelled to confront Herzl.  Following a bitter dispute, he 
resigned from Die Welt in 1904 to become editor of The Jude, a platform for many of 
his ideas. His followers who migrated to Palestine - including Arthur Ruppin, Hugo 
Bergman, Ernst Simon - subsequently formed Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace) in 
1925 to implement the bi-national community project. From their vantage point on the 
ground they realized that the Arabs would never accept a Jewish state - and, in their 
opinion, without Arab consent all Zionist activity would be futile. Echoing Buber, 
Brit Shalom members felt that the Jews in Palestine did not need to create a Jewish 
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state per se; instead, together with the Arabs, they would create a cultural centre in the 
Middle East based on the principles of social justice and ‘the teachings of the prophets 
and Jesus’. 
Apart from implementing the principles of a spiritual-contractual community 
that Buber greatly admired, the framework proposed by Brit Shalom offered two 
additional attractions. First, it superseded the nation state, which gave one people, the 
so-called ‘people of the land’ primary rights as opposed to the minority - considered 
‘guests’ of sorts. Bergman asserted that prophetic justice demanded that in a country 
occupied by two peoples there should be no privileged group. Indeed, Buber, 
Bergman and others felt that the new entity in Palestine - by eliminating the ills of a 
national state - would serve as a stellar example of a new of international morality and 
remove the need for force attending a national state. In their view, creating a 
sovereign state to protect the rights of the dominant group was immoral and 
illegitimate.69 
The first experience of the Palestine-based members of Brit Shalom with the 
growing violence between Arabs and Jews made, in their mind, this imperative even 
more significant. By the early 1920s Arab attacks on Jews had ensued, though they 
were of a limited scope and directed from above.70 Brit Shalom disciples were 
especially worried that a violent conflict would delegitimize the Zionist project, a 
view that received reinforcement from the veteran Jewish thinker Ahad Ha’am. A 
passionate advocate of Hebrew culture and literature, Ahad Ha’am broke with Herzl 
over the issue of Jewish sovereignty, advocating the creation of a Jewish cultural 
centre in Palestine that would usher in a Hebrew cultural renaissance in the Diaspora. 
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In his critique of Altneuland, Ahad Ha’am chastised Herzl for downplaying the role of 
Hebrew. He was even more unsettled by Herzl’s call for mass migration of Jews 
because, as an intellectual elitist, he considered large masses detrimental to his vision 
of an exclusive cultural centre.  
 Although Ahad Ha’am did not share Buber’s hope of bi-national coexistence 
becoming an epitome of international morality and justice, he was taken aback by the 
‘colonial’ relations that had developed between the Jewish pioneers and the native 
population. On an early visit to Ottoman Palestine he noted that some Jews treated 
Arabs with contempt.  ‘We are used to thinking of the Arabs as primitive men of the 
desert, as a donkey-like nation that neither sees nor understands what is going around 
it’, he wrote. ‘But this is a great error. The Arab, like all sons of Sham, has sharp and 
crafty mind... Should time come when life of our people in Palestine imposes to a 
smaller or greater extent on the natives, they will not easily step aside’.71 
On that and other occasions, Ahad Ha’am warned about the abuse of power 
that went against the teaching of the prophets: 
However, a political idea alien to the national culture can turn the people’s 
heart away from spiritual power and produce a tendency to achieve its 
‘honours’ by achieving physical power and political independence, thus 
severing the thread linking it with its past and losing the base which sustained 
it throughout history.  
Ahad Ha’am, who settled in Palestine in the 1920s, was quick to imply that Arab 
violence against the Jews was a product of the colonization project. At the same time, 
he chastised the Jews for using force in their own defence, reinforcing Buber’s 
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prediction that Zionism required too much military power to serve a cultural-spiritual 
foundation for the Jewish renaissance.72 
While Ahad Ha’am had little impact on the political scene in Palestine, Brit 
Shalom - numbering some two hundred activists - gained a high profile due to 
dynamic leadership of Judah Magnes who emigrated from the United States to 
Palestine in 1921. A Reform rabbi and an active pacifist during WWI, Magnes was 
connected to the affluent and powerful anti-Zionist German Jewish community in 
New York. The Reform movement’s Pittsburgh Platform of 1885, which defined 
Judaism as a religion with a universal message unfettered by parochial tribalism and 
nationalism, provided the group with a rationale. The Platform essentially reflected 
the German-Jewish ‘Classic Reform’ faith that, as noted above, modernized and 
acculturated Jewish orthodoxy. The association of Reform Rabbis was unnerved by 
the nationalism embedded in Zionism and gave the World Zionist Organization a cold 
shoulder. 
More important, prominent anti-Zionist Jews opposed the Balfour Declaration. 
Henry Morgenthau Sr., a former ambassador to Istanbul, called Zionism ‘the most 
stupendous fallacy in Jewish history’. Julius Rosenwald, a leading philanthropist 
whose family founded Sears Roebuck, and Felix Warburg, an equally wealthy banker 
and philanthropist, were resolved to fight Zionism in Washington.  They were part of 
a group of prominent Jews who signed a petition to President Woodrow Wilson 
protesting his intention to support the Balfour Declaration. The petition raised a 
number of concerns about settling Jews in Palestine, including the resistance of the 
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Arabs who already lived there. The signatories warned the president that siding with 
the Jews would jeopardize Washington’s relation with the Arab world.73 
The activity of the anti-Zionist group reached a peak during the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference, where it joined State Department officials to lobby against 
Wilson’s plan to support the declaration. When the president overruled his own 
bureaucrats and put American support behind the Jewish Homeland in Palestine, the 
anti-Zionists redoubled their disruptive efforts. Magnes, newly arrived in Palestine, 
became instrumental in this effort.  
Having persuaded Warburg to become the chief financial supporter of the 
Hebrew University he used this connection to have himself instated as the new 
institution’s president and chancellor, driving the irritated Albert Einstein to comment 
that ‘the good Felix Warburg, thanks to his financial authority ensured that the 
incapable Magnes was made director of the Institute’.74 
Whatever Einstein’s misgivings, Magnes’s control gave Brit Shalom a clear 
intellectual and political edge. Even before the official opening in 1925, Magnes 
declared that the university would serve to promote the idea of Jewish-Arab 
coexistence. Making good his word, academic staff in a number of departments 
reflected this mission.  In short order, the School of Oriental Studies hired Goitein and 
other orientalists to teach and research subjects that, in Buber’s words, would bring a 
‘sympathetic knowledge of our neighbours’. While Buber sincerely hoped that the 
newly discovered ‘shared past’ would provide a solid underpinning for Jewish-Arab 
coexistence, some observers were less charitable accusing the School of inventing a 
new Semitic Jewish history. 
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Magnes used his own high-profile position to further the political cause of bi-
nationalism, mainly through a public relations effort and the Jewish Agency where he 
was a member. Faithful to the premise that the local Arabs would never accept a 
recognized and institutionalized national Jewish presence, he warned about an 
impending clash where Jews would have to take up arms: ‘The question is, do we 
want to conquer Palestine now as Joshua… with fire and sword? Or do we want to 
take cognizance of Jewish religious developments since Joshua - our Prophets… and 
repeat the words, not by might, and not by violence, but by my spirit, saith the 
Lord’.75 
The 1929 pogroms in Palestine in general, and the Hebron massacre - where 
local Arabs murdered 67 Jews and wounded scores of others - in particular, gave the 
anti-Zionists an opening. While the Jewish Agency appealed to prominent European 
figures to safeguard both Jewish religious rights of access to the Western Wall and 
immigration quotas to meet the needs of eastern and central European Jewry, Magnes 
demanded an immediate renunciation of the Balfour Declaration, writing that ‘we 
must once and for all give up the idea of a Jewish Palestine’. Reiterating Buber’s 
position that only total parity and equality could assure a peaceful existence for both 
communities, he chastised the World Zionist Organization for pursuing a ‘militarist, 
imperialist, political Zionism’ and urged a policy of pacifism, internationalism and 
Spiritual Zionism.  Moreover, he tried to persuade his patron, Warburg, to threaten the 
withdrawal of funding for the Zionist enterprise, a suggestion that wealthy American 
anti-Zionists were quite amenable to. Although nothing came out of this plan, the New 
York Times, under the ownership of the staunchly anti-Zionist Sulzberger family, 
launched its own campaign to undermine the Zionists. Sulzberger sent Joseph Levy, 
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his Palestine correspond, to approach the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, 
the effective leader of the Palestinian Arabs. Levy arranged a meeting between 
Magnes and Harry St. John Philby, a British adventurist and explorer who converted 
to Islam with alleged connections to al-Husseini, who in turn drafted a memorandum 
of understanding with Magnes that renounced the Balfour Declaration and gave up 
any special rights for the Jews in exchange of a Palestinian government where Jews 
would be a minority.76 
In spite of its roster of leading academics and the institutional base provided 
by the Hebrew University, Brit Shalom declined in the 1930s. Ignoring the Philby-
Magnes proposal altogether, the mufti drove his constituents to ever growing 
militancy, culminating in the 1936-39 ‘revolt’ that made it eminently clear that the al-
Husseini circles would settle for nothing less than total sovereignty over Palestine and 
the expulsion of its Jewish community. So much so that even the indefatigable 
Magnes seemed to have his moments of doubt, noting that ‘the Palestinian Arabs are 
still half savage, and their leaders almost all small men’.77 
There were other Jewish movements opposing Zionism too. The ultra-
orthodox Neturei-Karta was founded in Jerusalem in 1938, splitting off from Agudat 
Israel, which had been established in 1912 for the purpose of fighting Zionism but 
stopped negating it after some time. Over the years, a number of Neturei Karta 
activists and followers settled outside Palestine, leaving the country in which they and 
their families had lived for many generations.78 
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        As the situation in Europe darkened, the Yishuv became less and less responsive 
to Brit Shalom’s vision of peaceful coexistence. In May 1939 Arab violence reaped its 
most significant fruit in the form of a British White Paper that reduced Jewish 
immigration to Palestine to a trickle, and imposed draconian restrictions on Jewish 
land purchase, thus causing extreme anxiety and bitterness in both the Yishuv and 
world Jewry. The outbreak of the Second World War, followed by growing evidence 
of mass extermination of European Jews forced Brit Shalom leaders to revisit their 
tactics, without abandoning their overall cause.  
The Holocaust Crucible:  A New and Improved Bi-Nationalism?  
After years of cautious practical Zionism that saw Jewish settlement as a key 
to future sovereignty, socialist Zionism articulated a bold vision of a Jewish state. 
Prodded by the situation in Europe and sensing a historical opportunity to seize the 
initiative, Ben-Gurion gathered some six hundred Zionist leaders in the Biltmore 
Hotel in New York in 1942 where they declared that Palestine should be established 
as a Jewish Commonwealth. 
The declaration ignited a storm of protest from American anti-Zionists that 
culminated in the creation of the American Council on Judaism (ACJ). Among the 
founders were Louis Wolsey, Morris Lazaron, Abraham Cronbach, David Philipson, 
and Henry Cohen. Elmer Berger became chief executive and its most vocal 
spokesman while Lessing Rosenwald, a heir to the Sears Roebuck fortune, accepted 
the presidency. Eugene Meyer Jr., owner of the Washington Post, and Arthur Hays 
Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, supported the ACJ, with Sulzberger 
being behind the wording of the founding declaration though failing to sign it. 
The declaration opposed ‘all philosophies that stress the racialism, the 
nationalism and the homelessness of the Jews, as injurious to their interests’. The 
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‘Digest of Principles’ rejected the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, but was kept 
mostly private. However, in 1943, Rosenwald went public with an article in Life 
magazine that created enormous controversy. At the same month, a CCAR (Central 
Conference of American Rabbis) meeting denounced the ACJ, leading to tremendous 
bitterness between the Zionists and the anti-Zionists.  Between 1943 and 1948 the 
ACJ conducted a ‘fierce public campaign against Zionism’ with its spokesmen 
emphasizing the ‘purely religious nature of Judaism’ and accusing the Zionists of 
manipulating Jews and using the Holocaust to advance a Jewish state.79 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the response of the anti-Zionists was equally 
fierce. Working closely with the ACJ, Magnes, together with Henrietta Szold, the 
leader of Hadassah, reconstituted Brit Shalom under the banner of Ihud (Unity) in 
August 1942. Many of the original members were present among the hundred odd 
new cofounders; the group could also rely on Buber who arrived in Palestine in 1938 
and obtained a position at the Hebrew University, teaching anthropology and 
sociology.  Buber, widely considered the Ihud ideologue, took a lead in attacking the 
socialist Zionists in general and Ben-Gurion in particular, charging him with relying 
‘on imaginary prospects which have no reality’ and conducting foreign policy not 
based on the ‘real interests of the people’. Scorning the Biltmore Program, he called it 
‘fata morgana’ (mirage) as well as a contradiction of the moral principles of the 
Jewish people, as ‘it is impossible for any length of time to build with one hand while 
holding a weapon with the other’. Moshe Smilansky, a ranking Ihud member, 
objected to a Jewish state as part of his general rejection of small states which he 
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considered inferior to a large federation, or confederation, such as the United States or 
the British Commonwealth.80 
But it was Magnes who gave Ihud a high profile abroad. In an article in 
Foreign Affairs he called for a U.S.-British initiative to prevent the partition of 
mandatory Palestine.81 To this effect, Magnes testified no fewer than eleven times 
before the 1947 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in an 
attempt to sway it against partition. Equally important, the ACJ used his writings to 
lobby the State Department and the Truman administration against a Jewish state. In a 
conversation with Secretary of State George Marshall on 4 May 1948, ten days before 
the proclamation of the state Israel, Magnes told the Secretary who bitterly fought 
Truman on the issue, that Israel was ‘an artificial community’ and suggested imposing 
economic sanctions that, in his opinion, would halt the ‘Jewish war machine’.82 
The full revelation of the Holocaust did not alter Ihud’s fidelity to the bi-
national ideal. In its only concession, the group agreed to Truman’s 1946 suggestion 
that 100,000 Jewish refugees be admitted to Palestine. It also argued for 50-50 parity 
between Jews and Arabs, as compared to its earlier insistence on Arab majority. In the 
opinion of one historian, Magnes ‘did not retreat one iota from the idea of bi-
nationalism’.83 Such a stand outraged many: the Zionist Organization of America 
demanded that Magnes be fired as president of the Hebrew University. Szold, an icon 
among Jewish American women, was subject to barrage of protest from her own 
organization.    
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 Faced with ferocious opposition, Magnes fled to the United States early in 
1948, where, on behalf of the American Council for Judaism, he continued to lobby 
against a Jewish state, meeting with representatives from the United Nations, Britain, 
France, and the United States; during a meeting with Secretary Marshall, he pleaded 
for American military intervention to stop the newly declared state of Israel from 
defending itself from the invading Arab armies.  
Magnes died on 27 October 1948 but Buber and Arendt, who was fast 
becoming the new face of anti-Zionism, filled in the void. Writing in Commentary, 
Arendt denounced the ‘fanaticism and hysteria that had brought almost all of Jewry to 
demand a Jewish state and urged the United Nations to negotiate with Ihud and non-
Zionist Jews willing to reach an immediate settlement with ‘moderate Arabs’.84  
The Canaanite Movement: Ancient Royalists in the Orient 
Though mainstream Zionism maintained that compromise with the local Arab 
population was possible, a smaller group led by Vladimir Jabotinsky challenged the 
view that the local Arabs could be induced to a compromise with the Jews: 
The Arabs loved their country as much as the Jews did. Instinctively, they 
understood Zionist aspirations very well, and their decision to resist them was 
only natural... There was no misunderstanding between Jew and Arab, but a 
natural conflict... No Agreement was possible with the Palestinian Arab; they 
would accept Zionism only when they found themselves up against an ‘iron 
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wall’, when they realize they had no alternative but to accept Jewish 
settlement.85  
In 1923 Jabotinsky broke with Weizmann when the World Zionist 
Organization rejected the goal of creating a Jewish state on both banks for the Jordan 
River.  He formed the Alliance of Revisionist Zionists and a youth movement, Beitar. 
Despite the nationalist tenor of the Revisionists Jabotinsky had mixed feelings about 
traditional Jewish identity.  Reflecting his personal distance from the culture of the 
Ostjude (East European Jew), he criticized his brethren for lack of physical stamina, 
discipline and military prowess bordering on cowardice.86 To remedy these allegedly 
Diaspora-bread attitudes, articulated the philosophy of Hadar, his term for a number 
of characteristics and qualities such as respect, politeness, loyalty, physical fitness, 
proper social manners and self-esteem. As befitting a secularist, Jabotinsky made few 
references to Jewish religion, though the Jewish connection to the biblical Land of 
Israel was an integral part of the Beitar training.87 Taking military valour one step 
further, the Revionists created their underground movement Irgun Zvai Leumi 
(National Military Organization), commonly referred to as the Irgun. 
By the mid-1920s, Beitar had attracted a large following among the nationalist 
segment of the Yishuv. Among them was Uriel Heilperin who changed his name first 
to Halperin and then Shelah (later he used the pen-name Yonatan Ratosh).  His father 
Yehiel, a Hebrew educator in Warsaw, brought up the family speaking Hebrew rather 
than the customary Yiddish. Together with his two brothers - who later renamed 
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themselves Uzzi Ornan and Zvi Rin - Ratosh joined the Irgun where he became close 
to Avraham ‘Yair’ Stern - the charismatic figure who would subsequently establish 
the ultra-radical Lehi group. Ratosh, a gifted writer and poet served as editor of the 
Irgun publication, Ba-Herev, (By the Sword). However, by the end of the 1930s 
Jabotinsky had demoted Ratosh because of his ‘radical tendencies’, that is, a demand 
to immediately create a Jewish state and an affinity with Lehi, a splinter from the 
Irgun that embraced terrorism in an effort to eject the British. Embittered and 
disillusioned, Ratosh moved to Paris in 1938 where he met Adyah Gurevitch, a 
historian, known under his Hebrew name as Adyah Gor Horon, or A.G. Horon. 
According to historian Yaakov Shavit, author of a comprehensive study of the 
Canaanite movement, during his stay in Paris Horon was exposed to a flourishing 
school of historical-linguistic-anthropological Orientalism founded by Silverstre de 
Sacy. Coinciding with French colonial interest in the Orient, de Sacy disseminated the 
notion of an ancient Canaanite (Phoenician)-Semitic civilization. Victor Berard, the 
author of works on the Phoenician-Canaanite civilization, had also appealed to Horon, 
who studied Semitic languages and history. Ernest Renan, a leading 19th century 
literary figure, was a major influence as well, especially his claim that Jews were not 
a unified racial group in a biological sense.88  
In 1928 archaeologists digging in Syria discovered tablets bearing the Ugaritic 
script, a language that had once flourished in Mesopotamia in 1500-1300 BCE and 
bore a remarkable resemblance to Hebrew. Umberto Cassuto, a professor at the 
Hebrew University, was among a number of scholars who claimed that Ugaritic texts 
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informed the Bible. To Horon, the tablets were proof of the Hebrew link to the ancient 
Semitic civilizations and its lost glory.89 
Historical interest aside, Horon was also an active member of the Revisionist 
movement and head of the Beitar office in Paris. Using his position as an insider, in 
1931-32 he published a series of nine articles in Revisionist papers expanding on the 
theory that the Hebrew nation was rooted in Canaanite civilization. An opportunity to 
persuade his colleagues to adopt the Canaanite theory presented itself in September 
1935 when, following their final break from the World Zionist Organization, the 
Revisionists convened in Vienna to establish the New Zionist Organization (NZO, 
better known as the Revisionist Zionist Organization). Leading a group of radical 
atheists, Horon unsuccessfully fought Jabotinsky’s proposal to include a religious 
plank that called to ‘inculcating deeply the holy heritage among the Jewish society in 
the future Jewish state’. Upsetting the delegates by urging to separate Zionism from 
Judaism, Horon derided religion as a reactionary force on top of being anti-national 
and anti-territorial and urged the delegates to adopt his Canaanite theory.  Jabotinsky, 
by then more open to the religious feelings of his followers, admitted to being deeply 
hurt by Horon and proclaimed that linking the Canaanites and the Bible was ‘mixing 
apples and oranges’.90 
Undaunted by the rebuke, Horon worked hard to publicize his views.  In 1938 
he gave a series of lectures in the Renaissance Club in Paris, subsequently published 
in a pamphlet titled Canaan et les Hebreux, which asserted that the ancient Hebrews 
derived from the Canaanite civilization and that this record was lost when the 
monotheist scribes in the Temple altered or expunged the Canaanite foundational 
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stories in the Bible. Worse, the rabbinical tradition had corrupted the Hebrew 
civilization and turned it into a Jewish one. This alarmed Jabotinsky and in December 
1938 he warned Horon not to ‘degrade Israel in order to glorify the Hebrews or 
denigrating Monotheism in order to exalt idol worship’. 
Arguably, the timely arrival of Ratosh in Paris saved Horon’s Canaanite 
vision. Greatly impressed by Canaan et les Hebreux, Ratosh embarked upon his 
return to Palestine on an effort to re-educate his people on their true origin, alleged to 
be in the Land of Kedem, an area of the Fertile Crescent inhabited by Canaanites. 
Urging the Yishuv to embrace a Hebrew rather than Jewish identity and to sever all 
ties to the Jewish past, he derided Judaism as ‘an ill culture’, a culture of an 
‘immigrant society’, a ‘spiritual leprosy’. Clearly, the Canaanites, or the New 
Hebrews as they preferred to be known, found the ancient sea-faring civilization of 
the Canaanite-Phoenicians to be a cure for Jewish ‘leprosy’.91 In a 1943 manifesto, 
Ratosh urged the Yishuv youth to reject affiliation with the ‘Shtetl and history of the 
Diaspora’ that he compared to ‘borrowed cloth, faded and tattered and too-tight’ and 
to embrace the Canaanite past.92 
 His demand from the Palestinian Arabs was even harsher. Since the Canaanite 
program spoke of ‘a stimulation of the culture of the homeland based on the national 
Hebrew revival, drawing on the values intrinsic to this land, and transmitting them to 
all its inhabitants’, they were urged to discard their Islamic-Arab identity and be 
incorporated into a ‘uniform educational and cultural system based on the Hebrew 
culture’. As one scholar put it, ‘the Canaanite concept of Hebrew domination 
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amounted to the elimination of the Arab cultural presence’.93 With his customary 
attention to details and a flair for the dramatic, Ratosh even designed a flag for Eretz 
ha-Kadem. In the words of James Diamond, author of the definitive study on the 
Canaanites: ‘Instead of the Zionist tallit... Ratosh prefers the letter alef, written in its 
ancient Hebrew or Canaanite form, emblazoned in gold on a field of blue and 
purplish-scarlet (tehelet v’argaman). These colors affirm for Ratosh the royal glory of 
the ancient Hebrew past… the alef, which originally denoted a bull, is a ‘primeval 
symbol of strength and majesty’. 94 
Bold vision of a resurrected an ancient royal past aside, the New Hebrews 
attracted virtually no political following. Ratosh’s group numbered some twelve 
members, including his brothers, as well as a few writers, artists and poets: Benjamin 
Tamuz, Aharon Amir, Moshe Giora, Yitzhak Danziger, Ezra Zohar, Dani Herman, 
and Avraham Rimon. Drawing on his Irgun connections, Ratosh tried to convince 
Stern to adopt the Canaanite precepts, to no avail. In any event, the British killed 
Stern in 1942 severing Ratosh’s most important link to the Revisionist underground.95 
The literary establishment of the Yishuv was even more hostile. Nathan 
Alterman, the reigning poet of the day and leader of the literary circle Turim, attacked 
Ratosh for his fanciful interpretation of the Jewish past. Avraham Shlonsky, the 
influential poet and literary editor actually coined the term Canaanite in effort to 
disparage the group. That Ratosh and his friends continued their brutal critique of 
Jewish culture in the midst of the Holocaust struck many as insensitive at best and 
callous at worse. The call to create a pan-Semitic entity in Greater Palestine sounded 
hollow in the face of Arab rejectionism. Unlike Brit Shalom though, the Canaanites, 
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with a strong grounding in literature and visual arts, survived as a cultural movement 
that was to gain traction over time.96 
The Communist Version of Bi-nationalism  
Much as the Zionist movement appealed to nationally-oriented Jews it left the 
sizeable socialist and communist segments unmoved or even hostile. The Bund Party 
- organized at the end of the 19th century in Tsarist Russia as an ethnic section of the 
Communist Party - rejected the idea of Jewish statehood and responded to the Balfour 
Declaration with the slogan of do-igkeit (here-ness), meaning that Jews should 
develop their own culture in the countries of their existence. When Jabotinsky 
initiated the evacuation of large number of European Jews to Palestine in the face of 
the growing Nazi threat he was rebuked by a Bund leader: ‘The Zionists are unable 
and unwilling to understand that we Bundists cannot accept, even for a moment, the 
trappings of a capitalist society. They, on the other hand, wish to remain within these 
trappings. Because they adapt themselves to the existing capitalist society, they 
cannot understand the urgency of our struggle in Poland’.97 
Hard-core Jewish communists went further in their rejection of Zionism. Rosa 
Luxemburg, a prominent German Jewish communist leader, viewed herself as free 
from national feelings: ‘I feel equally close to the wretched victims of the rubber 
plantations in Putumayo or to the Negros in Africa… I have no separate corner in my 
heart for the ghetto. I feel at home in the entire world’.98 Such declarations were part 
of the communist ideology that rejected national sentiment as a basis for human 
organization and expected class interests to trump bonds of ethnicity and nationality - 
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a line that the Palestine Communist Party (PCP), formed in 1923, eagerly adopted.  
Although mostly Jewish, the party denounced as ‘a movement of the Jewish 
bourgeoisie allied to British imperialism’ and took the Arab side whenever it resorted 
to anti-Jewish violence and terror. This created much tension between its Jewish and 
Arab members, though, ironically, the pro-Arab policy failed to attract more Arabs to 
the party.99 
Both communists and the socialists of the Mapam and Hashomer Hatzair 
movements participated in the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement, an 
organization founded in 1938 by Haim Kalvarisky, a Jewish farmer and peace activist.  
The League believed that capitalism and imperialism stood in the way of good 
relations between the Arab and Jewish working classes, advocated Arab-Jewish 
cooperation and opposed the creation of a Jewish state. Writing on the ‘Arab Terror’ 
of 1936- 39, Smilansky emphasized the role of foreign imperialist forces: ‘The hostile 
relations stemmed from foreign influence. Today we witness Arab-Jewish 
rapprochement taking place naturally, almost spontaneously’.100 
The outbreak of World War II and the Holocaust threw the party’s Jewish 
members into turmoil, raising doubts about its rigid, doctrinaire anti-Zionism and 
culminating (in 1943) in a split into Jewish and Arab groups with the latter forming 
(in 1944) the National Liberation League (NLL). Both the PCP and NLL opposed the 
November 1947 partition resolution, holding out for a bi-national state, but the 
surprising Soviet decision to endorse the resolution and recognize the state of Israel 
forced them to follow suit. The PCP which subsequently became the Communist 
Party of Eretz Israel (MAKEI), along with the NLL, bowed to reality and welcomed 
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the new state. After the 1948 war MAKEI and NLL merged adopting the name the 
Communist Party of Israel (MAKI).101 
The Marginalization of the Bi-national Opposition  
  Even the highly idealistic and motivated advocates of bi-nationalism could 
hardly ignore the fact that the creation of Israel was a huge triumph for Zionism. That 
both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the new state was probably 
even more disheartening for them. International goodwill towards Israel was only part 
of their problem, however.  The mass immigration of Holocaust survivors and Jews 
from the Arab states changed the country’s demographic balance in ways that made 
its Jewish nature much more pronounced. In order to survive, each of the three groups 
had to make a serious adjustment in its philosophy and modus operandi. 
         To remain relevant, Ihud reinvented itself as somewhat of a pacifist organization 
dedicated to promoting peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This transition 
was made easier because Buber, by then a renowned world philosopher, had replaced 
Magnes as the group’s public face. Though devoting an increasing share of his time to 
philosophy, Buber was active in Arab-Israeli reconciliation. The American Friends of 
Ihud, an organization chaired by Maurice Friedman, attracted its share of vocal anti-
Zionists, something that Buber seemed to have tolerated.102 
 In his new role as peacemaker, Ihud was quite outspoken on the need to find 
an accommodation with the Arab states. Ignoring years of Egypt-originated terror 
attacks on Israeli civilians, and President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s increasingly 
belligerent policy, Buber scolded Ben-Gurion for the attack on Egypt in 1956, known 
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as the Sinai Campaign or Suez Campaign, which the Ihud publication Ner considered 
an unjustified expression of militarism.  Buber also worked to solve the problem of 
the 1948 Palestinian refugees in ways that were bound to clash with the Israeli 
government. In a 1961 conversation with Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie 
Endowment for international Peace and an American representative on the refugee 
problem, Buber transmitted an Ihud proposal to allow the refugees to choose whether 
to settle in the Arab countries and receive compensation or to return to Israel as full 
citizens. This stand contradicted Israel’s adamant opposition to the wholesale 
repatriation of refugees and its insistence that the refugee issue would have to be 
resolved as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. 
Much as Buber went against core government positions on the refugee issue, 
his most high profile disagreement with the Labour government occurred during the 
1962 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem.  Ihud and his leaders launched a protest against 
Eichmann’s death sentence, provoking a public outcry from Holocaust survivors and 
their families. Residing then in Germany, Buber let it be known that he was ‘disgusted 
with the whole process’. His friend Ernst Simon at the Hebrew University pleaded 
with Israel’s president to commute Eichmann’s sentence. Few applauded Buber’s 
stand, but most of Israeli citizens were outraged. One of them sarcastically wrote to 
express ‘condolences to Professor Martin Buber on the hanging of Adolph 
Eichmann’.103  Clearly, the divide between Ihud and popular sentiment on this and 
other issues was too wide to breach.  When Buber died in 1965, Ihud seemed like a 
forgotten chapter in Israeli politics, despite Arendt lending her seal of approval to 
many of its ideas. 
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Greatly as Brit Shalom ideals suffered from Israel’s changing demography, the 
Canaanites vision of a Semitic empire faired even less well. The Canaanites found 
that the Yiddish or Arabic speaking Jews had no desire to turn into ‘New Hebrews’ 
preferring instead to become ‘Israeli Jews’. Perhaps most shocking to the Canaanites, 
the Mizrahim, as Jews of Middle Eastern descent are commonly known, harboured a 
particular hostility towards Arabs, making them unlikely recruits for a bi-national 
state. As Diamond succinctly noted, the Canaanites ‘were demographically 
overwhelmed’ and relegated to ‘coffee shops in northern Tel Aviv’, a pejorative 
reference to the affluent Ashkenazi neighbourhoods in the city.104 
Still Ratosh and his small circle, based largely at the Hebrew University, 
continued the uphill struggle to promote the Semitic theme. Culturally, it was centred 
on the Alef magazine that first appeared in 1948; the movement was credited with 
many literary innovations and its impact on visual arts was undeniable.105 Politically, 
though, the adjustment to the new reality was more difficult, causing the group to split 
in 1953.  In 1956 a number of former Canaanites and Irgun and Lehi members created 
the Semitic Action (Hapeula Hashemit). Among its founders were Uri Avnery, Boaz 
Evron, Nathan Yellin-Mor, Amos Kenan, Shalom Cohen, and Maxim Ghilan. The 
group’s 1958 manifesto made some concessions to Judaism, acknowledging that the 
New Hebrew nation in Israel had some connection to the Diaspora, yet urged it to 
move beyond the ‘outmoded’ framework of Zionism by adopting complete 
secularism, total equality for Jews and Arabs and support for anti-colonial 
movements. The manifesto urged Israel to join a Palestinian-Jordanian federation, a 
smaller version of the original Canaanite-Phoenician empire.  Between April 1960 
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and March 1967, the Semitic Action published a biweekly paper Etgar (Challenge) 
edited by Yellin-Mor. 
However, it was the charismatic Avnery who contributed most to publicizing 
the Canaanite agenda. A former Irgun member, the German-born Avnery used his 
sensationalist weekly Haolam Haze (This World) to push pan-Hebrew ideas based on 
a pamphlet he had penned in 1947 that called for the Hebrew and Arab nations to 
liberate the common ‘Semitic Region’ from colonialist rule. Indeed, in its new 
reincarnation, the political wing of the Canaanites took up the banner of anti-
colonialist struggle in the Middle East. Avnery chastised Ben-Gurion for teaming up 
with ‘colonialist’ France and Britain to attack Egypt in 1956. In December 1960, 
prompted by Henri Curiel, a Jewish-Egyptian Communist and anti-colonialist activist, 
Avnery and some of his Semitic Action colleagues created the Israeli Committee for a 
Free Algeria. Curiel argued that, once liberated from French rule, Algeria would ally 
itself with Israel to form an anti-colonialist regional movement.106 
The Birth of Matzpen 
While the Semitic Action was the first to take up the anti-colonialist theme to 
create a common Arab-Israeli front, it was a splinter group from MAKI that 
popularized the colonialist narrative in Israel.  As noted earlier, under Moscow’s 
direction the Israeli communists were driven to accept the reality of a Jewish state. 
Yet tensions within the party simmered over this and other issues and a small group of 
young Trotskyites - Moshe Machover, Akiva (Aki) Orr, Oded Pilavsky and Jeremy 
Kaplan - began criticizing the Soviet line as oppressive. On 28 September 1962 
MAKI paper Kol Haam announced their expulsion from the party and soon afterwards 
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they created a splinter group, the Israeli Socialist Organization, better known by the 
name of its organ Matzpen (Compass). 
David Ehrenfeld, a diamond company owner and staunch supporter of Arab-
Jewish reconciliation, undertook to bankroll the new group.  Though tiny, Matzpen 
could count on a cadre of talented and energetic activists.  Machover - a Hebrew 
University mathematics student - attracted fellow students, including would be 
mathematicians Haim Hanegbi and Meir Smorodinsky - later Hebrew University 
professors (Machover himself would become professor at King’s College London).  
In 1964 a number of Arab members who had split from the Haifa branch of MAKI 
signed up; among them were the prolific journalists and polemicists Jabra Nicola and 
Daoud Turki who joined on the basis of a few principles: rejection of Zionism; 
rejection of Soviet dominance and the Stalinist cult of personality; support for 
international solidarity and for Israel’s integration into a socialist Arab union. In the 
words of Hangebi, Matzpen was established ‘in opposition to the Communist lie’ and 
‘in opposition to the Zionist lie’.107 
While Matzpen was involved with the Trotskyite International, the fight 
against Stalinism, a signature Trotskyite battle, took a back seat to the more pressing 
problem of fighting the ‘Zionist state’.  It was around this issue that Matzpen reached 
out to the Semitic Action where Hanegbi worked for Etgar. Some Semitic Action 
activists joined outright, including Aharon Bachar and Gabriel Lahman; even more 
important, writing in Etgar in January 1962, Amos Kenan, a prominent journalist and 
charter member of the Canaanites, expressed admiration for the revolutions in Cuba 
and Algeria. He also claimed that the left-leaning intelligentsia in the Middle East and 
Africa had a vital role in spreading socialist revolutions and hoped that a similar 
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group could rise up in Israel.  Based on this article, the Semitic Action was the first to 
congratulate Matzpen and broached the idea of a formal collaboration based on a 
desire to create a common front against Zionism. Nothing came of these plans, but in 
1966 Matzpen joined Avnery in his Haolam Haze-Koah Hadash parliamentary run, 
netting him a seat in the Sixth Knesset.108 
Though electorally insignificant, the Matzpen-Semitic Action collaboration 
was much more fruitful in the realms of ideas. Keenly aware of the need to change 
‘public consciousness’ through public discourse, Matzpen activists were effectively 
going in the footsteps of Gramsci, a popular figure among the Trotskyite and New 
Left groups who could not trigger a full scale revolution in Europe and elsewhere.  
Turning necessity into virtue, they dedicated themselves to impacting the public 
discourse.109 
Indeed, even before the official launch of Matzpen, its two cofounders, 
Machover and Orr, had tried altering public consciousness.  In 1961 they published a 
book, Shalom, Shalom Vein Shalom (Peace, Peace When There is No Peace) 
criticizing Israel’s alignment with Britain and France in the 1956 Sinai campaign as 
collaboration with world imperialism. The two also provided a novel interpretation of 
the 1948 war, viewing it as a corollary of British colonialist interests and claiming 
that the Arabs’ real target were the British rather than the Jews. Most important, 
Shalom, Shalom Vein Shalom stated for the first time that the Palestinian problem was 
at the core of Arab-Israeli relations. Machover and Orr blamed the British, their ‘Arab 
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agents’, and Israel for creating the refugee problem and warned that, absent a political 
(rather than a humanitarian) solution, no peace was feasible.110 
Other activists pushed the Palestinian issue to the forefront of the Middle East 
conflict as well. At the end of 1964, Meir Smorodinsky wrote in the Matzpen 
magazine that Zionism was a special variety of colonialism and denounced Israel as a 
colonialist state. Smorodinsky and his colleagues were careful to draw a distinction 
between European colonialism (aimed at exploiting the native population) and the 
supposed Zionist colonial enterprise built on the expropriation of the land.  To prove 
the case, Matzpen published references to the multi-volume study of the Nakba (the 
catastrophe), as Palestinians and Arabs call their 1948 defeat, by Aref al-Aref, the 
renowned Palestinian journalist, historian and politician, which provided detailed 
statistics about some four hundred Arab villages that existed before the war. Israel 
Shahak, a Hebrew University chemistry lecturer and a frequent collabourator with 
Matzpen, adopted Aref’s statistics in his own reports about the expropriation of the 
Palestinian land.111 
In 1964 Orr left for London where he cofounded the Israeli Revolutionary 
Action Committee Abroad (ISRACA), an anti-Zionist publication devoted to a 
critique of political, cultural and psychological aspects of Zionism. He also befriended 
a number of prominent New Left revolutionaries and anti-colonialist advocates. One 
of them, Cyril Lionel Robert James, a Trinidadian Marxist and a leading voice on 
decolonization, became a close friend. James believed that decolonization should 
become the most important goal of international revolutionaries.   
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Adopting the colonialist perspective enabled Matzpen to broaden its critique of 
Zionism. The magazine was one of the first to claim that Palestinians, as opposed to 
Arabs, had a separate identity and that they were the primary victims of the ‘Zionist 
Project’. The October-November 1965 issue attacked Zionism as a racist ideology, 
listing the alleged racist characteristics of Judaism such as exclusion and domination. 
The themes of colonialism and domination were prominently displayed in the 1964 
proclamation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); at least one historian 
claimed that the prodigious literary output of Matzpen had impacted the thinking of 
the groups that coalesced under the PLO umbrella. In this view, the intellectual 
infrastructure for the subsequent cooperation between Matzpen and the PLO was 
created.112 
Extending the Zionism-as-racism paradigm to the Mizrahim was, from the 
perspective of Matzpen members, the next logical step. Though predominantly 
Ashkenazi, the group attracted a number of Mizrahim, including Alan Albert (later 
Ilan Halevi, a PLO representative in Europe and a former PLO vice minister), a 
French-born son of a Yemenite Jew who moved to Israel in 1965 after a detour in the 
United States. In America Halevi met Malcolm X and, by his own account, acquired 
an insight into the black struggle. Moving on to Algeria, Halevi was exposed to the 
anti-colonialist struggle; he subsequently explained that his experiences made him 
understand the plight of the Palestinians. Matzpen thus published a number of articles 
claiming that Zionism discriminated against the Mizrahim. One of these stated that 
the ‘dark-skinned [Jews] increasingly feel the sting of racist discrimination’.113  
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Notwithstanding the creative energy of Matzpen and the Semitic Action, and 
Avnery’s public notoriety, initially the small group of activists made little impact on 
the public discourse in Israel. Much to their dismay, Gramsci’s formula of avant-
garde-triggered change of consciousness seemed as elusive as the efforts of their anti-
Zionist predecessors. Like Brit Shalom, Matzpen members were publicly attacked as 
‘traitors’. It was thus hugely ironic that they would profit from another Zionist 
triumph, the June 1967 war.  
The 1967 War and its Discontents: Prelude to Post-Zionism    
Few could foresee at the end of the war, which put Israel in control of vast 
Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian territories, its far-reaching implications. Since 
Egyptian President Nasser precipitated the war by blockading the Straits of Tiran, 
expelling the UN forces from the Sinai Peninsula and proclaiming Israel’s imminent 
destruction, the astounding victory was seen by Israelis as a divine miracle and, in a 
more secular view, a testament to the resilience and valour of the Jewish state.  Israel 
garnered considerable legitimacy in the West that had been embarrassed by its failed 
diplomatic effort to dissuade Nasser from persisting in his aggressive course. Western 
audiences also took note of the fact that, in response to a June 1967 offer by the Israeli 
government to trade almost all the territories gained for peace, Arab representatives at 
the Khartoum conference in August responded with the so-called three no’s: no 
negotiations, no recognition, no peace. 
Helping Israel to rule the territories, especially the densely populated West 
Bank, was the ‘low-cost’ model conceived by Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan and 
his advisers, entailing the retention of most of the Jordanian administrative framework 
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and the ‘open bridges’ policy that gave Palestinians access to Israel’s and Jordan’s 
labour markets and quickly raised the standard of living of in the territories.114 
While the majority of Israelis prided themselves on an enlightened occupation 
policy, Matzpen was one of the few dissenting voices.  Ironically, the war provided 
some new recruits. The radical political activist Ehud Adiv, who would be convicted 
of espionage for Syria, recalled that it was clear to him that ‘I was losing my life in a 
war I did not believe in.  The Palestinians don’t hate us… they didn’t step on us, we 
stepped on them. We came to Jerusalem to take their Wailing Wall’. Traumatized by 
his war experience, he joined Matzpen soon after. Shlomo Sand, a member of the 
Communist Youth Alliance and later a history professor at Tel-Aviv University, was 
equally upset. He contemplated leaving the country but Mahmoud Darwish, the noted 
Israeli Arab poet, persuaded him to stay; the Israeli author Dan Omer introduced him 
to Matzpen where he became a member in good standing.115 
Other activists arrived through Matzpen’s social network. Michel 
Warschawski studied philosophy at the Hebrew University where, shortly after the 
war, he encountered a group of Matzpen activists handing out the pamphlet Enough is 
Enough. Warschawski, who by his own admission was ‘passionate about injustice’, 
read the pamphlet that compared the occupation to the situation in Algeria and South 
Africa. After extensive talks with Machover and Arie Bober, a Semitic Action-
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Matzpen freelancer, whom he considered a guru, Warschawski, commonly known as 
Mikado, joined Matzpen.116 
Energized by the new recruits, the group set out to fight the ‘ills of Israeli 
occupation’.  The August 1967 issue of the journal featured a picture of a town in the 
West Bank under curfew and a caption ‘Old Story - Revolt against a Foreign 
Occupation’.117 On 22 September 1967 Matzpen published a petition in the daily 
Yediot Aharonot paid for by Ehrenfeld, calling Israel to withdraw from the occupied 
territories and insisting that oppression of another people was morally wrong. As the 
PLO’s growing terror attacks, waged first from Jordan then from Lebanon, triggered 
Israeli reprisals, the group repeated its dire warnings about the moral wrongs of 
Zionism.  In March 1968 Matzpen organized a petition signed by eighty-eight public 
figures against collective punishment, administrative detentions, and forced 
deportations of terrorist suspects. When the petition was subsequently published in 
other papers, one Israeli official considered it ‘a stab in the back’. 
After allegations surfaced that Matzpen had links to Palestinian terror groups, 
more public outrage followed.  On 9 January 1968 Le Monde carried an article in 
which Machover was said to have praised ‘Palestinian resistance’, his term for acts of 
terrorism. On 17 March 1968 a member of Fatah, the largest group in the PLO, 
revealed that Matzpen members were among the few Israelis to support it, praising 
some of them ‘real fedayeen’.118  A few days later, Matzpen took a public stand on the 
issue: it noted that ‘it is both the right and duty of every conquered and subjugated 
people to resist and to struggle for its freedom. The ways, means, and methods 
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necessary and appropriate for such a struggle must be determined by the people 
itself’.119 
If support for ‘resistance’ by whatever means proved a hard sell, Matzpen’s 
depiction of the conditions of Palestinians was more successful. Actually, even before 
the 1967 war the group used the alleged exploitation of Israeli Arabs as a major 
selling point. In early 1966 a short documentary financed by Ehrenfeld, I Am Ahmad, 
showed the plight of Arab workers in Israel. The film was based on the memories of 
Ahmad Masarwa and his friends looking for work, allegedly suffering in the process 
racist taunts, discrimination and other indignities. Although the authorities approved 
the screening, the documentary upsets the Labour government; one minister wrote 
that ‘it was a harsh film, telling the “truth but not all the truth”’.120 With the massive 
influx of Palestinians in the aftermath of the war, Matzpen could amp up the theme of 
exploitation and what it saw as the corrupting influence of occupation.   
Paradoxically, as Matzpen’s predictions about the moral dangers of occupation 
took tentative root, the organization was falling apart. First, the arrival of new 
members created tensions that, as in the case of other Marxist groups, resulted in 
multiple cleavages. The major one pitted those who wanted Matzpen to spend most of 
its effort on class struggle as opposed to devotees of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Adding to ideological issues were personality clashes and competition between the 
Tel Aviv and Jerusalem branches, taking the tiny movement through a titillating series 
of secessions and regroupings, accompanied by an acrimonious fight over who was 
entitled to the Matzpen brand name.  Disclosure that some group members conspired 
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to commit espionage proved more devastating challenge. In 1973 Adiv and colleagues 
were tried and sentenced to long prison terms for spying for Syria. The sensational 
‘Red Trial’ almost derailed Matzpen and many of its members followed Machover 
and Orr into self-imposed exile in Europe. 
But relocating to Europe benefited the organization in many ways. Their move 
coincided with the New Left student upheaval that seized France, Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Matzpen leaders befriended 
leading student activists, including Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Rudi Dutschke (the 
former visited Israel as their guest in 1969).  Matzpen was also attractive to a group 
that followed Rosa Luxemburg, finding her call for a spontaneous ‘people revolution’ 
highly inspiring.121 
The relations between the European New Left and Matzpen were mutually 
beneficial. For the former, the plight of the Palestinians added credibility to their 
Third World credentials as the liberation struggles in North Africa were coming to an 
end.  For Matzpen, the extensive publication and propaganda network of the New Left 
was a major boon. From their London residence Machover and Orr attracted the 
attention of Jean Paul Sartre and his publication, Modern Times, and could also rely 
on Eric Rouleau, the reigning power in Le Monde. They also had access to Bertrand 
Russell and his organization, the Bertrand Russell Foundation, which issued a number 
of statements against Israel’s occupation. In fact, shortly before he died, on 31 
Januarys 1970, Russell urged Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in 1967. 122 
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In the spring and summer of 1970, Arie Bober, representing Matzpen, made a 
speaking tour of the US sponsored by the Committee on New Alternatives in the 
Middle East (CONAME). Among CONAME’s sponsors  were Arthur Miller, Noam 
Chomsky and Pete Seeger; its main activists included Berta Green Langston, Robert 
Langston and Emmanuel Dror Farjoun - a Matzpen member doing postgraduate work 
at MIT and later a Mathematics professor at the Hebrew University. In connection 
with this tour, the Langstons arranged with the leading publisher Doubleday to issue a 
book titled The Other Israel: The Radical Case against Zionism. The book - 
consisting entirely of Matzpen material - came out in 1972 under Bober’s nominal 
editorship - though Farjoun with Langston’s help did the actual editing.123   
To appeal to the European market, in 1975 Matzpen launched a publication 
called Khamsin in Paris, where the first four issues were published in French; when 
the office moved to London it switched to English. Machover and Avishai Ehrlich - 
later a political sociology professor at the Academic College of Tel Aviv-Jaffa - 
joined the editorial board in 1978 alongside a number of Matzpen members who 
served in some capacity until the magazine folded in 1989.  Khamsin billed itself as a 
‘committed journal’ that not merely expressed opinions but was also ‘part of the 
struggles for social liberation and against nationalists and religious mystifications’.   
The magazine listed the struggle against Zionism and its ‘power structure’ and the 
plight of the Palestinians - described as ‘the most direct victims of Zionism’ among its 
top goals, but also highlighted the problem of Oriental Jews and women. Some of the 
Khamsin articles where first published in the Matzpen journal and later translated to 
garner a wider audience abroad.124 
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By the end of the 1970s, working both at home and abroad, Matzpen, with 
some help from the Semitic Action, developed a comprehensive critique of Zionism.  
As a matter of fact, sometimes during this period they described themselves as ‘post-
Zionists’, though the authorship of the new label is not entirely clear.125 Whatever its 
provenance, the rebranding was a clever ploy to adjust the antiquated-sounding anti-
Zionist label to new opportunities created by the 1967 war. Avnery, widely credited 
with coining the term, recognized the historic service of Zionism in creating the state, 
but deemed it necessary to rethink all aspects of Israel’s identity, including its 
‘foundational myths’.126 As an indefatigable journalist and government critic he also 
encouraged new historical disclosures and the questioning of normative historical 
truths, an imperative that blended well with New Left and post-modern assumptions 
that ruling societal groups produce ‘hegemonic narratives’ of events. 
Post-Zionism 
To infuse post-Zionism with contemporary relevance, its intellectual architects 
advocated the rethinking of a variety of subjects ranging from the circumstances of 
Israel’s creation to its ethnic and gender structure. In launching the revisionist project, 
Matzpen borrowed widely from historical anti-Zionists, including Brit Shalom, the 
Canaanites and the communists as well as contemporary movements such as post-
modernism.  Such liberal blending of perspectives made a binding definition of post-
Zionism difficult. The respected Israeli scholar Eliezer Schweid identified three 
different strands of post-Zionism: colonialism/post-colonialism, post-nationalism, and 
post-modernism, but others added post-Jewish tribalism and even ‘spiritual renewal’ 
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of Judaism, to the mix.127 For the purposes of this study, the domains earmarked by 
Avnery and Matzpen for revision will be considered post-Zionism. 
Allowing for some overlaps, post-Zionists discussed four issues.  First, they 
urged to apply the colonialist theory to Israel’s foundation, producing an alternative 
narrative to the one attributed to the ‘hegemonic Zionist majority’. Their narrative 
claimed that Israel was a colonialist creation, albeit with a twist in the sense that the 
metropolitan ‘mother country’ was Britain, a surrogate parent - as opposed to a real 
‘mother country’ relation as in the case of Australia or Canada. Even so, the 
consequences of Israel’s birth were the same as they led to the dispossession of the 
indigenous Palestinian population.  During the 1970s, Matzpen and Khamsin carried a 
number of articles based on the colonialist perspective. In July 1975 Ehud Ein-Gil 
(later an editor in Haaretz newspaper) endeavoured to prove that Tel Aviv was not 
built on sand, as the Zionist narrative would have it, but on the lands of a number of 
Arab villages. The May 1976 issue listed Jewish villages erected on top of derelict 
Arab localities within the Green Line and the last publication, in the summer of 1983, 
included a long article about Ben-Gurion’s plans to expel the Arabs in 1948.128 
Second, Avnery and his peers accused Zionism of discrimination and racism 
towards the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians.  As they saw it, the nationalist Israeli 
state relegated its own Arab population to second class status through a mixture of 
institutional discrimination and personal racism. The military administration imposed 
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on the Arab population in the wake of the 1948 war for security reasons was a prime 
exhibit.  Though the military administration was lifted in 1962, the Israeli government 
restricted the activities of certain nationalist Arab parties, prompting Matzpen to 
protest.129 Institutional discrimination aside, Avnery and the post-Zionists argued that, 
imbued with ‘colonialist spirit’ and Western ideology, Zionist Jews looked down 
upon Arabs and Palestinians as culturally and socially inferior. Indeed, using the same 
logic, the post-Zionists argued that Zionism had pushed Israel into the Western 
hegemonic orbit and away from the culture of the Middle East, a claim not dissimilar 
to Canaanism. 
Third, post-Zionists accused Zionism of racism towards the Mizrahim, or 
Oriental Jews. Matzpen struck up close relations with the Black Panthers, a movement 
of mainly Moroccan Jews modelled on the American Black Panthers. Ilan Halevi 
served as a liaison to the Black Panthers but others provided much of the theorizing 
on the ‘dialectical contradictions’ in the relationship between Zionism and the 
Mizrahim. For instance, a Khamsin article maintained that Zionism was an Ashkenazi 
movement that invented ‘Jewish unity’ to get the largest possible number of 
immigrants - that is ‘human raw material for the Zionist enterprise’. Once in Israel, 
the Mizrahim were considered inferior and often referred to as ‘black’; the state 
reinforced such perceptions by adopting a paternalistic attitude towards these 
immigrants. In addition, Machover and Orr argued that ‘in the context of the colonial 
society in Israel’ class and ethnicity overlapped as ‘the majority of the most exploited 
strata within the working class are immigrants from Africa and Asia’ prevented from 
social mobility by the dominant Ashkenazi elite which needed workers for menial 
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jobs. Politically, the lower-class Mizrahim provided ‘reactionary’ Arab-hating voters 
that bolstered right wing parties.130 
In a rather unorthodox use of the racist label, the post-Zionists even accused 
Israeli Jews of behaving cruelly towards East European Jews during the Holocaust.  
The charge was apparently based on a loose interpretation of accusations made by the 
American Council of Judaism and Ihud to the effect that Zionists refused offers of 
resettling Jewish refugees outside Palestine. According to the Matzpen version, 
Zionists, like anti-Semites, called on Jews to leave Europe and ‘go to Palestine’, but 
did not take part in saving them unless they could be directed there.  To prove the so-
called ‘cruel Zionism’ theory, Matzpen revealed a ‘hidden truth’ about alleged Zionist 
machination. Machover and Orr quoted from a 1938 letter where Ben-Gurion 
allegedly stated:  ‘If Jews will have to choose between the refugees and [contributing 
to the Yishuv], mercy would have the upper hand and the whole energy of the 
[Jewish] people would be channelled into saving Jews… Zionism will be struck from 
the agenda’.  Machover and Orr implied that Zionists opposed offers from the United 
States to rescue Jews and transfer them to other countries. To Machover and his 
colleagues the treatment of Holocaust victims, like that of the Mizrahim, was a prime 
example of Zionist willingness to manipulate vulnerable populations for the sake of 
hegemonic goals.131 
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Fourth, the post-Zionists charged that Zionism reproduced the ‘bourgeois’ 
gender role models and that, because of Israel’s militarization, women could not 
aspire to genuine equality. Nira Yuval-Davis - an early Matzpen member and later a 
sociology professor at the University of East London - claimed that Jewish women in 
Israel were following the ‘false consciousness’ imposed by society and could not 
aspire to true liberation and freedom in a Zionist imposed nationalism.132 
Linking women’s issues to a call to settle the conflict by creating a Jewish-
Palestinian federation - a standard Matzpen prescription - carried risks. Some of 
nascent women groups in Israel balked at an association with post-Zionists for fear of 
hurting their public standing. The first feminist conference in 1972 reflected these 
tensions and, by way of avoiding a split, adopted a somewhat vague manifesto that 
called to fight oppression and abuse of women. In practical terms, Matzpen made only 
limited inroads into the feminist movement, which preferred concentrating on 
building shelters for abused women. Those truly faithful to a post-Zionist version of 
feminism were either members of Matzpen, such as Yuval-Davis, Amira Gelblum - 
later a history lecturer at Israel’s Open University - and wives and girlfriends of 
Matzpen members, such as Leah Tzemel, Aviva Ein-Gil, Sylvia Kleingberg, and Ilana 
Hanegbi. Even so, allegations that Matzpen ‘did not care about women’s issues’ 
dogged the group.  In 1982, Gelblum left the group to concentrate fully on feminism. 
Devising a more sophisticated and coherent perspective was a significant step 
towards gaining a wider audience. Yet despite the considerable support abroad, at the 
beginning of 1980s the post-Zionists were still a tiny movement, more likely to be 
known because of the flamboyant Avnery. As a reviewer of a recent Avnery 
biography noted, the journalist and ‘other talented members of his generation’ who 
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dreamed about discarding ‘the traditional foundations of Judaism’ and turning Israel 
into a ‘progressive Hebrew-speaking nation’ rode on the notoriety of his weekly 
tabloid, a studious mix of intellectual fare, sensationalist scoops and semi-nude 
women who appeared on the last page’.133 Clearly, more was needed to mainstream 
post-Zionist ideas in the public discourse of Israel. As before, a number of factors 
seemed to give credence to Mazpen’s ideas.  
Mainstreaming Post-Zionism  
With its arduous fighting and high number of casualties the October 1973 war 
undermined much of the euphoria of the previous war. Though ultimately victorious, 
many Israelis, notably the better educated, came to reflect upon the Zionist concept - 
long taken for granted - that military power was needed to protect the Jews. Peace 
Now was formed in 1978 when some 350 officers and soldiers from combat units sent 
a letter to the Prime Minister Menachem Begin contending that Israel could not retain 
its democratic nature while occupying a large number of Palestinians and that its only 
hope was to reach a peace agreement with its Arab neighbours.134 
It was also around the time of the 1973 war that the Israeli leadership 
concluded, albeit privately, that Dayan’s ‘low cost occupation’ had become 
ineffectual. The PLO was gaining dominance in the West Bank and Gaza by 
undermining the traditional clan-based elite loyal to the Hashemite dynasty in Jordan. 
In 1974 the PLO was recognized by the Arab League as ‘the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people’, a claim that was effectively accepted by the 
United Nations.  After King Hussein expelled the PLO from Jordan during the ‘Black 
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September’ of 1970, it moved to Lebanon, where it established a state within a state in 
the south of the country.   
The Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords of September 1978 and the peace 
treaty of March 1979 made little change in the increasing difficulty of controlling the 
territories. The accords stipulated that, during an unspecified transition period, the 
Palestinians would receive limited autonomy, but when Israel created the civilian 
administration as part of the process in 1980, it made matters worse. Fiercely opposed 
to the Israeli-Egyptian deal, the PLO and its public front in the territories, the National 
Guidance Committee, warned the population not to comply. In what proved to be a 
vicious circle, the increasingly harsh Israeli reprisals gave the PLO more legitimacy to 
intensify its attacks on Israel’s civilian population. After a series of failed Israeli 
efforts to prevent Palestinian attacks from Lebanon, the Begin government ordered 
the military into Lebanon in June 1982. Much to the surprise of almost everyone, the 
IDF extended its operation to Beirut where the PLO sheltered among the population.  
While the operation was successful in forcing the PLO to relocate to Tunisia, its cost 
was high both to Israeli forces and to Lebanese civilians. When the Christian 
Phalanges allied to Israel massacred hundreds of Palestinians in the refugee camps of 
Sabra and Shatila in September in retaliation for the murder of its leader and 
Lebanon’s President Bashir Gumayel, the war turned into a huge public relations 
debacle for Israel at home and abroad.   Its architect, Defence Minister Sharon, was 
directly blamed for the massacre and forced to resign, while Begin, unable to deal 
with the fallout, went into a slow psychological decline. 
The Lebanon war proved a boon for the post-Zionists who hoped to work with 
new groups that found the Peace Now too timid. Among them was the influential 
Yesh Gvul - variously translated as ‘there is a limit’ or ‘enough is enough’ - a group of 
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combat soldiers who refused to serve in Lebanon and then expanded its negation of 
service to the West Bank and Gaza. The Twenty One Year and Dai Lakibush (Enough 
to Occupation) presented Matzpen themes to younger audiences, including the crucial 
high school seniors who contemplated service refusal. Speaking for the Zionist left, 
Amos Oz, a leading literary figure, echoed post-Zionist themes when he lamented the 
transformation of Israel from an exemplary, egalitarians, cultured, and peace-loving 
society to one permeated with nationalism, chauvinisms, clericalism and primitive to 
boot. Oz blamed East European Holocaust survivors for an undue reliance on military 
power, and anti-socialist immigrants for creating ‘pocket of capitalism’. Others were 
blunter, charging the Mizrahim who contributed to the victory of Likud and 
‘messianic zealots’ - their euphemism for the National Religious Party (NRP) settlers 
and a critical partner in the Likud coalition - for corrupting the founding vision of 
Zionism.135  
In a parallel development the American Jewish community found the Likud 
coalition in general and the Lebanon war in particular upsetting. The community had 
greeted Begin’s election in 1977 with apprehension bordering on dismay. To many 
the new leader ‘with his Polish accent’ and ‘formal manners’ looked like an Old 
World uncle who had suddenly emerged from the shadows of the Diaspora. His 
political vision of ‘Greater Israel’ was even more alarming to many of them.  Likud 
supporters - Mizrahim and Orthodox Jews - did not sit well with a community steeped 
in secular and liberal values. Soon after, a number of groups sprang up to protest 
Israel’s policies of occupation and the war in Lebanon. Breira and its successor, the 
New Israel Agenda, as well as American Friends of Peace Now were among the first 
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to organize. The New Israel Fund, which provided funding for post-Zionist-leaning 
projects, had an important impact. Tikkun, a publication of the architect of Jewish 
spiritual renewal, the leftist Rabbi Michael Lerner, was equally important as it became 
a chief forum for post-Zionist writing in America, many by Israeli post-Zionists.  Not 
surprisingly, much of the new protest borrowed themes from the all but forgotten 
American Council for Judaism, reviving interest in Buber’s ideology.136   
The turmoil engendered by the Lebanon war and the increasingly explosive 
situation in the territories gave the post-Zionists a wider exposure and, indeed, 
political respectability.  Even before the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987, 
the notion that there was no such thing as a ‘benevolent occupation’ seemed to be 
getting a wider hearing. The sense of vindication that Mazpen’s warnings about the 
‘evils of occupation’ were coming true, was an important asset in changing the public 
discourse. Still, as per Gramsci’s observations, changing public beliefs could not be 
accomplished without penetrating the institutions of higher learning.  As noted above, 
Magnes understood full well that a real change of opinion could only come from a 
cadre of scholars financially secured and intellectually legitimized by academic 
appointments. In fact, his foresight bore fruit as a relative large number of Brit 
Shalom professors came of age at the Hebrew University.  Some of Matzpen’s own 
members joined the faculties of the newer universities, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Ben-
Gurion respectively.  In addition, many students who became radicalized in the 
aftermath of the Lebanon war went on to obtain graduate academic degrees. Tracing 
these developments from a vantage point of time, Hazony commented that, although 
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Brit Shalom was virtually written off in the 1950s, its enduring impact became clear 
in the faculty-based burgeoning post-Zionist movement.137 
In what was another fortuitous twist for post-Zionism, the new academic 
cohorts, a majority of whom studied in the United States or Britain, arrived at the time 
of a sea change in the humanities and social sciences. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the new development combined the neo-Marxist, critical scholarship 
paradigm with Gramsci’s call to turn academic pursuit into political advocacy.  
Starting with post-Zionist history, in due course the Matzpen themes penetrated 
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Chapter 3  From Rewriting to Inventing History  
Surveying the field of critical scholarship and its associated disciplines in the 
early 1970s, few would have predicted its dramatic impact on the academic depiction 
of Israel. As we have seen, Galtung was one of the first to apply critical principles to 
the circumstances of Israel’s founding and the influential neo-Marxist scholars viewed 
international relations as an asymmetrical ‘top-dog-underdog’ structure where the 
powerful Western actors subjugated weak indigenous populations. The Institute for 
Policy Studies (IPS), a radical leftist group founded in 1963, took Galtung’s 
arguments one step further. In 1971 IPS launched its Middle East Research and 
Information Project (MERIP) and the Transnational Institute under the Chilean 
communist Orlando Letelier.  Four years later MERIP created something of a 
firestorm with a report titled ‘Middle East Studies in the United States’, suggesting 
that Middle East scholars were part of the apparatus of subjugation, ‘an instrument of 
control over the peoples of the Middle East’. Indeed, the report denounced the leading 
experts of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), known as ‘Orientalists’ for 
practicing ‘imperialist science’. The journal Race and Class provided accounts of 
imperialist and colonialist practices in the Middle East, notably against the Palestinian 
people.138 
Under normal circumstances the challenge to the ‘orientalists’ would have 
been more difficult. However, in 1978, under pressure from the Carter administration, 
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the Shah of Iran decided to liberalize his regime triggering a full-scale revolution, 
which discredited many MESA leaders such as Leonard Binder and George 
Lenczowski who vouched for the resilience of the regime even as the Shah was losing 
control. A special issue of Race and Class chastised ‘Orientalists’ for ignoring the 
fragility of the Pahlavi regime because of their service to ‘imperialism’. Other critics 
pointed out that the European or American trained scholars were incapable of 
understanding the realities of the Middle East.139 But it was Edward Said who, as we 
have seen, cemented the view that Middle East scholarship in the West was an 
intellectual construct aimed at legitimizing imperialism and colonialism. As one critic 
put it, ‘Orienalism made it acceptable, even expected, for scholars to spell out their 
own political commitments as a preface to anything they wrote or did. More than that, 
it also enshrined an acceptable hierarchy of political commitments, with Palestine at 
the top… [as] they were the long-suffering victims of Western racism, American 
imperialism, and Israeli Zionism’.140 
While the main brunt of the anti-Orientalist assault took place in the United 
States, it had its counterparts elsewhere. Roger Owen, then head of the Middle East 
Centre at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, called Orientalism ‘politically 
charged obscurantism’ and praised Said for doing ‘such a good job of undermining 
the authority of the old guard’.141 Small wonder that those Matzpen members who had 
moved to Britain understood that in the climate of shifting academic identity politics 
the new narrative would be served well if written by Jews, or, even better, by Israeli 
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Jews, who could enhance the legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative and relieve the 
burden of anti-Semitism: ‘Western liberals previously too frightened to speak out for 
fear of being called anti-Semitic’.142 Arguably, Owen’s decision to groom three Israeli 
academics at St. Antony’s was a step in this direction. 
Benny Morris was the first of the trio. Having written his doctorate in 
Cambridge on Anglo-German relations, Morris became, by his own admission, highly 
disenchanted with Begin’s right wing government and the Lebanon war. In the 1980s, 
he spent some time at St. Antony’s College working on his influential The Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem. In the forward to the book he acknowledged his ‘large 
debt’ to Owen for facilitating the research.143   
     Ilan Pappe was equally well suited for the task. As a student of Middle East history 
at the Hebrew University, Pappe was, in his own words, exposed to ‘the plight of the 
Palestinians’. Motivated to produce a pro-Palestinian narrative, he rejected the 
traditional regard for ‘truth’ because he viewed ‘any such construction as vain and 
presumptuous’ and in the way of his ‘compassion for the colonized not the colonizer’.   
Working under Owen on a doctoral dissertation about the 1948 war enabled him to 
take a decisive step towards challenging the ‘pro-Israel narrative’. As Pappe put it, 
Owen ‘had strong ties to the British left and the pro-Palestinian scholarly world’. He 
noted that his second adviser, Albert Hourani, who had testified in the 1946 Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry on behalf of the Arab cause ‘was well acquainted 
with the ‘Palestinian narrative’.144 Indeed, in the words of one observer, Hourani’s 
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testimony ‘remains to this day a powerfully argued statement of Arab opposition to 
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine’.145 
Avi Shlaim, an ex-Israeli scholar, taught at Reading University for almost two 
decades where he specialized in European issues. Asked to serve as an external reader 
for Pappe’s doctoral dissertation, Shlaim gradually switched his attention to the 
history of the 1948 war. The career change paid off handsomely; despite a scant 
publishing record on the Middle East at the time, Shlaim became a reader at St. 
Antony’s College in 1987 and later a professor of International Relations.146 
Owen’s protégées surpassed all expectations by producing a revolution in 
Israeli historiography that sent shockwaves through the political community in Israel 
and created a stir abroad.  
The ‘New Historians’: 1948 as a tool of de-legitimization 
When Morris, Shlaim and Pappe published their books - The Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem, Collusion Across the Jordan and Britain and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict in 1987-88, the initial reaction was minimal. To provide the group 
with a wider exposure, Michael Lerner, who, as noted in Chapter 2, drew inspiration 
from the American Council on Judaism, convened a ‘mini-conference’ at the Van 
Leer Institute in Jerusalem in 1988. His magazine Tikkun published an article by 
Morris under the rather sensationalist title ‘The New Historiography: Israel Confronts 
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Its Past’, thus coining the group’s collective name - ‘New Historians’.147 According to 
Pappe, the trio adopted the New History label because the alternative revisionist 
history was associated with Jabotinsky’s Revisionist movement, parent of today’s 
Likud party.148 
Taking a page from the ‘anti-orientalist’ playbook, the ‘new historians’ 
claimed to be free of the alleged political and personal biases of their ‘old’ 
predecessors, who ‘were unable to separate their lives from this historical event [the 
creation of the State], unable to regard impartially and objectively the facts and 
processes that they later wrote about’. Morris found the New Historians ‘to be more 
impartial’, a view shared by Shlaim who claimed that the ‘old guards’ could not be 
trusted to deliver an objective account as they were not professional historians or 
worse, hagiographers comporting to a ‘popular-heroic-moralistic’ version of 1948.149 
Attacking traditional Israeli history as a ‘popular-heroic-moralistic’ narrative 
was at the heart of the ‘new historiography’ project. By proving that Israel’s 
beginnings were anything but heroic or moral, the New Historians hoped to 
delegitimize the State of Israel in the international arena. In Morris’s words: 
If Israel, the haven of a much-persecuted people, was born pure and innocent, 
then it was worthy of the grace, material assistance and political support 
showered upon it by the West… If, on the other hand, Israel was born 
tarnished, besmirched by original sin, then it was no more deserving of that 
grace and assistance than were its neighbours. 
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Shlaim was equally explicit, accusing one traditional critic of clinging ‘to the doctrine 
of Israel’s immaculate conception’.150 
Broadly based on the Galtung-Said topology, the three new historians offered 
a view of the 1948 war hand-tailored to prove that Israel had inflicted an injustice on 
the Palestinian Arabs and - far from being a valiant underdog - was actually a top dog 
abetted by imperialist Britain. To justify the novel take on the events, all three 
claimed that the newly released Israeli documents made their research possible. 
Morris offered a high profile critique of the traditional view that the majority 
of the Palestinians fled on their own or on orders from local leaders. Though 
admitting that ‘what happened in Palestine/Israel over 1947-9 was so complex and 
varied… that a single-cause explanation of the exodus from most sites is untenable’, 
his analysis put most of the blame on Israel.  Indeed, Morris quoted extensively from 
the diaries of Joseph Weitz, an official in charge of land settlement, to demonstrate 
that Israel expelled the Palestinian Arabs to seize their lands. To add historical 
context, Morris explained that the Peel Commission first suggested population 
exchange in conjunction with its partition proposal in 1937; the Palestinian Arabs 
rejected partition out of hand, but, according to Morris, Ben-Gurion and other Jewish 
leaders mulled over the population exchange, or ‘transfer’ as it came to be known, in 
private. He described Plan D, developed by the Hagana, the forerunner of the Israel 
Defence Force (IDF) in March 1948 as a military roadmap for rebuffing the 
anticipated pan-Arab attack; and while he did not feel that the plan was primarily 
geared to expelling the Palestinian Arabs, he was clear that Israel drugged its feet 
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during the 1949 Lausanne conference that dealt with the refugees issue and, 
practically prevented their return.151 
While Morris concentrated on the dynamics of expulsion he paid considerable 
attention to the balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians.  In an expanded 
edition of his book, he alluded to the need to debunk the ‘David and Goliath’ 
depictions of traditional historiography.152 In Morris’s version, far from being the 
‘little David’ facing the Arab Goliath, the Jewish community was actually superior in 
‘traditional indices of strength’ such as ‘command and control, manpower and 
weaponry’ and good intelligence.153 By contrast, the ‘Palestinian Arabs were 
backward, disunited and often apathetic’, they ‘failed completely to organize itself 
into a statehood and [when the British left] they slid into chaos’. In the ensuing 
‘confusion and anarchy’ armed bands roamed the neighbourhoods and police 
abandoned their weapons.154 
Though Shlaim claimed to provide a ‘novel and undoubtedly controversial 
interpretation’ of the Palestinian tragedy, his book essentially followed the ‘Arab 
narrative’ on the issue. He asserted that the Jewish leaders and King Abdullah of 
Transjordan reached an agreement ‘to carve up the British mandate’, dividing the 
territory allotted to the Palestinians by the UN partition resolution. This ‘unholy 
alliance between Abdullah and the Zionists’ was allegedly based on their fear of a 
common enemy, the Palestinian leader Hajj Amin Husseini. Moreover, in Shlaim’s 
view Britain, eager to assure its colonial interest in the Middle East, was an active 
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partner in the collusion scheme. In his words, Sir John Glubb, the English commander 
of the Transjordanian army known as the Arab Legion, was a ‘British proconsul’ 
implementing London’s directives in Amman. Contrary to the traditional view that 
Bevin was a ‘callous, brutal enemy of the Jewish state’, determined to ‘cut the Jewish 
state to size’, Shlaim found the British government pragmatic enough to realize that 
Israel was important to the wellbeing of Transjordan. No less important was the 
support of Israel’s new friend, the president of the United States. As Shlaim put it, 
Harry Truman ‘played a lamentable or duplicitous role’ by assuring the Jewish leaders 
of his support behind the back of the State Department.155 
Not incidentally, Shlaim used the collusion theory to debunk some of Israel’s 
foundational ‘myths’, including the idea that the Jews fought a ‘war of survival in 
1948’.  He explained that this perception was coloured by the destruction of European 
Jewry rather than the real balance of power between the parties. But, in his opinion, 
the agreement kept the Arab Legion, by far the strongest military force, away from an 
all out engagement with the Israeli forces.  As Shlaim saw it, combined with the poor 
performance of the other Arab armies and the virtual disintegration of the 
Palestinians, the collusion gambit gave Israel a substantial military advantage.  Like 
Morris, he also attributed some of the Israeli success to an ‘effective intelligence 
gathering service’, especially an ‘outstanding Arab section’ in the Political 
Department of the Jewish Agency. Taken together, Shlaim felt that his research 
undermined ‘the war of survival myth but also the legend of a monolithic Arab 
attitude toward Israel’.156 
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Compared to Shlaim’s expansive treatment, Pappe’s contribution was 
relatively modest and, ironically, differed on key issues.   He described British policy 
in Palestine as ‘ad hoc’ with ‘scarcely any planning’ yet opposed to the creation of a 
Jewish state because of a potential communist connection.  As for the collusion thesis, 
Pappe felt that, at best, it was partial, noting that in Gush Etzion (the site of an early 
Arab League operation), ‘there was an agreement, but it was neither written nor 
biding’.  In Jerusalem, the difference between Abdullah and the Jews was so great that 
it had to be settled on the battlefield. Pappe’s portrayal of Abdullah was less than 
flattering; he was said to be susceptible to pressure from Arab states and at least on 
one occasion, when cornered, was caught lying about a map delineating a border with 
Israel.157 
In subsequent version, Pappe provided a more radical account of events. He 
agreed with Shlaim that the division of Palestine between Jews and Transjordan was 
‘the only peace plan considered’ during the war. Pappe’s stand on the refugees was 
particularly blunt. Though allowing that some Palestinians left before they were 
expelled, he claimed that ‘Plan D was an important factor accounting for the exodus 
of so great a number of Palestinians’. As for the balance of power, Pappe was 
emphatic that the Jews did not face the ‘Holocaust or Masada’. Repeating the Morris-
Shlaim argument, he asserted that the well-organized Jews were ahead of the game 
whereas the ‘Palestinian elite had abandoned responsibility when it was most needed’. 
The Arab armies did not change the balance, in his view, because they had no combat 
experience and could not match the organizational and intelligence skills of the 
IDF.158 
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Scholars that embraced the Middle East Studies Association paradigm 
received the New Historians with enthusiasm, though some felt that Morris and his 
colleagues did not state clearly enough that the ‘Palestine Arabs were expelled 
systematically and with premeditations’.159 Much of the commentary lauded Morris, 
Shlaim and Pappe for proving that Israel was born in ‘original sin’. As Zachary 
Lockman noted, ‘Zionism’s victims must be made to disappear or, if that fails, to bear 
the blame for their situation’.160 
     Conversely, the New Historians were harshly criticized by those whom they 
labelled ‘old historians’ (though some of them were actually younger than the New 
Historians).  Leading the way was Shabtai Teveth, a Ben-Gurion biographer who 
accused Morris and his colleagues of considerable bias and failure to use Arab 
sources.  Reflecting on the larger discursive context, Teveth argued that the New 
Historiography mustered sources sympathetic to the Arab narrative while accusing 
Israel of ‘original sin’.161 
The New Historians forcefully denied besmirching the image of Israel. Morris 
wrote that the ‘possibility that [his work] might be subsequently used by 
propagandists and…politicians is of no concern of the historian,’ adding it was his 
duty to ‘penetrate the murk of the past’ regardless of the contemporary politics.162 
Shlaim stated that ‘to me the historical truth is more important than the contemporary 
image or interests of one of the parties’. He accused Teveth of reflecting ‘the 
                                                          
159
 Norman Finkelstein, ‘Rejoinder to Benny Morris’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 21 
(Winter 1992), p. 61.    
160
 Zachary Lockman, ‘Original Sin’, Middle East Report, no. 152 (May-June, 1988); 
Lockman and Joel Beinin (eds.), Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against the 
Israeli Occupation (London: Tauris, 1989).  
161
 Shabtai Teveth, ‘Charging Israel with Original Sin’, Commentary, March, 1989.  
162
  Morris, 1948 and After, pp. 27, 29; Morris, ‘The Eel and History: A Replay to 
Shabtai Tevet’, Tikkun, vol. 5, 1990.    
100 
 
hypocrisy that is so characteristic of the Labour establishment’, that he ‘insists on 
claiming for Israel not just the twenty pieces of silver but also the crown of thorns’.163 
Under normal circumstance, Morris’s reference to ‘original sin’ and Shlaim’s 
comment on Jesus and Judas Iscariot should have been puzzling, especially as the 
decidedly secular theme of the 1948 war did not require Christian imagery to analyse. 
A number of critics argued that the New Historians were aware that such ‘highly 
charged language’ was instrumental in delegitimizing Israel in the eye of a Western, 
Christian audience. One went so far as to suggest that there was a sinister anti-Semitic 
quality to such usage.164 Manipulation of Christian symbols aside, a number of 
scholars offered an in-depth critique of New History project. 
Efraim Karsh, a professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King’s 
College London, provided arguably the most comprehensive critique of the New 
History. Karsh’s major reservation pertained to the misuse of sources by the New 
Historians. By comparing original documents with the versions presented in their 
writings, he determined that the New Historians ‘rewrote’, ‘fabricated’ or otherwise 
distorted certain accounts to suit the conclusions.  For instance, he found no evidence 
that Ben-Gurion condoned or authorized the transfer of the Palestinian Arab 
population as alleged by Morris and Pappe, and that Shlaim’s ‘collusion that never 
was’ was lifted from Arab anti-Hashemite historiography that sought to paint 
Abdullah as a tool of Zionism. Karsh considered the claim that the British were party 
to the collusion particularly ridiculous, writing that ‘for contemporary Jewish leaders 
Bevin and his advisers were implacable enemies, and vice versa; to Shlaim and Pappe 
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they were all bosom friends without their own knowledge’ and the ‘guardian angel of 
the Jewish state’.165 
Karsh reserved some of his most penetrating analysis to the empirical 
contradictions and logical lapses in the books. He pointed out that, in his haste to 
discredit the notion that Jews waged a ‘heroic struggle’ Pappe proclaimed that the 
outcome ‘had been predetermined in the political and diplomatic corridors of power 
long before even one shot had been fired’. Karsh asked how was it that the Jews, 
despite the alleged benefit of an international collusion and battlefield superiority, 
suffered 6000 fatalities – a full one per cent of the population - in addition to the loss 
of half of Jerusalem and the destruction of numerous settlements. As for the morale 
issue, Karsh pointed out that Morris did not mention that the Jews, facing equally 
severe obstacles and a higher relative casualty rate than the Palestinian Arabs, did not 
take to the road.166 
All in all, Karsh asserted that there was nothing new in the New 
Historiography, which effectively recycled old, partisan accounts so as to give them ‘a 
scholarly seal of approval’.  To Karsh, the distortions of Morris and his peers were not 
a fluke but ‘a modus operandi of a sizeable group of academics, journalists, and 
commentators, who had predicted their professional careers on rewriting Israel’s 
history’ at a time when the scholarly community was extremely welcoming to this 
approach, in the process violating any and all tenets of scholarly research and 
integrity.167  
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  When Roger Owen groomed the New Historians in their early steps, the 
prospects of Arab-Israeli peace process were grim despite numerous peace efforts by 
Washington and the Europeans. The PLO remained as opposed as ever to recognizing 
Israel and give up terrorism while Jerusalem felt no compulsion to negotiate with the 
organization despite international pressure. Yet the intifada had increased the cost of 
‘business as usual’ for Israel.  Much to the frustration of the IDF, the popular uprising 
proved difficult to suppress, generating growing unease in Israel with the unsettled 
situation with many prominent leftwing intellectuals complaining of the occupation’s 
growing moral toll on society. David Grossman’s Yellow Wind, portraying in stark 
colours the reality of Palestinian life under occupation became a bestseller. Opinion 
polls in the late 1980s and early 1990s showed Israelis to be physically exhausted and 
morally confused by the intifada.168 
Desperate to settle the Palestinian issue, in late 1992 the newly formed Labour 
government headed by Yitzhak Rabin authorized secret informal talks with a PLO 
delegation in Oslo. The culmination of the talks in the PLO-Israel Declaration of 
Principles (DOP, or Oslo I as it was known), signed on the White House lawn on 13 
September 1993, greatly excited the New Historians. Pappe, in particular, felt that the 
‘reconstruction of the past was now clearly connected to contemporary efforts to 
reach a political settlement’ and that this ‘constituted the most valuable aspect of the 
new history’.  In his account, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, who initiated and 
steered the secret negotiations, had ‘produced the new history books’ to convince the 
Palestinians that their narrative was accepted.169 
For Pappe, by then an established activist in the communist Hadash Party, the 
new agreement offered a golden opportunity for delegitimizing the birth of Israel.  
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Though somewhat of a late comer to the field of critical studies - he recalled being 
both intimidated and sometimes bored by ‘the postmodernist and neo-Marxist 
arguments’ - he quickly got involved in Theory and Criticism (Teoria ve Bikoret), a 
neo-Marxist journal sponsored by the Van Leer Institute. The journal, which 
specialized in deconstructing Zionism as a colonialist movement, inspired Pappe to 
view his historical work in the broader ‘anti-colonialist struggle’ of the Palestinian 
people. Around that time Pappe met Said who left a lasting impression: ‘Ever since 
then I have felt that his dual involvement in both human sciences and the concrete 
Palestine case study turned his comments into the best guidelines for future academic 
involvement in the conflict’.170 
Pappe put his academic-political activism to work by cofounding, in the 
summer of 1997, the Palestinian Israeli Academic Dialogue (Palisad), a group of 
twenty Israeli and Palestinian historians to provide ‘bridging narratives’ between the 
two people that, by his account, ‘worked almost frantically, motivated by a sense of 
urgency in the wake of the deadlock and dissatisfaction with the Oslo peace process’.  
The ‘bridging narrative’, among other things, was meant to help the Israeli 
participants to accept the Palestinian perspective on 1948 war. Somewhat to their 
surprise, they learned that the revelations of the New Historiography, notably the 
‘ethnic cleansing of Palestine’ (to borrow the title of Pappe’s later book) was already 
part of the Palestinian narrative. 
Pappe’s immersion in critical scholarship and academic activism bore fruit. He 
renounced the positivist methodology and diplomatic history that had guided his 
earlier books to accommodate the Palestinian argument that positivism could not 
convey their part of the story. As he put it, ‘From a positivist point of view, there was 
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no clear evidence for some of the major claims made by the Palestinian narrative, 
such as the existence of a master plan for the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 or the 
forty massacres alleged to have occurred during the conflict’. Instead, he decided to 
write in ways ‘connecting my research on Palestine to the present Palestinian 
predicament and the contemporary attempt to reach a solution’. 171 
Overcoming some ‘epistemological and methodological challenges’, Pappe 
was able to frame his research within the ‘post-colonialist perspective’ claiming that 
from the outset the Zionist project was aimed at expelling the Palestinians to create an 
ethnically pure Jewish state. Reiterating that in 1948 the Jews faced no threat of 
annihilation, he suggested that the military parity on the ground was bolstered by 
American and British support for the Jews. Departing from his earlier writing and 
following in Shlaim’s footsteps he argued that, despite his ‘domination’ by Israeli 
historiography, Bevin supported the idea of a Jewish state, not the least because of the 
guilt over the Holocaust. Finally, Pappe suggested that, despite the ‘myth of Arab 
intransigence’, the Arabs were willing to compromise; the failure to prevent the war 
or to resolve the conflict, in his opinion, laid with the Jews. Expanding further on the 
theme of ‘Zionism and Colonialism’ he concluded that the Zionist project was 
comparable to other ‘mixed’ colonialist projects in Asia and Africa.172 
In yet another effort to make historical research favourable to the Palestinian 
cause Pappe concentrated on what he would ultimately describe as ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
of the Palestinians. In a lengthy chapter titled ‘Were They Expelled? The History, 
Historiography and Relevance of the Refugee Problem’ he rejected the argument that 
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the Palestinians fled either on their own or at the urging of their leadership claiming 
that even the limited call of the Mufti for women and children to leave was ignored by 
the Palestinians: ‘Before women and children could be evacuated, they were expelled 
with the men from their homes’. Forgoing his customary use of Morris’s book, he 
took to citing Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian scholar who was an early exponent of the 
expulsion theory, stating:  ‘So, Plan D was, in many ways, just what Khalidi claims it 
was - a master plan for the expulsion of as many Palestinians as possible’.173 
Pappe’s newly-found conviction that Israel was exclusively responsible for the 
refugee problem was closely related to the peace negotiations.  The DOP was sketchy 
enough to allow an interim confidence-building period before the settlement of such 
explosive issues as the partition of Jerusalem and the fate of the 1948 refugees.  In 
preparation for the final agreement Palestinian academic-activists launched a major 
effort to highlight the ‘right of return’ of Palestinians to their former homes in Israel, 
the standard Arab/Palestinian euphemism for Israel’s demographic subversion. Salim 
Tamari, coordinator of the Project for Palestinian Refugees Rights & Residency at the 
Alternative Information Centre run by former Matzpen activist Michel ‘Mikado’ 
Warschawski, and a participant in the Work Group on Refugees (WGR) created at the 
1991 Madrid Conference, asserted that ‘the right of return’ should not be to a 
Palestinian state only.174 By proving beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ that the refugees were 
expelled, Pappe hoped to lend legitimacy to a broader definition of ‘the right of 
return’, admitting that ‘The demand for associating the Palestinian narrative with the 
contemporary peace process was made throughout the Palestinian world’.175 
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While Pappe celebrated the post-positivist, critical studies approach, Morris, 
fearing that political activism could damage his self-proclaimed image of academic 
objectivity, tried to distance himself from his colleague. To recall, Karsh noted that 
‘Morris came to regard Pappe as a “fly in the ointment”, a discordant note when 
Morris’ sings the praise of “objective” history writing’.176 Things came to a head 
during a symposium on the history of 1948 sponsored by the Paris-based Le Monde 
Diplomatique in 1998 where Pappe censured Morris for failing to provide empirical 
evidence to support the Palestinian position that Zionism was a colonialist movement 
bent on cleansing the indigenous population. This, in turn, prompted the Palestinian 
participants to question the competence of Israeli academics to investigate their 
‘cultural holocaust’.177 
Based on contextual analysis of some of Morris’s writings, Aliza Craimer, an 
Oxford University researcher, demonstrated his growing ‘idealization of neutrality 
and objectivity’ in the 1990s. In the early work, Morris maintained that his research 
‘may also in some obscure way serve the purpose of peace and reconciliation between 
the warring tribes of this land’; oddly enough, as the Oslo process got underway, 
Morris adopted the posture of a historical purist ‘indicative of his rejection of 
judgment, blame along with apologies’. Craimer observed that Morris insisted that ‘it 
was possible for an historian to discover objective truth wherever the truth may lead’, 
but there was a certain sense of defensiveness in the assurance that ‘he did not try or 
aim to delegitimize Zionism’.178 
Karsh provided a possible motive for Morris’s growing unease with Pappe’s 
political use of the New Historiography, surmising that Morris, the chief architect of 
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the ‘assiduously cultivated heroic image of a small and courageous minority, 
persecuted by Israel's academic and intellectual establishment for its uncompromising 
quest for truth and justice’, was most likely to lose his lustre as a serious scholar.179 
Craimer hypothesized that Morris was stung by the critics on the left who, as noted, 
accused him of not going enough in damning Israel. Pointing out that he chided them, 
as well as Teveth, for applying a ‘simple-cause explanation of the Palestinian exodus’ 
appropriate for propaganda more than scholarship, she noted an increase in the 
frequency of such terms like complexity and nuance in Morris’s vocabulary.180 
Whatever the motives, there is little doubt that, by documenting instances of 
fabrication, Karsh forced Morris onto the defensive. The Economist and the Times 
Literary Supplement (London) carried several examples of documented falsification 
prompting Morris to concede that ‘Karsh had a point’.181 
Apparently affected by the turn of events Morris seemed to have become more 
subdued when he ‘revisited the Palestinian exodus’.  He made a point of emphasizing 
that ‘transfer thinking’ was spurred by the Peel Committee, but ‘how exactly this 
thinking affected Zionist policy and actions in the course of the 1948 war remains 
more complicated than some Arab researchers have suggested’.  This was also an 
apparent rebuke to Pappe, who had meanwhile adopted the Palestinian narrative of 
expulsion.182 
With Pappe and Morris pulling in different directions, Shlaim was left to chart 
his own way. Given his previous efforts to create an image of academic objectivity, he 
could have been expected to continue on this on path. Indeed, due to harsh criticism 
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of his collusion theory he changed the title of the second edition of his book to 
Politics of Partition, acknowledging in the preface that his previous terminology was 
‘polemical, loaded and pejorative’. Shlaim also reiterated his denials of politically 
motivated research and professed dedication to objectivity and neutrality.183  
A closer look at some of these statements, however, reveals a number of 
ambiguities and contradictions. In 1996 Shlaim expressed regret at dropping 
‘collusion’ from the second edition of the book; according to Craimer he subsequently 
‘worked in’ the concept of collusion through a variety of means, including such 
loaded phrases as ‘underhand schemes’ between Abdullah and the Zionists and 
‘unholy alliance’ between Transjordan and Israel.184 Evoking political objectivity 
enabled Shlaim to denounce Karsh for harbouring a political agenda and for 
advocating a ‘totalitarian conception of history’.185 
Yet Shlaim’s admission that he did not shy from passing judgment and took ‘a 
certain pleasure from targeting of sacred cows of Zionist history’ was telling. In 
another somehow sarcastic statement he attributed his ‘two decades of further 
research and reflection in the relative tranquillity offered by British universities’ to his 
‘heretical views’.186 Craimer speculated that Shlaim was still eager to convey the 
image of a detached and objective academic afforded by Reading and Oxford 
Universities. But Karsh, who deconstructed such professions of objectivity pointed 
out that not only did Shlaim enjoy growing media attention for his Israel indictment, 
but he was ‘the chief academic adviser to a six part BBC series coinciding with 
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Israel’s 50th Independence Day in 1998’ which, in his view, made the Jewish state 
look like the ‘regional villain’.187  
Not surprising, Morris was increasingly displeased with his fellow New 
Historians. He would later admit that Pappe’s penchant for fronting political 
motivations created a ‘methodological discord’ between them, lamenting that Shlaim 
showed lack of prudence by admitting during a Hebrew University conference that 
‘he willingly took up the office of both “judge and hangman”.’  Morris cautioned 
Shlaim that such self-revelations undermine the credibility of an objective 
historian.188 
Yet for all the talk on methodology, it was a political event that brought these 
simmering tensions into the open. By the end of the 1990s it had become increasingly 
clear that the peace process was stuck. When lunched in May 1994, the Palestinian 
Authority was hoped to be a model of democratic development in the Middle East.  
Instead, Yasser Arafat’s leadership it became a mismanaged, corrupt, and oppressive 
political entity. So much so that Edward Said and other champions of the Palestinian 
cause felt compelled to denounce Arafat and urge him to step down.  Arafat’s failure 
to generate legitimacy played into the hands of the Islamist Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
groups that constantly sought to undermine the peace process. Unwilling or unable to 
confront the Islamists, Arafat would not deliver the security-for-territory agreement 
implicit in the peace process.  
Things came to a head at the Camp David summit of July 2000 where Arafat 
rejected Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s proposal of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip 
and some 95 per cent of the West Bank, with east Jerusalem at its capital. Much to 
their surprise, the Israelis and the Americans realized that Arafat would not reach an 
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agreement without ‘the right of return’ for Palestinians - a deal breaker on the Israeli 
side. For Morris, already harbouring doubts about the PLO’s commitment to peace, 
the failed summit proved a tipping point. Surprising many fellow travellers on the 
Left, he went public with his disillusionment in an interview in the daily Yediot 
Aharonot which he summarized in a Guardian article. Denying having ‘undergone a 
brain transplant’ Morris explained that his ‘conversion’ was prompted by Arafat’s 
failure to respond to Barak, a ‘sincere and courageous’ leader.  He contended that the 
‘root problem’ was Palestinian denial - driven by the vision of a Greater Palestine - of 
the Jewish right to statehood and that the Palestinians were ill served by Arafat, whom 
he called a ‘worthy successor’ to Hajj Amin al-Husseini, a ‘trickster and liar’ and a 
Nazi collaborator to boot. With the centrality of ‘the right of return’ established by 
Camp David, Morris felt compelled to revisit his own contribution to enhancing the 
profile of the refugee problem. He pointed out that ‘critics of Israel subsequently 
latched on to those findings that highlighted Israeli responsibility while ignoring the 
fact that the problem was a direct consequence of the war that the Palestinians - and, 
in their wake, the surrounding Arab states - had launched’.  As for the new demands 
for repatriation into Israel Morris was adamant: ‘[I]f the refugees are allowed back, 
there will be god-awful chaos and, in the end, no Israel’.189 
Shlaim responded the next day with a blistering attack titled ‘Betrayal of 
History’. Lamenting the defection of the ‘trailblazer of new history’ he charged 
Morris’s reading of event as being ‘more in common with propaganda than with 
genuine history. Like most nationalist versions of history, it is simplistic, selective 
and self-serving’. Decrying the article as ‘a rambling and self-pitying monologue, 
seething with contempt and hatred for the Arabs in general and Palestinians in 
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particular’, he suggested that Morris’s inability to see the truth was due to ‘his 
deficient and defective’ view of recent history that led him to blame ‘the victims for 
their misfortunes’ and to join ‘the Israeli national sport’ of ‘Arafat bashing’.  Shlaim 
further chastised Morris for having ignored the account of Robert Malley, a former 
State Department official, whereby it was ‘Barak who mishandled’ the summit, and 
claimed that Morris ‘can no longer tell the difference between genuine history and 
fiction or fabrication along the lines of the Protocol of the Elders of Zion. At this rate 
Benny is in danger of becoming what Isaiah Berlin once described as “a very rare 
thing - a genuine charlatan”’. Needless to say, Shlaim blamed Israel’s expansionist 
policies and insatiable appetite for ‘Palestinian’ territory for the Camp David 
fiasco.190 
Undeterred, Morris published an interview with Barak in the New York Review 
of Books to rebut the ‘revisionist’ account of the summit based on Malley’s version of 
events (which he articulated together with Palestinian activist Hussein Agha). The 
Morris piece most memorable line pertained to Palestinian and Arab behaviour 
whereby he quoted Barak describing it as a ‘product of a culture in which to tell a 
lie… creates no dissonance. They don’t suffer from the problem of telling lies that 
exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category’. In a separate 
article, Morris assailed Arafat whom he accused of failing to negotiate and instead 
‘just saying no’.  Following a reaction from Malley and Agha, Morris responded with 
an attack on what he described as the ‘shopsoiled Palestinian Weltanschauung, that 
someone else, always, is to blame for their misfortunes - Ottoman Turks, British 
Mandate officials, Zionists, Americans, anyone but themselves’.191 
                                                          
190
 Avi Shlaim, ‘A Betrayal of History’, Guardian, 22 February 2002.   
191
 Benny Morris and Ehud Barak, ‘Camp David and After: An Exchange’, New York 
Review of Books, 13 June 2002;  Benny Morris and Ehud Barak, ‘Camp David and 
112 
 
Replete with name calling and accusations of betrayal, the breakup of the New 
Historians made for an interesting public spectacle and much commentary at the 
popular level. But, as Karsh hypothesized, changing political circumstances were 
likely to prompt the trio to alter yet again their accounts of the 1948 war, especially 
on the three key issues: culpability for the refugee problem, the balance of forces, and 
Zionism as colonialism. In the 2004 revised edition of The Birth, Morris disassociated 
himself further from the notion that Zionist thinking on transfer was implemented in 
1948. Though he was loath to disown his earlier assertions, he seemed to emphasize 
the ambiguity of the situation and the difficulty of making assessments as to who was 
responsible for what. Apparently hoping to lessen the impact of his 1987 book, Morris 
forcefully concluded: ‘But there was no pre-war Zionist plan to expel “the Arabs” 
from Palestine or the areas of the emergent Jewish state; and the Yishuv did not enter 
the war with a plan or a policy of expulsion’.192 
If Morris’s academic prose was quite circumspect, his lengthy interview in 
Haaretz on 9 January 2004 revealed a profound disenchantment with the Palestinians. 
He explained that the bombing of Israeli buses and restaurants full of civilians had 
‘shocked him’ because they exposed the true depth of Arab hatred. Juxtaposed with 
the 9/11 attacks, Morris viewed such strategy as a war between ‘civilization and 
barbarity’ fuelled by an Islamic religion that did not value human life and an ‘Arab 
tribal culture’ in which ‘revenge plays a central part’. Most astoundingly, current 
Palestinian behaviour led Morris to radically alter his view of the past. In the 
interview, he faulted Ben-Gurion for not expelling all of the Palestinians and justified 
ethnic cleansing on the grounds of self-defence: ‘A society that aims to kill you forces 
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you to destroy it. When the choice is between destroying or being destroyed, it’s 
better to destroy’.193 
Back to scholarly language, Morris’s self-revisionism was evident in yet 
another retelling of the 1948 story. In this new version the Palestinian exodus was 
viewed more as a flight than a planned Israeli expulsion-operation. He explained that 
the Palestinian society was ‘backward, largely illiterate, disorganized’; never robust, it 
‘fell apart’ and the ‘flight was the earliest and most concrete expression of Palestinian 
demoralization’. One factor that contributed, in this view, to the crumbling was the 
early defection of the elites: nurses and doctors fled, followed by functionaries at all 
levels, including medical drivers who fled with their families in their ambulances.194 
Morris’s new found appreciation for sociological factors led him to conclude 
that ‘an honest appraisal of balance of strength in war’ should necessarily extend the 
discussion beyond the parameters of military manpower and weapons roster to 
include a society’s strength and weakness. He found Jewish society far superior to the 
Palestinian Arabs ‘with [their] well established tradition of disunity, corruption, and 
organizational incompetence’. Also, Palestinian Arabs were dependent on outside 
intervention, displaying ‘a knee-jerk penchant to always blame others’ and relying ‘on 
the Arab States to pull their chestnuts out of the fire’. Most important in this respect 
was the contrast in leadership; whereas the Jews were led by seasoned men of stature, 
the Palestinian Arabs had to contend with the likes of Husseini and his ineffectual 
acolytes. 
In the end, though, it was the total Arab rejection of the Zionist movement and 
the partition proposal that presaged the war: ‘Western Jews failed to appreciate the 
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depths of Arabs’ abhorrence of the Zionist-Jewish presence in Palestine, an 
abhorrence anchored in centuries of Islamic Judeophobia’ where ‘Jews were seen as 
unclean’. In the face of religious edicts from Cairo’s al-Azhar institute and religious 
authorities against Israel even King Abdullah did not dare signing a peace treaty. As 
for the others, negotiating with Israel ‘undermined the legitimacy of Arab leaders’. In 
any event, most of them tended to sound like Jamal Husseini, the Mufti’s deputy, who 
promised that Jewish ‘blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East’.  Morris pointed 
out that this was not an idle threat: ‘when opportunity arouse, the call Idbah al Yahud 
(slaughter the Jews) was carried out’. Indeed, ‘the Jews felt that the Arabs aimed to 
re-enact the Holocaust and that they faced certain personal and collective slaughter 
should they lose’.195  
Compared to a genocidal threat posed by a winning Palestinian Arab side, the 
Israelis, in Morris’s opinion were greatly circumscribed; some expulsions 
notwithstanding, Plan D was never a blueprint for ethnic cleansing as argued by 
Khalidi and Pappe, not the least because Ben-Gurion was careful not to upset the 
Western powers anxious to preserve Arab goodwill.  External pressure aside, Morris 
now implied that the low number of Palestinian civilian casualties was related to the 
moral code of the Hagana fighters known as ‘tohar haneshek,’, or purity of arms. He 
also praised the Jews who did not take to the road despite tremendous difficulties.196 
By moving closer to what Shlaim pejoratively described as the ‘orthodox 
Zionist’ narrative, Morris not only contradicted his early writings but put distance 
between himself and his former colleagues. For his part Shlaim, even before the 
Guardian exchange, escalated his anti-Israel rhetoric in order to keep up with the 
deteriorating Israeli-Palestinian situation. Writing in an introduction to a coedited 
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book, he proclaimed that it took a ‘generation of critical scholars’ to unravel the 
‘fabric of myth’ spun by Zionist history that tried ‘to reaffirm a sort of Zionist 
manifest destiny while diminishing responsibility for the negative consequences of the 
war’.  It was this changed consciousness that, in his opinion, contributed to the Oslo 
peace process.197 
But after these self-congratulatory words, Shlaim described his own trajectory 
deflated by ‘the three dark and terrible years during which Israel had been led by the 
unreconstructed proponents of the Iron Wall’ - his allusion to Likud’s rule of 1996-99.   
As noted earlier, it was Jabotinsky who had coined the term ‘Iron Wall’ to describe 
the grim nature of the Arab-Jewish confrontation. By using the term as a title for his 
new book, Shlaim sought to indicate that Zionism had always been driven by military 
force - ignoring altogether the complex and nuanced nature of Jabotisnky’s ‘iron wall’ 
concept, which comprised economic strength, social and national cohesion,  justness 
of cause, and other elements of ‘soft power’ on top of military strength. He conceded 
that ‘the moral case for the establishment of an independent Jewish State was strong, 
especially in the aftermath of the Holocaust’, but argued that it ‘involved a massive 
injustice to the Palestinians’.  In his opinion, Israel ‘still had to arrive at the reckoning 
of its own sins against the Palestinians’. In the conclusion, written after Barak’s 1999 
victory over Netanyahu, Shlaim seemed to recover some of his optimism, comparing 
the election to a ‘political earthquake’ and ‘a sunrise’ after Likud’s dark reign, only to 
unleash on Barak (and Israel) with great ferocity once Arafat declined his far-reaching 
Camp David concessions.198 
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Trying to change current events by producing yet another version of the 1948 
war was equally high on Pappe’s agenda. As a self-confessed critical scholar, he now 
urged Israel to ‘perform this liberation act… to rewrite, indeed salvage, a history that 
was erased and forgotten’. The erased chapter in his view pertained to the catastrophe 
that had befallen the Palestinians: Palestine was not partitioned in 1948; it was 
destroyed with most of its people expelled. Pappe warned that as long as Israel 
refused to assume responsibility for its ethnic cleansing, no ‘liberation’ and 
reconciliation would be possible. To make the liberation and reconciliation real, rather 
than an empty gesture, Israel should agree to the Palestinian ‘right of return’.199 
To make the case for this ‘right’ Pappe published his own version of the 1948 
war. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine promised to replace ‘the paradigm of war with 
the paradigm of ethnic cleansing’ and ‘war crime’. In this perspective, ‘the Zionist 
movement did not wage a war that “tragically but inevitably” led to the expulsion of 
parts of' the indigenous population, but the other way around: the main goal was the 
ethnic cleansing’. As a result, ‘the ethnic cleansing of Palestine must become rooted 
in our memory and consciousness as a crime against humanity’. 
Pappe repeated his claim that Plan D represented a blueprint for wholesale 
expulsion of the native population that, in his opinion, was expedited by a 
considerable number of deliberate massacres. In addition to the well known 9 April 
1948 Deir Yasin tragedy, when 100 people (including women and children) were 
killed in the fighting for the village,200 Pappe dwelt on a supposed massacre in the 
coastal village of Tantura. The subject of a graduate dissertation by Teddy Katz at the 
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University of Haifa, where Pappe taught at the time, the supposed massacre - 
glaringly missing from contemporary Palestinian Arab historiography of the war - 
was allegedly committed by soldiers of the Alexandroni brigade in the course of the 
battle for the village. Katz was sued by brigade fighters and agreed an out-of-court 
settlement whereby he would issue a public apology disowning his massacre claim. 
He then tried to retract his retraction only to be rebuffed by the presiding judge who 
declared the settlement a legally binding agreement, forcing him to proceed with the 
public apology. His subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court was similarly rejected, 
leading the university to appoint a re-examination committee that disqualified his 
thesis.201 Ignoring these facts altogether, Pappe quickly transformed Katz into a 
victim of the oppressive Israeli system, adding the hitherto unclaimed Tantura 
‘massacre’ to the roster of supposed Jewish atrocities. In one of them, in the village of 
Mi’ar, Pappe had the ‘Israeli troops shooting indiscriminately at the villages…When 
they got tired of the killing spree, the soldiers then began destroying the houses’.202 
Pappe’s new narrative presented the balance of forces as overwhelmingly 
favouring the Jews; contemporary fears of extermination, just a few years after the 
Holocaust, were dismissed as a myth because the ‘reality on the ground was, of 
course, almost the opposite’. He noted that in ‘public, the leaders of the Jewish 
community portrayed doomsday scenarios… In private, however, they never used this 
discourse. They were fully aware that the Arab war rhetoric was in no way matched 
by any serious preparation on the ground’.  Indeed, in making fantastic claims of 
crimes allegedly committed by the Jews - from rape, to murder, to labour camps, to 
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massacres, to biological warfare by poisoning of water supplies - Pappe clearly 
insinuated to Nazi-like behaviour, not to mention harping on longstanding anti-
Semitic libels.203 
To cover all the bases of Israel’s immoral origins Pappe placed Zionism within 
the parameters of the ‘colonialist project’, praising Israeli sociologists Baruch 
Kimmerling and Gershon Shafir as pioneers of the theory that equated Zionism with 
colonialism. Drawing on their and other insights of colonialist theory, Pappe 
contended that, like the early colonialist outposts in Africa, Australia and North and 
South America, the Zionist enclave ‘was constructed around 1922 by a group of 
Jewish colonialists from Eastern Europe with considerable help and assistance from 
the British empire’. As such, Zionism was constructed to defend a ‘white’ (Western) 
fortress in a ‘black’ (Arab world). And by way of ensuring the country’s Jewish and 
European character, the Palestinian Arabs had to be cleansed. This is why, in Pappe’s 
estimate, the Zionists rejected all appeals from Arabs and the Palestinians to resolve 
the conflict.204 
As much as he tried to paint Jews and Israelis as irredeemable rejectionists, 
Pappe was well aware that this depiction was at odds with the role played by the 
Palestinian Arab leadership in general and Haj Amin al-Husseini, in particular. With 
his relentless extremism and long history of anti-Semitism, subversive activities, and 
Nazi collaboration, Pappe understood that the Mufti was in need of image 
rehabilitation (not least since many of his contemporaries viewed him as culpable for 
the Nakba). Reflecting on the issue in 1997 he warned that ‘when discussing the 
Husaynis’ attitude toward Zionism one should be wary of the pitfalls of retrospective 
analysis’.  A few years later he mentioned working on the Husseini family project, 
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first published in a Hebrew edition. In the back cover of the book Pappe explained 
that by focusing on the Husseini family he wanted to convey to the Israelis that 
Palestine was a thriving community led by seasoned notables like the Husseinis.205 
Predictably, Pappe’s portrayal of Hajj Amin was different from the ruthless, 
rabble-rousing manipulator blamed for leading the Palestinians astray. Downplaying 
several well documented instances of the Mufti’s incitement to violence, he stated that 
Husseini ‘did not consciously turn a minor incident into a violent clash’ and made the 
incredible claim - against all available evidence - that the Mufti did not support the 
1936-37 ‘revolt’ (which he actually instigated). When faced with explaining some of 
Husseini’s more egregious misdeeds, Pappe seems to contradict himself. Forced to 
concede that ‘Haj Amin gave the green light to eliminate several of his opponents’, he 
concluded that ‘this chapter of Haj Amin biography marred much what he had done 
before’. The Mufti’s notorious corruption prompted Pappe to admit that ‘suspicion 
about how Amin used the fund of the Muslim Council has never been dispelled’,  only 
to try to soften the assertion by making the contradictory claim that ‘there is no doubt 
that Haj Amin enjoyed a personal reputation of decency and probity - amid the 
endemic corruption in Arab politics’.206 
The Mufti’s high profile advocacy of the Final Solution and his personal 
contribution to Nazi war efforts got Pappe into more contradictions.207 When 
discussing the Mufti’s initial contacts with Nazi officials in Palestine, Pappe 
complained that ‘Israeli historiography would claim, with very little evidence, that by 
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this time the Mufti endorsed the Nazi ideology’. But later on he admits that 
‘Palestinian historiography was long uncomfortable’ with discussing ‘his ill-fated 
liaison [with Nazi Germany]’.  Pappe’s solution was to explain that by then the Mufti 
and his pro-Nazi associates were but ‘a few individuals who were detached from 
Palestine and its politics’, emphasizing that the Mufti’s ‘identification with the Nazi 
death machine made it difficult for him to reintegrate into Palestinians politics’. At the 
same time Pappe lamented that ‘many historians in the world, especially in Israel, 
have depicted him as a mini Hitler, unjustifiably and inaccurately’.208 
Pappe’s books triggered a huge, but politically predictable reaction. Observers 
on the left embraced his findings but many critics denounced it in the strongest 
language possible. Not surprising, Morris, by now totally alienated from his former 
fellow traveller, led the chorus of protest, taking the opportunity to reflect on the 
broader issue of historical revisionism. Concluding that revisionism ‘became too 
much of a good thing’, he compared it to a ‘veritable tsunami, taking that revisionism 
to shores and provinces that go far beyond what the available documentation indicates 
or allows, creating a destructive current that is underpinned by invented and spurious 
narratives and non-facts presented as truth’.209 
Morris saved most of his scorn for a review titled ‘The Liar as a Hero’. He 
described Pappe as ‘at best sloppiest, at worse one of the most dishonest’ scholars  
who maliciously distorted research to appeal to Western audiences, as when he 
allegedly mistranslated a comment by Ben-Gurion condoning blinding of dogs in a 
chemical experiment. Morris noted that both Shlaim and Pappe hardly mentioned 
ethnic cleansing in their earlier books suggesting that Pappe - ‘a retroactive poseur’ in 
his words - became radicalized only after getting tenure. In other words, not only was 
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Pappe a ‘poseur’ but lacked the moral courage to stand up for his convictions before 
receiving job security. Morris lamented that Pappe was riding the crest of critical 
scholarship that made its home in departments of political science, sociology, and 
cultural studies in some universities that ‘had become bulwarks of anti-Zionism, in 
which professing Zionists can barely achieve a toehold’. As for his portrayal of the 
Husseini family Morris wrote: ‘The Palestinian national movement, since its inception 
in the 1920s, has sought to establish a unitary Arab state in all of Palestine...This state 
was to contain only a small Jewish minority - as defined by the first leader of the 
movement, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, restricted to 
the Jews who lived in Palestine prior to World War I’. In his own exercise of linking 
the present to the past, Morris argued that nothing had changed in the ‘basic 
Palestinian rejectionism, amounting to a Weltanschauung, is routinely ignored or 
denied by most Western commentators and officials’.210 
Even though Morris was apparently unaware of the irony, his denunciation of 
revisionism gone wild and its exaggeration and fabrication of facts, sounded not much 
different than Karsh’s original critique of the New Historiography. In what could be 
described as a remarkable coincidence, Morris seconded many of the assertions in 
Palestine Betrayed, Karsh’s new study about the 1948 war where he chided the Israeli 
‘“new historians” - younger, politically engaged academics and journalists who claim 
to have discovered archival evidence substantiating the anti-Israel case’ for turning 
the ‘saga of Israel’s birth upside down’, notably by ignoring the ‘Arab commitment to 
destroy Israel’. In this politicized version, Karsh argued, ‘Zionism emerged, as a 
colonizing and expansionist ideology and movement, an offshoot of European 
imperialism at its most rapacious’. Karsh blamed the Mufti for a good share of the 
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problems; among others, he was loathed by his peers who considered him a ‘menace 
to the general Arab interests’ and ‘a schemer seeking his own personal interests’, who 
became ‘the most important Arab Quisling in German hands’.211 
All in all, the New Historians have worked within the relatively well-
established Galtung-Said paradigm which, as indicated, portrayed the Jews as 
Western, white, colonialist top dogs who arrived in Palestine with the blessing of an 
imperialist power to dispossess an  indigenous, downtrodden population. More to the 
point, most of them presented the Zionist model as anachronistic and harmful to the 
Jewish people and Israel, a position exacerbated by Pappe and Shlaim after the 
collapse of the Oslo process.  Yet while the colonialist perspective contended that the 
Jews had no legitimate right to Palestine it did not deny their collective identity. It 
was left to another historian to take this denigration a step forward by denying the 
Jewish people’s very existence.   
Neo-Canaanism and the ‘Invention of the Jewish People’  
  As we have seen, in the 1960s the remnants of the Canaanite movement 
assimilated into Matzpen where, together with other radical-leftists, they challenged 
the ‘colonialist-Zionist’ system. With hostility between the Arabs and Jews showing 
no sign of abating, the old paradigm of a common Canaanite origin as a base for 
future coexistence fell out of favour. Even Boaz Evron, one of the original Canaanites 
still active in the 1980s, felt compelled to adjust, paving the way for a neo-Canaanite 
version of Jewish history. In his book A National Reckoning, Evron revisited the old 
Canaanite thesis but also discussed at some length the ‘artificial Zionist creation’ of a 
Jewish nation out of disparate exiles and conversion. Published in 1988, the book 
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received virtually no public attention but a number of scholars at Tel Aviv University 
elaborated upon his ideas, giving it a higher profile.212 
Joseph Agassi, a philosophy professor, had devoted considerable thought to 
the link between faith and nationality in Israel, finding the ‘ghetto culture’ of Eastern 
Europe to be detrimental to the formation of national identity.213 The so-called Tel 
Aviv School of Archaeology - Nadav Naaman, Israel Finkelstein and Zeev Herzog - 
vigorously attacked traditional Israeli archaeology. Their approach was closely 
patterned on the radical Copenhagen-Sheffield School whose leaders sought to 
delegitimize the ‘biblical narrative’ of modern archaeology on the ground that such 
‘scholars have created a false Ancient Israel’. While Naaman excavated Canaanite 
sites, Herzog attracted public attention in writing in Haaretz that the biblical narrative 
of the early Israelites had no support in reality, adding that the Israelites adopted 
monotheism late in the monarchy period.214 
By comparison, the theoretical challenge to the conception of a Jewish nation 
was much less public. Uri Ram, a critical sociologist using neo-Marxist methodology, 
was the first to determine that modern Jewish nationhood was ‘imagined, invented 
and narrated’. He blamed ‘Zionist historiography’ in the ‘service of the Zionist 
movement and the State of Israel’ for this invention. Ram noted that in order to 
legitimize their claim to Palestine, the Zionists had to prove the ‘unity and continuity 
of the ostensible nation’. In other words, ‘spatial concentration and temporal 
endurance’ had to be presented as ‘backbone of Jewish existence’ and a matching 
narrative created which included an Origin in the Land, Exile, Diaspora and 
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Return/Zionist Redemption. Ram urged the deconstruction of the Zionist ‘story’ and 
its replacement by a different ‘story’, one that would mould a new national identity in 
line with a post-Zionist concept of a multicultural, communitarian state.215 
Prima facie, Shlomo Sand, a professor of French culture, history and cinema at 
Tel Aviv University with a modest publishing record, was an unlikely candidate to 
answer Ram’s call to undermine the ‘unity and continuity of the ostensible nation’. 
But Sand’s long association with Matzpen, his knowledge of Evron’s work, and an 
appreciation for neo-Marxist interpretation of a national identity gave him the 
necessary motivation. He credited the ‘challenging work of Evron and Ram’ and 
‘non-Israeli scholars of nationalism such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson’ 
for questioning anew ‘the root of his identity’.216 
Indeed, the latter two were essential to Sand’s rewrite of Jewish history 
because they introduced a neo-Marxist sensibility into the commonly used 
anthropological conceptualization of national identity. In anthropology, national 
beliefs, like other elements of a collective belief system are viewed from a micro-
sociological perspective positing that individual members of a collective engage in a 
constant discourse to conceptualize notions crucial to their existence. Following Max 
Weber, it is understood that national identity evolved from the Gemeinschaft 
community where group belonging is based on kinship to Gesellschaft association 
where members are tied by a ‘feeling of interdependent’ and a ‘community of fate’.217 
Anthony Smith, perhaps the best known student of nationalism, used the 
anthropological, micro-sociological approach, arguing that members of an ethno-
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national group share a unique sense of group origin, and harbour knowledge of a 
unique group history, among others.218 
Neo-Marxists have preferred the ‘holistic’ position - that emerging group 
properties are not reducible to the sum proprieties of individuals - associated with 
Marx and Louis Althusser. Suspicious of collective beliefs considered a form of ‘false 
consciousness’ they rejected any notion of a discursive democratic process. In a 
somewhat contradictory fashion, Sand quotes Ernest Renan to the effect that ‘a 
nation’s existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite’ but has little 
use for Smith after conceding that the latter’s definition actually fits the Zionist 
historical narrative. He clearly preferred the more radical premise of Anderson’s 
imagined community and Gellner’s assertion that nationalism was not possible before 
the formation of a ‘consolidated culture’ coinciding with the rise of an industrial 
society.219 
 To his credit Sand informed readers that Gellner’s ‘theoretical landmine’ - the 
idea of ‘nationalism engendering nations and not the other way round’ - shook most 
scholars. Yet he offered only an indirect defence of such ‘theoretical audacity’ by 
referring to Eric Hobsbawm, a British Marxist historian who wrote ‘that nations are a 
dual phenomenon, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be 
understood also analyses from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, need, 
longing and interest of ordinary people’. Even that was qualified because, as Sand 
saw it, it was not easy to discover what ‘ordinary people’ had thought.220 
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Liberated from the effort of finding out empirically what ‘ordinary [Jewish] 
people’ think, Sand proceeded to invoke yet another theoretician of nationalism, 
Carlton Hays, who suggested that ‘the national theology of intellectuals becomes a 
national mythology for the masses’. By adding Gramsci to the equation, Sand was 
able to argue that the intellectual class, the historians, journalists and even civil 
servants have become the nation’s ‘prince’, a ‘collective corps of intellectuals who 
control the apparatus of the nation-state’. Even without accepting all of Gramsci’s 
theory, Sand argued, it was possible to prove that some of these intellectual ‘princes’, 
notably historians, are truly the ones that create national identity for disparate 
individuals: ‘With the help of the historians, nationalism became an “optimistic 
ideology” where the heroism of the receding world prophesized a brilliant future’. 221 
For those adept at deciphering the somewhat obtuse critical theory, Sand’s 
methodology was hand-tailored for a critique of the Zionist historians, the intellectual 
‘princes’ in charge of producing the ‘spatial concentration and temporal endurance’ of 
the ‘alleged’ Jewish nation.222 He identified a number of historians who qualified for 
the title of ‘high priest of national memory’ due to their alleged contribution to the 
myth of the Jewish nation. First on his list was Heinrich Graetz (1817-91) who, while 
not a ‘complete Zionist’, was said to form the national mould for the writing of Jewish 
history: ‘he created a unified narrative… an unbroken history, branching but always 
singular’. Next in line was Simon Dubnow (1860-1941), to whom Sand attributed the 
‘the fostering the national consciousness through the study of history’. He charged 
Dubnow with initiating ‘a lasting tradition in Jewish nationalism’ of creating the 
‘proprietary claim of “People of Israel and Land of Israel”’. Last but not least on 
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Sand’s list was Ben-Zion Dinur, whom Ram already fingered as the chief architect of 
the ‘false’ Jewish national narrative in his capacity as both a Hebrew University 
history professor and Israel’s minister of education (1951-55). Sand accused Dinur of 
‘rewriting history’ to create a connection to the Land of Israel as part of the Zionist 
‘holy trinity’ of Bible-Land-People, pointing out that Dinur was a guest at the regular 
Bible circle that met Ben-Gurion’s home in the 1950s, a presumed workshop of 
Zionist ‘national memory merchants’.223 
After deconstructing the Zionist ‘nation-and-identity building’ project, Sand 
offered his own version of history that, not surprisingly, tried to undermine the ‘false’ 
space-time continuity. First, he dismissed the Old Testament as ‘mythistory’ to denote 
the contention, based partially on the Tel Aviv archaeologists, that Judaism did not 
take root until of late in the monarchy period.  For good measure, Sand also cited the 
Copenhagen-Sheffield School that described the Bible as a ‘grand library that was 
written, revised an adapted’ between the late sixth and early second century BCE. The 
implication was clear: the Jews were imposters who brought monotheism from 
Babylon and fraudulently turned it into a divine mandate and a title deed to the 
Land.224 
Exposing the ‘myth’ of forced exile was Sand’s second goal in the effort to 
disprove what Ram defined as the Zionist creation of ‘temporal endurance’. With no 
statistical data, the question of how many Jews were forcibly deported, how many 
freely migrated and how many stayed before and after the destruction of the Second 
Temple has been a fertile ground for historical speculation. Sand mentioned a number 
of historians who tackled the issue but seemed to be intent on highlighting only one 
category - the ‘exile without-expulsion,’ which, in his opinion, was extremely 
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problematic for Zionist scholars.  Sand explained that Dinur and others considered the 
issue of exile through a Zionist prism: ‘If exile was undertaken voluntarily - God 
forbid’ it would ‘have undermined their [Jewish] renewed claim’ to the Land. In lieu 
of statistical evidence to support his own conclusion that exile was almost always 
voluntary, Sand claimed that, starting with Yitzhak Baer (1888-1980), Zionist 
historians adopted the Christian myth of the Wandering Jew - Jews punished by exile 
for rejecting the Messiah. More to the point, once in exile, with small exceptions, 
Jews were most reluctant to return to their Land: ‘The Jews were not forcibly 
deported from their “homeland”, and there was no voluntary “return” to it’.225 
For all his emphasis on voluntary exile to delegitimize Zionist claims, Sand 
needed to provide more dramatic proof that Diaspora Jews were not linked to the 
ancient Jewish Kingdom, let alone descended from Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. His 
solution was to focus on the role of proselytizing and conversion throughout Jewish 
history, a subject with no statistical grounding.  Starting with the forced conversions 
of the Edomites by the Hasmoneans Sand scoured Jewish and general history for 
more examples of what he claimed to be mass conversions, albeit voluntary ones, 
during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, going so far as to argue that the Septuagint, 
the Greek translation of the Old Testament, was a prelude to Jewish proselytizing.   
Stretching the argument further, Sand concluded that rabbinical authorities - normally 
known as opponents of proselytizing - were either tolerant or encouraged mass 
conversions.226 
Further down the line, Sand found evidence of mass conversions in Arabia and 
among the Phoenicians and Berbers.227 But it was the story of the Khazars that formed 
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the core of the book’s argument that the vast majority of Jews were never linked to 
biblical Israel. As related by Sand, the Khazars - a nomadic tribe of Turkic and 
Hunnic-Bulgar clans interspersed with Scythians who created an empire between the 
Black and the Caspian Seas - converted to Judaism in the eighth century. After the 
decline of the empire in the thirteenth century, the Jewish Khazars were dispersed but 
survived as an ethnic group. 
Sand was by no means the first to bring attention to the Jewish Khazars. 
Medieval Arab, Christian and Jewish sources provided fragments of information on 
their Judaization, a fact that Sand prominently showcased. He also listed a number of 
nineteenth century Jewish laymen who investigated the Khazars’ Jewishness to prove 
this thesis as well as Arthur Koestler, the Jewish-Hungarian Marxist author, whose 
1976 book, The Thirteenth Tribe, created a stir in the West. Missing from Sand’s 
inventory is the multitude of writings and websites that make ideological use of the 
Khazars-as-Jews theory. A minority is philo-Semitic or evangelical Christians trying 
to reclaim these long ‘lost Jews’ for Christianity. The bulk of the literature, however, 
is highly anti-Semitic, propagated by such disparate sources as Henry Ford, Christian 
identity movement in the United States and assorted British anti-Semites. 
After his forced retirement from command of Jordan’s Arab Legion, the 
notoriously anti-Semitic John Bagot Glubb (better known as Glubb Pasha)228 devoted 
a great deal of time to tracing the ‘true’ origins of East European Jews. In a 1967 
lecture, ‘The Problem of Jewish Noses’, he asserted that, with their fair hair and blue 
eyes, East European Jews were descents of pagan Slav proselytes and the Khazars, 
whereas the Arabs of Palestine were closely linked to the Judeans. The anti-Zionist 
implication of this alleged racial makeup did not escape Glubb who concluded that 
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the Palestinians had more right to Israel than the Jews.229 In the early 1950s Douglas 
Reed, a famous British journalist, author and playwright published The Controversy 
of Zion  in which he ‘proved’ that Jewish ‘bloodlines’ did not run to the Holy Land. 
He mentioned the forced conversions of the Edomites but his key proof were the 
Khazar Jews, whose East European Jewish decedents allegedly applied the ‘Khazar 
warrior acumen’ to seek world dominance. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union generated more anti-Semitic use of the 
Khazar-Jewish theory. Lev Gumilev, the son of the famed poet Anna Ahmatova and a 
student and protégé Mikhail Artamonov, a Soviet historian and archaeologist who 
pioneered the study of Khazaria in the 1930s, sought to scientifically prove that the 
Jewish descendants of the Khazars were parasites feeding off the Russian Slav 
society. A number of strange bedfellows picked up Gumilev’s theory. On the one 
hand there was the Russian Orthodox Church that posited that Jewish Khazaria was 
locked in an epic struggle with Russian Christianity. Russian pagans, on the other 
hand, accused the Khazar Jews of bringing Christianity to Russia. In a report by the 
Vidal Sassoon International Centre at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Victor 
Shnirelman demonstrated how these and other anti-Semitic groups used Gumilev’s 
‘scientific theory’ of Jewish Khazars to portray Jews as a group of alien parasites on 
the Slavic super-ethnicity. Reviewing Shnirelman’s report, London University 
Professor John Klier, a leading expert on East European Jewry, pointed out that the 
Jewish Khazars have proved a mother lode for all kinds of ideologically motivated 
writing.230 
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It was ironic, but probably inevitable that the anti-Zionist American Council of 
Judaism joined the long list of consumers of the Jewish Khazaria lore. Alfred 
Lilienthal, a prolific writer who emerged as the Council’s most eloquent spokesman, 
maintained that Americans had no religious obligation to support Zionism because 
most of the Jews were decedents of the medieval Khazars. Small wonder that 
Lilienthal’s writings were featured in a multitude of anti-Semitic, Islamist, and pro-
Palestinian websites.231 
While it is not difficult to surmise why Sand failed to mention these 
questionable fellow travellers, Tel Aviv University historian Anita Shapira, who 
labelled Sand the ‘Jewish people denier’, was willing to give him the benefit of doubt 
as being unaware ‘of the suspect company that he keeps’.232 A more plausible 
explanation, however, is that Sand was anxious to dissociate himself from rampant 
anti-Semites, conspiracy theory buffs and assorted crackpots who championed the 
Jewish Khazaria theory. Indeed, he was at pains to emphasize the academic nature of 
his work by quoting from the limited but respectable pool of scholars like Douglas 
Morton Dunlop, an authority on the Khazars at Columbia University in the 1990s, and 
Peter Golden, a Rutgers University professor. He also mentioned Abraham Polak, a 
Polish Jewish historian who taught at Tel Aviv University in the 1950s and even 
Dinur and other ‘Zionist historians’. 
In spite of Sand’s efforts to establish scientific credibility, his work was met 
with withering criticism, something that he expected and apparently welcomed. Like 
the New Historians, Sand could portray himself as a courageous ‘speaker of truth to 
power’ in the quest for ‘a new Jewish history’ not obscured by the ‘dense prism of 
Zionism’ or hindered by ‘stubborn refusal’ of Jewish history departments ‘to open up 
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to new historiography’. As for his critics, they were the ‘old guard’ Zionist and 
nationalist historians unwilling to appreciate the new methodologies that made the 
book possible.233 
Much as Sand presented himself as a victim of ideological attacks, his work 
raised a number of valid concerns. One pertains to his rejection of established 
scholarship and the privileging of ‘alternative narratives’ of questionable academic 
legitimacy. As noted, Sand dismissed Smith and his views of national identify 
formation because it did not fit the neo-Marxist notions of Anderson, Gellner, 
Hobsbawm and Gramsci. As a neo-Marxist he was apparently not comfortable with 
the democratic idea of discourse, let alone with the possibility that ‘yearnings for 
Zion’ and the temporariness of the Exile could have had some popular resonance in 
Jewish history - a sentiment that would have been at odds with his theory of Zionist- 
‘manufactured’ peoplehood. Much in the same way, Sand elevated the marginal 
Copenhagen-Sheffield School and its Israeli clone, the Tel Aviv Archaeology School, 
while dismissing virtually all mainstream biblical archaeologists. 
Yet another problem is concerning Sand’s lack of expertise necessary to write 
a study of this kind. Indeed, by his own admission, his research would have been 
better served by a team of scholars. The treatment of the complex issue of conversions 
in the late pagan-early Christian period was a case in point. Sand stated that masses of 
Gentiles flocked to Judaism without specifying that most of them were arguably 
followers of the new Christian faith preached by Paul to Jews and Gentiles alike. 
Even a cursory reading of the history of the Church would indicate that the fluidity of 
faith came to an end under Constantine and his fellow Christian emperors. At times, 
Sand’s understanding of Judaism is not much better. For example, Shapira noted that 
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the idea that Jews were punished by exile was firmly anchored in the Talmud, more 
than a millennium before the advent of Zionism.234 
But it is Sand’s eagerness to prove that the Khazars morphed into the Yiddish 
civilization of Eastern Europe that is most troubling. While there is enough evidence 
to indicate that the Khazar aristocracy accepted Judaism, there is virtually no proof 
that they were followed by the entire population as Sand asserted. His argument that 
after the collapse of their empire the Khazars-turned-Jews moved westward creating 
the ethno-demographic base of the Ashkenazi population is even more problematic.  
There are no records to indicate what happened to the Khazars who disappeared from 
the annals of history. Based on available sources, most scholars have suggested that 
many of the Khazar Jewish nobility were killed while others converted to Christianity 
or Islam and some, retaining their Judaism, established a small settlement in Crimea 
and as far as Kiev. Dunlop described the alleged mass migration westward as an 
‘assumption’. There is also nothing in Golden’s doctoral dissertation to support 
Sand’s theory that the descents of the Khazars formed what he calls ‘the Yiddishland’ 
of Eastern Europe.235 
Sand skated on thin scientific ice when trying to prove that the Yiddish 
language is of Slavic rather than Germanic in origin. Paul Wexler seems to be the best 
known defender of this theory, but neither he nor Polak, who surmised that Jews were 
linguistically influenced by German traders who travelled to the East are mainstream 
scholars. Sand’s use of demographic data is equally questionable. He argued that the 
small Jewish communities in medieval Germany could not have resulted in the large 
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population of Yiddishland. But, as Shapira pointed out, census data from Poland 
indicates that up to the nineteenth century Jews numbered in the ten thousands, not 
millions: ‘one way or another, these figures match both the migration rates of Jews 
from the west and the natural increase without having to resort to masses of Khazars 
to balance the account’.236 
Posing even a greater challenge to Sand’s theory has been the new genetic 
data indicating a similarity among the disparate Jewish communities. Genome surveys 
carried out by Gil Azmon and Harry Osterer (United States) and Doron Behar and 
Richard Willems (Israel and Estonia) showed the closeness of the European Jews and 
their Middle Easterner counterparts. Azmon noted that ‘members of any Jewish 
community are related to each other as close as fourths of fifth cousins in a larger 
population’, about ten times as high as a random sample from New York City. This 
genetic closeness surprised the researchers given that the communities have been 
separated for so long. One commentator observed that the results refute Sand’s 
contention ‘that Jews have no common origin but are a miscellany of people in 
Europe and Central Asia who converted to Judaism at various times’.237 
Sand’s response to genetic research seemed odd.  Evidently he took little time 
to study the subject and dismissed the older studies as inclusive or contradictory. He 
failed to understand that the prevalence of some Jewish specific mutations such as 
Tau-Sachs and the more recently discovered BRCA1 and BRCA2 that make Jewish 
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women of Ashkenazi origin highly susceptible to breast and ovarian cancer are related 
to the so-called ‘founders gene’, a mutation created by a ‘genetic bottleneck’ 
originating in small population with a history of endogenous marriages. The 
extremely high frequency of breast cancer in Israel has prompted the authorities to 
consider genetic testing for women of Ashkenazi origin, the strongest acceptance yet 
of the genetically-based theory.238 
As for the cutting edge new studies - published in the prestigious American 
Journal of Genetics and Nature - his response bordered on the bizarre.  He dismissed 
Behar as part of a group of ‘Zionist’ geneticists lead by Karl Skorecki, an Orthodox 
Jew, bent on proving the existence of a Jewish gene. In the afterword to the 2010 
paperback edition, Sand noted that ‘it is a bitter irony to see the descendants of 
Holocaust survivors set out to find a biological Jewish identity: Hitler would certainly 
have been very pleased! And it is all the more repulsive that this kind of research 
should be conducted in a state that has waged for years a declared policy of 
‘Judaization of the country’.’239 
Sand’s theory took another hit when Martin Richards, an English 
archagenecist and a team of scientists conducted a study indicating that the conversion 
among women in the Mediterranean and further north in Europe were part of the 
Jewish maternal lineage of the Ashkenazi branch. Osterer considered the findings 
plausible, noting their correspondence to the outline Jewish migration - as it pushed 
north from the Mediterranean.  Skorecki and Behar were somewhat more sceptical, 
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but there was an agreement that the Richards research - like its predecessors - found 
no support for the Khazar theory.240 
In the end though, Sand’s book was more about current politics than scientific 
research. By denying a distinctive Jewish identity he tried not only to delegitimize 
Zionism but to help the formation of a non-Jewish bi-national state – Matzpen’s ‘Holy 
Grail’.  He asserted that the ‘Jewish nationalism that dominates Israeli society is not 
an open, inclusive identity’ but an exclusive one ‘that segregates the majority from the 
minority’, denying ‘active and harmonious participation in the sovereignty and 
practices of democracy’.241 
Personally, Sand, even more than the New Historians, profited from the 
unprecedented success of his book.  He boasted that much claiming that ‘the 
“authorized” body of historians fell on the book with academic fury’ yet ‘the book 
stayed on the [Israeli] bestseller list for nineteen weeks’. The English edition created 
even more of sensation, catapulting Sand to ‘stardom’ in Western anti-Israel circles.   
Most dubiously, Sand legitimized the anti-Semitic Khazar websites which could now 
claim academic pedigree. 
With the addition of Sand, post-Zionist historians achieved a high profile role 
among Israel’s international critics. Close behind them were radical sociologists 
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Chapter 4   The ‘Critical Sociological’ Indictment 
Compared to the much publicized debate of the New Historians, let alone the 
spectacular exposure of Sand’s book, the changes in Israeli sociology were low key 
and initially not well understood. Yet the diffusion of the neo-Marxist, critical 
paradigm did not fail to affect this discipline. Not only did truth and knowledge come 
to be seen as relative but, more importantly, they were viewed as a creation of the 
‘hegemonic classes’. Hence the efforts to change Israeli society had to go hand in 
hand with destroying the ‘hegemony’ of the discipline’s founding generation.   
Launching the Challenge: The Haifa University Marxist Group  
 In the first two decades after independence, Israeli sociology followed closely 
the positivist paradigm. Shmuel Eisenstadt, ‘father’ of Israeli sociology, a professor at 
the Hebrew University and a leading adviser to the government, was inspired by 
Weber and Parsons. He embraced the developmental model to guide Israel’s nation-
building effort, a decision prominently reflected in his magnum opus, Israeli Society, 
where he asserted that Jews had transited from Gemenischaft to a Gesellschaft, albeit 
with a detour in the Diaspora.242 
 Still, according to Eisenstadt and his students, some of whom doubled as 
government consultants, the arrival of a large number of Jews from Arabic-speaking 
countries, known as Mizrahim, had created unique challenges to nation-building. In 
their view, the Mizrahim were a ‘traditional’ group lacking education and skills to 
compete in a modern society. To deal with the potential tensions stemming from 
unequal development Eisenstadt suggested a speedy process of education and 
modernization, something that was part of the developmental playbook, only to 
realize the inadequacy of this theory. 
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 Starting with the Wadi Salib riots in 1959, dubbed by the press as a ‘Moroccan 
rebellion’, the Mizrahim showed increasing frustration with the lack of economic 
progress and absence of political clout in a system dominated by veteran Ashkenazim 
entrenched in the Labour party. In 1971, a group of Moroccan-born activists in 
Jerusalem created the Israeli Black Panthers movement modelled on its American 
prototype. For a nation-building model that prided itself on national solidarity the 
symbolic alienation of the Panthers was disconcerting. 
 Despite the cracks in the absorption process, there was virtually no challenge 
to Eisenstadt’s sociology. As noted in Chapter 2, Mazpen harnessed ethnic discontent 
to bolster its portrayal of Zionism as a colonialist ideology that dispossessed the 
Palestinians and exploited the Mizrahim, known at the time as ‘Second Israel’ or ‘the 
other Israel’. Arie Bober, one of Mazpen’s leaders, made the case in his edited 
volume The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism that accused the 
‘colonial Ashkenazi settlers’ of exploiting the Mizrahim in ways that left them in a 
peripheral, depended position. 
 Without academic credentials, Matzpen intellectuals could do little to 
undermine the sociological orthodoxy and, equally important, the group, dogged by 
accusation of treason following the Adiv spy-trial, operated on the margins of the 
public discourse. It took almost a decade for their ideas to be picked up by 
sociologists, notably a group of self-described Marxists from Haifa University - 
Henry Rosenfeld, Shlomit Carmi, Shlomo Swirski and Deborah Bernstein, among 
others. In 1978 they founded a mimeographed journal Mahbarot Lemehkar Uvikoret 
(Notes on Research and Criticism) under the leadership of Swirski who excoriated 
positivist sociology for its ‘fetishization of quantitative methods’ at the expense of 
normatively-driven analysis. Swirski billed the journal as offering a ‘new trend which 
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opposes the positivist method and neutral attitudes which prevail in the social science’ 
adding that the ‘view from below’ will expose ‘institutions of oppression, 
discrimination, alienation and backwardness’. Well acquainted with Gramsci’s 
writings, he hoped to turn this academic vanguard into an agent of societal change, a 
theme he discussed at length in his book, Campus, Society and State.243 
 Freed from constrains of rigorous methodology, Swirski and his collaborator 
Deborah Bernstein proceeded to demolish the two pillars of traditional sociology that 
accepted Jewish legitimately in Palestine and the Zionist mission of ingathering of the 
exiles. The Haifa University scholars embraced the Matzpen argument that Jews were 
not a national community returning to their ancestral homeland but European colonial 
settlers. Worse, in this view, the much-lauded ‘gathering of exiles’ was nothing more 
than an exercise in class exploitation. Swirski mentioned Bober’s book but also 
borrowed from dependency theory, claiming that the Ashkenazi capitalist class in the 
Yishuv exploited the Mizrahim so as to keep them in a dependent and marginalized 
position.244 
 The Haifa group reserved its harshest criticism for the Eisenstadt’s positivist 
sociology. In a scathing article titled ‘Sociology is Absorbing Immigration’, Bernstein 
took issue with the developmental trajectory according to which the Mizrahim were 
expected to move from a traditional to a modern stage, suggesting that instead of 
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dividing Israel to immigrants and regular society, sociologists needed to place the 
issue within the framework of class relations in a capitalist system. Only by 
addressing class and political inequalities could the Mizrahim assume their proper 
place in society. Swirski added that the government could play a role in levelling the 
playing field by promoting corporate ventures. 245 
 For the Haifa University Marxists, interest in the Mizrahim went well beyond 
scholarship. As Matzpen before them, they expected to recruit the Arabic-speaking 
immigrants to a broader movement for peace. To their dismay, the Mizrahim 
preferred to rally en masse behind the Likud, playing a major role in its historic 1977 
electoral victory that ended Labour’s decades-long domination of the Yishuv’s and  
Israel’s political scene. Faced with a discrepancy between reality and theory, Swirski 
resorted to a variant of ‘false consciousness’ claiming that supporting Likud was an 
‘overnight shelter’, a ‘temporary refugee’ that the allegedly misguided Mizrahim had 
used. Once they formed their own channels for political expression they were 
expected to realize that they were victims of a class division and vote accordingly.246 
 Though the Haifa group hoped to call the foundation of traditional sociology 
into question, their academic impact was actually limited.  Most were junior faculty in 
a new university that could hardly compete with the prestigious sociology department 
at the Hebrew University. In fact, Swirski was denied tenure and left the university 
soon after the journal folded. It took another decade to advance the neo-Marxist, 
critical ideas that privileged Matzpen.  
From Marxist to Critical, Neo-Marxist Scholarship 
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The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was Israel’s first ‘war of choice’ and public 
support began to decline as casualties mounted. As noted earlier, the disenchantment 
helped Matzpen to move out of the margins, and as some of its members joined the 
faculty ranks they found like-minded scholars to undermine Eisenstadt’s sociology. 
Uri Ram, a student of Swirski who did his graduate work at NYC’s New 
School of Social Research, the ‘intellectual Mecca’ of the new paradigm, explained 
the process. Arguably the most articulate among the new breed of critical sociologists, 
Ram posited that positivist sociological tradition reached a Kuhnian-like crisis and 
needed to be replaced. Invoking Parsons critics Alvin Gouldner and Louis Coser he 
faulted Eisenstadt and his students of overemphasizing the property-maintenance 
features of functionalism-structuralism while downplaying the role of conflict. He 
was optimistic that the ‘post-Kunhnian trajectory’ in Israeli sociology would be 
chartered by ‘a generation of critical intellectuals’ already ‘established in the corridors 
of academe’ as well as in the media. This new cohort was, in his opinion, behind the 
process that ‘Israeli sociology is beginning to awaken from its own Parsonian 
slumber’ and implementing a radical political agenda in the spirit of ‘post’ that is 
post-Zionism. 247 
Ram considered the ontology and epistemology of the new paradigm to be 
paramount in challenging positivist sociology in general and its reading of history in 
particular. As he saw it, the difference between objectivist history and the relativist-
critical version was key; the former was ‘ostensibly analytical’ in the sense that a 
‘historical text is either true of false’, but for ‘relativists a historical text must be 
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understood in its context’. Moreover, ‘history should be understood in its broadest 
sense as collective memory rather than in its strict academic sense’. As a result, 
‘historical narrative is not an inventory of data or a timetable but rather the rending of 
the past in a manner meaningful to the present’.  In other words, history is not ‘what it 
is about but what it is for’, which means ‘what it signifies in the present’. With this 
mandate in mind, Ram proceeded to stake a bold position on the meaning of history: 
‘History is not merely the provenance of academe, it is a dimension of… national 
culture… when nationhood changes so must history’. He hoped that, liberated from 
the ‘hegemonic narrative truth’, different groups would join the discourse and bring 
their own ‘truth’ to the narrative.248 
To accomplish a radical transformation, Ram spurned positivist methodology 
decrying the ‘tendency of academic sociology to descend into arid scientism, 
ornamented with fig leaves of technique and professional decorum’.249 The 
methodologically ‘soft tools’ discussed in Chapter 1 were, in this view, much more 
suitable to affect societal change.  Among them was critical ethnography - used to 
broaden the field of inquiry beyond the ‘hegemonic-sanctioned’ topics to include 
accounts of minorities, women and working classes. While positivist ethnography 
stressed objectivity and counsels scientific detachment on the part of the interviewer-
observer, critical ethnography took the opposite stand; researchers were urged to 
become intrinsically involved with the subjects of their studies, as well as articulate 
their own ideological position.  
Critical ethnography became popular with politically active academics during 
the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s.  According to a leader in 
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the field, ‘critical ethnography begins with an ethical responsibility to address 
processes of unfairness or injustice… the researcher feels a moral obligation to make 
a contribution toward changing those conditions toward greater freedom and 
equality… disrupts the status quo…the critical ethnographer resists domestication and 
moves on from 'what is' to 'what could be’.  In critical parlance, ‘what could be’ was a 
society where dominance and inequalities would no longer exist. 250 
To recall, in his crusade to change the ‘oriental narrative’ Edward Said often 
lamented the ‘crisis of representation’ - his name for the alleged persistence of 
‘colonial forms of knowledge’.  He suggested that critical ethnography should be used 
as an antidote to the ‘official narrative’ and, in an effort to spread the message, even 
pleaded the case to a meeting of the American Anthropological Association in 1987.   
But his real goal was to rewrite the Palestinian narrative using the tool of ‘memory’ to 
which historians, sociologists and anthropologists were invited to tap.251 
Said’s call struck a responsive chord among Israeli critical sociologists and 
anthropologists, among them Dan Rabinowitz, a Tel Aviv University academic who 
was inspired by Foucault’s ‘critique of modern reason’ to resurrect and legitimize 
Palestinian historical narrative while demystifying and delegitimizing the narrative of 
the ‘hegemonic Israeli group’. By opening a ‘new discursive space for the 
Palestinians’, Rabinowitz and his colleagues could call attention to the concept of 
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Palestinian ‘sumud’ whereby ‘attachment to place is paramount in the articulation of 
right, is self-evident’.252 
To gain a broader audience for the post-colonialist paradigm, critical scholars 
launched a project to translate Said’s writings to Hebrew in the early 1990s. After 
some setbacks, Gabriel Piterberg, then at Ben-Gurion University, with assistance from 
the university’s Chaim Herzog Centre for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy, 
facilitated the publication of Orientalism through the leading publisher Am Oved. 
Said had an opportunity to advocate in person for critical methodology as a keynote 
speaker at the Israeli Anthropological Association meeting in 1998 that Rabinowitz 
helped to organize. Even when Said’s biographical fabrications came to light, 
Rabinowitz and his peers defended him on the grounds that critical ethnography 
allowed a certain biographical license.253 
Translating Said to Hebrew represented the first phase of a broader project to 
build a publishing infrastructure for the new paradigm. Ram, whose stay in the New 
School taught him the value of networking through critical journals and presses, 
acknowledged as much in a book discussing the politics of knowledge in challenging 
Israeli nationalism. He listed the Hebrew language journal Teoria Uvikoret (Theory 
and Criticism), a critical journal underwritten by the Van Leer Institute and the 
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Hakibutz Hameuhad Press, as well as a number of Hebrew language presses or critical 
projects within mainstream presses. Among them was Resling, the ‘Dark Red’ series 
of Hakibutz  Hameuhad (e.g., translations of Jurgen Habermas) and the ‘French 
Series’ of Sifriat Hapolaim (guided by Ariella Azoulay, the press translated Michele 
Foucault and other critical French philosophers). In due course, the cadre of activist-
scholars expanded their domain. Oren Yiftachel, a critical political geographer from 
Ben-Gurion University in Beersheba took over as editor of the quarterly Israeli Social 
Science Review, renaming it Hagar: International Social Science Review and opening 
it to critical scholarship. Of course, Ram and other Israeli critical scholars could 
always rely on the New School’s critical journals Constellation, International Journal 
of Politics, and Culture and Society among many other publication outlets.254 
Laying the foundation for the new paradigm was a crucial step in rewriting the 
narrative of the Zionist project in ways that would undermine Israel’s legitimacy. 
With Said’s post-colonialist perspective translated to Hebrew it was only a matter of 
time before Israeli university students would be acquainted with his devastating 
criticism of their country’s legitimacy, presented by their teachers as a fresh, rigorous, 
corrective narrative.  
Colonial Settlers and Invented Nationalism  
Beginning in the late 1980s, three Israeli scholars have advanced the notion 
that Zionism was a colonialist venture on a par with the British one. Avishai Ehrlich, 
a Maztpen activist and former editor of Khamsin who obtained a doctorate at the 
London School of Economics and returned to teach at the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Academic 
College, criticized mainstream sociology for separating the Jewish and the Arab 
realms thus ignoring the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Israeli society. His own 
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preference was for integrating Israeli-Jewish society and Israel’s Arab citizens into 
‘one analytical framework, namely: the settler colonial model’.255 
Gershon Shafir, a Tel Aviv University sociology professor (who would later 
move to University of California San Diego), used Marxist perspectives to claim that 
Jewish immigrants to Palestine were colonialist settlers who in many respects 
behaved like their counterparts in the United States or South Africa. To prove his 
point, Shafir presented Arab-Jewish relations in mandatory Palestine as a class 
struggle in which non-capitalist settlers (Jewish workers) sought to dissuade capitalist 
settlers (Jewish landowners) from employing cheap non-settler workers (indigenous 
Arabs) by camouflaging their competition with nationalist phraseology and slogans. 
He conceded that this contrived explanation violated the classic colonialist rationale 
of exploiting cheap native labour but explained that ‘during most of its history, Israeli 
society is best understood… in terms of the broader context of Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. Nor was Israel completely different from some of the other European 
overseas societies that were also shaped in the process of settlement and conflict with 
already existing societies… and of various European models of colonization’.256 
Clearly aware of the difficulties of  ‘knowledge formation’ (that is creating a 
new narrative), Ram predicted a long struggle between mainstream sociology and the 
colonialist perspectives as the latter’s potential to delegitimize Zionism was already 
manifest in the writings of Said and his followers. He noted that colonialism was still 
an ‘outcast in mainstream academia’ because it threatened to bestow an academic 
credibility on arguments used by Arabs and Palestinians to dispute Israel’s legitimacy: 
‘the colonial perspective entails a drastic shift in the conceptual and comparative 
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analytical framework… Instead of being compared to the western democracies as is 
usually preferred by mainstream, especially functional sociology, it is now compared 
to South Africa’. Aware that such a shift may be too much to require, Ram took care 
to assure that ‘recognition of colonial origin of Israel does not entail a wholesale 
delegitimation of the State of Israel’.257 
It was at this juncture that the still little-known critical sociology school 
received a boost from unexpected quarters. On its face, Baruch Kimmerling, a 
Hebrew University sociologist was a surprise convert to the new paradigm. Ram 
described him as a ‘Weberian’ (a reference to a positivist sociologist) and his initial 
treatment of Zionism deviated only modestly from the traditional version of 
Eisenstadt. At the same time Kimmerling took a more comparative perspective by 
using the work of Ferdinand Tonnies that had influenced Weber’s work on the 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft membership. He constructed a taxonomy of validity 
claims that ranged from the very instrumental - an approach found in colonial settler 
societies - to the highly symbolic-religious, where land was viewed as the centre of 
the religious-moral universe. While Kimmerling conceded that the latter category 
could fit the concept of the Holy Land in Jewish religion he chose to follow Frederick 
Turner, another disciple of Tonnies, who classified the United States as an immigrant 
settler society. The decision to describe Israel as an immigrant settler society was 
significant.258 
For those familiar with Tonnies’s highly nuanced study, Kimmerling’s 
taxonomic choice signalled a rejection of the Gemeinschaft-derived Jewish 
connection to the Holy Land. At the same time he was not ready to embrace the post-
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colonial approach, which would have delegitimized Israel’s foundational claim. 
Significantly, Kimmerling did not use the term ‘colonial’ when discussing the same 
issue a few years later but acknowledged that since 1967 Israel created a ‘control 
system’ in the ‘occupied territories’.259 
By 1992 Kimmerling seemed to have progressed towards the neo-Marxist, 
critical view that equated Zionist immigration with colonialism. After citing Gouldner 
and Gramsci, he admitted that sociologists make ‘framework decisions’ - his term for 
paradigms - that affect topics that each society has to study and, ultimately, society’s 
identity. He credited the Marxist scholars at Haifa University with offering an 
alternative to the dominant Zionist political-intellectual worldview and mentioned the 
Matzpen intellectuals, whom he defined as ‘radical non-Zionist left’. Though 
Kimmerling was still reluctant to link Israel’s origin to the colonial machinations of 
European powers he conceded that under certain circumstances ‘the dominance of a 
paradigm can be contested by other approaches’.260 
But it took the failure of the Oslo peace process to fully push Kimmerling into 
the critical, neo-Marxist camp. In a revealing article, he linked his ‘conversion’ to the 
political needs of the hour, explaining that in order to produce political change an 
‘alternative ideational’ framework was needed. For Kimmerling, the colonialist label 
was important since the ‘Zionist movement has tried to shake all the dust of 
colonialism because it did not want to lose legitimacy’. Indeed, in his new version of 
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the 1882-1948 period he claimed that Zionist displayed ‘some colonizing features’ 
and that the ‘era of colonization ended with ethnic cleansing’ of Palestinians.261 
Kimmerling’s intellectual metamorphosis was a huge boost for the fraternity 
of critical scholars still struggling to make the ‘Zionism-as-colonialism’ a household 
theme in the Israeli academic milieu. That a Hebrew University sociologist would 
lend a hand to claims that Zionist intellectuals invented the Jewish nation was 
especially significant. Indeed, Kimmerling, well-versed in the importance of the 
sociology of knowledge, embraced Hobsbawm’s claim that ‘nationalist’ historians 
could not be trusted with writing their country’s history, repeating his assertion that 
scholars needed to check in their ideology before entering their office. To him, the 
wrongdoers who created the ‘Zionist historical narrative’ were to be found among 
unnamed Hebrew University historians who understood that the ‘Jewish past and 
history were perceived as a major source of legitimacy for the Zionists’ claim for title 
over the land in opposition to the local Arab population's counterclaim to be the 
exclusive legitimate owner of the land’.   This national mission was overriding to the 
point of allegedly undermining their objectivity: ‘when ideological commitments 
collide with standards of objectivity and impartiality, usually the “Zionist 
orientations” receive primacy’.262 
Kimmerling further claimed that this past narrative had contributed to ‘a 
common perception of Jewish history as an internally coherent unit extending beyond 
the particularities of place and time’. He explained that these historians generated the 
myth that the Jewish ‘national organism’ survived for so long because of its focus on 
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the Land of Israel, its vitality and the ‘acute historical consciousness’. Worse, in his 
opinion, the historians created a view that Jewish history was sui generis, that it was 
unique to the point of being mythical. Aggravating as this was from a comparative 
perspective, Kimmerling hinted that there was a darker motive to the sui generis 
thesis: a comparative perspective would have forced Israel to face its colonialist 
legacy, something that was ‘taboo in both Israeli society and Israeli 
historiography’.263 
If Kimmerling was still somewhat ambivalent about calling the Zionist 
narrative an outright fabrication, Ram had few such reservations. He put his New 
School training to good use, accusing Zionist historians, notably Dinur, of inventing 
the Jewish nation. Armed with a long list of references to Hobsbawm, Anderson, 
Gellner and other enthusiasts of ‘imagined communities’, Ram charged that Dinur and 
his colleagues invented ‘the modern Jewish nationhood in the service of the Zionist 
movement and, later, the state of Israel’.  Chastising Dinur for being a Weberian-type 
‘organicist’ (a reference to the Gemenischaft-Gesellschaft transition), he took 
particular exception to the notion that Jewish identity was linked to the Land of Israel: 
‘Even though the assumed nation has lived outside of Eretz Israel for almost two 
millennia, this land has continued to form the axis of its national identity’. Ram 
evoked Ruth Firer, another critic of traditional sociology, to charge that Zionist 
historians invented the Law of Zionist Redemption: ‘the teleological depiction of 
Jewish history, i.e., its rendition as leading toward a specific goal - the return of the 
people to its motherland’.264 
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For Ram the Zionist historiography was a source of intense irritation. He 
lamented the fact that it created ‘a nation in the modern state’ and dismissed the 
notion that ‘Jews were in essence a political nation, i.e. a consolidated spatio-temporal 
collective subject’ said to be ‘inherently connected to Zion, and in temporal terms to 
be a perennially continuous entity’. Ram was adamant that this type of nationalism 
did not comport with the neo-Marxist ‘post-conventional identity’ - a reference to 
Habermas’s theory that in the age of post-nationalism identity would be derived from 
universal rather than particularistic values. Indeed, he complained that the 
‘conventional identity’ of Zionist historiography created a ‘Procrustean bed’ that 
prevented the expression of a ‘pluralistic conception of Israeli identity’.265 
If Ram was irritated by ‘Zionist historians’, he seemed to be greatly 
encouraged by the New Historians, whose work he considered to be a model for 
future historiography. He must have also been gratified when, in a little noticed 2002 
essay, ‘The Post Zionist as an Agent of Unauthorized Memory: On the Structure of 
the Production of the Past in Israel’, Sand admitted being inspired by Ram’s critical 
sociology, which provided a ‘universal legitimacy’ to the negation of the ‘uniqueness 
tradition’ used by Israeli historiography to justify Zionist claims to Palestine. To 
recall, Sand devoted an entire chapter to the literature on the ‘invented communities’, 
an idea borrowed from Ram’s article.266 
Upending traditional understanding of Jewish history was only one of the 
items on Ram’s agenda.  Another task involved ‘updating’ Weber’s categories for the 
age of globalization. Like his neo-Marxist teachers in the New School, Ram followed 
the process of globalization with great interest. By the early years of the twenty-first 
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century it was quite evident that a one-world community was taking shape, albeit not 
in the socialist form predicted by Wallerstein or Habermas. 
Though clearly frustrated by the fact that globalization was spreading the 
American ‘McDonald ethos’ of capitalism, consumerism and liberal individualism, 
Ram saw a silver lining in the capitalist cloud proving his own theory of Israel. 
Repeating Tom Friedman’s observation in The Lexus and the Olive Tree that 
globalization created a class of global citizens (Lexus people) alongside entrenched 
traditionalists (olive tree people), he suggested that Israeli society was divided into 
two sharply contrasting groups. The former was said to embrace post-Gesellschaft 
globalist identity whereas the latter allegedly followed neo-nationalism described by 
Ram as ‘an old or invented Gemeinschaft’. By redefining post-Gesellschaft as 
secularism and the neo-Gemeinschaft as religious tribalism, Ram could claim that 
both posed a challenge to traditional Zionism, the nemesis of critical sociology. Much 
as he disliked the latter, there was more than a hint of satisfaction in pronouncing the 
Zionist-Israeli identity crumbling. Kimmerling went even further, proclaiming the 
‘invention and decline of Israeliness’.267 
In fact, Ram had much to be satisfied with since his plea for an equal playing 
field with the positivists. A study published in the early 2000s found that critical 
sociology, measured by the number of advanced degrees and topics, became 
‘hegemonic’ in Israeli universities, effectively ending ‘genuine pluralism in Israeli 
sociology’.  Apparently in recognition of this fact the New School of Social Research 
honoured Ram in 2011 as an outstanding alumnus.268 
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When rewriting the ‘Zionist narrative’ critical sociologists had major 
advantages over their positivist counterparts. As Karl Popper determined, Marxist and 
neo-Marxist theories were formulated in a way that made empirical falsification 
impossible. The paradigmatic term ‘post’ essentially gave its practitioners a license to 
offer an alternative narrative, no matter how different from reality. Positivist scholars 
trying to dispute critical narratives were accused of being agents of the national status 
quo or worse, the same charge that was levelled against Karsh and other critics of the 
New Historians. Alternatively, positivists were dismissed as lacking in intellectual 
sophistication since they did not catch up with what Ram called ‘the time of the post’. 
In an exchange with traditional sociologists who blamed him and his colleagues for 
the ‘lost years of Israeli sociology’ Ram listed five ‘posts’ that allegedly made for a 
more sophisticated reading of reality. Indeed, on one occasion he suggested that, after 
some years of ‘infiltration’, critical sociology ‘became a bon-ton at least in some 
circles in the social sciences’. He was even more encouraged by the broader context 
in which Israeli critical scholars operated, writing that ‘the last vestiges of positivistic 
philosophy of science are disappearing from the philosophical landscape’.269 
Judging from the response of leading positivists such as Moshe Lissak, Ram 
had a point. Lissak, the reigning heir to Eisenstadt, stated that the ‘engaged scholars’ 
made a mockery of the scientific research protocol to support an ideological position. 
Worse, critical, neo-Marxist scholars were said to totally ‘invalidate the paradigm of 
the established sociology’. Eliezer Ben-Rafeal, a fellow positivist, complained about 
the aggressive methods that critical sociologists used to delegitimize their opponents; 
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the latter were said to create ‘holy history of sociology’ in which ‘the villains’ (non-
critical sociologists) ‘are “unveiled” as accomplices of the “ruling Ashkenazim”’.  But 
it was the increasing imbalance between the older and even retired positivists and the 
growing ranks of critical scholars - augmented by the assiduous effort to co-opt 
likeminded colleagues - that worked in favour of the latter. As Hazony put it bluntly, 
the former were ‘heavily outgunned’.270 
With the post-colonialist perspective firmly attached to the Zionist project, 
critical academics were eager to take on the ‘ingathering-of-exiles’ phase of nation-
building. As noted earlier, the Zionists had argued that without a homeland of their 
own Jews were likely to fall victim to anti-Semitism or even face considerable 
physical danger, a prediction that was most horrifically vindicated during the 
Holocaust. Critical sociologists had to reverse the equation and prove that it was 
Zionism that actually victimized Jews, or, at the very least, some categories of Jews; 
the Mizrahim became exhibit one for this theory.  
Israel as a Post-Colonialist Society: Mizrahim as Victims of Zionism 
As noted above, the Haifa University group was the first to place the alleged 
mistreatment of the Mizrahim in an academic context. Critical sociologists accepted 
Bernstein’s diagnosis that Ashkenazi capitalists used the Mizrahim as a steady supply 
of cheap labour, but the issue received a post-colonialist makeover by Ella Shohat 
whose ‘Mizrahim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims’ was a 
replay of  Said’s ‘Zionism from the Perspective of its Victims’. According to Shohat, 
the Mizrahim, like the Palestinians, were victims of white Ashkenazi colonialists.  To 
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make the parallel stick she placed the Mizrahim within the cultural sphere of the 
region and in opposition to European Jews, charging the Ashkenazi Zionist ideology 
with alienating the immigrants from their cultural kin, the Arab, and with ‘de-
Orientalizing’ them to fit the Western image of the State of Israel.271 
Shohat’s ideas found a fertile ground in the identity movement of Mizrahi 
intellectuals who subsequently created the Hakeshet Hademocratit Hamizrahit (The 
Democratic Mizrahi Rainbow). Yehouda Shenahv, a sociology professor from Tel 
Aviv University and a leading activist in this circle, was an unlikely candidate to take 
up Shohat’s ideas. Born to a middle class family of Iraqi immigrants as Yehouda 
Shahrabani, he worked for the Israeli Military Industry that sponsored his PhD studies 
in the United States. Upon his return in 1986 he secured a position teaching and 
researching the sociology of management, but his research interests shifted to the 
Mizrahim. In a testimony to the Gramscian-like mixing of critical scholarship and 
political activism, Shenhav described the impact of Hakeshet on his research as 
‘remarkable’.272 
Borrowing another Saidian phrase, Shenhav proclaimed the functional-
structural representation of the Mizrahim in traditional sociology to be part of the 
‘fertile imagination of the West’. But he had more than theory on his mind when 
accusing the sociological establishment of turning the Mizrahim into political 
hardliners. Stating that the Mizrahim were no more ‘naturally’ hawkish than other 
Israeli groups, he explained their voting behaviour as ‘compensatory’: since they were 
forced to deny their Arab background they compensated by adopting a hard line 
attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  As Shenhav saw it, Ashkenazi Zionists had 
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a manifest political interest in alienating the Mizrahim from their cultural roots, thus 
thwarting their natural bonds to the Palestinians and creating a pool of voters for 
Likud.273 
Moving on to consider the Mizrahim from a post-colonialist perspective, 
Shenhav drew on his own family background - as well as a study of Zionist emissaries 
in Iraq in the 1940s - to suggest that as early as 1941 Ben-Gurion considered the 
Mizrahim a ‘demographic replacement’ for those who would perish in the Holocaust. 
To persuade Iraqi Jews to immigrate the emissaries, who operated as colonial British 
agents, spoke the ‘colonial language’, commenting on the ‘Arabness of the locals’ 
(including the Jews) while simultaneously insisting that the Jews were different. 
When this colonial ‘marker’ did not generate enough immigrants in the early 1950s, 
Shenhav argued, the Mossad resorted to bombing attacks on Jewish targets in 
Baghdad. In Shenhav’s view, Israeli efforts to encourage immigration went so far as 
to collude with the Iraqi authorities in confiscating the property of the Jews.  In March 
1951 the Iraqi parliament passed a bill to expropriate Jewish property; soon after 
Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett declared that the property forfeited by the 
Palestinians would be considered a compensation for the ones confiscated from Iraqi 
Jews.274 
To attract attention to his provocative ideas Shenhav published a number of 
articles in the 1990s, but it was his 2003 book, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial 
Reading of Nationalism, Religion and Ethnicity (an English version was published 
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three years later), that created a stir, not least because of the label ‘Arab Jews’. 
Shenhav explained that renaming the Mizrahim was part of a new sociological theory 
that, unlike Said’s dichotomy between East and West, questioned the traditional view 
of nations.  Authored by Roger Brubaker, the theory used critical concepts to advance 
the neo-Gramscian view of international relations. Echoing Brubaker Shenahv 
proclaimed that ‘the understanding of nations as real groups contradicts recent 
developments in sociological theory such as network theory, ethnomethodology, 
postmodernism, and feminism’. Indeed, there was ‘a growing interest in network 
forms rather than in fixed entities’. Following Brubaker’s suggestion to study ‘nations 
as events that emerge through situated networks’ he decided to embrace the 
‘fluctuating rather than fixed entities in fragmentary, ephemeral, and elusive 
boundaries rather than in static categories’. In other words, the label Arab Jews was 
logical because of the ‘ephemeral and elusive boundaries’ pioneered by Brubaker, 
even if it negated customary use (and for that matter reality).275 
Turning the Mizrahim to Arab Jews was essential to Shenhav’s political 
activism. He was fully aware that the foreign ministry supported advocacy groups like 
Justice for Jews from Arab Countries (JJAC) that demanded compensation for the 
property of the 850,000 Mizrahim forced to flee following the 1948 war. A sharp 
critic of the JJAC, Shenhav admitted that his book aimed at denying the Israeli 
government the use of the ‘Mizrahi asset’. But he also hoped that the post-colonialist 
narrative would convince the Mizrahim that their true identity required a political 
alliance with the Palestinians, a project that the Keshet group worked very hard to 
accomplish. The book was received with great enthusiasm by critical scholars, 
applauded by one critic as a ‘brave, fascinating, excellent book that will mark an 
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important turning point in the study of Jews from Arab and Islamic countries and their 
relationship to the Jewish state’.276 
Positivist sociologists were highly critical of Shenhav’s work. In a 1991/92 
exchange with Shenhav, Shlomo Fischer argued that there was plenty of empirical 
evidence to suggest that the Ashkenazim and Mizrahim were actually in the process 
of developing a new identity that transcended the old categories, making Shenhav’s 
argument obsolete. Accusing Shenhav and other critical intellectuals of ignoring such 
findings to protect their agenda, he argued that ‘it gives them the political and moral 
capital by connecting them to the discourse of the Third World and making them 
spokesman for the oppressed’.277 Other analysts focused specifically on The Arab 
Jews where, they pointed out, three of the emissaries to Baghdad were mistakenly 
classified as Ashkenazim. They concluded that Shenhav’s attempt to analyse the 
situation ‘via the prism of colonial theory’s tortured conceptualizations’ might have 
led to the error.  
Shenhav’s fidelity to facts was taken to task in the case of the alleged 
Mossad’s bombings in Baghdad.278 Critics insisted that the three sources on which 
Shenhav relied for the Mossad story were either unreliable or hostile; one of them, a 
self-proclaimed anti-Zionist Iraqi-Jew who lived in the United States, mentioned it in 
a self-published book. The Israeli authorities vehemently denied the charges and a 
number of independent studies could not find any corroborating evidence either. But, 
in the manner of the neo-Marxist, critical paradigm, Shenhav claimed that his 
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narrative was valid and that those who criticized him represented the ‘Zionist 
narrative’.279 
Shenhav was likewise unperturbed by empirical data that led sociologist 
Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, a renowned expert on ethnic relations, to question critical 
sociologists who, in his opinion, prematurely declared the death of the melting pot 
idea. Yuchtman-Yaar, who designed and directed some of the most important 
empirical research projects in Israel, noted that the idea that the melting-pot ‘deserves 
a ‘failing’ grade was apparently too hastily reached and that the degree of its success - 
and some would say ‘too much success’ - was most impressive by any standard.  
Shenhav’s refusal to be bothered with facts was vividly illustrated when a critic of 
The Arab Jews pointed out that, contrary to the book’s assertions, a study found that 
some 88 per cent of Mizrahim reported no experience of ethnic discrimination. 
Invoking a variant of Marx’s ‘false consciousness’, Shenhav declared the results a 
form of ‘self-denial’.280 
Ignoring criticism from other academics was one thing; overlooking the 
phenomenal rise of the Shas Party was quite another. Founded in 1984 by Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef, Shas combined a return to traditional Mizrahi culture with the most 
stringent dictates of the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox world where Yosef had studied. 
Upset by the small representation of the Mizrahim in the ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel 
Party, Yosef conceived of a separate political movement that would combine two 
functions: ‘restoration of the crown to its old glory’, his name for reuniting the 
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Mizrhaim with their alleged ultra-orthodox roots and improving their economic 
situation, mostly through a communal social network. Shas initially took a moderate 
position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but turned hawkish, partnering with Likud 
in a number of right wing coalitions. 
It is more than a passing irony that Shenhav, whose outspoken positions on 
ethnicity made news, had little to say about the Shas phenomenon. Indirectly though, 
his complex views on the issue offer an interesting clue. Like his Keshet colleagues 
Shenhav initially complained about the forced ‘westernization’ of the Mizrahim that 
had deprived them of their ‘authentic’ Arab cultural identity, but was reluctant to 
discuss the well-known religious-folkloristic elements in their cultural fabric. The 
category of masorti (traditional religiosity) to describe the Mizrahim was indeed 
recognition of this non-halachic but deeply felt religious beliefs.  Much in the spirit of 
critiquing the positivists he asserted that the masorti label was a social construct from 
the Eisenstadt’s school of sociology, claiming that the Mizrahim were essentially 
secular. In his view the Zionist emissaries to Iraq (and other Middle East Jewish 
communities) found them not religious enough to sustain the Zionist project and 
consequently attempted to stir up their religious feelings: ‘In order to return the Arab-
Jews to history, the emissaries of the secular movement needed to find in them - 
perhaps even forge in them - religious fervour’.281 
When criticized for negating the reality of Mizrahi religiosity, Shenhav drew 
on the theory of modernization of the controversial French philosopher Bruno Latour, 
explaining that the concept of ‘modern’ contained two contradictory principles within 
it: ‘hybridization’ that mixed ‘non-homological’ and distinct elements and 
                                                          
281
 Yehouda Shenahv, ‘The Cloak, the Cage, and the Fog of Sanctity: The Zionist 
Mission and the Role of Religion in the Middle East’, Nations and Nationalism, 9/4 
(2003), p. 525.   
161 
 
‘purification’ that created separate ontological zones with no continuation between 
them.  Applying the process to Israel, Shenhav argued that Zionism ‘hybridized the 
secular with the religious, while at the same time it obscured these hybridization 
practices, thus purifying nationalism (the very product of hybridization) and treating 
nationalism and religion as two separate spheres of action’. Thus Zionism 
‘religionized’ the Mizrahi Jews in order to mobilize them to the modern secular 
national project.282 
More forthcoming than Shenhav, Yaacov Yadgar, another critical sociologist, 
was ready to admit that the Shas phenomenon ‘left students of Israeli politics 
perplexed, seeking suitable theoretical and discursive frameworks’. He blamed mono-
casual theories for this failure of understanding and suggested that Pierre Bourdieu’s 
field theory could shed more light on the ‘enigmatic’ Shas movement. This 
enormously complex and somewhat contradictory theory asserted that ‘a field is an 
arena of relationships that is both structured and at the same time a dynamic 
competitive sphere. This arena is the locus of production, circulation, and 
appropriation of goods, knowledge, or status and the competitive positions held by 
actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize these different kinds of capital’.  
At the heart of the field is human agency, meaning the behaviour of individuals as 
they strive to accommodate themselves to the special rules of the game of each field, 
its capital and other positions. Yadgar identified several hieratically-stacked fields 
topped by the economic and political fields where, in his view, the Mizrahi Shas 
players have been engaged. In other words, Shas was a product of competition for 
symbolic (religious) capital between the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi religious leaders as 
well as competition in other fields over economic goods and cultural goods.  Out of 
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this complex network of competitions, a new Mizrahi orthodox field had apparently 
emerged.283 
Yadgar’s plea for multiple-cause explanations notwithstanding, other critical 
scholars chose to deal with the Shas ‘enigma’ in a more conventional way, fuelling a 
large debate on ‘what sends the Mizrahim stampeding to Shas’. To recall, Ram 
blamed globalization for increasing the gap between the poor and the rich, making it 
clear that the Shas voters should be counted among the non-globalized ‘olive people’.  
Eva Illouz, a professor of sociology at the Hebrew University and an occasional 
contributor to the debate, asserted that the absorption patterns marginalized the 
Mizrahim in bad schools, letting Shas fill the void.284 
All these commentaries must be understood as an effort of critical scholars to 
shore up their reputation. That the ‘Arab Jews’ conjured up by Shenhav could support 
the policies of Shas provided critics with an opportunity to make a broader point 
about critical, neo-Marxist scholarship. They lambasted Shenhav and his peers for 
engaging in ‘libellous rhetoric’ against the ‘old sociologists’ as well as ‘vacuous 
activity of inflated rhetoric’ and ‘constant repetition of the Said mantra, all waged 
from the comfort of their offices’. They suggested that by replacing field research 
with ‘abstract style for titles, library research and esoteric linguistic manipulations’, 
their critical colleagues lost touch with reality.285 
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Ironically, Shenhav’s effort to remake the Mizrahim into Arab Jews received a 
serious rebuke from among his own ranks. The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, a 
German-based Marxist think tank with an office in Jerusalem, asked a colleague of 
Shenhav at Tel Aviv University, Nissim Mizrahi, to conduct an empirical study of 
‘the obvious yet un-scrutinized gap between leftist ideology and the people it aspires 
to represent - a gap that has hindered attempts to initiate fundamental change in 
Israel's political culture and has impeded the creation of an effective movement for 
peace’. This phrasing left little doubt that Shenhav was part of the gap ‘between leftist 
ideology and the people it aspired to represent’. The project planned ‘to outline an 
intervention model that will provide grounded theoretical foundation for a new 
Palestinian-Mizrahi dialogue’.286 
A study by Momi Dahan, an economics professor at the Hebrew University 
who headed the inequality project at The Israel Democracy Institute in Jerusalem, 
offered a harsher rebuke of Shenhav’s theory. Dahan found a dramatic improvement 
in the socioeconomic status of the Mizrahim due to ‘a nearly continuous narrowing of 
income gaps between Israeli households of two groups of origin (Europe/America 
versus Asia/Africa) since the 1990s’. In 2011 the disparity in net income between 
these two groups stood at 27 per cent, as compared to about 40 per cent in the mid-
1990s. He concluded that, paradoxically, ‘the increase in earnings inequality (between 
people with higher education and people without higher education) is responsible for 
the economic upsurge of Israelis of Asian/African origin. This increase in the rate of 
return for higher education generated greater incentive among those with lower 
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education (from Asia/Africa) to increase their investment in education. This 
suggestion is consistent with the increase of the education level of Israelis originating 
from Asia/Africa, which was more rapid than that of native Israelis whose families 
came from Europe/America’. By emphasizing the rapid educational achievements of 
the Mizrahim the study vindicated traditional sociology advocating education as a 
vehicle for social integration. In other words, the melting pot that Eisenstadt’s nation-
building model predicted took about half a decade to achieve.287 
Dahan, himself a Mizrahi, took a rather dim view of his academic colleagues 
who, in his view, peddled the old ethnic grievances. This much was clear in his 
commentary on the very public firing of an economist who, in a lecture at Sapir 
College in 2012, described Bank Leumi as the ‘bank of white people’ along with 
reference to the ‘ruling white society’ and the ‘robber kibbutzim’, long considered a 
‘white’ bastion. Dahan noted that the speech was motivated more by personal distress 
than ‘by dispassionate observations’.288 
Much as the Mizrahim created problems for critical sociologists who wanted 
to portray them as victims of Zionism, turning women into alleged targets of the 
Zionist enterprise proved to be even more complicated.   
Zionism as a Patriarchal-Militaristic Project: The Victimization of 
Israeli Women  
By standards of positivist sociology the position of women in Israel should 
have been considered advanced, even by western standards. The gender equality of 
the Zionist movement, the relatively important role of women in the nation-building 
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process, not to mention their integration in the Israel Defence Forces, propelled Israel 
into the higher rung of the global developmental chart. 
Yet despite the fact that women’s socioeconomic and political conditions 
improved during Israel’s first three decades, the Haifa group was not impressed with 
gender equality with Swirski claiming that women were discriminated against and 
most likely to be found in lower-class precincts in society. This claim was a reflection 
of the Marxist thesis that, in search for profits, Israeli capitalism was likely to exploit 
women and other vulnerable sectors including Arabs and Palestinians.  His solution to 
overcoming this and other forms of inequality was to launch a ‘second socialist 
revolution’.289 
Barbara Swirski, who worked in battered women shelters in Haifa, offered a 
somewhat more complex reading of Marx and women. She linked violence against 
women both to their inferior economic position and to the militarism of Israeli 
society. By injecting a new element to the equation, she seemed to suggest that a 
social revolution - ‘the one size fits all solution’ was not enough. This was not 
incidental, since complaints of Marx’s alleged gender blindness became part of the 
feminist critique in neo-Marxist circles. But Swirski’s suggestion that violence 
towards women could not be eradicated without eliminating Israeli militarism was a 
novel demand and not likely to acquire a wide following. A handful of American 
feminist academics visiting Haifa University in the late 1970s paid lip service to the 
slogan of fighting economic inequality and militarism but were more interested in 
issues of self-realization. One of their leaders, Marcia Freedman, a professor of 
philosophy, became a lesbian and switched her efforts to promoting the rights of gays 
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and lesbians.290 Academic research on feminism picked up in the 1990s, but 
assessments on how women fared in the Zionist project varied.  Dafna Izraeli took the 
liberal position that women had done quite well but that more economic opportunities 
were needed to level the playing field.  In 1987 Deborah Bernstein concluded that 
women remained ‘marginal in the struggle for social change’ in the Yishuv but 
attributed this marginalization to opposition from the conservative elements in the 
women’s movement. Her 1991 edited volume promised to take aim at the ‘official 
Zionist narrative’ of women’s role in the Yishuv but the chapters implied a consensus 
that women made important political and economic strides during that period.  Hanna 
Herzog, a sociologist from Tel Aviv University, agreed with this premise, going so far 
as to praise the pioneer women; her complaint was that not enough credit was given to 
women pioneers in the official historiography of the period. The book editor promised 
to launch a vigorous effort to remedy this oversight.291 
However, as already noted, by the end of the 1990s the neo-Marxist, critical 
paradigm had taken root, reconfiguring the field of women studies. Ram noted that 
critical feminism was very different from traditional women studies and Herzog, who 
had become a leading voice in the new field, provided a preview of the changes to 
come.  She explained that critical feminism was ‘an umbrella for diverse and 
adversarial approaches all claiming to be authentically critical... Marxist, socialist, 
radical, psychoanalytical, existential, postmodern’. Deriving from Foucault and 
Gramsci, ‘all these approaches share the refusal to accept the existing cultural and 
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social order as self-evident’. Herzog emphasized that critical feminism sought not 
only ‘the root of the gendered social order’ but wished ‘to engender social change’. 
To affect the public discourse, critical feminism needed to adopt a new approach, ‘the 
method is the perpetual subversion of prevailing concepts, the adoption of an 
“oppositional imagination” in order to expose mechanisms of cultural domination and 
to question the underpinnings of hegemonic thought’.292 
Herzog made clear that adopting this method meant much more than 
complaining about paucity of research on Yishuv women. The new goal of feminist 
critique was to fight the militarization of Israeli society stemming from the Israeli-
Arab conflict, something that Swirski has suggested in the past. The mission of the 
feminist movement was said to ‘civilize’ Israeli society by subverting its ‘masculine, 
nationalist, militaristic and exclusionary traits’.  To this end Herzog urged to put an 
end to the ‘grand narrative’ and introduce the ‘subversive logic’ that ‘opened the 
space to various critical voices’. Calling her own voice a ‘post-Zionist narrative’, she 
promised to apply the spirit of Foucauldian critique to ‘Zionist historiography’. 
Indeed, Herzog’s new writings indicated a dramatic shift from her 1992 position. She 
found that ‘Zionism has created a regime of knowledge operating through the pastoral 
power of identification with the collective... including women as mothers of the 
nation’. At the same time, she accused the Zionist system of ‘shunting them off to the 
sidelines and denying them access to various positions of power’.293 
Changing the view of history, as already noted, was common among critical 
scholars who needed to adapt to altered political circumstances or fashionable 
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paradigmatic developments. But critical feminism faced a particular conundrum; if 
the Zionist movement was a colonialist project, the pioneer women were every inch as 
guilty as their colonialist husbands and colleagues.  The only way to absolve them of 
the colonial guilt was to turn them into victims of the Zionist enterprise, as Herzog 
had done.294 
While revising the past posed difficulties, dealing with the contemporary task 
of undermining the ‘patriarchal-militaristic’ structure proved to be far more daunting.   
Solving the conflict was a necessary step in doing away with Israeli militarism and, 
according to the paradigm, women and other minorities expected to join the peace 
movement since minorities were said to suffer from military conflicts.  However, 
creating a ‘feminist sisterhood for peace’ was much more difficult in reality than in 
theory. Cracks within the feminist movement surfaced as early as the 1980s when one 
Mizrahi feminist voiced her alienation by stating: ‘no sisterhood’.  Things deteriorated 
further in the 1990s over accusation that Ashkenazi feminists ignored concerns of 
Mizrahi women - low pay, lack of social infrastructure and skimpy welfare services – 
in order to pursue self-realization, a reference to feminist-lesbian forums that 
Freedman and others had launched. Mizrahi critics also denounced the waste of 
resources on what they considered symbolic issues like having women pilots in the 
Air Force, an issue that was deemed of marginal interest to lower-class Mizrahi 
women. Things came to a head during one of the annual feminist conferences where 
lesbian feminists demanded a separates slot. Since most of the lesbians were 
Ashkenazi, Mizrahi activists wanted to adjust the quota-based system of 
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representation. The fight led to a lot of hard-feelings with the Ashkenazi feminist 
calling their comrades ‘whiners’, a reference to their alleged countless complains.295 
Mizrahi academic-activists dealt with another blow against the common peace 
front by taking Ashkenazi feminists to task for championing Palestinian rights.  They 
accused them of hypocrisy for picking ‘politically correct topics’ like demonstrating 
for peace or advancing the cause of Palestinian lesbians but relinquishing the struggle 
for low-class Mizrahi women. They alleged that the Ashkenazi women preferred to 
work on peaceful coexistence to deflect from their failure to acknowledge their 
discomfort with their own ‘other’, Jews from Arab countries. Coming from privileged 
backgrounds, Ashkenazi feminists were said to exhibit the same racist attitudes 
towards low-class Mizrahim as other ‘whites’. Worse, the elitism of the Ashkenazi 
feminists was assumed to be closely related to their class interests as employers of 
Mizrahi baby-sitters and cleaning women. For their part, the Mizrahi women were 
said to refer to their Ashkenazi employers as ‘ladies’, a class moniker that originated 
in the Yishuv period.296 
Efforts at creating a unified front were further marred by allegations of power-
grabbing, hegemony and domination. Mizrahi academics blamed their Ashkenazi 
counterparts for creating a ‘very powerful hegemonic discourse’ and, indeed, 
‘epistemic violence’ defined as ‘conspicuous aggression of those who define their 
systematic knowledge as the only “true” and “objective” knowledge - against any 
other claims to knowledge’. As one Mizrahi activist put it, Israeli women 
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organizations ‘are managed by an exclusive forum of women who believe that their 
academic and professional degrees grant them [privileged] insights’. Their own initial 
subversive act was to ‘define ourselves as feminists and Mizrahi’. In a follow up, they 
deconstructed the skewed power relations between the two groups going so far as to 
claim that Ashkenazi feminists rode the coattails of their influential fathers or 
husbands to positions of prominence in society.297 
One Mizrahi critic accused her Ashkenazi peers of preferring Palestinian 
women of similar educational background over lower class Mizrahi women. The 
international foundations that supported these professional coexistence seekers - 
known as dukers (a short form of the word du-kium, coexistence) - made matters 
worse, in this view.  The elegant venues in which middle-class Israeli and Palestinian 
feminists met to discuss conflict resolution had no place for the non-English speaking 
Mizrahim.298 
With issues of class and ethnicity crisscrossing the critical feminist discourse, 
the unified narrative of Israeli women as victims of Zionism was thrown into disarray.  
Clearly, critical Mizrahi feminists felt victimized by their Ashkenazi counterparts, 
raising the question whether the latter should be considered authentic victims of 
Zionism or just elitists posing as do-gooders in their spare time.  With identity politics 
built into the critical paradigm, competitions over victimhood and oppression could 
become fierce, as already demonstrated in Chapter 1. Mizrahi feminists resented the 
fact that the ‘trifecta of oppression’ was bestowed on feminists, Palestinians, and 
lesbians. They also complained that they were underrepresented in universities, the 
implication being that more academic slots for female Mizrahi scholars would go 
some way towards assuaging the sense of Mizrahi victimhood. 
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In many respects, the failure to mobilize feminists for the mission of 
‘civilizing’ Israel and ending the conflict should have been expected. As noted, the 
critical paradigm is engineered to ‘subvert’ any broader narrative, a factor that has 
contributed to the splintering of the movement into narrow, identity-based groups.    
Certainly, ethnic and class grievances have never been far from the surface in the 
critical discourse in Israel, often articulated by Keshet members. In 1996 Shenhav 
created quite a stir by accusing his colleagues on the Left with privileging the 
Palestinian case at the expense of the Mizrahim.299 
More surprising was that some Mizrahi critical scholars concluded that 
without first healing the domestic schism and ethnic divisions it was impossible to 
settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a most radical version of this idea, as 
advocated by Shenhav and Smadar Lavie, the only real solution was to create a bi-
national state where the Palestinians and the Mizrahi Jews would form a majority 
relegating the Ashkenazim to a permanent minority. The logic of this position put 
radical Mizrahim at odds with those in the critical community who preferred a two-
state outcome, a topic of yet another heated debate.  
As will be shown in the next chapter, the various visions of a post-conflict 
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Chapter 5  Israel’s Political System in Critical Political 
Science    
The sociologists who pioneered the neo-Marxist, critical paradigm, were eager 
to extend their critique to the political system in Israel. As shown earlier, the positivist 
and critical paradigms offered radically different perspectives on what constituted a 
democracy. None of the categories that factored into a positivist-based grading of 
democracy - elections, civil society, political freedoms - played a role in the 
contending paradigm that pegged the legitimacy of the authority system on the 
country’s distributive justice system. The dependencistas in particular were adamant 
that ‘true’ democracy could not coexist with a capitalist economy that did not 
distribute wealth in an equitable way. Bolstered by Wallerstein’s world system theory, 
173 
 
critical political geography shifted even more attention to egalitarian distribution of 
resources, along with attention to marginalized (proletarian) groups. As one of the 
advocates of the critical approach put it, a ‘“true” democracy is sensitive to social 
justice’.300 
Israel as a Colonial-Heritage Democracy  
When Eisenstadt published The Israeli Society in 1967 - compiled from his 
Hebrew language writings in the 1950s - few would have disagreed with his approach 
to nation-building.  As indicated in the previous chapter, functionalism-structuralism 
was a quintessential positivist tool for modelling the complex ways in which disparate 
societal groups come together to create and sustain a political system. Two of its 
leaders - Talcott Parsons and David Easton - wrote the ‘bible’ on the subject, 
providing the formula for homeostatic harmony: as long as the inputs and outputs into 
the system were in equilibrium the political system could sustain a status quo through 
consensus, social order, integration and solidarity.301  
This in turn inspired the consociational democracy theory developed by Arno 
Lijphart. Looking at his native Netherlands, which had overcome centuries of social, 
ethnic and religious strife, he suggested that ethnic and religious groups had to 
compromise with each other to create what he called consociational democracy. Well 
received among scholars of democracy, the model was touted as an answer to doubts 
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about democratic viability in deeply divided societies; indeed, Lijphart included Israel 
among the twenty-one consociational democracies identified in his survey.302 
It was Sammy Smooha, a Haifa University sociology professor, who would 
depart from Lijphart to introduce the concept of ethnic democracy to the Israeli 
discourse. A graduate of the Department of Sociology at Berkeley, Smooha followed 
the work of Pierre van den Berghe who utilized the case of South Africa’s apartheid 
to develop the concept of Herrenvolk democracy - a system that reserved full 
democratic privileges to the dominant group only. Herrenvolk, a variant of the 
ethnocratic paradigm, asserted that minority groups (defined by race, ethnicity or 
religion) suffered systemic discrimination in addition to human rights violations. 
While van den Berghe considered Israel an ethnocracy, Smooha maintained that 
ethnic democracy was a much better fit as the Jewish state, despite a dominant core 
ethnic group, extended political rights to the non-core group along with incomplete 
individual rights. He felt strongly that Israel should be regarded as an archetype of an 
ethnic democracy, a good enough facsimile of a liberal democracy in a deeply 
fragmented society.303 Yet it was before long that critical sociologists and political 
scientists were to take this paradigm a step further by presenting Israel as a non-
democracy. 
Gershon Shafir and his Tel Aviv University colleague Yoav Peled, a political 
science professor, were the first offer a systematic treatment of the supposed Israeli 
non-democracy. Identifying themselves as members of a ‘new generation of critical 
social scientists’ determined to set the record straight, Shafir recalled that his 
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conversion to critical scholarship occurred during a 1973 lecture by Eisenstadt where 
the eminent professor apparently failed to mention the Israeli Black Panthers, a group 
of protest Mizrahi activists. Peled, who came from a prominent leftwing family and 
joined the Communist Party himself, was eager to follow the Gramscian imperative as 
a scholar-activist.304 
Peled and Shafir’s early work on the split Jewish labour-market in the Pale of 
Settlement in Russia provided a clue to their subsequent view of the colonial origin of 
Israeli democracy. Two observations were especially pertinent, namely that the 
straightforward model of capital chasing the cheapest labour did not tend to work in 
an ethnically stratified society because of the role of the state in the economy, which 
they conceptualized in three different ways: the pluralist view that conceived the state 
as neutral arena for groups’ struggle; the functionalist view where the state was said to 
mediate the group struggle to assure social stability; and the conflict approach where 
the state acted to promote the interests of the dominant ethnic group.305 
While the Jews of the Pale did not succeed in leveraging their influence, the 
Jewish workers in Palestine, according to Shafir and Peled, did much better due to 
their position as a dominant group. In the colonialist setting of the Yishuv they 
commanded higher wages while the marginal Arabs suffered from exclusionary 
labour practices and low wages. To extrapolate the colonialist condition onto the 
independent State of Israel the authors borrowed from a theory of republican 
citizenship that became popular in the late 1980s. According to a group of political 
philosophers and legal scholars, there was a significant difference between the notions 
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of citizenship in liberal versus republican democracy. The former implied a passive 
sense of citizenship whereby individuals were recipients of a certain participatory 
rights regardless of their civic proclivities. The latter postulated that democracy 
required a certain type of virtue and identity to create the common good. While the 
original interest in republican citizenship was not ideological, Cass Sunstein, John 
Friedmann and other leftist scholars were quick to point out that the republican 
democracy privileged were bearers of certain virtues deemed to benefit the collective.  
Conversely, those who were remote from the communitarian virtue - ethnic or racial 
minorities and immigrants - were considered second or third class citizens in the 
United States and Britain, countries viewed as liberal democracies.306 
Peled, who rejected both Eisenstadt’s consociational democracy and Smooha’s 
ethnic democracy, found the republican citizenship model more commensurate with 
Israel’s colonial-heritage democracy, alleging this pattern to be deeply rooted in the 
Yishuv’s political culture. Pioneering (halutziut) served as the civic virtue of the 
community, ‘the criterion by which civic recognition was awarded to individuals and 
groups’. Defining virtue through the Zionist-pioneering endeavour created a dual 
distinction system that differentiated between Jews and Arabs and between the 
pioneering Ashkenazi elite and other Jews who were considered mere immigrants. 
The ‘ethno-republican community’ served also a ‘democratic republican community’ 
where individual rights and procedural rules of democracy were observed - but first 
class citizenship was reserved for those identified with the civic virtue of pioneering.  
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Consequently, ‘like those who cannot acquire full republican citizenship,’ Israeli 
Arabs have a ‘truncated political status: they do not share in attending to the common 
good but are secure in their possession of what we consider essential human and civil 
rights’.307 
Transiting into statehood in 1948 allowed Ben-Gurion, in Peled’s opinion, to 
engage in some clever juggling of republican and liberal forms of citizenship. By 
promulgating the Law of Return - a basis for immediate citizenship - the new state 
privileged the commitment to the communitarian good of the Zionist project. 
Interestingly, Ben-Gurion argued that the right of Jews to return was not granted by 
the state but predated the state in the sense ‘that the state itself came into being 
through the right that Jews had always had to the Land of Israel and in order to enable 
them to fulfil that right’. Recognizing the primordial rights of Jews was not entirely 
unique, as other immigrant societies enjoyed the principle of ‘communal self-
determination’ that is the right to ‘to shape its own cultural character to provide refuge 
to its ethnic kith and kin’. Peled conceded that such an arrangement made sense from 
a strong republican standpoint but was ‘an anathema to liberal political theory’. At the 
same time, Ben-Gurion started granting Arabs equal rights thus satisfied the 
requirements of liberal citizenship, making Israel an ethno-republican democracy. 
Peled emphasized that ethno-republicanism was different from the South African 
Herrenvolk democracy or some other blatantly discriminatory system, giving Israeli 
Arabs a strong incentive to operate within the system of law.  While the system was 
not ideal because the Arabs - and to a lesser degree the Mizrahi Jews - could not 
partake in the ‘common good’, the arrangement was quite tolerable: ‘The overt use of 
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ethnicity (as of other particularistic markers, e.g. gender, class, or religion) to 
categories of citizenship is offensive to anyone committed to liberal values… It may 
serve us well, however, to remember that discrimination based on the basis of 
ethnicity, race, religion, gender, and sexual preferences has not been unknown in 
liberal democracies’. This two-tiered republican democracy gave the Israeli Arabs a 
set of liberal rights and a political space to ‘consolidate those rights’. Indeed, in a 
choice between perfect civic equality and blatant discrimination, the ethnorepublican 
arrangement ‘may not be the worst possible choice’.308 
Published shortly before the start of the Oslo peace process, the article did not 
discuss the status of the Palestinians in the territories, nor did it address a possible 
settlement of the conflict.  After all, as conceptualized by Peled, a colonialist 
democracy was not expected to voluntary decolonize by giving up its conquest. To 
account for decolonization, aka the peace process, Peled, joined by Shafir introduced 
some Marxist insights. Claiming that the third generation Ashkenazi elite - heirs to the 
founding fathers ‘virtuous pioneers’ - became entrepreneurs in the newly emergent 
market economy, Shafir and Peled posited a clash of interests between those whose 
personal fortunes were tied to a liberal market economy and global competition and 
the occupation: ‘For these reasons, settling the conflict - decolonization portions of 
the occupied territories through accommodation with the PLO - became an economic 
necessity for the Israeli business community’. Along with economic liberalization 
there was a shift towards liberal values that underpin liberal democracy.  The two 
predicted that with the end of decolonization, there would be a move to 
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‘universalization of the citizenship structure as well to reduce ethnic discontinuities 
which interfere with the smooth operation of the market’.309 
Expanding on the economic dynamics underpinning the decolonization 
process, Shafir and Peled also added the Intifada to the factors reconfiguring the 
citizenship discourse.  Virtually invisible at the bottom of the discursive pyramid, the 
Palestinians upped the ante posing economic (and moral) challenges to the neo-liberal 
elite. Persuaded that the occupation was a detriment, the business community took the 
lead in pushing the peace process. Dov Lautman, president of the Israeli 
manufactures’ association was quoted in the article as complaining about the slow 
progress of negotiations and urging the government to expedite the process so as to 
allow Israel to partake in the ‘unprecedented prosperity’. The authors conceded that 
the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin forced yet another change in the republican 
versus liberal discourse, describing the opposition to decolonization as ‘the hard core 
composed mostly of settlers and their religious Zionist backers’ driven by ideology 
rather than economic calculus. Still, reflecting their belief in the primacy of 
economics, they expressed confidence that the decolonization would proceed apace, 
bypassing the purely ideological forces of opposition to colonialism.310 
Inspired by the same economic determinism, Shafir subsequently proclaimed 
that process of decolonization was irreversible. In this scenario, for the new elites 
whose economic self-interest clashed with the traditional values of colonialist Zionist 
society - settlement and long-term military service were seen as having the upper 
hand in the democratic discourse. By organizing around business as the new civic 
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virtue, they were actually pushing for a liberal citizenship. Still, Shafir invoked 
Gramsci who warned about destructive dynamics capable of undermining long-term 
processes. As he saw it, ‘the noxious intentions and destructive actions of religious 
zealots - Palestinian and Jewish’ would try to scuttle the process of decolonization.311 
Shafir and Peled found the prospect of Israel’s ‘socioeconomic liberalization’ 
and its impact on decolonization highly compelling, spurring them to bring out an 
edited book on the subject. Published before the collapse of the peace process in 
September 2000, the tome described the DOP as an act that ‘stunned the world’ and a 
‘decisive step’ towards peaceful resolution of one of the world’s ‘most intransigent 
international feuds’. The thesis they ‘wished to advance’ was simple: ‘peacemaking 
and economic growth - are closely related’. Though clearly aware of the peace 
spoiling ‘zealots’, the selected articles focused on the economic peace dividend. So 
much so that Uri Ram, hardly a fan of capitalist globalization, contributed an essay on 
the ‘promised land of business opportunities’ as a driver of the peace process.312 
With so much attention on the alleged economic dynamics of the Oslo 
process, Shafir and Peled felt the need to update their original notion of republican 
democracy in a work described as the ‘culmination of many years of intellectual 
cooperation’ and one that has been ‘many years in the making’. Reference to the 
continuity of the project notwithstanding, the new book shifted to a more radical form 
of critical theory of citizenship. Rogers Smith, a self-described critical political 
scientist provided much of the inspiration.  Smith decried Western civic ideology for 
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harbouring inequalities and exclusionary principals and was equally dissatisfied with 
the republican citizenship discourse. In his opinion, both the liberal and republican 
principles were part of a myth forged by elites to create an imagined popular identity 
and provide the legitimacy of the ruling class. Instead of analytically privileging the 
two discourses, Smith urged the adoption of what he called ‘a multiple traditions’ 
view of American citizenship. In other words, he wanted to include the disfranchised - 
illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and other marginal groups - in the citizenship 
discourse, rejecting as ‘hegemonic’ and ‘nationalistic’ the notion that citizenship and 
the consequent democratic rights should be limited to the established groups.313 
Shafir and Peled’s version of ‘multiple traditions’ featured three distinctive 
citizenship discourses: the liberal, the republican and the ethno-nationalistic. The 
latter was said to originate in German Romanticism and focused on the community 
‘conceived as a nation, or ethnic group’. Even more exclusive than republican 
citizenship, the ethno-national ideal of citizenship was delineated by the ethno-
national identity of its members, denying to non-members the chance to assimilate.    
Using the three-tiered citizenship concept as a base, the authors reached out for other 
theoretical insights, among them Yasemin Soysal’s ‘incorporation regimes’. They 
noted that such regimes dictated the allocation of resources to the different social 
groups by state and para-state institutions while legitimizing such differential 
allocation through a ‘citizenship discourse’. Indeed, ‘to understand a particular 
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incorporation regime…we must be familiar with its main allocative institutions and 
with the citizenship discourse, or discourses, that prevail in its political culture’.314 
Surveying Israel’s history from the perspective of the three-tiered citizenship 
construct, Shafir and Peled arrived at some new conclusions. They insisted that, 
spurred by economic interest, liberal democracy had grown considerably at the 
expense of the republican democratic discourse. But it was the new ethno-national 
citizenship discourse - as embodied by the National Zionist settlers and the right wing 
parties - that worried them, not least because of its alleged racially-tinged hatred 
towards the Palestinians. In this new version the ethno-national discourse was 
surmised to be a formidable opponent of de-colonization and indeed, a chief architect 
of ‘contemporary colonization’. Though Nazi Germany was not mentioned, there 
were hints that, behind a liberal façade, Israel nurtured a complex discursive regime 
with dangerous racist and nationalist overtones.  Still, written before the outbreak of 
the ‘al-Aqsa Intifada’, the book expressed confidence in the irreversibility of the 
process of decolonization as a step to creating a real liberal democracy.315 
Reaction to the book followed predictable lines. Hailed by neo-Marxist, 
critical scholars as a path breaking work, it was questioned by positivists. As argued 
in the preceding chapter, Lissak led the charge against critical social scientists in 
general and Shafir and Peled in particular, accusing them of misrepresenting and 
distorting the practices of the Yishuv and ignoring facts that did not fit their 
deterministic Marxist theory. He asserted that, far from being rapacious colonizers, 
the Zionists desired an anti-colonialist solution of creating a Jewish and a Palestinian 
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state in the region. Other disciples of Eisenstadt denounced what they described as 
‘the simple Marxist assertion that conditions of life exclusive and directly undermine 
the conscience of individuals’. They noted that many of the decisions made by the 
pioneers, including the revival of the Hebrew language, could not be explained in 
materialistic terms.316 
Lost in the exchange about particulars of the Yishuv era and the motivation of 
the pioneers was the far more important issue of methodology. Only one reviewer 
pointed out that though a ‘central axis of Western political philosophy’, the 
‘citizenship discourse’ was too vague a construct to measure the level of democracy. 
More significantly, she found the construct to be a ‘proscriptive rather than 
descriptive convection’ signalling the authors’ ideological preference – ‘one that 
ultimately promotes “a democratic multiculturalism” with “multiple public spheres” 
based on both universal individual rights’.  Differently put, the reviewer suggested 
that the negative evaluation of Israeli democracy was guided by the authors’ 
ideological goals. Since Shafir collaborated on a number of projects aimed at 
expanding liberal citizenship based on international criteria (that would have given 
immigrants and undocumented workers in the West full citizenship rights), this charge 
was not entirely unfounded.317 
Whatever the criticism, Shafir and Peled’s hopes for ending the conflict and 
creating a ‘real’ liberal democracy vanished in the wake of the al-Aqsa Intifada, along 
with their complex and nuanced description of Israel’s authority system.   Radicalized 
by the collapse of the Oslo process, Peled adopted a new position claiming that 
Israel’s authority system could not be compatible with a democracy unless it was 
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ready to follow the path of the new South Africa: ‘The obvious model for the 
transformation of the Israeli control system into a secular, democratic state is the 
transition experienced by South Africa’. Though having previously rejected the 
apartheid model, Peled quoted Mona Younis, who used a class-based analysis 
comparing the South African and Palestinian national liberation movements, hailing 
her argument that ‘it was the involvement of this African working class in the struggle 
for national liberation that ensured its democratic character and, ultimately, its 
political success’. Conversely, the working class in Israel was not involved, dooming 
the goal of the PLO and its supporters to create a ‘democratic, non-sectarian states in 
all of the territories of their respective homelands’. Without such a transformation, he 
argued, Israel would not resemble a democratic, non-sectarian state.318 
The post-9/11 reality led Peled to update yet again his three-tiered citizenship 
construct. In a 2007 Tel Aviv University workshop on ‘Democratic Citizenships and 
War’ Peled acknowledged for the first time that Israel had experienced war and Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC) virtually since its inception, yet claimed that his three-tiered 
concepts of citizenship - republican, liberal and ethno-national - were still valid, albeit 
in a security rather than colonial setting. In this interpretation, the first tier of the 
citizenship discourse was reserved to those in the forefront of the security struggles, 
with the third tier reserved for those who endangered the security project, notably the 
Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians. Positioned in-between was the liberal citizenship 
discourse that tried to guard civil rights from antiterrorist legislation and practices.319 
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This seeming recognition of the importance of terrorism on the citizenship 
discourse did not last for long. In a 2013 edited book on ethnic democracies Peled 
returned to his original three-tier discourse but reassessed the location of the Israeli 
Arabs in line with a Marxist interpretation of political developments. He explained 
that after the collapse of the Oslo peace process in 2000, the Arab citizens suffered a 
serious regression of their rights because of the liberal concept of citizenship - an 
outcome of the privatization and liberalization of the economy - malfunctioned. In 
this version, ‘the ideological shift from corporatism to neoliberalism as the guiding 
principle of economic organization… moving away from the principle of pioneering 
Jewish solidarity as a limitation on the profit motive… left the republican principle of 
incorporation devoid of a material basis and weakened it vis-à-vis the other two 
principles, or discourses of citizenship’. With the republican principle diminished, a 
‘head-on collision’ between liberal democracy and ethno-naturalism occurred, 
allowing the latter to push back the rights of Israeli Arabs. 320 
By reverting to the Marxist-based interpretation of the three-tiered citizenship, 
Peled erased any mention of the impact of the anti-terror campaign on the discourse, 
thus restoring the consistency of his research. But the work raised considerable 
methodological problems, not least because some of the examples were clearly 
indicative of the state’s desire to prevent Israeli Arab MKs from embracing the cause 
of terrorist organization. By trying to explain the alleged diminution of liberal 
citizenship by changes in the ‘material base’ of republican discourse, Peled avoided a 
much needed discussion of how a democracy should deal with an ethnic minority with 
conflicting national loyalties. 
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Much as the Shafir-Peled work gained special status among detractors of 
Israeli democracy, the construct of a multiple citizenship discourse was too complex 
to be readily related to the apartheid label that Matzpen activist scholars such as Uri 
Davis, working with a revived Council for American Judaism, affixed to Israel in the 
early 1980s. 
In the peculiar hierarchy of perceived academic legitimacy, such works stayed 
on the margins of the scholarly discourse. Kimmerling recalled his hesitation to use 
Matzpen ideas, explaining that its intellectuals were not professional social scientists 
and tended to mix politics with writing. As the preceding chapter showed, it took 
Kimmerling more than a decade of a tortuous intellectual journey to join the critical 
sociology camp. It was only fitting thus that this former student of Eisenstadt turned 
the apartheid model into legitimate social science, making a strong impact not only in 
sociology but also in political science.321   
Israel as an Apartheid Democracy 
There was nothing in Kimmerling’s early work to indicate that, in his view, 
Israel’s democracy was marred by a colonialist design.  To the contrary, writing in the 
early 1980s, Kimmerling described the 1967 war as ‘an accident’ claiming that there 
was no design to seize territories in order to expand the colonialist empire and the 
control of the territories was ‘accidental’.  As a matter of fact, in a coauthored book, 
he used a theoretical framework derived from disaster theory to argue that the Israelis 
developed an effective coping mechanism with the conflict-driven interruptions of 
civilian routine.  By treating emergency situations as temporary aberrations, the state 
                                                          
321
 Baruch Kimmerling, ‘Sociology, Ideology and National Building: The Palestinians 




and the citizens invested all their resources to get back to the ‘normal’ state of 
existence. As a result, the economy and the social system were able to function, 
avoiding the type of convulsions that ruined democracies elsewhere.322 
Kimmerling’s observation of the Israeli peace process with Egypt - requiring 
the evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula and the city of Yamit - indicated optimism about 
the democratic process. He suggested that, in responding to the Egyptian overture, 
Israeli society was forced to engage in a series of trade-offs between territory and 
security, territory and peace, and territory and democracy.  The societal discourse on 
the trade-off, he asserted, indicated that most Israelis were ready to give up territory 
not only to secure peace but to assure the continuation of democratic practices and 
international recognition. In other words, in the case of Sinai the question ‘how much 
territory for democracy’ was answered resoundingly in favour of democracy. He left 
open the possibility that Palestinian land could be given up in a similar trade -off.323 
By the end of the decade, however, Kimmerling, as shown earlier, had begun 
his transformation.  In a 1988 preface to an edited volume on territory and democracy 
he reproached the contributors - mostly his Hebrew University colleagues - for 
leaving out the occupied territories when discussing Israel’s democracy. For his part, 
he was ready to side with those who accepted the long-standing Matzpen view that the 
Israeli political system could not be judged in separation from the occupied territories.   
Kimmerling credited American scholars in the Association for Israel Studies (AIS) for 
‘making it possible’, noting that they were less encumbered by ‘the ideological load 
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than [their Israeli] predecessors’. This coded reference to the AIS was highly 
significant; he subsequently affirmed that the AIS played a ‘vital role’ in legitimizing 
the Mazpen approach and helped his evolving view on the nature of Israeli political 
system.324 
Stanley Greenberg, then associate director of the Southern African Research 
Program at Yale University working on ways to undermine the apartheid system in 
South Africa, was also instrumental in Kimmerling’s change of mind. While 
Greenberg’s first book, Race and State in Capitalist Development offered a standard 
Marxist examination of the anti-apartheid struggle, the second, Legitimating the 
Illegitimate: State, Markets and Resistance in South Africa adopted the legitimacy 
discourse approach of Gramsci. Scrutinizing the discursive practices of the 
Afrikaners, Greenberg found their hegemonic discourse - with claims of ‘God-given 
vocation’ - to be ‘like the Hebrews of the Old Testament’. Pursuant of this perceived 
mandate, white South Africans created a society ‘where illegitimacy is a defining 
characteristic of the social order’. Furthermore, the ‘entrenched illegitimacy’ of 
apartheid ‘embodies three central ideas: primacy of racial-national rights, centrality of 
the state and the subordination of the civil society, and fashioning of the homeland as 
an entity fully separated from the civic realm’. Greenberg suggested that, drawing on 
a divine mandate, Israel created a similar structure of illegitimacy with regard to the 
Palestinians.325 
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On a visit to Israel, Greenberg penned a paper ‘The Indifferent Hegemony: 
Israel and the Palestinians’ calling attention to the delegitimizing aspects of control 
over the Palestinian population. Soon after, Kimmerling quoted the paper in a chapter 
‘Boundaries and Frontiers of the Israeli Control System’. He declared that after 1967 
the ruling elites in Israel showed ‘virtually total lack of interest and ability in creating 
a common identity or basic value system to legitimize its use of violence to maintain 
the system, or in developing other kinds of loyalties toward force and power’, 
warning that by holding on to the territories ‘we might see the institutionalization of 
the process of transforming the Israeli control system into a Herrenvolk democracy, 
without its racist dimension’.326 
By the early 1990s, Kimmerling’s resolve to join the critical camp had become 
all but evident. He excoriated Eisenstadt for refusing to include the treatment of 
Palestinians in the ‘framework decision’ of Israeli sociology, allegedly to avoid the 
‘embarrassment of characterizing Israeli society - before and after sovereignty - as an 
immigrant-settler (if not colonial) society’.327 In an article published the following 
year, Kimmerling described Israel as a militaristic society rooted in the violence of its 
colonialist past and the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. Contradicting his early 
work, he now claimed that the militaristic ethos was shared by civilians, a 
phenomenon he described as cultural militarism. Wars were a central part of the 
collective identity of Israelis and turned into an integral, routine part of Jewish 
society. Invoking Gramsci’s concept of hegemonic discourse Kimmerling argued that 
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‘civilian militarism in Israel ministered the approach most acceptable to the majority 
in the Jewish collectivity’. More to the point, given this integral militarism, Israel 
could not be described as a democracy but rather as a democracy of the ‘ruling 
nation’, an allusion to the South African Herrenvolk system.328 
Kimmerling’s reinvention as critical sociologist did not go unnoticed.  Yoram 
Peri, a Tel Aviv University political scientist and a leading expert on the Israeli 
military, described Kimmerling as a scholar with a ‘developing line in his perception: 
‘If, in his early works in the 1970s he was close to his teachers Lissak and Horowitz, 
he later developed the most critical approach in his attitude to the underlying ethos of 
the Israeli society’. Peri produced extensive survey data to show that the concept of 
‘militaristic hegemony had no empirical basis’ but was not hopeful that Kimmerling 
and his new ideological peers would be persuaded. To his mind, the vast majority of 
critical scholars ‘identifies with the criticism of the Zionist movement and questions 
the Zionist meta-narrative. They accept the Palestinian criticism of the nature of the 
State of Israel, support the post-Zionist ideology, and seek to establish in Israel a civil 
society of all its citizens, Jews and Arabs, through the negation of the Jewish identity 
of the State and its ties to Diaspora Jewry’.329 
In a book published just before the al-Aqsa Intifada Kimmerling elaborated on 
the concept of the ‘military-cultural complex’. Arguing that ‘settler culture’ in the 
territories was just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of Judaism’s ‘mixture of religious and 
secular chauvinism’, claiming that the 1967 war ‘reawakened the dormant codes of 
the immigrant settler political culture’.  In his opinion, this cultural militarism 
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trumped all other considerations, so much so that the ‘Palestinian territories’ were 
chosen for expansion because of national Zionist ideology rather than economic 
benefits, as Shafir and Peled surmised.330 
As shown in the preceding chapter, the collapse of the peace process greatly 
embittered Kimmerling, spurring him into Gramscian-like prodding of scholars to use 
their academic position to change society. He blamed Israel alone for the failure of the 
July 2000 Camp David summit, deriding Barak’s concessions as designed ‘to give up 
enough of the territory but to keep the advantage of the colonization project flowing.  
No Palestinian will agree to that’.  His readiness to change opinions to suit the 
circumstances has also evolved, creating serious inconsistencies. For instance, 
ignoring his militarization thesis his newest version stated that ‘we made profit from 
the territories and Israel’s reluctance to give them up is an egregious manifestation of 
the colonialist instinct... it is amazing to think that at the beginning of the third 
millennium a country is actively colonizing by marginalizing its citizens and acting 
against international law’.331 
For Kimmerling, like virtually all critical scholars, Ariel Sharon, the military 
hero-turned-politician represented all that was wrong with Israel’s cultural militarism. 
In a book titled Politicide, he stressed that under Sharon - and even well before him - 
Israel had engaged in politicide, defined as a process that aimed, as its ultimate goal, 
at ‘the dissolution of the Palestinian people’s existence as a legitimate social, political, 
and economic entity’. The national existence of the Palestinian people, he argued, was 
being destroyed through ‘murders, localized massacres, the elimination of leadership 
and elite groups, the physical destruction of public institutions and infrastructure, land 
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colonization, starvation, social and political isolation, re-education and partial ethnic 
cleansing’.332 
While Kimmerling conceded that in the past Israel had been an ‘imperfect 
democracy’, politicide, in his opinion, turned the Jewish state into a ‘Thacherist and 
semi-fascist regime’. Some three dozen pages later, his definition of the authority 
system changed:  
Israel [has] ceased being a true democratic state and became a Herrenvolk 
democracy. This term, coined to describe South Africa under Apartheid 
described a regime in which one group of subjects (the citizens) enjoys full 
rights and another group (the non-citizens) enjoys none.  The laws of Israel 
became the laws of a master people and the morality that of the lords of the 
land.333 
There was more confusion pertaining to the time framework. At times Kimmerling 
seemed to suggest that the transformation occurred when Israel decided to make the 
occupation permanent, on other occasions he hinted that apartheid was actually built 
into the very fabric of the ‘colonialist’ Zionist enterprise. 
It would be easy to suggest that such contradictions were very much in line 
with neo-Marxist, critical standard of mixing politics with academics. As noted, 
Kimmerling proved quite adept at changing his ‘narratives’ to fit the shifting political 
circumstances. Yet there was something more personal, indeed emotional, about 
Politicide. The visceral hatred of Sharon compounded by the disjointed and self-
contradictory definitions of the ‘Israeli regime’ was out of character for what was 
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billed as a serious scholarly study.  The preface provided a clue to Kimmerling's state 
of mind. Strongly rejecting the label of a ‘self-hating Jew’ he described his book as a 
warning against the alleged plans to ethnically cleanse all the Palestinians.  As he put 
it, ‘the apartheid policy was not just a catastrophe for the Palestinians people but for 
the Israelis as well’.334 
That Kimmerling came to see his work as a clarion call to a society allegedly 
morally corrupted by apartheid was quite evident from his subsequent attack on 
Benny Morris. As noted in Chapter 3, in a 2004 interview in Haaretz, Morris created 
a stir by denouncing the Palestinians as perennial losers. Kimmerling’s assessment of 
Morris’s character was scathing: ‘Then he turns to his own prejudices and stereotypes 
of the Islamic and Arabic culture that happen to be fashionable… since the September 
11 calamity. But the historian is not just a part of the collective mood and expresses it, 
he also provide historical and intellectual legitimacy to the most primitive and self-
destructive impulse of a very troubled society’. Having voiced his indictment of his 
former fellow traveller, Kimmerling claimed that Israel was more than a ‘troubled 
society’: 
It should be treated the way we treat individuals who are serial killers. After 
thirty five years of oppression, colonization of their land, expropriation of 
their water, ignoring almost all of their freedoms, administrative detention of 
tens of thousands of Palestinians, systematic destruction of their social and 
material infrastructure, it is more than ironic to talk about the Palestinians as 
barbarians and a sick society. If the Palestinian society is sick, who is 
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responsible for this sickness and which society is sicker and an 
institutionalized serial killer?335 
Not incidentally, by excoriating Morris Kimmerling hoped to establish himself as a 
pioneer of the New Historiography/New Sociology movement. Claiming that during 
research on a doctoral dissertation in the 1970s he proved that Plan D referred to 
ethnic cleansing, he recalled departmental colleagues warning him that the thesis was 
too explosive to be published for ‘many years’: ‘It was probably hard to find major 
commercial and even university press publishers (especially in the United States) who 
were willing to publish a book or monograph that was perceived as undermining the 
official Zionist version in the fields, not to say presented as an alternative Palestinian 
“narrative”. These narratives were published in the past decades mainly by little 
“fringe” publishers and by some “brave” university presses’. 
Addressing the strong emotions surrounding the nature of Israel’s authority 
system, he acknowledged the sharp divisions on the issue: 
Israel perceives itself as a ‘Jewish and (liberal) democratic’ state, but it is hard 
even domestically to define the meaning of those two contradictory terms, 
when most of Jews give priority to the state’s ‘Jewishness’, accepting that 
Arab citizens enjoy ‘reduced citizen’s rights’, or that the Jews have to protect 
their demographic majority and political and cultural hegemony by formal 
discrimination... To this must be added the gradually converged direct ‘control 
system’ over the territories and population occupation in 1967. Naturally, 
Israel was characterized by Palestinians and their supporters as an ‘apartheid 
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state’... In an inter-communal war perceived as a zero sum game, each side is 
using indiscriminate violence to get rid of the other side.336 
Some critics denounced Kimmerling’s inappropriate use of the apartheid label to 
demonize Israel. Others accused him of academic opportunism and rewriting his 
history for political gain by alleging that his anti-positivist position somehow hurt his 
career.337 
Yet as the foremost post-Zionist scholar and a professor at the Hebrew 
University, Israel’s top university, Kimmerling gave the apartheid label considerable 
legitimacy.  His premature death in 2007 left others to claim his mantle in developing 
variations on the apartheid theme. Two scholars at Ben-Gurion University - Oren 
Yiftachel and Neve Gordon - took a leading role in this effort. 
Israel as an Ethnocracy    
Yiftachel, a political geographer with a degree in urban planning, joined the 
Geography Department at Ben-Gurion University in 1993. According to his 
homepage, he ‘has tried to combine teaching and activism for social and political 
justice. Co-founded and was an active member in a range of organizations working to 
assist Arab-Jewish peace, anti-colonialism and social equality in Israel/Palestine’. 
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Yiftachel was keen to show his own commitment to Gramsci noting that his ‘own 
approach draws from neo-Gramscian perspective’.338 
Unlike Kimmerling whose transformation from a positivist to critical 
sociologist was long and anguished, Yiftachel was proud of his credentials as a 
critical political geographer having been influenced by John Friedmann, a Wallerstein 
disciple involved in the International Foundation for Development Alternatives 
(IFDA), a group of scholars and activists constructing the Third System Project.  
Inspired by the South American dependencistas, the IFDA planned to harness the 
power of people by raising their conciseness to challenge the dominance of markets 
and the state. Using the Gramscian formula, Friedmann described the Third System as 
‘a movement of those free associations, citizens and militants, who perceive that the 
essence of history is the endless struggle by which people try to master their own 
destiny’. Among the groupings mentioned were those ‘actively serving people’s aim 
and interests, as well as political and cultural militants who, while not belonging 
directly to the grassroots, endeavour to express people’s views and to join their 
struggle’.339 
Clearly eager to be among those ‘actively serving people’s aim and interests’, 
Yiftachel set out to implement this mandate. Writing on an Internet Forum for Critical 
Geography, he stated that though ‘Our jobs here [in Israel] are more secure with the 
tenure system (still?) in place... this has not nurtured any tendency for critical 
geography’. He blamed low faculty salaries and the ‘most acute need’ to supplement 
income with government consulting fees for the reticence of his colleagues to adopt a 
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critical perspective. Still, Yiftachel seemed optimistic: ‘your list, as well as the 
Vancouver conference and several recent journals are helping us in “diffusing” 
critical material which may have some long-term effect on students and faculty’.340 
Co-edited by Yiftachel, the Ben-Gurion University-based journal Hagar: 
Studies in Culture, Politics and Space became a premier outlet for critical writings. 
His homepage boasts his considerable contribution to the field: ‘in urban and planning 
studies he was among the first to focus on the “dark side” of urban planning and has 
contributed much to opening up planning theory to critical theory in general, and to 
issues of identity, power and space in particular’. More importantly, ‘in political 
geography his groundbreaking work formulated the concept of “ethnocratic” regimes, 
which has opened up several important debates in ethnic and racial studies, regime 
theories and research in Israel/Palestine and the Middle East’.341 
Yiftachel wasted little time in popularizing the concept of ‘ethnocratic 
regimes’. With support from Ben-Gurion University’s Centre for Regional 
Development in December 1993 he co-organized a conference on ‘Urban 
Development, a Challenge for Frontier Regions’. In the preface to the volume of 
proceedings, Yiftachel claimed to have ‘invited contributions from various other 
Israeli experts on these issues: geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, and political 
scientists, which have now become the main body of chapters in this book’. In fact, 
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virtually all participants were neo-Marxist, critical scholars such as Dan Rabinowitz, 
Yoav Peled, Hanna Herzog and Lev Grinberg.342 
Setting the tone of the debate, Yiftachel rejected the positivist model of 
nation-building invoking the Wallerstein-Taylor class-based theory. He argued that 
‘spatial changes in settlement in general and frontier settlement in particular, are often 
part of a transformation aimed at deepening social control and inequalities over 
peripheral groups’. In a subsequent chapter, Yiftachel applied the theme to the Galilee 
Arabs, who due to possessing a homogenous territory became an ‘internal frontier’ 
where land had to be conquered, that is Judaized, creating a ‘pattern of class 
oppression’.  Taking a rather dim view of democratic processes, he dismissed them as 
a ‘procedural measures’ - a quintessential notion of the neo-Marxist, critical 
paradigm. Equally important, Yiftachel claimed that Israel could not claim to be a real 
democracy because it failed to deliver social justice: ‘While the present paper deals 
mainly with territorial control of minorities against the background of an ethnic 
struggle over land control, it must be remembered that such territorial struggle is 
embedded within the operation of a certain (capitalist) economic system and its 
supporting political institutions’.343 
To provide a more trenchant critique Yiftachel joined forces with two political 
scientists to argue that equal and inclusive citizenship, popular sovereignty and civil 
rights, protection of minorities and regular, universal and free elections were not 
enough to qualify Israel as a ‘real democracy’. In their view, without fixed borders 
that would restrain the considerable statuary privileges of the Jews, the Israeli 
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political system amounted to ethnocracy. In Yiftachel’s words: ‘Israel is a state and a 
polity without clear boundaries; and the country’s organization of social space is 
based on pervasive and uneven ethnic segregation’. As a result, ‘the Israeli polity is 
governed not by a democratic regime, but rather by an “ethnocracy”, which denotes a 
non-democratic rule for and by a dominant ethnic group, within the state and beyond 
its borders’.344 
As in the case of other post-Zionists, the collapse of the Oslo accords darkened 
Yiftachel’s views.  In an edited volume published shortly after the outbreak of the al-
Aqsa Intifada, he described the peace process as ‘peace pretence’ and a cover up for 
the continuation of the occupation, blaming the alleged Israeli appetite for land for its 
failure and warning the ‘Israeli leadership and people’ of the looming spectre of 
apartheid. The same message was underpinned in a number of articles written in the 
early 2000s. In one, ‘From Fragile Peace to Creeping Apartheid: Political Trajectories 
in Israel/Palestine’, Yiftachel attributed the failure of peace to ‘the ethnocratic culture 
developed in Israel, which saw the Judaisation - and de-Arabisation - of 
Palestine/Israel as a moral historical process, with scant attention to its impact on the 
Palestinian-Arabs’.345 In the summer of 2002 he repeated the apartheid charge when 
describing an alleged Israeli plan to offer ‘a mixture of measures ranging from firm 
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ethnic control to apartheid and future transfer, but couching them in terms more 
acceptable to the Jewish Israeli ear’.346 
Yiftachel’s growing use of the terms ‘creeping apartheid’ or ‘apartheid’ 
instead of his customary ‘ethnocracy’ was apparently related to the Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement formally launched after the 2001 World 
Conference Against Racism in Durban. To make the BDS advocacy palatable to the 
general public, there was an urgent need to present Israel as an apartheid state, a 
charge considered more legitimate when made by ostensibly bone fide Israeli 
academics. 
Also noted was Yiftachel’s experience with the journal Political Geography, 
which Taylor and his disciples turned into a premier outlet for critical studies. In early 
2002 Yiftachel submitted a co-authored article describing Israel as ‘a state dedicated 
to the expansion and control of one ethnic group’ and suggesting that ‘such societies 
cannot be classified as democracies in a substantive sense’. Yet David Slater, one of 
the journal’s editors and a prominent supporter of the Palestinians who signed the 
2002 British petition to boycott Israeli universities, felt that the journal should not 
accept works by Israeli academics. After an acrimonious exchange Slater backed 
down but Yiftachel was asked to make substantial revisions, including an explicit 
comparison between Israel and South Africa. He complied, raising the salience of the 
apartheid analogy.347 
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In a revised form of the Political Geography article, Yiftachel and his co-
author explained the reasons for making comparisons with South Africa. Yet 
seemingly dissatisfied with his limited impact, he decided to devote an entire book to 
the subject. Crediting Gramsci and other critical theorists for their inspiration, 
Yiftachel stated that his work was aimed at developing a ‘critical ethnocratic theory’ 
by integrating geography into political science. Specifically, he contended that the 
process of Judaizing Israel/Palestine with its ‘associated dislocations, struggles and 
contradictions’ should be front-page in evaluating Israeli democracy. More to the 
point, Yiftachel hoped that his work would undermine the scholarly and popular 
perception of Israel as a democracy in good standing.348 
Without naming Eisenstadt or his students, Yiftachel asserted that ‘the 
classification of Israel as a democracy may appear to function more as a tool for 
legitimizing the political and legal status quo than as a scholarly exploration guided 
by empirical accuracy or conceptual coherence’. Somewhat surprisingly, Peled and 
Shafir, whose work Yiftachel described ‘as groundbreaking on many counts’ did not 
entirely escape criticism.  Particularly upsetting to Yiftachel was the notion that three 
tiers of the citizenship discourse implied discursive equality, thus masking the 
profound power disparities among the citizenship groups.   He further charged the two 
authors with using misleading categories and falling to the trap of ‘conceptual 
stretching’. Using Habermas’s distinction between ‘constitutional patriotism’, a 
mechanism associated with universal democracy, and ‘false’ forms of democratic 
participation, Yiftachel claimed that ‘the questionable use of these terms confuses 
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more than assists in the understanding of the Israeli political system and erroneously 
enables its classification as democratic’.349 
Much as Yiftachel deplored others’ incoherence, his own theory of ethnocracy 
was seriously flawed. In the preface, he thanked his editorial staff for ‘chastising me 
ceaselessly, regularly and rightfully for inconstancies, duplications or general 
sloppiness’. Yet for all the editorial team’s efforts, the work - assembled from 
previously published articles and drawing  upon an empirical base generated by four 
somewhat disparate projects - was vague,  at times, inconsistent and contradictory.350 
Emblematic of these problems was the book’s very subject matter - the construct of 
ethnocracy.  Yiftachel first argued that with ‘blurred borders and boundaries and the 
partial inclusion of peripheral groups, Israel has neither managed to create a firm 
sense of “Israeliness” nor a genuine Israeli (as distinct from Jewish) polity. This 
presents severe obstacles for the development of civil society and hence democracy’. 
Yet, though he promised to define civil society in the next chapter, there was instead a 
long discussion of Israel’s politics and political economy replete with references to 
the core project of Judaization of Israel/Palestine.  In one of the many contradictions, 
Yiftachel acknowledged that the Judaization project was challenged by new dynamics 
like globalization, liberalization, mass immigration from the Soviet Union (that 
included some 300,000 non-Jews) and the growing consciousness of Palestinians. Yet 
he did not incorporate these civil society dynamics in the way that Shafir and Peled 
did so as not to detract from the ethnocracy thesis.351 
Yiftachel’s struggle to reconcile ethnocracy as an all-encompassing ethnic 
ethos on the one hand, and the ambiguous demarcation between Judaism as ethnicity 
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and religion on the other, generated additional contradictions. In his original 
formulation, ethnocracy was anchored in ethnos, the ethnic Jewish population.  The 
chapter on the ‘making of ethnocracy’ was clear that the secular pioneers - the 
original builders of the ethnocracy - and their Israeli offspring were the closest to the 
Judaization project and accrued most of its benefits, turning them into a privileged 
elite: As the religious component of Judaism became more dominant, along with a 
dramatic increase in the ultra-Orthodox community, questions about the ethnocracy 
construct surfaced.   
By way of pre-empting criticism, Yiftachel discussed the problem under the 
heading ‘ethnocracy or theocracy’. On the one hand he reassured readers that, 
contrary to ‘rhetoric’ very few religious laws were passed to qualify Israel as a 
theocracy.  On the other, he argued that it was the religious population (ultra-
Orthodox and religious Zionists) that was most hostile to Palestinians and most keen 
to continue the Judaization project.352 Both statements could be questioned on 
empirical grounds, but Yiftachel’s sleight of hand actually undermined the entire 
theory. For if Israeli ethnocracy privileged those closest to the Judaization project, 
then how was it that so many of the new ‘Judaizers’, notably Shas supporters, 
belonged to the lower classes? 
By lumping together the religious-Zionist settlers and the ultra-Orthodox in 
one category Yiftachel weakened the argument of forced segregation - another key 
factor in the ethnocracy construct.  According to his scenario, Israel’s dominant 
Ashkenazi elites were allowed to separate themselves from the lower classes and the 
indigenous population - the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians.  In reality though, only 
the settlers were segregated from the Palestinians; the ultra-Orthodox within the 
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Green Line were voluntary segregationist anxious to protect their religious lifestyle. 
Yiftachel’s effort to demonstrate that the Mizrahim were another victimized group 
segregated from the dominant Ashkenazi population by the ethnocratic regime made 
even less sense. As the preceding chapter indicated, high levels of intermarriage 
shrank the ‘pure’ Mizrahim group, undermining key arguments in critical sociology.  
The same statistics suggested that Shas members were the largest segment among the 
non-intermarried Mizrahim; like their Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox counterparts they 
were self-segregators.353 
Perhaps more significantly, for all the book’s academic veneer, Yiftachel 
never meant it to be an objective study but a proscriptive-normative document aimed 
at furthering his goal of creating a bi-national state. As he put it, ‘the normative 
ending of this book requires further comment on the Israeli demos’. To make Israel a 
‘legitimate democracy’ he urged changing the status of its Arab citizens, providing an 
equitable distribution of resources, and creating a multicultural polity.  Put differently, 
in his opinion, Israel had to adopt a bi-national framework and a socialist distributive 
justice system to qualify as a democracy. Before this scenario could materialize, 
Yiftachel urged a long-term project of creating a new framework and consciousness 
of coexistence, premised on the legitimacy of both Jewish and Palestinian bonds to 
their common land. Echoing the Third System Project guidelines, he counselled 
dealing with the denied root cause of conflict, such as the ‘return of Palestinian 
refugees and the Jewish right of self-determination’.354 
Yiftachel acknowledged that the bi-national scenario ‘was put forward by 
Jewish thinkers of the 1920s’ - a reference to Brit Shalom - but felt that his generation 
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could do better than Magnes and his professors because bi-nationalism ‘has received 
renewed attention among Palestinians, mainly in Israel and the diaspora’. Conversely, 
Jews showed strong resistance to the bi-national project, which he attributed to a 
desire to hold on to power: ‘Because a democratic bi-national state can only be 
established by mutual agreement, the sweeping Jewish opposition renders this option, 
at this point in time, highly unlikely’.355  
Still, as a dedicated Gramscian, Yiftachel was resolved to push for the changes 
needed to create a true democracy in a bi-national state. With little prospect to 
persuade the Israeli Jewish public he planned to use the ‘contradictions and tensions 
embedded in the coterminous existence of limited democratic institutions and 
procedures and entrenched patterns of ethnic dominance’ to mobilize the international 
community. The prospects there, in his view, were good since there was a ‘growing 
importance of human and minority rights in the international political discourse and 
on the growing institutionalization of democratic norms among the international 
community’. In other words, to attract attention of the international community, 
warnings about ‘creeping apartheid’ were required.356 
Yet Yiftachel, who failed to develop measurable indices for ‘creeping 
apartheid’, was also stumped by Israel’s 2005 unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip. To account for a development that was antithetical to his ethnocratic theory, a 
change of narrative was called for; he now argued that the ‘Israeli regime system has 
long been ethnocratic, but more recently, the ultimate logic of Judaization led Israel to 
adopt unilateral separation’. Those wondering how occupying Palestinian territory 
and withdrawing from it are parts of the same ‘logic of Judaization’, were not 
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enlightened by his comments on the 2009 elections, which spoke on ‘democratic 
distortion’, ‘colonialist’ agenda and ‘creeping apartheid taking place’ in the entire 
territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.357 
Mainstream scholars found the ‘ethnocracy-creeping apartheid’ construct 
highly questionable. Alan Dowty went so far as to accuse Yiftachel of failing to 
comport to academic standards, noting that virtually all indices of ethnocracy existed 
in countries considered democratic, which in turn meant that Yiftachel compared 
Israel to an ideal democracy rather than a real one. Indeed, Dowty touched upon a 
larger issue common in critical scholarship - a lack of a comparative perspective that 
would have placed Israel among the so-called ‘imperfect democracies’, that is, 
countries that tried to balance democratic rules of the game with daunting challenges.  
For instance, Yiftachel’s case for apartheid featured the nomadic Negev Bedouins. 
While their nomadic lifestyle has been undermined by their growing residence in 
established settlements, nomadic populations in Europe and elsewhere had their 
traditional ways similarly challenged by the increasingly urban environment taking 
over the expanses needed for free roaming.358 
Whatever the methodological pitfalls of the apartheid model, it served well 
Yiftachel who, as the chairman of the board of B’Tselem NGO was calling at the time 
for ‘effective sanctions’ against Israel. It was not hard to imagine, as one observer put 
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it, that ‘the word apartheid is useful for mobilizing people because it is an emotional 
word’.359 
Amplifying the Apartheid Charge  
Neve Gordon, a political scientist from Ben-Gurion University, was likewise a 
long time activist keenly aware of the value of presenting Israel as an ethnocracy 
engaged in ‘creeping apartheid’. A professional pro-Palestinian activist, he headed 
Physicians for Human Rights-Israel during the first intifada, charging the Israeli 
authorities with torture of Palestinian prisoners and other crimes against humanity.360 
As a graduate student at Notre Dame University, Gordon worked with Fred 
Dallmayer, a political scientist who introduced him to Foucault. Gordon’s doctoral 
thesis, ‘Social Control in Democracies: A Theoretical Analysis’, was based on 
Foucault’s interpretation of power as a hidden and subtle underlying mechanism of 
manipulation. For Foucault ‘power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and 
which constitute their own organization’.  Furthermore, power ‘is produced from one 
moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to 
another’. By conceptualizing power as omniscient but imperceptible and fluid, 
Foucault could then argue that political institutions and processes, including 
democracy, were just illusions, hiding the real controls exerted by authorities.  One of 
them was bio-power, a term that Foucault coined to describe practices of public health 
and risk regulations, and other regulatory mechanisms linked to physical health.   
Foucault strongly suggested that bio-power was an efficient way to supplement two 
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traditional tools of control - disciplinary power and sovereign power. The former was 
said to be based on coercive tactics, notably involving military or police forces; the 
latter was managed through legal and juridical intervention.361 
After Foucault’s premature death, Giorgio Agamben, a fast-rising critical 
philosopher, expanded on the issue. In what amounted to an antithesis to Foucault’s 
sovereign power, Agamben declared that it should be defined through exception, the 
power to withdraw and suspend law.  By suspending the legal system, the authorities 
could turn groups or entire populations within the zone of exception into homo sacer, 
individuals whose lives could be taken with impunity:  
The entire Third Reich can be considered a state of exception that lasted 
twelve years. In this sense, modern totalitarianism can be defined as the 
establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that 
allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of 
entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the 
political system’. 
On a more contemporary note Agamben criticized the Italian government for 
detaining illegal immigrants and the Bush administration for keeping Taliban and 
other enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay.362 
In Gordon's ontological analysis of Foucault’s concept of power there was a 
clear focus on the complex interaction of power dynamics that shape identity and 
guide the behaviour of subjects. He made a particular point of noting Foucault’s 
                                                          
361
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction (New York: 
Pantheon, 1990), pp. 92-93. 
362
 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), pp. 2-4, 40. 
209 
 
concept of control based on the Benthamian panopticon: an observer such as a prison 
guard in tower generates the ‘the perpetual gaze:’ ‘It is as if the “gaze” penetrates the 
individual, helping to shape the “soul” so that it conform to the existing rules, codes, 
and mores’.  Revisiting the concept of the panopticon, Gordon, echoing the criticism 
of another critical philosopher, found it too centralized to fit Foucault’s ubiquitous 
and pervasive presence of power.  His solution was to suggest a cubicle - such as an 
office cubicle - where ‘the mere possibility’ of someone watching was enough to 
enforce authority.363 
 Armed with the Foucault-Agamben theory, Gordon proceeded to analyse the 
Israeli rule in the territories. The work, billed as the first analysis of the ‘infrastructure 
of occupation’, was not a direct evaluation of the Israeli non-democracy; yet it cast an 
extremely harsh light on what he called the Israeli ‘regime’. In his words, ‘I do not 
only mean the forces or mechanism that use coercive measures used to prohibit, 
exclude and repress people, but rather the array of institutions, legal devises, 
bureaucratic apparatuses, and physical edifices… to produce new modes of 
behaviour’.  By uncovering these subterranean dynamics, Gordon expressed hope that 
his ‘interrogation’ would help to ‘see beyond the smoke screen of political 
proclamations, and thus improves our understanding of why the acrimonious Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has developed in the way it has’.364 
As Gordon saw it, Israel had used a sophisticated blend of controls - 
disciplinary, sovereign and bio-power to subjugate and control the Palestinians.    
With its ill-defined contours and subversive logic, Foucault’s bio-power made it 
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possible to present virtually every seemingly positive act of the authorities as a 
negative one.  For instance, Gordon listed the initial efforts to improve the standard of 
living of the Palestinians: ‘In the health field practices were introduced to encourage 
women to give birth at hospitals (a means of decreasing infant mortality rates and 
monitoring population growth) and to promote vaccinations (in order to decrease the 
incidence of contagious and noncontagious diseases)’.  While many would applaud 
these progressive and beneficial measures, to Gordon they were instances of a bio-
power control mechanism. To make sure that Foucault's metaphor of controlling the 
collective body was not lost on the reader, Gordon related the alleged extensive Israeli 
Big Brother effort to ‘monitor every aspect of Palestinian life’: ‘Televisions, 
refrigerators, and gas stoves were counted, as were the livestock, orchards, and 
tractors... There were detailed inventories of Palestinian workshops for furniture, 
soap, textiles, olive products, and sweets. Even eating habits were scrutinized, as was 
the nutritional value of the Palestinian food basket’.365 
Disciplinary powers, and a large dose of sovereign controls, in Gordon’s 
judgment, were extensively employed during the first two decades of Israel’s control. 
But, following the first intifada Israeli authorities realized that a new way to keep the 
territories quiescence was needed. As a result, they decided to outsource the control in 
the territories, via the Oslo Accords, to the newly-created PLO-dominated Palestinian 
Authority (PA).  Gordon strongly suggested that the Israeli leaders had no intention to 
achieve peace but rather to use it as a means for allowing the IDF to ‘outsource the 
responsibility for the population’. He pointed out that, in 1996, less than a year after 
the Rabin assassination, virtually all ruling functions were passed to the PA that 
assumed ‘responsibility for the occupied inhabitants’. To some this would have meant 
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the end of Israeli occupation. To Gordon it was the intensification of occupation by 
other means. 
Gordon ran into a theoretical wrinkle when, following the outbreak of the al-
Aqsa Intifada, Israel did not dismantle the PA to regain back its ‘outsourced’ 
sovereign power. On the contrary, IDF’s military operations refrained from permanent 
reoccupation of the symbols of PA authority. Again invoking Agamben, Gordon 
suggested that ‘Israel now operates primarily by destroying the most vital social 
securities and by reducing members of Palestinian society to what Giorgio Agamben 
has called homo sacer, people whose lives can be taken with impunity’.366 True to 
neo-Marxist critical scholarship practises, Gordon felt little compulsion to support his 
‘narrative’ with sound data: evoking Agamben, in his view, sufficed to charge Israel 
with such misconducts as ‘widespread extrajudicial executions’. At the same time, 
Agamben gave him yet another opportunity to portray Israel in the darkest possible 
light by enabling an implied comparison between Nazi Germany and the disputed 
territories. To push for the Holocaust-Palestinian analogy, Gordon listed the ‘two 
impulses’ that guided Israel as ‘militaristic and messianic’, a term that Agamben and 
others often associated with the Nazi regime.367 
Using a far-fetched interpretation of Israeli reality to fit the Foucault-Agamben 
model was one thing; trying to incorporate Islamist fundamentalists into the critical 
framework was another. For all his allusions to spiritual power, Foucault failed to 
incorporate religion into his theories. By default, his followers reverted to the neo-
Marxist view of religion as false consciousness manufactured by the hegemonic class.   
Alternatively, religious impulses were perceived as a reaction to material deprivation, 
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class subjugation and marginalization. The resulting confusion was very much in 
evidence in Gordon’s efforts to explain the emergence of Hamas as the preeminent 
Palestinian power. After describing the group’s views as ‘a kind of postmodern 
fundamentalism’, he went on to claim that much of its appeal stemmed from a critique 
of postcolonial Western domination and cultural imperialism and globalization. 
Gordon actually found that ‘the deconstruction of the universal pretensions of 
European civilization... has led to a growing recognition that the West too is a 
provincial culture with its own hegemonic project’.368 
Gordon’s theoretical straightjacket created additional difficulties, notably in 
explaining the bloody struggle between Hamas and the Fatah movement in the Gaza 
Strip.  Since critical orthodoxy made no room for internecine fights among victims of 
‘hegemonic oppression’, Gordon was reduced to blaming Israeli and American 
policies for the turmoil. He assailed Israel for boycotting Hamas and excoriated the 
United States for imposing a scheme on Gaza ‘that, for clarity’s sake, one could call 
the Somalia Plan’, namely ‘inadequate resources, economic sanctions, thousands of 
armed men in distress, and foreign support of certain factions are, after all, the 
ingredients from which warlordism , a la Somalia, is made’. 
By asserting that the Palestinians were powerless victims of an Israeli-
American power play Gordon managed to keep the narrative within the boundaries of 
critical theory. At the same time, he constructed a radical contradiction when, in 
another part of the book, he described Hamas as hegemonic power intent on 
subjugating secular Palestinian society: ‘Hamas aspires to establish a theocratic 
regime, one that is extremely oppressive toward women and several other segments of 
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society. The successful consolidation of its control will be extremely tragic for all   
those who have fought the establishment of a secular democracy in Palestine’.369 
Prescient as the above statement was, Gordon did not follow up on the human 
rights violations of Hamas’s increasingly theocratic rule in the Gaza Strip.  Instead he 
chose to dwell on the apartheid analogy writing a number of articles on the subject in 
popular venues. As a political activist, Gordon’s appreciation of what he described as 
‘transitional normative regime’, that is ‘dense networks’ of human rights groups was 
well known. In a co-authored article, he observed that such ‘normative regimes’ 
successfully ‘socialized’ states into granting democratic rights, protecting the welfare 
of migrant workers and eliminating certain practices such as torture, disappearance, 
and extrajudicial killings. To ‘socialize Israel’ the international ‘normative regime’ 
had to be persuaded that it was an apartheid state. Indeed, in what was a clear 
coupling of academic research and advocacy in 2009 Gordon wrote an op-ed in the 
Los Angeles Times urging to impose BDS on Israel - described as a right-wing 
apartheid-like state.370 
Making the case for ‘socializing Israel’ through international sanctions was 
not without cost.  Even before the BDS op-ed exposed Gordon to withering criticism, 
he felt the need to defend his patriotic credentials, writing about his love for Israel, 
emphasizing its uniquely democratic system where ordinary citizens had relatively 
free access to political authorities, and where activists could create a grassroots 
movement and effect political change. Gordon used his own experience to point out 
that, in spite of his radical ideas, he suffered few impediments both inside and outside 
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the classroom.  More surprisingly for a neo-Marxist, there was a first hint of an 
admission that some of the distributive justice disparities were related to the unique 
problem of the ultra-Orthodox demographics and, to a lesser extent, the Israeli Arab 
sector. That Gordon was capable of this rather gushing portrayal of a country that he 
repeatedly excoriated as a right-wing apartheid regime indicated his extraordinary 
flexibility in deploying facts to fit the narrative of the moment.371 
Like virtually all his peers, Gordon enthusiastically welcomed the ‘Arab 
Spring’. The wave of optimistic outpouring, especially by left-wing and liberal 
observers was subsequently attributed to ‘optimism bias’ theory, especially among 
those keen to remove the stain of ‘Arab exceptionalism’ - the idea that Arabs could 
not sustain a democracy.372 But Gordon seemed to emulate Foucault who had 
heralded Islamist Iran as a ‘true participatory democracy’ and an example of 
egalitarian justice, proclaiming that Ayatollah Khomeini could teach the West a 
lesson or two in democratic governance. Mimicking Foucault, Gordon declared that 
Israelis should take lessons in democracy from the Tahrir Square protestors. He 
blamed the media and Israeli politicians for fomenting fear of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a tactic he described as ‘colonialist and Orientalist’:  ‘Political Islam is 
constantly presented and conceived as an ominous force that is antithetical to 
democracy’. Gordon chastised an Israeli official for warning that Egypt might end up 
like Iran and Gaza under Hamas, describing it as self-serving and hypocritical. He 
assailed Defence Minister Ehud Barak for describing Israel as ‘a villa in the jungle’, 
namely ‘a civilized Western island surrounded by semi-barbaric Arabs and Muslims’. 
In Gordon’s opinion, ‘this  approach has helped bolster an already existing fear of 
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political Islam among the Jewish citizenry, which is constantly being presented as an 
ominous force that is both antithetical to democracy and an existential threat to Israel.   
Indeed, it has helped to reinforce the Zionist trope that Israel is an island of 
civilization in the Middle East, and serves as a wall against barbarism’.373 
As the ‘Arab Spring’ deteriorated into wholesale violence in Libya, Syria, and 
Yemen, as well as a power struggle between the Egyptian secularists and the Muslim 
Brotherhood - bolstered by the extremist Salafis - Gordon’s enthusiasm for Arab 
democracy has diminished.   
 
 
Israel as a Military-Democratic Regime  
Like Yiftachel and Gordon, Lev Grinberg, a professor of sociology at Ben-
Gurion University, found a way to combine a highly active political life with an 
academic career. By his own account, having arrived from Argentina as an ardent 
socialist Zionist in 1971 he turned against the ‘hypocrisy’ of the Labour Party - ‘the 
phony socialism of a party that essentially represents the ruling group in the society’ - 
and later on joined the Black Panthers, among other protest groups. In search for an 
alternative, Grinberg turned further left creating Campus, an Arab-Jewish student 
group; its Mizrahi member were subsequently inspired to join the Mizrahi Rainbow 
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Coalition. In between studies, Grinberg worked as a labour organizer and an anti-
Histadrut activist.374 
Grinberg’s choice of research topics reflected a highly critical view of Israel’s 
distributive justice systems. His first work, Split Corporatism borrowed Shlomo 
Swirski’s themes of workers’ exploitation and other alleged social injustices. His 
subsequent book, Histadrut Above All repeated many of the same charges and noted 
the corruption and lack of equality in the labour movement.375 
Grinberg’s early work was only tangentially related to authority system; this 
changed when he joined Yesh Gvul, a watchdog monitoring the IDF to prevent ‘war 
crimes’.  In a review of the Peled-Shafir book, Grinberg offered a preview of his own 
theory of Israeli democracy. While praising the work as ‘highly ambitious’, he found 
it conceptually and factually wanting, accusing the authors of ignoring ‘new practices 
of settlement, colonialism and republicanism’ and producing ‘a questionable general 
theory of Israeli dynamics and historical processes, suggesting uncritical assumptions 
about liberalism, decolonization and democracy’.376 
In Grinberg’s opinion, the civilian political system has not been functioning 
since the Rabin assassination in November 1995 as consecutive governments failed to 
muster support to deal with the challenge of Israel’s peaceful incorporation into the 
Middle East. ‘This paralysis creates a vacuum into which the generals are drawn’, he 
argued. 
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Because when the politicians don’t seem to know what to do, the generals 
think they do... They are supremely self-confident individuals. But that does 
not mean there is a danger of a military putsch. On the contrary… the army 
feels more comfortable with the present system - it sets policy, while 
responsibility remains with the politicians. In the current intifada… the 
political echelon lost control of the army, which used disproportionate force, 
which led to escalation. But when the politics of force failed, what did the 
army say? ‘Our hands are tied, the politicians are to blame’.377 
Reflecting Grinberg’s radicalization during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which drove him to 
charge the IDF with war crimes, these comments signalled his full embrace of critical 
scholarship with which he had toyed for a number of years. In his first venture into 
critical theory in 1999 he echoed Benedict Anderson, arguing that every democracy 
was imagined twice, ‘once because it imagines the national community and then 
because it elected officials to represent “people”’.  In a real democracy, disillusioned 
citizens could mobilize and vote out the government. However, in Israel where some 
groups are prevented either formally or otherwise from accessing state power, 
democracy is imagined’. Appropriating the discourse on symbolic politics, Grinberg 
went one step further, accusing Israel of symbolic genocide against the Palestinians: 
‘Because the world will not permit total annihilation, a symbolic annihilation is taking 
place instead’. Critical theory considers exclusion and misrecognition to be 
tantamount to symbolic violence, but Grinberg actually claimed that only 
international pressure prevented Israel from physically annihilating the Palestinians.   
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Critics pointed out that at the level of intent, Grinberg found no difference between 
Israel and the genocidal Third Reich, a comparison that many called appalling.378 
By 2006 Grinberg had managed to put his scattered writings into a book-
length work. Unlike other critical scholars, however, he dispensed with academic 
pretences, describing the book as ranging ‘between theory, research and the personal 
politics of the researcher’. He went on to state that ‘I do this consciously and am 
aware that my interpretation of political dynamics is influenced by my moral 
preferences... intentionally designed to facilitate a political critique of politics’. ‘I 
have no pretence... of having an objective or scientific position’, he explained, ‘my 
interest in the past is also motivated by my aspiration to build a better future’. Though 
Grinberg was frank about using research for polemical ends he was somewhat 
confusing when discussing the book’s real goal: ‘The political part at the end of the 
[last] chapter is not at all a detailed discussion about how to resolve the conflict, 
which would contradict my entire theoretical approach’.379 
The absence of a clear link between the theoretically-inspired discussion and 
the proposed solution was only one of the work’s shortcomings. Another stemmed 
from the inconsistencies in defining democracies. After reviewing the constructs 
proffered by Smooha, Kimmerling, Peled-Shafir and Yiftachel, Grinberg rejected all 
of them because they did not include the crucial issue of borders: ‘In the absence of 
recognized borders, it is very difficult to contain conflict by political dialogue: hence, 
conflict usually deteriorates into violence’. Invoking Arendt’s philosophical 
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postulation that ‘violence is the negation of politics’ he argued that politics was all 
about ‘recognition, representation, dialogue, mediation, bridging coalitions, and 
agreements’.  Creating a radical distinction between politics and violence was crucial 
to Grinberg’s effort to separate himself from mainstream political science that 
perceived politics and violence as two poles of the same continuum: ‘The moment 
that politics and violence are interpreted as continuum of two mutually supportive 
forms of power relations, our theory becomes a non-critique of violence, and 
unintentionally legitimizes it by presenting it as a ‘normal’ and expected form of 
power relations’. 
Though Grinberg made much of Arendt’s theory, he was forced to admit that 
‘this theoretical argument does not mean that, in concrete cases, politics and violence 
cannot take place at the same time and even sometimes by the same actors’.    
Obfuscating the argument, he argued that ‘violence is always used by the dominant 
elite to prevent or bypass negotiations by unilateral action... In reaction to their non-
recognition, oppressed groups also exert violence and sometimes succeed in imposing 
political negations on the rulers’.  Grinberg’s additional caveat muddied the waters 
further, as he asserted that ‘violence can lead to politics only when both sides 
conclude that they cannot achieve their goals by force’.380 
Trying to fit the assessment of Israel’s authority system into Arendt’s theory 
complicated virtually every aspect of his analysis.  Having declared Israel to be a non-
democracy - as opposed to Yiftachel and Gordon’s apartheid state - Grinberg was 
hard pressed to provide some content to his construct. He settled on a military-
democracy since ‘in the absence of borders, politics is displaced by violence. Military 
discourse, organization and actors become dominant because the citizens they claim 
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to protect feel fear and anger’. He further explained that the military features 
prominently in the context of the ‘security myth’.381 
To demonstrate how the military-democratic regime really worked, Grinberg 
used a modified form of political field theory of Paul Bourdieu who conceived of 
politics as a set of intersecting but autonomous symbolic spaces where political actors 
exercised coercive power through physical and symbolic violence.  The former was 
applied by traditional tools of control such as military, the latter imposed through 
assimilation or, alternatively, non-recognition or silent exclusion.  Grinberg was also 
inspired by Michael Mann, a neo-Marxist theoretician who furnished a class-based 
theory of ‘genocidal ethnic cleansing’ committed by democracies suggesting that 
‘upper class societies’ in Europe were likely to denigrate lower class, proletarian 
groups, making ethnic cleansing easy.  In this version, the conflict between Israel (an 
upper ethnic group) and the proletarian Palestinians resulted in more than half a 
century of ethnic cleansing, ‘most murderously in the 1940s, supported by the 
“imperialist” United States’. Israel, Mann contended, was a prime example of a 
‘settler-conqueror’ democracy devising the typical settler state, democracy for the 
settlers, lesser rights for the natives. Approvingly quoting Mann, Grinberg claimed 
that the latter’s research proved that ‘democratic regimes might be even more 
aggressive and brutal toward excluded social groups than non-democratic regimes, 
whether colonial, dictatorship, or communist. In case of symbolic exclusion, 
democracy becomes a problem’.382 
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Grinberg deemed the Israeli military an agent of physical violence since it was 
‘ready to use it against the other, especially when the “they” are considered not part of 
the “us”’.  Lacking defined borders, Israel gave the military a key role in the political 
space, turning the IDF into a de facto arbiter of the democratic process.  By bestowing 
on the military such a prominent position - a notion at odds with the customary view 
of IDF-civilian relations - Grinberg could claim that the Israeli democracy was unduly 
violent, making it an ‘imagined democracy’.383 
Under any circumstances, a theory based on Arendt, Bourdieu and Mann 
would be hard to apply to evaluating democracy, which as noted, was defined by 
positivist criteria such as the existence of appropriate institutions and processes. 
Grinberg’s haphazard use of open and closed spaces and the mingling of physical and 
symbolic violence made his description of the military-democratic regime confusing 
and inconsistent. Failure to provide rigor evidently did not faze him; he mocked 
positivist efforts to develop formal democratic rules as a ‘huge industry of 
typologies’. He went on to proclaim that ‘my interest is not in classification but in 
providing a tool for the analytical critique of political practices that prevent 
representation of social conflict, the opening on new agendas, and the entry of new 
political actors’. 
That Grinberg had little use for rigorous classification was quite evident from 
his changing definition of the military-democratic regime. At one point he claimed 
that the Israeli civil society and the political parties were weak and likely to be 
overwhelmed by the military. On another occasion he seemed to imply that despite 
the ‘ambiguity between democratization and colonization’ in the regime there was 
dynamism in the civil society.  Grinberg justified these contradictions by yet another 
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explanation: ‘this is the double meaning of imagined democracy: while it facilitates 
the dynamic opening by means of imagination, it might be an illusion or fake, which 
closes political space, preventing the realization of democracy’.384 
Grinberg’s hardest task was to explain how the military, whose very existence 
was contingent on the Arab-Israeli conflict, could embrace the Oslo process. His 
ingenious solution was to claim that it was Rabin’s personal charisma that made the 
opening of the political space possible. Rabin was said to create the ‘demobilization 
of the parties and organizations of the left, concealing their leaders under the skirt of 
his security platform and “Mr. Security” image, and making himself the embodiment 
of the political process that would move the nation from war to peace’. Without Rabin 
and his charisma the political space closed; worse, his successor Shimon Peres - ‘the 
figure who symbolized the “left-wing tribe”, who turned inward, and was unable to 
recruit widespread support’.385 
If Rabin’s alleged charisma helped Grinberg to explain the initial impetus for 
the Oslo process, it made it harder for him clarify how the military - the guardian of 
the perpetual conflict - prevented the Likud government of Benjamin Netanyahu from 
antagonizing the Palestinians. Even more puzzling, Grinberg subsequently suggested 
that during the al-Aqsa Intifada the military was intent on closing the space for the 
Palestinians by brutally persecuting them. To explain the reversal of the military he 
claimed that public opinion - the locus of civic society - was so outraged by suicide 
bombings that it legitimized the use of force. Differently put, it was the civic society 
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space that pressured the military to close the conflict resolution space, a development 
that was at odds with the theory of the military impetus of the military-democracy.386 
But it was the Palestinian side that proved most challenging to Grinberg. In 
order to blame Israel for its alleged failure to resolve the conflict he required a 
‘narrative’ that absolved the Palestinians of any a culpability. For instance, Grinberg 
failed to mention that Peres’s electoral loss had little to do with the ‘left-wing tribe’ 
but rather with a series of Hamas brutal suicide bombings and a barrage of rocket 
attacks by Hezbollah to undermine Labour’s chances at the poll. Grinberg was also 
eager to portray Arafat and the Palestinian Authority fully compliant with the Oslo 
accords, a questionable proposition given Arafat’s underhand tactics. Indeed, 
Grinberg suggested that ‘Arafat managed to negotiate with Hamas moderates who 
accepted the Oslo II accord’. The truth was very different: Arafat consistently turned a 
blind eye to Hamas’s murderous attacks and only took action under irresistible Israeli 
and/or American pressure.387  
In yet another ploy to shift blame on Israel Grinberg consistently described the 
settlers as ‘Yesha zealots’ responsible for sabotaging the peace process, an adjective 
missing from his references to Hamas that were defined on a number of instances as 
‘moderate’ and ‘pragmatic’ – though the Islamist group was responsible for the 
murder of hundreds of Israelis in planned terror attacks while the settlers confined 
their opposition to political protest (with the odd exception of a violent act, notably 
Baruch Goldstein 1994 ‘Hebron massacre’).388 
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Grinberg’s determination to ignore the strong showing of the Islamists was 
notable in his discussion of possible solutions to the conflict. Stating that ‘security is 
the most important problem in the discourse of Israel’ he attributed its threat 
perception to the ‘traumatic past of the Jews in Europe and the Holocaust’ and to a 
defensiveness ‘rooted in ancient religious texts’. Without mentioning Hamas or 
Islamic Jihad (and Fatah’s Tanzim militia, which claimed its share of terror attacks), 
Grinberg went on to argue that ‘the myth of eternal and a-historical insecurity has 
been the national myth since 2000’. In other words, it was this ‘imaginary threat’ 
elevated to a myth that prevented the opening of the Palestinian space thus 
condemning Israel to the eternal status of a violent military-oriented ‘imaginary 
democracy’. 
According to Grinberg, the only viable way to democracy was through an 
Israel-Palestine Union (IPU), a federative structure with two separate governments 
that ‘must administer everything that can be separated’ and a federal government that 
‘must administer everything that is indivisible’. The IPU would require a ‘major 
international peacekeeping force designed to protect the Palestinians from Israeli 
military forces and the total disarmament of all civilians, Jews and Palestinians’. By 
disarming the IDF, the military would have been removed from the democratic-
military regime; Israel could be on its way to a true democracy.389 Improving slightly 
on his original designation of military-democracy, he adopted the name ‘occupying 
democracy’ explaining that, unlike Europe, Israel did not have fixed borders and the 
two groups - Jews and Palestinians - suffered from a severe imbalance of power that 
made democracy impossible. Interestingly enough, Grinberg changed the explanation 
for the failure to settle the conflict, attributing the fiasco to negative synergy - the 
                                                          
389
 Ibid, p. 214. 
225 
 
effort to democratize the PA and the refusal of the Israeli government to dismantle all 
the settlements. Still, he predicted that the ‘occupying democracy’ will sustain itself 
unless the international community would force Israel to resolve the conflict, 
preferably by creating the IPU.390 
For Grinberg and other critical scholars, the democratic character of a bi-
national construct was self-evident and obvious freeing them to focus on the alleged 
ills of the non-democracy, be it ethnocracy or military-democracy. By using this 
‘methodology’ these scholars could present bi-nationalism as an act of redemption 
from the sins of Zionism. This in turn meant that, consciously or unwittingly, those 
who were most eager to see a Jewish-Palestinian state were most likely to give the 
Israeli democracy a failing grade. That the bi-national entity was expected to have a 
progressive distributive justice system is another boon for those considering 
egalitarianism an essential feature of democracy. Conversely, those who were pushing 
for a two-state solution were less likely to describe the political system in terms 
reserved for South African style apartheid.  
Whatever the visions for a post-peace state, the ongoing conflict between 
Israel and the Palestinians has engendered a large literature which, as already noted, 
tended to blame Israel. This was hardly surprising given the paradigmatic approach; 
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Chapter 6   The Holocaust in Post-Zionist Thinking  
For pre-WWII anti-Zionists the intellectual path to a bi-national state was 
clear and straightforward. According to Martin Buber, Yehuda Magnes and their 
disciples, universal humanistic values would easily trump ethnic or religious tensions. 
The communists had little use for humanism but postulated that differences between 
Jews and Arabs could be easily overcome by a common class struggle against Jewish 
and Arab capitalists. United in their abhorrence of nationalism, bi-national advocates 
dismissed Zionist warnings of growing anti-Semitism in Europe as ‘propaganda’ 
intended to scare Jews into immigrating to Palestine. 
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Even before the full scope of the Jewish genocide transpired, the anti-Zionist 
movement crumbled politically and philosophically.  Brit Shalom and its Ihud 
successor virtually evaporated, Magnes died lobbying the State Department against 
Israel’s creation, while Buber and his academic acolytes had little to say about the 
Holocaust and still saw no justification for a Jewish homeland. To the contrary, 
writing in the early 1950s Buber advocated a ‘Near East confederation that would 
encompass Palestine and bordering countries’.391 
In any event, with Buber returning to his original interests in spirituality and 
metaphysics, it was Arendt, who arrived in New York in 1941 after fleeing Germany 
via France, who filled the intellectual anti-Zionist void. For Arendt, who studied 
under Martin Heidegger and Carl Jasper in the 1930s, this was a surprising turn-about 
since she initially described Zionism as a ‘national liberation movement of the Jewish 
people’ and praised the Socialist Zionist parties for creating a legitimate Jewish 
existence in Palestine through labour.392 
This appreciation, however, was replaced before long with anxiety over the 
possible excesses of Jewish nationalism, epitomized in her eyes by the Revisionist 
movement of Jabotinsky whom she considered a ‘fascist’. Arendt, who fell under the 
spell of the Jewish Soviet writer Ilyah Ehrenburg, a spokesman for Stalin, became 
convinced that Jews would be better off as a protected national minority. Lauding the 
Soviet Union as an ideal model, she declared that the Jews there were fully protected 
from anti-Semitism by its progressive constitution. Behind this enthusiasm for the 
soviet model were twin concerns: the ‘excessive’ manifestation of Jewish power and 
the future of the Palestinian Arabs. The first was addressed in a Commentary article 
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where she bemoaned the ‘fanaticism and hysteria of Zionism’. The second was 
revealed in her call to the United Nations to work with Ihud and other non-Zionist 
Jews to create a bi-national state. Undeterred by Magnes’s lack of success in finding 
Palestinian Arab partners, she blamed Ben-Gurion for failing to make the bi-national 
vision work, giving virtually no accounting of the political attitudes of Palestinian 
Arabs.393 
It was Arendt’s subsequent reflection on the Holocaust, however, that made 
her the intellectual leader of the anti-Zionists and their academic successors, the post-
Zionists. Realizing early on the importance of the nascent research on the 
extermination of the Jews, she tried to shape the public debate as a reviewer for 
respectable American presses. Raul Hilberg, author of the seminal three-volume study 
The Destruction of European Jews recalled that, on Arendt’s recommendation, a 
number of prestigious publishers, including Princeton University Press, rejected his 
manuscript. In a subsequent note, Arendt called that scholar ‘quite stupid and mad’ 
but this did not stop her from extensively borrowing from Hilberg’s book when 
covering the Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem in 1961. This glaring breach of 
ethics was virtually overlooked in the huge controversy created by her own book, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.  Arendt accused the State of 
Israel and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of manipulating the Holocaust for political gain 
and blamed the Jewish leadership in Europe for complicity in the Holocaust.394 
But it was Arendt’s methodology that proved most attractive to post-Zionists 
seeking to alter the view of the Holocaust from a unique evil perpetrated against the 
Jews to one denoting a universal phenomenon of evil. Arendt laid the groundwork for 
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a universalistic reading of the Holocaust by attributing the Nazi movement to the 
crisis of modernity that had befallen Germany. Using an essentialist historiographical 
approach, Arendt was able to ‘dehistorize’ the Nazi brand of totalitarianism in a way 
that the industrial massacre of the Jews looked as a peripheral issue, hardly deserving 
special attention.395 
Still, Arendt could not avail herself of the fledgling tools of critical philosophy 
that would make the universalized Holocaust an effective tool for a harsh criticism of 
Zionism and Israel. As Elhanan Yakira, author of a study on the subject put it, the 
anti-Zionist movement was ‘strengthened by very powerful academic and intellectual 
trends… including theories, modes of thoughts, methodologies, meta-historical 
prepositions’.396 
Unlike the better-known Holocaust deniers, this group of intellectuals and 
scholars has used critical theory to propagate the idea that the catastrophe of the 
Holocaust devolved into the Palestinian catastrophe. Permeated by the sense of 
perpetual victimhood combined with a sense of moral entitlement, the Jews were said 
to become not only desensitized to the suffering of the ‘other’ but actually inflicted 
the ontologically-defined universal evil of the Holocaust on the Palestinians. Israeli 
critical scholarship on the Holocaust produced three versions of the ‘catastrophe of 
the catastrophe’ theme.  
Israel as Nazi Germany  
A leading role in this trend has been played by Adi Ophir, a philosophy 
professor at Tel Aviv University. Beginning his academic career at the philosophy 
                                                          
395
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich, 1973). 
396
 Elhanan Yakira, Post-Zionism, Post-Holocaust: Three Essays on Denial, 




department of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Ophir has been a veteran political 
activist with roots in the Peace Now movement. In 1987 he co-founded The Twenty 
First Year, a circle of academics and intellectuals with links to Matzpen who wanted 
to fight the ‘occupation’ which they believed ‘defined the State and structured its 
society, economy, and culture’.397 The group pioneered the idea of boycotting 
products and services made in the territories and urged conscripts and reservists alike 
to refuse military service there. 
Throughout the years Ophir has led high-profile campaigns, including appeals 
to the international community to stop Israel from an alleged plan to expel all 
Palestinians from the territories. His view of Israel was unequivocally dark: ‘a 
garbage hip of Europe… a site of experiment… in ethnic cleansing… a regime that 
produces and distributes evil systematically’. Ophir, who described himself as a 
‘moral entrepreneur’, felt personally compelled to bring ‘a new concept of 
sovereignty and a new model of relations between politics, law, and morality in the 
Western states’.398 
But it was in his effort to apply critical philosophy to deconstruct the 
Holocaust that Ophir made his mark. Ontologically a nominalist, he was at ease with 
the notion that the world external to individuals was made of concepts, names and 
labels that structured reality. But even a dedicated critical philosopher like him could 
not dismiss the Holocaust as yet another label. Unwilling to follow Holocaust deniers 
who claimed that the mass murder of Jews either did not occur or was vastly 
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exaggerated, Ophir borrowed from the more sophisticated approach of the French 
radical left which one observer described as ‘stylishly nihilistic view of the world, 
which insists that all meaning is relative, that all truth is elusive and therefore futile… 
assail those two pillars of human civilization, memory and truth’.399 
Launched by Paul Rassinier, a French socialist pacifist who survived a number 
of concentration camps, this tradition viewed Auschwitz and other camps not as the 
epitome of evil but as an extreme manifestation of a universal logic of exploitation 
and oppression.  In his widely read Holocaust Story and the Lies of Ulysses Rassinier 
argued that Nazi camps did not differ that much from other camps, be they French 
penal intuitions or the Soviet gulag.400 In the words of one critic, Rassinier’s theory 
that a ‘camp is a camp is a camp’ resonated with the anarcho-pacifist fringe of the 
French left, for whom the essence of the state was translated into the logic of war and 
enslavement. Not incidentally, Rassinier made scant mention of the extermination of 
the Jews - as victims they were interchangeable with the inmates of any penal 
institution.401 
 Rassinier’s colleagues in the ultra-left Socialisme ou Barbarie circle and its 
splinter Pouvior Ouvrier group elaborated on these themes. Pierre Guillaume, an 
activist with roots in Socialisme ou Barbarie, an offshoot of the Trotskyite movement, 
was the founder of the La Vieille Taupe (the Old Mole), a bookstore and a publishing 
press and a follower of Amadeo Bordiga, the Italian communist and leader of 
International Communist Party. In 1960 Bordiga penned an essay ‘Auschwitz or the 
Great Alibi’ that appeared anonymously in the French Bordigist publication 
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Programme Communiste. Applying a Marxist analysis to the Holocaust, Bordiga 
concluded that anti-Semitism had nothing to do with the extermination of the Jews.  
Rather, the killings represented a radical form of action against a capitalist class that 
was easy to identify and concentrate. They were not killed ‘because they were Jews 
but because they were ejected from the production process’. To add consistency to his 
class analysis, Bordiga claimed that ‘German capitalism resigned itself with difficulty 
to murder pure and simple’. In a somewhat muddled addition, he found that Western 
‘imperialists’ used the killing of the Jews to ‘justify... the despicable treatment 
inflicted on the German people’.402 
By reprinting the essay in Vieille Taupe in 1970, Guillaume signalled a 
synthesis of a number of themes. He emphasized the fragility of historical accounts:  
‘With the destruction of history, contemporary events themselves retreat into a remote 
and fabulous realm of unverifiable stories, uncheckable statistics, unlikely 
explanations and untenable reasoning’.  Embellishing Bordiga's portrayal of Jews as 
capitalists he claimed that their ‘mono-ethnic organizations’ were nothing more than a 
convenient facade of capitalism: ‘By words referring to the ideology and the mono-
ethnic organisational structures that pretend to be representatives of the Jewish 
“community”, but who seem to have tied their fate to the development of capitalism, 
and are nowadays widely involved in its moral rearmament, thanks to a victim 
ideology of their own’. Finally, he acknowledged that Auschwitz did exist and that 
‘Some Jews have been the victims of persecution’ and even that they were entitled to 
compassion and compensation. At the same time, Guillaume deplored the ‘“victim 
ideology” the one-sided representation system, apologetic and mythological, through 
which organizations that pretend to represent the Jewish victims, use, for their own 
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profit and to the benefit of their political plans, the real victims, who become twice 
victimized’.403 
Though Guillaume crossed the threshold of respectability by reviving The 
Vielle Taupe as a Holocaust denial press in the 1980s, his early position nourished a 
new generation of radical leftists who added it to their high-profile anti-colonialist 
message. By universalizing the Jewish catastrophe and insisting that this was just one 
instance of the oppressive power of the state acting against the true victims of 
exploitation - the workers, the minorities and the Third World peoples - they could 
claim that the Palestinians were the ‘true victims’ of the Holocaust. In an ontological 
sleight-of-hand the victimhood of the Jews was transferred onto the Palestinians; 
more to the point, Auschwitz was said to have blinded Israelis to the suffering of all 
other victims, especially the Palestinians. 
The Rassinier-Bogarti synthesis popularized by Guillaume and The Vieille 
Taupe circles acquired academic legitimacy through the work of Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, a political-activist-turned philosopher. Lyotard, who first introduced 
Guillaume to the Socialisme ou Barbariene group, achieved fame by articulating the 
meaning of postmodernism. He rejected the ‘grand-narrative’ or meta-narrative that is 
based on positivist science and a universally accepted hermeneutics of meaning. In his 
view, rather than bound by one common belief, postmodern discourse reflects a 
variety of beliefs, a multiplicity of aspirations and heterogeneity of desires. To decode 
this postmodern multiple discursive convention, Lyotard turned to the concept of 
‘language-games’ invented by Ludwig Wittgenstein to denote the existence of a 
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multiplicity of communities, each with its distinctive system for generating and 
circulating meaning.404 
The micro-narratives produced by language games with their fractured and 
splintered knowledge, however, presented a moral problem for the postmodern 
condition because it could not produce a universal code of ethics. To deflect possible 
criticisms, Lyotard published The Differend, arguably his most important work, to 
prove that ethical behaviour was possible by revamping traditional ways of thinking 
about justice and injustice. He contended that injustice occurred when language rules 
from one language regimen were applied to another. In essence, in his view, ethical 
behaviour amounted to being vigilant to the threat of particularities being encased in 
abstract conceptuality, silencing the voice of the aggrieved individuals or groups.  To 
be ethical, one had to bear witness to the ‘differend’, a situation where the ‘plaintiff is 
divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim’. At the same 
time, he argued that in the absence of a universal rule of judgment between two 
heterogonous genres, ‘a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be 
equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments’.405 
Applying this logic to the Holocaust Lyotard suggested that the Jews were 
differends, victims denied the ‘means to argue’ by their Nazi tormentors. But the 
Holocaust was also a central metaphor for his treatment of names, catastrophe and the 
problem of memory and forgetting in the postmodern sensibility.  In one ontological 
sense, Auschwitz was a concrete name place and Jews were a concrete people who 
were exterminated and their memory virtually erased.  At another, Auschwitz stood as 
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a name for lower case Jews, an idea of a catastrophe that has befallen countless other 
differends of the twentieth century. By universalizing the meaning of Auschwitz, 
Lyotard sought to remind the world of the need to remember these victims ranging 
from political prisoners in Stalin’s labour camps to causalities of Western neo-
colonial push under the guise of development and, indeed, the Palestinians.406 
Ophir’s acquaintance with the radical French take on the Holocaust dated to 
the 1980s, when Matzpen intellectuals began publicizing it in Israel. In 1980, Boaz 
Evron, by then the driving force behind the neo-Canaanite ideology, wrote an essay 
‘A Danger to the People’ that highlighted the major Rassinier-Guillaume themes. Put 
succinctly, Evron claimed that two misfortunes had befallen the Jews, the Holocaust 
and their interpretation of the Holocaust. In what could be termed as the catastrophe 
of the catastrophe the Israeli Jews were said to develop a habit of identifying the 
‘Nazis with the Arabs in general the Palestinians in particular’. He further noted that 
these parallels created a national zero-sum-game perception whereby the conflict 
could lead to either victory or a Holocaust-like destruction.  As a result, ‘the Israelis 
became free of moral restrictions since one who is in danger of annihilation seems 
himself exempt from any moral considerations which may restrict his effort to save 
himself’.407 
Yehuda Elkana, a Hebrew University professor who founded the Cohn 
Institute of Humanities at Tel Aviv University, furthered Ophir’s growing 
appreciation for the French radical circles. Ophir, an Elkana protégé and one of the 
first hires at the institute, was familiar with his mentor’s affinity for the Rassinier’s 
‘camp is a camp is a camp’ approach. In 1988 Elkana, an Auschwitz survivor, wrote 
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an article titled ‘In Favour of Forgetting’ in which he recalled spending a number of 
months in a Russian ‘liberation camp’ with former prisoners from many nationalities. 
Observing their behaviour Elkana concluded that ‘what has happened in Germany can 
happen everywhere, and to every people, mine included’. Elkana urged the Israelis to 
forget the past as represented by the Holocaust in order to move forward and settle the 
conflict with the Palestinians. Ophir followed with an article titled ‘Two Tier 
Thinking: A Moral Point of View’, subtitled a homage to Yehuda Elkana.408 
But Ophir’s own self-proclaimed effort to change attitudes to the Holocaust 
was much more ambitious. As early as 1986 he published an essay ‘On Sanctifying 
the Holocaust: An Anti-Theological Treatise’ that echoed the Evron-Elkana theme.  
He urged to stop what was described as a pathological drive to memorialize the 
Holocaust to the point where it became a civil religion and denounced the Zionist 
‘agents of identity’ who exploited the Holocaust for political gains. Alluding to the 
Ten Commandments, Ophir suggested that the ‘Holocaust religion’ or ‘upside down 
Sinai’ came with its own key commandments such as ‘remember the day of the 
Holocaust to keep it holy, in memory of the destruction of the Jews of Europe’ and 
that shirking from the task of remembering was the ‘archetype of sin’. Another 
commandment - ‘thou shall have no other holocausts’ - extolled the uniqueness of the 
Jewish catastrophe.  As a result, no other man-made disaster such as the slaughter in 
Biafra or the Soviet Gulag was allowed to be compared to the killing of Jews. 
Extending the comparison Ophir wrote: ‘Like God’s altar in Canaan one generation 
after the settlement… a central altar has arisen which will gradually turn into our 
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Temple, forms of pilgrimage are taking hold, and already a thin layer of Holocaust-
priests, keepers of the flame, is growing and institutionalizing’.409 
Over time, Ophir found more flaws with the way the Holocaust had influenced 
Israeli society. Published in a 2000 volume Order of Evils, he included a long list of 
the alleged misuse of the Holocaust. One, already touched upon in ‘Sanctifying the 
Holocaust’, involved the March of the Living, an annual trip organized by the 
Ministry of Education to expose high school Israeli students to the concentration 
camps in Poland. Using a sarcastic tone he described the trips as ‘Hajj’, a reference to 
the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.410 Another misuse, derived from Rassinier-
Guillaume, noted that ‘Holocaust worship’ removed the murder of the Jews from the 
realm of rationality and hence rational discourse.  The belief in the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust was, in Ophir’s view, the source of moral blindness that enabled Zionism 
to dispossess the Palestinians. In other words, Israel was able to get away with an act 
of colonial aggression by simply invoking the memory of the ‘six millions’.411 
Ophir’s principled opposition to Zionism and the creation of the State of Israel 
- the catastrophe that the Holocaust allegedly inflicted on the Palestinians - did not 
soften during the Oslo years. An ardent supporter of a bi-national state, he had little 
use for the negotiations and was not dismayed, as some of his colleague, by their 
collapse, referring to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada as zman emet (real time) 
and describing it as a ‘time when people say what they really mean’.  He admitted to 
suffering no intellectual confusion as ‘there was no undermining of the paradigm that 
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dictates the understanding of reality’. This reality was centred on the ‘occupation… 
on the scenes of evil, on the suffering there on the humiliation’.412 
In the circumstances, Ophir decided to turn the violence of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada into a ‘teachable moment’ on the alleged connection between the Holocaust 
and the mistreatment of the Palestinians. In an introduction to the volume named after 
one of his articles, ‘Avodat Hahove’ (Worshipping of the Present), he emphasized the 
didactic goal of the book.413 The collected essays solicited enough attention to prompt 
Ophir to expand on the subject by publishing the The Order of Evil: toward an 
Ontology of Morals in 2000. In many respects, the c. 600-page book - a compilation 
of his prior writings on the Holocaust - is a difficult and confusing work. The chapters 
are made up of numbered paragraphs with abrupt endings - on occasion arranged in a 
fragmentary and non-sequential manner. The difficulty created by this highly 
unorthodox style is compounded by the esoteric language and impenetrable prose not 
uncommon in critical literature. 
Pioneered by Theodore Adorno, who famously disdained the positivist 
regimen of facts and precise explanations, it was more recently associated with the 
critical scholar Judith Butler - recipient of the Bad Writing Award by the editors of 
Philosophy and Literature.  Certainly, Ophir fits the mould as attested by this rather 
typical sentence: ‘Inclusion through exceptional exclusion is no longer an exceptional 
relation to exceptional subject; it has become a daily relation to exceptional moments 
in the life or body of any individual, and an ongoing task of dealing with the life of 
entire population existing under exceptional circumstances’.414 
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In the preface to The Order of Evil Ophir acknowledged his affinity to the 
postmodern French philosophers and expressed his desire to follow in their footsteps 
and ‘try explicitly to restore to this world a moral point of view and give a critical 
account of it’.415 In line with this ambitious goal he asserted that the Israeli condition 
was ‘constantly on the horizon’ even when ‘there is a conscious and explicit attempt 
to be liberated from the limitations of the dejecting prism that the Israeli context 
forces on the systematic effort to think the moral matter and to interpret moral 
categories’. Ophir described the limitations as ‘first and foremost relevant to the 
meaning of the Holocaust in Israeli culture’. While it is beyond the scope of the 
present study to analyse his lengthy theoretical discussion of evil, a number of points 
bear clarification.  
Having defined evil as ‘superfluous suffering’, something that has no value to 
the evil doer, Ophir offered a road map for rectifying  Israel’s ‘moral blindness’ based 
on a three-step strategy for redefining the meaning of the Holocaust beginning with 
de-sacralising this genocide by universalizing its meaning. Ophir chose two 
ontological tools to achieve this goal: demystifying the magic name of Auschwitz and 
putting the genocide of the Jews on an ontological continuum of evil that essentially 
meant to ‘liberate Auschwitz from the dogma of uniqueness… to restore several 
conceptual continua to position it within the geography and history of contemporary 
evil’.416 
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Citing Lyotrad’s language games Ophir declared that in the ‘conventional 
truth’ Auschwitz played a ‘metonymic role’ - ‘a catastrophe name-place that has 
magic power’. Indeed, ‘the catastrophe name-place is always shrouded in a kind of 
aura that is signalled in a tone of voice… in the fragmentation of speech’. The aura 
signifies the inability to express the event in accordance to the rules of ‘conventional 
truth game’. Stemming from the unique horror of the place conveyed by the testimony 
of the survivors, this particular aura ‘partitioned those who seek to understand the 
catastrophe of the place from the place and event that the catastrophe was’.  Since, in 
Ophir’s view, the ‘name must not be allowed to exert its magic power’, the aura 
should be broken.  Echoing Rassinier, he raised doubt whether survivors could be 
counted on to provide a picture of the horror that Auschwitz was.417 
Though careful not to blame the former inmates themselves, Ophir 
nevertheless implied that they were ‘bewitched’ by their memories. In his opinion, 
this ‘bewitchment’ contributed to the separation between them ‘and all the others who 
were not’. Ensnared by the magic name, they made it hard for others, presumable 
Ophir, and even some survivors - an apparent reference to his mentor Elkana - to 
make a more general sense of the catastrophe. The testimony of the survivors who 
became the guardians of the separation had to be given a different meaning, if the 
magic name of Auschwitz was to be erased. ‘It must begin at precisely the point that 
the autobiography, the literature, and the history cease to represent and begin 
discussing the very problem representing the catastrophe… it must situate itself 
between the reader and the represented world… without assuming any act of 
identification or sympathy’.  Given that Ophir considered the Holocaust to be a new 
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civil religion, he felt justified in describing his work as being akin to ‘desecrating the 
name of Auschwitz’.418 
‘Desecrating the name of Auschwitz’ and placing the Holocaust on the same 
ontological continuum of evil proved a complex task forcing Ophir to wrestle with 
squaring Rassiner’s dictum that a ‘camp is a camp is a camp’ with his own definition 
of evil as a superfluous suffering serving no other goal. Quite clearly, since few 
camps could pass the restrictive muster of being a place where only superfluous evil 
was committed he proceeded to explain ‘a catastrophe place as a place where an 
exceptional concentration and intensification of evil-producing mechanisms 
occurred’. Ophir conceded that Auschwitz  was one such place but insisted that 
according to ‘phenomenological logic’ guiding his work, the Holocaust did not pass 
the threshold of a vital test: of the appearance of something new out of something 
else.  In other words, the evil of Auschwitz was not a unique case, a singularity, and 
should be placed on a continuum that included a long list of catastrophe places like 
Kolima, Kampuchea, Biafra, among others.419 
To justify placing other catastrophe places on the continuum of evil, Ophir 
explained that the ‘suffering and loss is common to the ghetto and concentration 
camps, to the Gulag, and to refugee camps and prison camps in wartime’. But, as he 
realized, the concept of ‘suffering and loss’ was too vague to serve the comparative 
required by the ontological logic of his continuum of evil. As a result, he suggested 
that it ‘was possible to objectify loss and suffering’ by developing systematic 
knowledge ‘about the creation of loss and suffering, their mechanics and dynamics, 
and their enmeshing with various exchange systems in social space’.  While admitting 
that such quantification was the subject of ‘future science,’ he felt confident that 
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‘what I said about them so far is enough to signal the direction of this study’, namely 
that ‘the inferno of Nazi camps where Jews were imprisoned could be found in the 
Gulag and in war prisoner camps run by Japan and China’.  He even went so far as to 
claim that Western ‘capitalist economy and the nation-state’ were ‘by far the most 
powerful of the systems producing and distributing superfluous evil’. ‘The United 
States and the industrialized countries of Europe’, he claimed, ‘methodically 
subjugated, exploited, plundered and destroyed’.420 
Much as Ophir tried to convince his readers that from a phenomenological 
standpoint there were more similarities than unique cases on the catastrophe list, he 
felt the need to confront the industrial scale killings in Auschwitz, something that 
Holocaust deniers minimized or denied.  Since Ophir could do neither, he was forced 
to come up with a rather peculiar explanation of the largest mass killing in modern 
history. In his version, if Auschwitz were a model of killing, ‘perhaps this was not an 
epitome of human distortion and perversion but rather of human excellence, a model 
in which killing was brought to a perfection of efficiency and precision’.  Ophir gave 
the Germans - as opposed to perpetrators of messier and less organized evils - high 
marks for solving the problem of industrialized murder: ‘The industrial process 
included living raw material slated for extermination, and waste material created in 
the course of the production process that in turn needed to be eliminated. The 
incoming raw material took up almost the same volume as the waste material left after 
the production of death’. The Nazis’ ingenious solution was to invent the crematorium 
- an efficient way to reduce ‘waste’ from the death industry thus ‘creating a product 
that took up no space or volume’.421 
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To Ophir this efficiency did not indicate a singularity but rather an extreme 
case of the superfluity that made up the continuum of evil: ‘Auschwitz turns from a 
private name into the family name of the victims of the West-Native Americans, the 
Africans, the Japanese of Hiroshima and all the rest’.  Echoing Lyotard he concluded 
that ‘Auschwitz becomes a metonym for the real; the differend of the memory of the 
extermination becomes a metonym for the differend; the problem of representing 
Auschwitz becomes a metonym for the representation of reality in general’. While 
conceding that the Jews were an ideal victim, an extreme differend, Ophir resisted the 
label of uniqueness. On the contrary, in his view, had the Germans won the war 
against the Soviet Union ‘it is likely that an annihilation of the Slavic people would 
have commenced’. He further speculated that a stable Europe under Hitler would have 
entailed the extermination of other categories of differends, including ‘the disabled 
and the mentally ill’. Quite clearly, the hypothesized annihilation of Slavs helped 
Ophir make the case against singularity: ‘Anti-Semitism cannot explain the Nazi 
myth; it explains only the fact that the Jews were its first and principal victims’.422 
That Ophir had to revert to such patently false, indeed absurd argument 
offered yet another indicator of the weakness of his continuum of evil construct. It 
was true that the Nazis considered the hundreds of millions of Slavs inferior, as Ophir 
noted, but they never planned to exterminate them - a task that would have 
exponentially dwarfed the extermination of Jews.  On the contrary, Hitler planned to 
use the Slavs as labourers to serve the master race, a fact well publicized by the Nazis. 
Ophir’s other examples were even more outlandish, including the following: ‘People 
kill in a systematic, industrialized way as a matter of routine every day - killing 
animals for food’. Odious as the comparison between Jews and animals is, it 
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contradicts his own definition of evil as superfluous suffering since animals are 
slaughtered for food.  Ophir’s parenthetic addition to the sentence - ‘one should take 
into consideration the possibility, at the moment seemingly absurd, cynical, horrifying 
or insane that the three-and-a-half years in Auschwitz will pale in the face of centuries 
of industrialized slaughter, the endless and superfluous taking of life by human 
beings’ - muddied the water further, since it could refer to either animals or human 
beings.423 
Amassing technical examples in favour of a continuum of evil, however, left 
Ophir ill-prepared for the moral argument that historians Yehuda Bauer and Steven 
Katz mustered in describing Auschwitz as a unique Jewish tragedy. They and many 
other observers noted that it was the intent of the Nazis to exterminate the entire 
Jewish people that made the Holocaust a singular moral offense. To pre-empt the 
Bauer-Katz thesis Ophir postulated that intent should not matter in evaluating the 
morality of Auschwitz. He argued that  
The intention to exterminate an entire group or other destructive or wicked 
intentions is important to the historical explanation… only when considering 
the structural conditions calling for and making possible the realization of this 
intention.  Regarding the moral meaning, the importance of intent is doubtful. 
The same superfluous evil… could in principle have followed from a realized 
intention of total extermination… but it could also have followed from an 
abstinence from action capable of preventing an inadvertent extermination. 
 The latter part of the argument was particularly significant as it created a construct 
broad and ambiguous enough for Ophir to fit all his favourite examples of evil.424 
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Muddled as Ophir’s arguments in favour of a continuum of evil were, the 
objective behind the campaign against the Holocaust’s singularity was clear enough. 
Turning Auschwitz to a universal catastrophe would save the Israelis from themselves 
since ‘the effort to singularize often serves to justify state crimes or to represent them 
in a way that fends off criticism’, thus driving them to reach a ‘dangerous point where 
the victims’ heirs express positions and implement practices that are alarmingly 
reminiscent of the slippery slope that led “there”’. In plain English, by putting the 
Holocaust on a continuum of evil, Ophir was trying to restrain the Israeli Jews from 
engaging in Nazi-type behaviour towards Palestinians.425 
Ophir listed a number of  alleged Israeli offences stemming from control of 
the territories: ‘The regime methodically deployed mechanisms of control and 
domination, reverted to violence, and employed ideological and technological means 
of “governance” that combined rule over the population with surveillance of each 
individual in it’. These and other methods were said to be part of a ‘broad spectrum of 
possibilities for harming Palestinian subjects… through different forms of state 
violence’.426 
 Bearing in mind the ontological continuum of evil Ophir construed the 
charges in a way that maximized the Israel-Nazi Germany equation. Choosing terms 
to carefully convey that the Palestinians suffered their own Holocaust at the hands of 
the Jews he wrote about the ‘gaping bottom of the slope’ where the Palestinians, a 
‘superfluous group’, were allegedly subject to ‘methodical removal’ and ‘destruction’.  
Without using the name Auschwitz, Ophir claimed that Israel turned the territories 
into a ‘chronic catastrophe place’. That only tens of thousands of Palestinians still 
lived under direct Israeli control at the time when the book was published made little 
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difference for Ophir.427 As we saw it, ‘evil rolls on three slopes’, one being 
‘governance and domination, or the possibilities available to the powers that be for 
harming their subjects in intentional and organized way; this is the methodized, 
controlled annihilation of a defined that is part of the population, of a size as large as 
the regime may wish’. By charging Israel with the ‘possibilities’ available through 
‘governance and domination’, Ophir did not have to prove that it actually murdered 
masses of Palestinians in extermination camps, only that the Zionist ideology turned 
the Palestinians into superfluous ‘others’ in the same way as the Nazi ideology 
transformed the Jews into ‘others’ prior to their extermination.428 
Critics like Yakira deplored Ophir’s habit of ignoring the empirical reality, 
pointing out that ‘there is certainly room to question’ whether ‘presenting Israel as a 
machine of evil, complete blind to the suffering of its victims, is true to the fact’. 
Yakira was especially annoyed by Ophir and other radical scholars who compared 
Israel’s control of the territories to the Final Solution, describing them sarcastically as 
self-appointed ‘bearers of special truth’ and members in a ‘kind of secret order of 
initiation’. Though Yakira presented a lengthy rebuttal of Ophir, positivist arguments 
could hardly win a debate with critical scholars who adamantly rejected the very 
notion of an objective reality.429 
Indeed, as noted above, Ophir prided himself on being a moral entrepreneur 
engaged in inquiry that stood outside the ‘academic consensus’ - a reference to the 
mainstream community of positivist researches. Well aware that his scholarship 
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needed alternative academic outlets, he founded the critical journal Theory and 
Criticism (Teoria Uvikoret) based at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem.  As head of 
the Political Lexicon project at the Minerva Centre for Humanities at Tel Aviv 
University, he created another journal, Mafte’ah (Key). Both publications served as a 
forum for Ophir’s research that supported his ontological linkage between the 
Holocaust and the alleged Nazi-like treatment of the Palestinians.  By one count there 
were some 52 items related to the Holocaust in Teoria Uvikoret and eleven in 
Mafte'akh. Outside the academic discourse, Ophir expanded his ontological 
continuum of evil to political commentary as epitomized by a series of articles during 
Israel’s 2008-09 operation against Hamas in Gaza. Using terms like ‘zone of 
emergency’ and ‘zone of catastrophe’ he claimed that ‘Israel governs Gaza by an 
ongoing measured and calculated catastrophization that becomes more brutal, deadly 
and shameless with each wave of violence.  More is yet to come’.430 
Ophir’s students furthered the Israel-Nazi imagery. In an article published in 
Mafte’ah, Michal Givoni argued that testimony ‘is more than just a piece of evidence, 
testimony marks the inscription of the political into an array of truth games, in which 
the truth is considered not an end itself but a medium for ethical and political 
transformation’. Crediting Lyotard and Ophir with abolishing the ‘temporal and 
ontological gap that is usually presumed to separate testimony from the event’, she 
derided the ‘evil’ manifested in the IDF’s Gaza operation and argued that exposing 
the ‘murderous plans’ against the Palestinians was part of the testimony as ‘moral 
witnessing’.431 Ariella Azoulay, Ophir’s colleague at the Minerva Humanities Centre - 
where she was listed as a photo-lexicographer - specialized in producing visual 
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depictions of the Nakba-Holocaust equivalency. Her favourite visuals featured 
Palestinians dressed as prisoners behind the separation fence to conjure up the fence 
surrounding Auschwitz. Occasionally, a caption would make the point that ‘in this 
act, too, Palestinians are the ones who will be arrested. This time, however, they force 
the Israeli soldiers to chase them as if they were chasing (Jewish) prisoners under the 
Nazi regime’.432 
The Holocaust as a Psychological Deformity of the Jews 
While Ophir could take credit for applying the most radical form of French 
critical theory to demonstrate the Holocaust’s destructive impact on Israel, other 
activist scholars relied on a mixture of less defined analytical approaches to reach the 
same conclusion.  
 Moshe Zuckerman, a professor of German history at Tel Aviv University and 
a veteran Marxist activist, did much to spread the Israel-Nazi equation in the Marxist, 
pro-Palestinian circles in Germany, a frequent venue for his visits. In what was 
arguably a highly unorthodox theoretical choice, Zuckermann combined the Frankfurt 
School and neo-Marxist quest to uncover the ‘false consciousness’ behind societal 
ideology with psychoanalytical themes. He seemed particularly excited about the 
latter writing that ‘psychoanalysis has revolutionized academic and cultural thinking 
in the twentieth century’. Though admitting that Freudian psychoanalysis was 
controversial as a tool of social analysis, Zuckermann noted that the Frankfurt School 
made a successful attempt to connect ‘macro-sociological analysis of society with 
central categories of psychoanalysis’. One of his essays begins with ‘Moshe 
Zuckermann approaches his subject matter, the major ideological themes in Israeli 
                                                          
432





political culture, inspired and informed by the Frankfurt School. His goal is to analyse 
the production of a common identity, which is by necessity 'a false consciousness’. To 
uncover the process responsible for the creation of this consciousness, ‘what is 
habitually hidden must be uncovered’.  Using these combined tools, Zuckermann 
claimed that the ‘psychological deformation’ of Israeli society stemmed from the 
‘ideologized Holocaust discourse’.433 
Zuckermann put the psychoanalytical approach to use in an article that echoed 
Elkana’s plea to forget the Holocaust, which he lauded as an ‘unprecedented act of 
bravery’ that chastised Israeli society for its national neurosis. While not opposed to 
private acts of remembrance, Zuckermann took a very dim view of the ‘pathologically 
compulsive’ public commemorations that enhanced the ‘psychological deformation’ 
of Israeli citizens. In his opinion, the deformation stemmed from the ‘Holocaust 
credit’ given to the Jews by a world feeling guilty for the genocide and willing to 
overlook the dispossession of the Palestinians that enabled Israel’s creation. It was, in 
his opinion, the same ‘Holocaust credit’ that compelled the international community 
to overlook the many transgressions of the ‘occupation’. Internally, the ‘credit’ 
bolstered nationalism and militarism in Israeli society to the point where, in his view, 
the question of whether ‘it was possible for the victims to become murderers’ could 
be legitimately raised. Indeed, Zuckermann found an ‘associative link’ between the 
alleged repression in the territories and Jewish suffering during the Holocaust. In his 
words, ‘every dead of an action in Gaza, every victim of a volley fired in the air in the 
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West Bank, every act of brutal suppression’ is rooted in Auschwitz. The Jewish 
collective has to behave in ways that could never be associated with Auschwitz.434 
The Iraqi missile attacks on Israel during the 1991 Gulf War gave Zuckermann 
an opportunity to expand on these themes.  In a book titled Holocaust in the Sealed 
Room (Shoah Baheder Haatum) he used press coverage to prove that the memory of 
the Holocaust, reduced to a ‘cultural code’, created a society that suffered from a deep 
neurosis interspersed with hysterical reactions.  In his view, this neurotic mental state 
was reflected in the numerous references to Germany and the gas chambers and the 
inappropriate comparison between Saddam Hussein and Hitler underpinned by 
‘anxiety and baseless comparisons to the Holocaust’. Worse, the subtext of press 
articles indicated to him that Jews learned a highly particularistic lesson from the 
Holocaust: they alone were the victims of a unique catastrophe creating ‘the whole-
world-is-against us mentality’ and a steely resolve of ‘never again’.435 
Needless to say, Zuckerman, like Ophir, was passionately opposed to Jewish 
particularism, advocating the perception of the Holocaust as ‘the objectification of the 
most radical example of a relationship between murderers and murdered’. For him the 
Holocaust required individual survivors and the State of Israel to adopt a 
universalistic code of sanctifying all human life. Through this highly generalized 
ethos Zuckermann conveyed his very specific concern for alleged acts of oppression 
in the territories: ‘The Zionist collective cannot escape the truth that every “deviation” 
in Gaza, every victim of a “warning shot in the air” in the West Bank, that every act 
of brutal suppression is distancing it from its ethical and humane conduct befitting 
victims of the Holocaust and moving it the realm of ‘mentality represented by the 
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identity of the murderers’. Echoing Ophir, he blamed the use of the Holocaust 
memory for the creation of a xenophobic and militaristic society, accusing Israel of 
‘fetishization of the extermination sites’.436 
Zuckermann reserved special rebuke for actual survivors who engaged in 
‘ideological reification’, namely turning the memory of the Holocaust into a 
commodity, describing them as ‘a noisy bearer of a well-marketed misery cliché’. 
Indeed, in his view, the memories of these individuals should be denied credibility as 
well as compassion.  He displayed a particular contempt towards ‘Holocaustologists’ - 
his name for those who allegedly used the memories for material and ideological 
gains; Holocaust activist and Noble Peace Prize Laureate Eli Wiesel figured 
prominently on this list. This scorn was more than matched by his derision of the 
State of Israel that turned the memory of the victims into the ‘Holocaust credit’, a sort 
of unlimited credit card used to establish the state in the first place and to oppress the 
indigenous Palestinians.437 
With his theory of a Holocaust-related ‘psychological deformation’ seemingly 
confirmed by the Gulf War, Zuckermann had a hard time coming to terms with the 
Oslo peace process. In particular, he needed to explain how Israeli Jews could reach 
out to the Palestinian ‘Nazi-like’ enemies, or talk to Yasser Arafat who was ‘tabooed 
in the past as a Nazi’. Grappling with the discrepancy between his theory and political 
reality drove Zuckermann to some interesting intellectual zigzagging. He initially 
considered Oslo a devious ploy to perpetuate the status quo but the assassination of 
Rabin in November 1995 prompted a new interpretation whereby the Jewish ‘tribe’ 
had apparently split into two: the ‘action-inclined fanatics’, namely the settlers and 
their supporters, and the peace advocates inhabiting the Rabin camp. Zuckermann 
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claimed that the ‘alleged Jewish unity, nourished by Jewish history of real 
persecution, culminating in the Holocaust of the twentieth century, which provided 
Zionist ideology, over decades, with a seemingly everlasting impetus’ created an 
‘Angst ideology’.  With the Arabs feeding into the national angst, Zionism was able to 
maintain a consensus ‘in the face of the fetishized security problem’ until Rabin, a 
national security hero, managed to persuade the peace tribe to let go of the Holocaust 
memory curse.438 
Zuckerman’s tentative willingness to give the ‘peace tribe’ the benefit of the 
doubt all but disappeared after the Camp David fiasco and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada. His November 2000 essay ‘The Yearning of Anxiety and Ideology of Peace’ 
attested to considerable radicalization laced with bitterness and sarcasm. Zuckermann 
chose to blame Israel for the failure of Camp David while ignoring Barak’s offers and 
the US-Israeli position known as the Clinton Parameters - a blueprint for resolving the 
conflict that proposed an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its 
capital - and claiming that the Palestinians could not accept a deal without East 
Jerusalem. Equally important, in his view, was the fact that no peace settlement was 
possible without acknowledging the historical calamity that Israel inflicted on the 
Palestinians and a discussion of their ‘right of return’ – the Arab euphemism for 
Israel’s demographic subversion. 
 More broadly, Zuckermann linked the Camp David failure to the underlying 
dynamics of the Holocaust-deformed Israeli psyche that included a half-suppressed 
collective feeling of guilt towards the Palestinians that found its release in 
‘catastrophic violence toward the subject of the guilt feelings’. Attributing such 
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dynamics to paranoid ideology of ‘perpetual victimhood’ Zuckermann explained that 
it blinded Israelis to the ‘cry of suffering, the humiliation and injustice of their 
[Palestinian] victims’. And by way of reinforcing the Nazi-Israeli symmetry he 
asserted that those who ‘benefited from the suffering of Jewish babies during the 
Holocaust were totally inured to fate of Palestinian babies who stayed anonymous’. 
As if this lengthy catalogue of alleged psychological deformations was not enough, 
Zuckermann felt compelled to end on a metaphysical note writing that it was the 
‘yearning of anxiety’ - the siren call of Jewish existential victimhood - that defeated 
the ‘ideology of peace’.439 
Zuckerman’s radicalization permeated the pages of his 2001 book, On the 
Fabrication of Israelism: Myths and Ideology in a Society in Conflict. Evoking the 
essay ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ by Adorno and 
Horkheimer, he argued that the Israeli ‘culture industry’ was heavily influenced by 
manipulating the memory of the Holocaust. In this view, the state subverted the 
meaning of suffering by the victims by drawing a ‘Zionist-appropriate conclusions’ 
from the memory’. Worse, because of such subversion, Palestinians were killed 
without the need to properly designate it an act of murder: 
A Jewish-Israeli kalgas killed a Palestinian child. In other words, not 
murdered, simply ‘killed’. One must be careful with words: In a society where 
the shock of the horrific in itself is less powerful than the overgrown 
narcissistic humiliation, because of the chosen words to describe the horrific, a 
shock that demands the right to protest, easily becomes a reason for libel-suit. 
But until the case is clarified in court one must not say that kalgas is kalgas 
and that the murdered was murdered. 
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Zuckerman’s use of the Hebrew term kalgas - loosely translated as a military thug, or 
mercenary, but used almost exclusively for Nazi soldiers - was highly indicative of his 
goal of deepening the Nazi-Israeli equivalency.440 
Zuckerman’s subsequent work, a compilation of letters and essays published 
under the title Reification of Man: Aphorisms on Social, Political and Cultural Topics 
hewed even closer to the Frankfurt School. As noted, the neo-Marxists added a 
discursive-psychological dimension to the ‘false consciousness’ theory claiming that 
modern culture turned human relations into a commodity with fixed market values.   
Zuckermann used this theory to argue that German and Israeli societies formed a 
symbiotic relationship based on the monetization of the Holocaust: ‘Israel and 
Germany are Siamese twins’ in which the former’s quest for financial assistance was 
exchanged for latter’s need for redemption for its sins. This profitable relationship, in 
Zuckerman’s view, led to a wholesale fetishist attitude towards the ‘Holocaust 
production’.  Most interesting, Zuckermann adopted the classic Marxist accusation 
that Jews were responsible for anti-Semitism, this time around towards their collective 
entity, the State of Israel. He blamed the ‘Zionist dialectics’ for the new wave of anti-
Semitism writing that ‘after Israel was created, Jews honestly earned every gram of 
hatred that they attract’ - as if six millions of them had not perished in the decade 
preceding the establishment of the Jewish state.441 
The al-Aqsa Intifada and the subsequent standstill inspired Zuckermann to 
elaborate on the ‘poisonous fruits’ of the Holocaust.  In an essay titled ‘The Shoah 
[Holocaust] on Trial’ Zuckermann revised his original theory, now claiming that the 
instrumentalization of the genocide’s memory created the ‘hatred of the Other’.  He 
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based the update on Walter Benjamin, an early member of the Frankfurt School, 
whose psychoanalytical insights influenced both Adorno and Horkheimer. In 
Zuckerman’s rendition, ‘hatred (like the will to see oneself as victim) feeds on the 
“image of the subjugated ancestor” as well as on one’s own subjugation; at the same 
time, however, it makes one blind to the combated opponent and enemy, leads to 
blind demonization and an unrealistic Manichaeization of a just struggle for 
emancipation’.442 
Applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict, these profound hidden dynamics took root 
after Israel normalized its relations with Germany leading to the diversion of the 
natural hatred Jews had allegedly harboured towards Germany to a different ‘Other’.    
Zuckermann quoted a participant in the March of the Living to prove his point: 
‘Somebody has to be blamed for the Holocaust; we have to hate somebody, but we 
have already made our reconciliation with the Germans’. To illustrate how casual 
such a transformation could be he added that ‘the easily performed transformation of 
the Nazi into a Pole, a Palestinian, or anybody else - indeed reveals the essentially 
vengeful and thus oppressive nature of the politically structured Israeli collective 
memory’.443 
Zuckermann explained that ‘the pupil expresses the need to hate because the 
Israeli collective memory never went through a real process of grieving; the collective 
recoils from remembering the Holocaust in terms of its having been the catastrophe of 
the victims’. Since the collective memory has not taught him to ‘work through a true 
process of mourning… hatred is a necessity for him’. Collectively, ‘this “hatred” turns 
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out to be instrumental for the achievement and satisfaction of heterogonous goals and 
purposes, at time even the rhetorical legitimization of policies and ideologies that are 
clearly bound to produce an ever growing oppression and to result in more and more 
victims’.444 This oppression was said to have transformed the land of Israel/Palestine 
into ‘a landscape praised by its occupiers for the sanctity of its lands - and saturated 
by its occupiers with the pollution of oppression, with endless human suffering as 
well as with the death of hopes of a home and of homeliness, safety, tranquillity and 
peace’.445 
With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict increasingly overshadowed by radical 
Islam and a new virulent form of anti-Semitism in Europe, Zuckermann was forced to 
change his approach again. Abandoning all academic pretences he took up the two 
subjects in a highly polemical German-language book Antisemit!. He strongly denied 
that Islam’s hostility to Israel had mutated into anti-Semitism noting that ‘anti-Semitic 
agitation in Arab media corresponds to anti-Arab racism in Israel’. Not satisfied with 
a simple equivalency, he suggested that the ‘inhumane popular voice’ of Israelis 
speaks larger than any anti-Arab propaganda. As for neo-anti-Semitism, in 
Zuckerman’s opinion this was a consequence of Israel’s ‘inhumane policy’ in the 
occupied territories and the attack on Gaza where the IDF committed ‘war crimes’. 
All in all, he felt confident that the new anti-Semitism was engineered by Israeli 
Zionists: ‘the claim of Zionism to overcome anti-Semitism (as an answer to it) made it 
necessary to preserve anti-Semitism in the world, as long as the project of Zionism 
does not come to a historical arrangement - according to central postulates of 
Zionism, has to continue until the majority of the Jews in the world, whether because 
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of life-historical pressures or as a result of free choice, do not live in the Zionist state 
of Israel, which was established for them’.446 
In yet another effort to defend Islamism, Zuckermann invoked classic Marxist 
materialism. He declared that Western tendency to criticize Islam, including the use of 
the terms Islamofascism, has complex psychological roots: ‘Islamophobia ideologizes 
those who are phobic about Islam… or if the already matured ideology requires 
phobia to ground its psychosocial anchoring in the public realm’. At the same time, 
‘the role attributed to both Islamist and non-Islamist protagonists in the Arab world is 
oriented solely towards their function in the pursuit of the geopolitical interests of 
American (or Western) capitalism.  Islam and its Islamist representatives then become 
a problem when finding themselves in an economic-political contradiction to the 
interests and demands of the US that have very little to do with religion per se or with 
its specific shapes’.447 
When discussing Germany, Zuckermann swapped quite inexplicably the 
Marxist generalization for a cultural explanation writing that Islamophobia was a 
mutated form of anti-Semitism.  There the Islamophobic ‘ideologeme is concocted - 
from the solidarity with Jews based on German historical responsibility, from the 
latent anti-Semitic projection of what is historically unresolved onto Islam, or from 
the rationalization of an already influential Islamophobia by means of a ‘solidarity 
with the Jews’ that can find an ideological consensus.  Indeed, Zuckermann went so 
far as to accuse Israel of ‘instrumentalizing’ Islamophobia in Germany and beyond. 
The Jewish state was also blamed for generating Islamist anti-Semitism in yet another 
way. Zuckermann suggested that if Palestinians ‘view settlers in the occupied 
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territories as the embodiment of everything Jewish and see the manifested repression 
as the essence of Jewishness, then their completely understandable anti-Zionism turns 
into anti-Semitism, thereby driving… hatred into excessive, ideologically solidified 
fantasies of annihilation’.448 
Like Ophir, Zuckermann was criticized or echoing the work of Guillaume and 
the La Vieille Taupe circle, with some accusing him of gross misrepresentation of 
Israeli political culture and flirting with Islamism.449 But there was virtually no effort 
to systematically scrutinize the methodology that underpinned his texts. Though 
Zuckermann claimed to follow the Frankfurt School, a closer analysis of The 
Holocaust in the Sealed Room and other writings reveals a version of classic 
reductionist tradition pioneered by the psychological anthropologist Geza Roheim. 
Akin to the psychoanalytical tradition in political science, the theory postulated that 
all mass phenomena could be conceptualized in terms of individual psychological 
processes. Rigorously applied, reductionism was expected to reveal the conscious and 
subconscious feelings of the collective. Yet critics such as Ernest Nagel and Michael 
Billing asserted that reductionist methodology - where the group and the individual 
were treated as isomorphic constructs – could lead to misinterpretation and abuse.  
Nagel, a leading philosopher of science, noted that such ‘hypostatic interpretations of 
what is denoted by collective terms have frequently been exercised in irresponsible 
intellectual construction’. Furthermore, ‘it is virtually impossible to assess their 
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validity since they are formulated far too unclearly to permit an unambiguous 
determination of what follows from them’.450 
Insomuch as Zuckermann borrowed from classic reductionism, his threshold 
for scientific rigor was even lower than the lenient standards of the discipline. For 
instance, Nagel warned about the difficulties of creating a causal model out of 
hypostatical relations since individual conditions such as ‘guilt’ ‘paranoia’ or 
‘neurosis’ could not be assumed to create a collective behaviour of ‘submission’ or 
‘aggression’. Ironically, Zuckermann admitted as much. Praising the Frankfurt 
School’s ability to demonstrate great affinity between ‘character formation’ and 
‘political formation’ he cautioned that ‘such an approach is less concerned with a 
linear casual connection between depth-psychological [sic] influence on politics, 
which are often difficult to recognize, and their sedimentation in the realm of 
ideology’.451 
Absolved from the need to prove causation between the ‘Holocaust-deformed’ 
Israeli character and perceived collective behaviour, Zuckermann was at liberty to 
relate the alleged Nazi-like treatment of the Palestinians to the historical trauma. The 
lack of a sound research protocol associated with reductionism made his other 
findings suspect as well. To recall, he claimed that Israelis displaced their hatred of 
Germans onto the Palestinians, but his evidence was limited to quoting two minor 
literary figures and an unverified teenage participant in the March of the Living. A 
similar lack of research standards marred Holocaust in the Sealed Room, which was 
based on quotes from editorials, articles and letters to the editor. As a rule, content 
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analysis requires a representative sample of a larger universe of relevant cases; 
Zuckermann did not bother to explain the criteria underlying his choices thus raising 
the possibility of tendentious selection. 
Zuckerman’s vague, imprecise language and polemical style detracted further 
from the credibility of his work. Nagel was particularly concerned that ‘irresponsible 
intellectual use’ of reductionist theories would result in a polemical style and inflamed 
slogans masquerading as academic research. Zuckerman’s determination that 
‘Islamofascism’ was a tool in the campaign to defame Islam - and one that Israel 
played a key role in producing - fits closely Nagel’s warning. Even a perfunctory 
bibliographical search would have shown that the 1979 revolution in Iran triggered a 
serious academic debate on the nature of the Islamist regime. The prestigious journal 
World Politics, for instance, published an article that found the Islamic revolution to 
share some core characteristics with ‘regressive’ fascist movements. Subsequent 
research linked Islamism with the phenomenon of generic fascism.452 
Zuckerman’s decision to forgo any comparative perspective undermined his 
work in other ways as well. As we have seen, Holocaust in the Sealed Room made 
much of the fact that, traumatized by the Holocaust, Israeli Jews took to comparing 
Saddam Hussein (who resorted to massive use of chemical weapons during the 1980-
88 Iran-Iraq war, including many attacks on civilians) to Hitler’s gassing of the Jews.  
In fact, similar comparisons were made by non-Jews and, on at least one occasion, by 
an American president. 
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Zuckerman’s treatment of work on Saddam’s psychology was arguably 
‘intellectually irresponsible’ in the way defined by Nagel. In order to demonstrate that 
the brutal Iraqi dictator was a figment of the Holocaust-scarred Israeli imagination, 
Zuckermann mocked the psychological studies of Saddam, calling them ‘pop-
psychology’ and ‘pseudo-psychology’. He found it especially amusing that some 
scholars pointed to the resemblance between Hitler’s Mein Kampf and Saddam’s Our 
Struggle, a programmatic book that was a required reading in Iraq. In reality, the 
noted psychiatrist Jerrold Post, founder of the CIA’s Psychological Profiling division 
and a leading expert on political leaders, who testified before Congress in the run-up 
to the 1991 Gulf War, took a very different position. He and other experts painted 
Saddam as a ruthless tyrant who emulated Hitler and Stalin and was given to high risk 
taking and miscalculations. In Post’s view, Saddam was not a ‘madman’ but a highly 
dangerous leader because of a mixture of ‘messianic ambitions, absence of 
consciousness, unrestrained aggression and a paranoid outlook’. Closer to home, 
Zuckermann should have been aware of similar psychological assessments by two 
respected Israeli experts on Iraq - Amatzia  Baram of the University of Haifa and Ofra 
Bengio of Tel Aviv University, Zuckerman’s home institution.453 But whatever their 
empirical findings, positivist scholars were unlikely to persuade Zuckerman. 
Nor were the facts ever allowed to stand in the way of Zuckerman’s fellow 
traveller - Moshe Zimmermann, Professor of German history at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem, who hasn’t shied away from persistent indictment of Israel, 
including the odious equation between Israelis and Nazis. 
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Unlike his Tel Aviv colleague, Zimmermann, did not use critical, neo-Marxist 
methodology to prove that the Holocaust deformed the collective Israeli Jewish 
mindset. Instead he opted for what could be defined as political polemics with an 
overlay of popular psychology. Yet even without the methodological pretences, 
Zimmermann’s work was remarkably similar to that of the critical scholars. His 2002 
Germany’s Past, Israel’s Memory showcased all the critical themes, including a 
chapter that paid the de rigueur homage to Elkana. He related Israel’s aggressive 
foreign policy to the instrumentalization of the Holocaust memory and the ‘credit’ it 
received from an international community (supposedly) overcome with guilt and 
remorse for allowing the catastrophe to occur. In Zimmerman’s words, it ‘was passive 
during the Holocaust and active in 1948’.454 
Much in the same popular psychology style Zimmermann castigated the 
‘March of the Living’ and visits to Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Museum in Jerusalem. 
Strongly implying that such excursions served as an incubator of nationalism, 
chauvinism and other alleged pathologies he repeated Elkana’s plea for ‘forgetting’.    
Still, he was less than optimistic since the instrumentalization of the Holocaust 
depended on a multipronged effort of memorialization. According to Zimmermann, in 
the early days of the state there was little public commemoration or indeed, a certain 
neglect bordering on indifference, and it was the Eichmann trial that unleashed the 
pervasive memory manipulation. Much like Elkana, he considered the Holocaust 
memory to be a curse that propelled Israel towards an oppressive, fascist state. 
Evidently encouraged with the foray into popular psychology, Zimmermann 
decided to diagnose additional problems of the collective Jewish-Israeli psyche. One 
of his new topics was a dig at the ‘muscle Jewry’ - creation of the Zionists - as 
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opposed to the ‘nervous Jewry’ of the Diaspora. But it was Zimmermann’s diagnosis 
of ‘Israel’s prenatal memory’ that took the popular psychology genre to a new 
frontier.   In a take on the ‘original sin’ theory, he postulated that the birth of Israel 
was affected by the ‘prenatal anxiety’ stemming from the Holocaust.455 
Popular psychology was only one of the tools Zimmermann applied to 
analysing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Another was projecting his own beliefs on 
groups such as the German Jews who arrived - like his parents - in Palestine during 
the 1930s. Without producing any empirical evidence he claimed that the majority of 
German Jews were averse to ‘Zionist politics fixed upon the conflict with Arabs’. 
Since it was impossible to ascertain how many German Jews were Buberites, the 
tactic served to provide a broader legitimacy to Zimmerman’s own views.456 
With a growing inventory of alleged psychological abnormalities it was only a 
matter of time before Zimmermann produced a book-length study on the alleged root-
cause of Israel’s supposed reluctance to make peace with the Palestinians. According 
to his diagnosis, the Israelis harboured a deep fear of peace brought about by the 
Holocaust experience that, for political reasons, was manipulated by the government, 
the media and right-wing groups.  Zimmermann’s theory was simple: these and other 
elements spread the fear of another Holocaust because they were either fearful or 
sought to exploit the potential of fear to induce anxiety and strife. This artificially 
fomented fear was said to be directed against Arabs and Palestinians, the ultimate 
‘other’.  Consequently, after decades of manipulation, Israeli Jews have developed a 
fear of peace. 
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To support this theory Zimmermann offered the following observations: The 
fear of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust was turned into the foundation of a system of 
socialization that turned it into a political guideline and a psychological state 
permeating the entire society. Seventy five per cent of Jewish voters who cast their 
votes for the dominant right-wing parties in 2009 were clearly an indication of the 
success of the socialization system; these parties grew strong because of the 
perception of a perpetual victim and advocated a pre-emptive war in order to avoid 
‘another Holocaust’. These and other elements of the Israeli society made it hard to 
conduct meaningful peace negotiations because of fear of being perceived as 
‘suckers’. Finally, these groups keep Israel’s foreign supporters at bay by spreading 
fears and insecurity which in turn makes the latter hostage to their alarmist visions 
and insecurities to prevent movement towards peace.457 
Zimmermann extended his diagnosis of the alleged Holocaust pathology to 
what was described as a special kind of Israeli arrogance - as sort of ‘we can do 
anything’ attitude. The Holocaust ‘dispensation’ affected all facets of Israeli policy 
but was most pervasive, in his view, in the mistreatment of the Palestinians. This 
alleged fact led to new wave of anti-Semitism that, ironically, triggered fresh 
existential fears. All in all, this anxiety was said to create a deep-seated paranoia in 
the population, keeping the society psychologically isolated and immersed in self-
righteousness - an ominous combination made more combustible because of the 
nuclear arsenal.  Zimmermann found it particularly alarming that Israel turned Iran 
into a ‘surrogate demon and a new evil state’.458 
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After years of writing about the alleged propensity of the Israeli Jews to 
exaggerate the danger of anti-Semitism, Zimmermann was taken aback by ‘What 
Must be Said’ - a recent poem by Gunter Grass widely considered to be anti-Semitic. 
He reiterated that ‘Israel likes to seal itself off, reducing itself to the idea that it is 
surrounded by enemies. The government’s doctrine is that Israel must defend itself 
against its enemies. There has to be a “Zionist response’ to the ‘anti-Semites”. This is 
an Israeli reflex’. But he was forced to acknowledge that Grass’s writings took anti-
Semitic overtones since the writer held Israel rather than Iran responsible for a 
possible nuclear catastrophe. Still, rather than chastising Grass, Zimmermann chose to 
lament that the writer helped the Israeli right-wing, not least by providing a 
confirmation that ‘the whole world is against us’. Zimmermann’s own reluctance to 
help the ‘right-wing’ generated a tortured answer to whether Grass is now an anti-
Semite: ‘This is a complex issue that requires even more complex answers. Of course, 
Grass is not a rabid anti-Semite who wants to expel or murder Jews. But anti-
Semitism is much more complex than that.  And Grass uses images and myths that are 
tinged with anti-Semitism’.459 
Zimmerman’s work was enthusiastically reviewed by German analysts from 
the radical left and pro-Palestinian circles. The German-language Fear of Peace, in 
particular, was celebrated by those who, in the words of one commentator, uncovered 
the pathology of Israel’s political culture that ‘if you believe in the statements of 
many of its politicians and intellectuals - even willing to use these terrible of all 
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weapons [nuclear weapons] without hesitation – one dare not imagine what this would 
mean for the Middle East’.460 
Some Israeli analysts, however, criticized Zimmermann’s methodology, 
finding it hand-tailored to produce polemics expressing a personal point of view. 
Projecting a post-Zionist view on a historical group - as noted above - was a favourite 
technique, according to one critic. A much more troubling product of Zimmermann’s 
and – and to the same extent, Zuckerman’s - methodology was to legitimize the link 
between the Holocaust and the Nakba. In a strongly worded article, Seth Frantzman 
argued that German history professors bore special blame because they ‘should have 
known better’ that the Holocaust was a unique event, in no way comparable to the 
Nakba.  He also charged the German history departments in Israel for ‘mission creep’ 
-  that is allowing their faculty tasked with studying German history - to write about 
the alleged impact of the Holocaust on the Israeli psyche. His conclusion was that 
such abuse of academic freedom has greatly contributed to the process of perverting 
Israeli intellectual thought by comparing of Zionism and Nazi Germany.461 
The Holocaust as ‘Zionist Capital’  
Idith Zertal was a relative newcomer to the ‘opprobrium community’ but, in 
most respects, she was a perfect fit. A former journalist and cultural essayist, Zertal 
was the editor of Zmanim, a historical journal she co-founded with Yossi Sarid, one 
time leader of the left-wing Meretz party where she held a position of influence. A 
bitter critic of Israeli policies in the territories, she was involved in numerous pro-
Palestinian activities. 
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Zertal made her academic debut in a work on the history of the Mossad 
Lealiya Bet, an organization founded in 1939 to facilitate ‘illegal’ Jewish immigration 
to mandatory Palestine, known as haapala.  A precursor of the modern-day Mossad, 
the secret group worked in conjunction with the Jewish Agency and Palyam, the 
maritime unit of Palmah, the Special Brigades of the Hagana. Between 1945 and 1948 
over 100,000 Jews, mostly Holocaust survivors in Displaced Persons (DP) camps in 
Germany, attempted to enter Palestine. Unwilling to relax its strict immigration 
quotas for fear of Arab response, Britain intercepted the majority of the ships and sent 
their passengers to detention camps in Cyprus and as far as Mauritania. In what 
became one of the most dramatic and symbolic events of the haapala, in 1947 the 
British boarded the ship Exodus and forcibly removed the passengers who were sent 
back to Germany. The Exodus affair attracted worldwide attention and embarrassed 
the British government; the famous American journalist I.F Stone travelling with the 
refugees helped to publicize their plight in his highly acclaimed book, Underground 
to Palestine.462 
In taking up the subject of Holocaust survivors in Israel Zertal was hardly a 
research pioneer. By the end of the 1980s, a burgeoning literature on the subject 
included a number of doctoral dissertations, scholarly publications and even popular 
books.  A subset of the field dealing with haapala threw light on the complexities of 
gathering the DPs and smuggling them on board of ships destined for Palestine. The 
historian Aviva Halamish, an expert on the period, credited the Yishuv for reasonably 
good work under the extreme circumstances of post-war Europe; she acknowledged, 
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however, that in the general chaos the old, the very young and pregnant women were 
allowed to make the hazardous journey.463 
Tom Segev, the revisionist journalist and New Historian, touched upon the 
subject in his numerous writings. It was his controversial The Seventh Million: The 
Israelis and the Holocaust however, that raised doubts about the benevolence of the 
Yishuv towards the survivors. In a chapter evocatively titles ‘A Barrier of Blood and 
Silence’ he suggested that the Jews of mandatory Palestine were ambivalent at best 
and repulsed at worst by the new arrivals: ‘People sincerely feared meeting the 
survivors face to face, with their physical and psychological handicaps, their suffering 
and terror. How we will live with them, they asked themselves over and over again - 
and their fears were justified’. When describing the children-survivors and their 
Israeli caregivers, Segev went even further: ‘an all-out battle war between the old and 
the new, a mythic battle between the sons of light and the sons of darkness’.464 
Zertal’s initial take on haapala was hardly controversial. In a 1989 article she 
referred to the survivors as ‘disappeared souls’ and wandered why, despite their 
importance in the haapala saga, not to mention their demographic mass, they 
disappeared from the public and political map. Along the way Zertal acknowledged 
that Ben-Gurion was received with huge enthusiasm during his visit to the DP camps; 
more to the point, opinion polls carried out by non-Zionist sources indicated that the 
vast majority of the refugees wanted to immigrate to Israel.465 
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But shortly afterwards, during a 1990 conference organized by Halamish on 
the subject of the haapala, Zertal changed her stand. Abandoning the question of why 
the survivors disappeared from public consciousness, she postulated that the Zionists 
used the Holocaust in general and the survivors in particular for political purposes.   
That the Holocaust helped to create the Jewish state was, of course, not a new idea; 
but Zertal upped the ante by accusing Ben-Gurion and his colleagues for turning the 
survivors into political cannon fodder. As she saw it, there were two basic approaches 
to dealing with Jewish people: ‘the work of the future’ (avodat haatid) and the work 
of the present (avodat hahove).  The former was defined as a future-oriented Zionist 
project where individuals were secondary to the ultimate, messianic goal of creating 
the state and redeeming the Jewish collective. The latter was said to focus on the 
Jewish people with a view to catering to their needs in the present regardless of how 
such a focus would affect nation-building.  To her mind, by adopting the ‘work of the 
future’ the Zionists sacrificed the real necessities of the Jews, including the Holocaust 
refugees brought to Palestine. In the manner of critical scholars, Zertal summed up 
her research by declaring that there was no ‘one truth’ in narrating history expressing 
the hope that her narrative would gain wide acceptance.466 
Indeed, her 1996 book Zehavam shel Hayehudim: Hahagira Hayehudit 
Hamahtartit Leerets Israel, 1945-1948 (The Gold of the Jews: The Clandestine 
Jewish Immigration to Palestine, 1945-1948) was a match to Segev’s book. Thanking 
Moshe Zuckermann for inspiration, she emphasized her commitment to critical 
scholarship: ‘the new perspective is the result not only of new evidence but also of 
new historiographical concept and issues central to the historian’s time and place. 
Such new perspective… may provide a more subtle and sophisticated decoding of 
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those events and offer new insights’. Given Zertal’s intensive political involvement, 
there was little doubt that the issue central to her concern was the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The reference to ‘sophisticated decoding’ was a way of signalling the alleged 
superiority of critical scholarship over positivist history while allowing a liberal 
approach to empirical material in the manner of New Historians.467 
Zertal deconstructed the ‘official Zionist narrative’ of the ‘illegal immigration’ 
by advancing two interrelated claims. The first posited that Ben-Gurion and other 
Zionist leaders cynically unscrupulously used the Holocaust survivors to create a 
Jewish state. She explained that the ‘Israeli Zionist collective’ benefited from the 
‘immense political power precisely from the “collapse of the earth”, from the ultimate 
Jewish catastrophe’. Noting that Ben-Gurion was particularly cold and calculating, 
she described him as ‘the theorist and expert practitioner of transforming Jewish 
agony into Zionist power’ eager to turn Holocaust survivors into ‘the object he needed 
for the complete realization of his concept of “exploiting the Jewish tragedy”’.468    
       The Mossad officials received equally bad reviews. Yehuda Arazi was described 
as ‘an adventurer, a lover of life, and a hedonist’ who used illegal arm shipments to 
smuggle ‘high-quality chocolate, and sausages, and expensive bottles of liquor’. Of 
Shaul Meirov, Zertal wrote that he ‘lacked uniqueness and charisma’ as well as 
operational experience but got ahead due to his belonging to ‘every primary 
sociological grouping in the Palestinian Zionist community’. Hinting that he was an 
elitist phony with no compassion or interest in the welfare of the survivors, she 
blamed him for reckless endangerment of refugees going back to the 1940 sinking of 
the refugee ship Patria where more than 260 perished.  All in all, the haapala leaders 
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were said to be driven by a strong desire to pursue ‘consciousness mobilizing’ 
through spectacular public relations stunts like the Exodus.469 
In Zertal’s view, both the ideological imperatives and personal psychology 
combined to create an atmosphere where the wishes of the survivors were routinely 
ignored. To prove the point, the book detailed the alleged strong-armed tactics used 
by the organizers to get the refugees onto the boats.  Accordingly, in many cases, peer 
pressure was applied on those reluctant to immigrate to Palestine; on the boats, 
survivors were allegedly manipulated into acts of resistance and mass hunger strikes 
that took a toll on a highly vulnerable population. Zertal concluded that there was 
little sympathy for those who were killed and wounded in the process of defying the 
British. She described as ‘pompous’ the eulogy offered by Yigal Allon, the Palmah 
commander: ‘Our pain at their death, and at their absence from our camp, is great, but 
in the end we are saving ourselves additional sacrifices and directly helping to save 
many who could expect destruction’.  She stated, ‘In fact, the Yishuv suffered no pain 
at all’ as most of the ‘refugees remained anonymous’.470 
If anything, Zertal’s second claim was even harsher, painting the Zionist 
leaders as horrified and repulsed by the Holocaust remnants. To reach this conclusion 
she borrowed from Sigmund Freud’s article on deep-seated alienation capable of 
transforming a phenomenon that is heimlich, meaning ‘the intimate, the close, the 
well and long known’ into unheimliche, denoting ‘the uncanny, the foreign, the 
threatening, the mysterious’. In her view, though the Zionist discourse on the refugees 
was  ‘suffused with the rhetoric of pity’ it was  also patronizing  and stigmatizing - 
‘the other side of the deep terror aroused in the Zionist subject by this familiar 
stranger, this close yet distant diasporic arriving in the homeland’. She quoted a 
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number of haapala operatives who complained about the poor ‘human material’ or 
stating that ‘the refugee element is very bad’.471 
But the crux of Zertal’s theory rested on what was described as two 
‘canonical’ texts, ‘My Sister on the Beach’ authored by Yitzhak Sadeh, the famed 
Palmah commander, and ‘Michael's Page’ by the leading poet Nathan Alterman.   
Without explaining why the texts should be considered ‘canonical’ she decided to 
treat them as ‘historical documents’ - rather than the more customary ‘literary 
representation of the historical’. To confuse matters further, Zertal declared that ‘my 
reading of these texts is “suspicious”… assuming that every text contains traces of 
something that the author is unconscious… traces of what he does not want to be 
uttered or is not utterable’.472 
In Sadeh’s poetic exhortation addressed to a refugee ‘sister’ carried to the 
shore by Palmah members, Zertal found a stark juxtaposition between the ‘beaten, 
filthy and weeping’ survivor of a concentration camp brothel for Nazi officers and the 
healthy, strong and courageous native sons. Such contrast, in her view, was a double 
insult to the girl - an example of the Zionist patronizing of the weak and defenceless 
Diaspora Jews as well a male-chauvinistic treatment of women. By branding her ‘For 
Officers Only’ Sadeh violated the girl once again, ‘for all the agonies she has already 
known. The additional blow is the gaze directed at the girl - interrogative, selective, 
all-knowingly hegemonic stigmatizing and invasive - a look that marks her and 
transforms her into an appropriated object whose innermost privacy is desecrated’. 
Zertal has little doubt that, subconsciously, Sadeh was ‘in line with the popular local 
parlance… that the girl survived the Holocaust… because she did not defend the 
integrity and the purity of her body, because her (Jewish) body served (Nazi) 
                                                          
471
  Ibid, pp. 262-63, 271-72. 
472
 Ibid, pp. 217, 263-64.    
273 
 
officers’. Since her body was ‘defiled’ by serving as her ticket to life, she was a loser 
twice: ‘She is defeated in every way, damned by the Law of the Land of Israel and 
tainted by the masculine law of Yitzhak Sadeh, the emblematic creator of the new 
Israeli manliness’.473 
Deplorable as Zertal found Sadeh’s treatment of Diaspora representatives, she 
considered Alterman’s take on the unheimlich positively egregious. Like Sadeh, 
Alterman conjured up a night time embarkation of refugees on a beach, but in this 
case Zertal did not detect even the ‘rhetoric of pity’.  In Alterman’s words the rescuers 
sensed the ‘fear in their [survivors] breath, and the moaning of their tortured and 
outcast bodies:  But also their hands closing on our throats’. With the survivors 
multiplying in the land, they ‘will wander among the masses…in a war of two… 
unseen and unbridled, will crawl like a thread… to resolve whether its millstone will 
grind the grain or the grain grind the millstones’. 
Zertal, who considered Alterman Ben-Gurion’s poetic alter ego, suggested that 
the poem reflected an existential anxiety of the Zionists - the bearers of the Diaspora 
burden - and the ‘ravaged and defeated remnants’. She noted that in the Alterman text 
there was no body-to-body touch between the two groups on the beach, ‘not an instant 
of eye contact between the bearer and the burden’. ‘If in Sadeh’s text the gaze is 
imbued with ideology and culture’, she wrote, ‘here there is no gaze at all, no 
recognition’.  Reading further into the alleged chasm between the two cultures posited 
by Alterman, Zertal noted the ‘the fatal distance… cannot be bridged unless Zionist 
hegemony is imposed… only the Diaspora must fundamentally and unilaterally 
change and cease to be what it is, and in this way fulfil its function in the Zionist 
scenario’. 
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At the same time, Zertal found the poem to represent the ‘unexpected, 
mysterious, ostensibly paradoxical anxiety’ that amounted to the Zionist 
unconsciousness, ‘a life-and-death war between the bearers and the burden, the grain 
and the millstone, two mutually exclusive entities that cannot dwell together’.   
Moreover, while an unexpected public relations bonanza and a ‘vital but terrifying act 
in the great project of establishing a state out of destruction’ the refugees were met 
with a strong ambivalence: ‘Yet this is not a welcome of unconditional love, an act of 
inclusion stemming from real compassion, but rather an “unseen and unbridled” war, 
an encounter of life charged with potential death’. Reading even deeper into 
Alterman, Zertal imputed yet another layer of meaning: ‘Another saying is insinuated 
into the verse, one that undermines the accepted power equation…between the bearers 
and the burden. The ostensibly omnipotent Israeli might be broken and destroyed by 
the presence of the previously negated and repressed Diaspora’.474 
By ending the book with the poetic texts Zertal hoped to strengthen her 
otherwise historical account of the alleged objectification and exploitation of the 
Holocaust refugees. Stretching the argument further, she was able to condemn the 
entire ‘Zionist project’ for its willingness to ‘obliterate that ‘other’ by ignoring it.   
Worse still, Zertal charged Ben-Gurion and his colleagues of refusing to ‘see’ the 
Final Solution by not harnessing ‘all its resources for a great, uncalculated, even if 
largely hopeless rescue campaign’.  She explained that the failure to come to the aid 
of the European Jews stemmed from the overriding Zionist goal to prevent ‘the vision 
of a Jewish state’ from shattering ‘under the overwhelming weight of horror and 
mourning’. In this complex Zionist script, Zertal argued, the victims had to be 
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simultaneously sanctified and tarnished ‘in order to realize the ultimate, complete 
Zionist redemption - the Jewish state’.475 
Well-written and clearly articulated, Zertal’s work attracted considerable 
public attention, both positive and negative. While post-Zionist scholars and Arab 
sources produced rave reviews, critics accused the author of selective use of facts and 
fabricating a narrative that fitted her political agenda. Uri Goren, a captain on one of 
the haapala vessels, wrote a letter to Zertal to protest the depiction of the Aliya Bet 
operatives as cynical manipulators of the Holocaust survivors. The former Palyam 
member was most emphatic that those boarding the ships, including the Exodus, were 
highly eager to immigrate to Palestine. In his own book, On Both Sides of the Crypto, 
Goren related how overwhelmed his colleagues were by the enormous tragedy that 
had befallen their charges and how hard they tried to help them. Goren urged Zertal to 
interview the survivors, only to elicit her comment that ‘historical research is not a 
copy of what people recalled. Decent historical analysis involved critical analysis, 
sometimes painful analysis of texts and documents of the related period’.476 
But Zertal’s virtually exclusive reliance on the official documents of the 
Mossad for Aliya Bet raised a serious methodological question of how she could 
determine that the survivors were reluctant immigrants at best, and coerced onto the 
boats, at worst. If Zertal felt that people could not be trusted to recall events from their 
past - a questionable proposition in social science research - she could have used a 
large body of contemporaneous evidence such as flyers, bulletins and newspapers 
published in the camps, articles in the Jewish press and other documents. 
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Zeev Mankowitz, a doctoral student at the Hebrew University did extensive 
research on the attitudes of survivors in DP camps in the American sector in 
Germany. His dissertation ‘The Politic and Ideology of Survivors of the Holocaust in 
the American Zone of Occupied Germany 1945-1946’ was defended in July 1987, 
years before Zertal commenced her project. Mankowitz claimed that, as a rule, the 
DPs were highly motivated to reach Palestine, a fact confirmed in the polls quoted in 
her own 1989 article ‘The Disappeared Souls’. As Dan Michman, a professor of 
Holocaust studies at the Bar-Ilan University, noted, Zertal managed to give credibility 
to her theory by careful cherry-picking of evidence.477 
Zertal’s methodology behind the ‘canonic texts’ was also questioned. The 
Holocaust historian Dalia Ofer denounced the use of the poems as historical texts 
noting that ‘by making a very imprudent literary use, she derived a far-fetched 
philosophical conceptual point on the relations between the Yishuv and the 
immigrants’. Ofer suggested that positivist scholarship would not allow for such an 
overreaching generalization but using the critical approach Zertal disregarded facts 
and bent research rules to fit her theory of subjection and manipulation.478 
Such criticism notwithstanding, by the early 2000s Zertal had embraced the 
more radical brand of critical Holocaust scholarship pioneered by Ophir and 
Zuckerman.  She offered a preview of her new approach in a 2000 article titled ‘From 
the People’s Hall to the Wailing Wall: A Study in Memory, Fear and War’ was a nod 
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to Ophir’s theory of Holocaust worship. After paying the customary lengthy homage 
to Elkana, Zertal offered the stock lament that ‘it appears that in this age the affliction 
with memorization and obsession with rituals of commemoration is actually an 
immense concerted assault on our very ability just to remember the past’.479 
Her 2002 book, The Nation and Death, (Hauma Vehamvet), offered a lengthy 
exposition of this theme starting with the Ophir-like assertion that Auschwitz was 
used to create a national martyrology of the ‘sanctified and sacrificed’. Before the 
Holocaust could be made into a focal power of national worship, she argued, it had to 
be ‘Zionized’, a term describing the alleged highjacking of key Holocaust events to fit 
the national-Israeli narrative. To prove her point, Zertal contended that the Warsaw 
ghetto uprising was incorporated ‘into the chain of Israel’s heroic battles for its 
homeland and the “Zionist” wars’; to this end, the ‘expunging of its incompatible, 
non-Zionist components’ had to be carried out.480 
Marek Edelman, the uprising’s deputy commander, was a prime example of 
the alleged Zionist ‘expunging’ of the national narrative. Describing Edelman’s 
exclusion as the ‘most striking case of silencing and obscuring’ Zertal noted that the 
former Bund member and ‘subsequently a Polish socialist’ refused to view ‘the 
establishment of the State of Israel as the belated “meaning” of the Holocaust’. She 
added that Edelman was not a Zionist and even after the war viewed Poland as his 
homeland ‘because it was the place where his friends had died and his people been 
felled’. In her view, though Edelman conducted himself well in the uprising he 
protested at the collective suicide of the uprising commander, Mordechai Anielewitcz, 
and his fellow fighters in the command bunker on Mila 18, making him a persona-
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non-grata in the Zionist pantheon of heroes - where Anielewitcz occupied pride of a 
place.  Indeed, to Zertal Edelman was the antithesis to the ‘Zionist ‘theory of death’, 
not least because of his subsequent metamorphosis into ‘a renowned cardiologist, a 
lifesaving humanist, capable of transforming inevitable death… into a tolerable 
event’.481 
In yet another nod to Ophir, Zertal decried the worship of the Holocaust as a 
‘memorial without memory’. Quoting Lyotard she emphasized the ontological 
impossibility of conveying what the victims of a catastrophe went through. At the 
same time she lambasted Israel for failing to ‘give voice to those who could not speak 
for themselves’ and, more to the point, for turning their suffering into an ‘ultimate 
card’ in dealing with the international community. In a version of Zuckerman’s ‘credit 
card’ theory Zertal declared that, by assuming the mantle of the ‘sanctified’, Israel 
demanded immunity from criticism of its foreign policy in general and in handling the 
Palestinians in particular.482 
In what was perceived to be an even more egregious use of the ‘sanctified and 
sacrificed’ Israel was said to turn the evil that had befallen the Holocaust victims into 
a legal formula, Zertal’s depiction of the 1950 Nazis and Nazi collaborators Law. 
Invoking Arendt, she argued that ‘the verbal translocation of Nazi crimes from their 
historical setting to a symbolic site (Israel), their very reproduction and duplication in 
the act of speech, in themselves already depreciated them, even if unintentionally, and 
marked the start of a long process of banalization’. To prove how banal the process 
had become, Zertal analysed a number of trials of Jewish capos and orderlies accused 
of brutalizing their fellow inmates.483 
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But for Zertal, as for Arendt, the Eichmann trial was the real pinnacle of the 
process of banalization. Having previously accused Ben-Gurion of detachment from 
and silence about the Holocaust, Zertal claimed that the Israeli leader used Eichmann 
to engineer ‘grand national pedagogy’. In her words, ‘Ben-Gurion’s nationalism 
needed now to forge new memories according to its own specific profile and goals’, 
most notably ‘the Holocaust, along with its victims…was a metaphor, a terrible 
sublime lesson to Israeli youth and the world that Jewish blood would never be 
abandoned, or defenceless again’. She went on to explain that Ben-Gurion seized 
upon the metaphor to equate the Arabs with the Nazis and, moreover, to develop ‘the 
ultimate weapon - an Israeli nuclear bomb’. Ben-Gurion’s ‘pedagogical moment’ 
worked through ‘transference of the Holocaust situation on to the Middle East reality’ 
creating a ‘false sense of the imminent danger... and utterly demonizing the Arabs and 
their leaders’ on top of distorting the image of the Holocaust and ‘trivializing the 
unique agony of the victims and the survivors’.484 
By linking the Holocaust to Israel’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons, Zertal 
echoed Zuckerman’s theme of existential anxiety in the Holocaust in the Sealed 
Room. She used the 1967 Six Day War to make the same point, referring to a 
prominent Israeli journalist whose article ‘From the Rhine to Erez’ found some 
disturbing parallel between the response of the international community to Hitler and 
Nasser.  Zertal quoted other articles that conveyed the same theme: ‘The West’s stand 
of non-intervention raised the spectre of Munich and enhanced a sense of another 
betrayal by the world’.  While stating that it was not her ‘intention to propose here a 
new version of the events which lead to the outbreak of war’ she felt that the ‘totemic’ 
narrative of the Six Day War needed to be ‘demystified’ through critical scholarship:  
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‘The narrative of the averted catastrophe or the redemption of the ancient land created 
by the June 1967 war is now confronted by critical versions of the question of the 
inevitability of the war’. According to her critical version, the danger of the Arab 
armies was greatly exaggerated and, more to the point, Israel played ‘the active part’ 
in most ‘events that preceded the war’. In other words, Israel was the instigator rather 
than the victim of Arab aggression; still, the Holocaust-driven existential anxiety 
made the official Zionist narrative easy to propagate.485 
In her quest for the alleged government’s machinations behind the atmosphere 
of public foreboding in the weeks preceding the war Zertal spent a few pages 
discussing the ‘organized authentic anxiety’ - a juxtaposition of antonyms typical of 
critical scholarships designed to leave the reader confused whether the anxiety was 
authentic or manufactured. Using juxtaposed antonymous was only one of the many 
tactics she employed to undermine the ‘Zionist narrative’. Another one was 
misrepresenting facts as the case of Edelman illustrated. 
The value of Edelman as the perfect anti-Zionist hero was well-appreciated by 
the tight network of pro-Palestinian activists even before the 1982 Lebanon war, 
which, as noted, jumpstarted political activism among the professoriate. In 1976 the 
Polish journalist Hanna Krall published a book based on interviews with Edelman 
titled Zdazyc Przed Panem Bogiem (Getting Ahead before God).  In 1980, Daniel 
Bar-Tal, a lecturer at the School of Education at Tel Aviv University and a pro-
Palestinian activist, travelled to Poland to obtain the publishing rights for the book; 
the Hebrew edition was brought out under the name To Race God (Lehakdim et 
Elohim) by Muli Melzer, a radical-leftist activist and owner of Adam Press.486 
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While Zertal mentioned Edelman’s membership in the anti-Zionist Bund, she 
failed to note that after escaping from the ghetto he joined the People’s Army (Armia 
Ludowa - AL), a small communist underground group created by Moscow as a 
counter to the Home Army (Armia Krajowa - AK), the military arm of the legitimate 
Polish government in exile in London. While Edelman might have been a 
‘humanitarian’, as Zertal asserted, his rejection of Israel was very much in line with 
the official position of the Polish Communist Party which, not incidentally, 
suppressed public commemorations of the Holocaust.487 In the 1970s Edelman had 
veered towards the budding Solidarity movement but his views on Israel had not 
changed. He claimed that the Jewish state was not a viable entity in the Middle East 
and accused Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir of murdering Arabs. Edelman 
called Ben-Gurion ‘a little Jew from a poor town unworthy of being considered a 
statesman’.  In 2002 Edelman made news by comparing the plight of the Palestinians 
to that of the ghetto partisans and entertained a PLO delegation in his home in Lodz. 
Holocaust scholar Israel Gutman, himself a survivor of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising 
and the Auschwitz extermination camp, commented that Edelman ‘was filled with 
hate for Israel for years... [The Bund was] so hostile to Zionism and stood out with 
their provocations against anything Jewish - opening soup kitchens even on Yom 
Kippur’.488 
There is little doubt that Zertal, who worked under Gutman at the Institute for 
Holocaust Research at Yad Vashem, knew about Edelman’s real record. But 
presenting him as a former communist party apparatchik would have tarnished the 
portrait of the noble hero shut out of the official ‘Zionist narrative’. Zertal’s fidelity to 
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a political cause trumped the positivist requirement to provide a full historical account 
- a habit she picked up from the post-Zionist pioneers. Like them, she was also adept 
at changing the narrative to suit a particular ideological point as the ‘Disappeared 
Souls’ article clearly indicated. 
All in all, producing a counter-narrative that promoted a political agenda was 
an overriding imperative for post-Zionist scholars who defined their mission in 
Gramscian terms. As the next chapter will illustrate, these narratives served as 
foundational texts for an array of political efforts that followed closely Matzpen’s 




Chapter 7  Post-Zionist Scholarship in the Service of 
Political Activism 
As shown by the preceding chapters, the anti-Zionist themes that Matzpen 
distilled from Brit Shalom, the Canaanites and the Communists in the early 1960s 
hovered in the margins of the public discourse for more than a quarter of a century. 
Post-Zionist scholars – whether former Matzpen members or those espousing a 
similar vision - mainstreamed these ideas by giving them academic legitimacy, a 
considerable advantage in a culture that held universities in high esteem. In less than a 
decade this cohesive and determined epistemic community, rebranded as post-
Zionists, achieved a remarkable academic and public prominence. 
To the Israeli followers of Antonio Gramsci, scholarship and activism were 
part of a seamless endeavour to change social reality. Yehouda Shenhav addressed 
this issue in an essay titled ‘Treason of the Intellectuals? Israeli Sociologists and the 
Colonial Occupation in the Palestinian Territories’. Ostensibly, his point of departure 
was Julien Benda, who famously accused (in 1927) the intellectuals of betraying their 
role by fomenting nationalistic hatred during the early decades of the twentieth 
century, urging them to adopt more objectivity and circumspection in the public 
discourse.489  Shenhav, however, argued that, with Palestinian land under occupation, 
objectivity and silence - as practiced by his fellow intellectuals hiding behind the pale 
banner of political ‘neutrality’ - was the real act of treasonous behaviour. While 
making a nod to Weber who urged scholars to ‘protect sociology from the tyranny of 
politics’ Shenhav wanted ‘to protect politics from neutrality of sociology’. To this end 
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he called upon sociologists to become public intellectuals, namely to embrace 
‘intellectualism which suspends the dogma of academic neutrality’.490 
Ishai Menuhin of the Department of Social Work at Ben-Gurion University 
spoke of many of his activist colleagues when emphasizing the need for ‘ideological 
commitment’ of academics. Echoing Gramsci he stressed the synergy of knowledge, 
academic status and social responsibly in driving social change.  With ‘speaking out’ 
established as the pinnacle of personal and professional morality, ‘silence’ was 
declared to be an immoral behaviour. For example, Shenhav lamented that only a 
small percentage of sociologists were involved in research on the ‘occupation’, which 
had never been adopted as a paradigm in the social sciences. The activist psychologist 
Dan Bar-On from Ben-Gurion University likewise lambasted his peers for ‘silence’ 
and lamented the absence of Post-Zionist Israeli Psychology, adding that ‘there were 
few signs of critical Israeli political or social psychology’.491 
The call to speak ‘truth to power’ was, of course, not new.  As early as 1961, 
Hebrew University professors organized a petition against Ben-Gurion accusing him 
of political corruption.  A few months after the 1967 war a large group of faculty 
signed a letter warning the government of the dangers of occupation. Yet for their 
bitterness, the above exchanges were located within the spectrum of the Zionist 
discourse.492 By contrast, the post-Zionist faculty took up the Matzpen mandate of 
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changing the collective belief of the Israeli society. Anat Biletzki, a philosopher at the 
Tel Aviv University and a lifelong member of the communist party, described this as 
a two-staged process: first, highly activist academics and progressive intellectuals 
would create a ‘bubble’ of radical ideas that challenged the national consensus.  
Second, these radical notions would penetrate the societal discourse and alter long 
held perceptions.493 
For the bubble concept to work, however, deeds were as important as words, a 
‘winning combination’ that Uri Davis, a veteran Matzpen activist and conscientious 
objector (later, an honorary research fellow at IMEIS University of Durham and IAIS 
University of Exeter), was eager to exploit. As a member of the tiny Israeli 
Association of Conscientious Objectors and subsequently as deputy head of the 
League for Civil and Human Rights - founded by the Hebrew University professor 
Israel Shahak - Davis developed a plan to harness draft refusal and other acts of civil 
resistance against the ‘Zionist project’ in general and the occupation of the territories 
in particular. Teaming up with Elmer Berger, a leader in the anti-Zionist American 
Council for Judaism who founded the American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism 
(AJAZ) in 1968, Davis established an outreach in the United States. In 1983 AJAZ, 
working with the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racism and Racial Discrimination (EAFAD), hosted a conference on ‘Israel's Zionist 
Society: Consequences for Internal Opposition and the Necessity for External 
Intervention’   where Davis, who gave the keynote address, urged participants to 
broaden draft resistance as a way of delegitimizing the military component of the 
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‘Zionist project’ and called for foreign intervention to stop the ‘settlement project’.  
While both Shahak and Davis were marginalized by those who saw them as ‘too 
radical’, elements of the Matzpen message spread through a network of reserve 
soldiers, as noted in Chapter 2, who found Peace Now too timid.  Yesh Gvul urged 
selective refusal followed by the smaller groups.494 
The refusal network - boasting a high percentage of graduates and post-
graduate members - picked up steam after a number of academics got involved. One 
researcher found that among the random sample of 36 objectors in the 1982 Lebanon 
War, 23 held academic degrees, four were doctoral candidates and four held PhD 
degree. Some faculty, like Professor Daniel Amit of the Hebrew University, a service 
resister who famously described the IDF as working for ‘American imperial interests’, 
added cache to the younger refuseniks. Others, like Menuhin worked virtually full-
time writing and distributing material for Yesh Gvul.  Leon Sheleff, a professor of law 
and sociology at Tel Aviv University helped to defend Gadi Algazi, who made 
national news in 1979 for refusing draft (and later became a history professor at Tel 
Aviv University).495 
But it was Ophir who put post-Zionism on the political map of the somewhat 
unfocused and fragmented peace movement. Drawing on the ideas that would later 
appear in his Order of Evil, in June 1987 he published a letter to ‘My Brothers and 
Collaborators’ in the political and literary journal Politika applauding his friends in 
the movement - ‘collaborators in spite of themselves, teeth clenching collaborators, 
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collaborators with an agonized conscious’. Ophir wrote about his own decision to 
refuse evil, ‘the evil… that you produce. This oppression you serve, my teeth 
clenching brothers, as small screws in a large machine, with some leeway for 
demonstrations, for protests, and for futile attempts at persuasion’.  He appealed to all 
who were ‘sick and tired of the occupation’ to ‘rise and throw their No in the face of 
the nation’.496 
The article attracted considerable attention and by October Ophir, together 
with his then-Hebrew University colleague Hannan Hever, Anat Biletzki and a small 
number of academics, founded the Twenty First Year organization. The name referred 
to the twenty one years since the Six Day War and its charter, the ‘Covenant for the 
Struggle against the Occupation’ attempted to redefine political reality by 
emphasizing that the occupation was a permanent condition of ‘the political and 
cognitive mind of the Israeli society’. Indeed, ‘the occupation is here, within us, and 
its destructive influence is felt in each and every sphere of our life’. Obfuscating the 
Green Line, the permanent occupation made Israeli ‘parliamentary government… 
serves as a fig leaf to cover the control relations between the occupying Israelis and 
the occupied Palestinians’. Ophir and his colleagues equated individual morality with 
active defiance of the occupation against which they pledged a ‘total struggle’ - 
waged through a refusal ‘to collaborate with the Occupation and pledge to do either 
part or all of the following: never enter the occupied territories without an invitation 
from their Arab inhabitants; not allow their children to be exposed to the racist bias of 
the school system; boycott institutions and products of companies whose Palestinian 
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employees were denied human dignity and decent working conditions; and boycott 
goods produced by Israeli settlements in the occupied territories’.497 
Professor Tamar Hermann of the Open University, a mainstream peace 
activist, considered the covenant ‘intellectually and morally very impressive’ but felt 
that few could ‘follow the high language and the complicated argumentation of the 
core activists’. In her opinion, ‘this highly sophisticated document alienated most 
audiences’.498 
Attracting a mass following, however, was never the goal of The Twenty First 
Year; instead, it relied on a cadre of dedicated followers drawn from the Communist 
periphery and assorted anti-Zionist groups. Reuven Kaminer, the leader of the ultra-
left Siah group, recalled that ‘hundreds of men and women attended house meetings 
devoted to the discussion of the covenant’ but, in reality, less than five hundred 
became involved in various projects. In the end, Ophir and his colleagues could count 
only on activist scholars to translate the abstract language of the ‘total struggle’ into 
political action.499 
Resistance from Within, Intervention from Without   
When Ophir conceptualized resistance as boycotting all facets of the 
occupation, the small and loosely knit group of activists was looking for practical 
ways of implementing the boycott. Working with Matzpen, they distributed a list of 
target products from the territories, mostly in Jerusalem. Mordechai Bar-On, a retired 
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IDF officer-turned-peace activist who was familiar with the organization, recalled that 
the internal boycott scheme fizzled out because members considered it ineffective.500 
Efforts at ‘witness bearing’ did not fare much better. Reviving Shahak’s 
project of documenting the occupation, The Twenty First Year created a special unit 
called Witnesses to Occupation (Edei Kibush). Palestinians invited the Witnesses to 
document incidents of alleged IDF brutality, but Bar-On suggested that the volunteers 
were not professional enough and sometimes fell into the trap of Palestinian 
propaganda. Worse still, tensions developed between Witnesses willing to defy the 
IDF and those who wanted to stay out of trouble. The struggle came to a head in 
Qalkilia where the military imposed a curfew; told that they could not proceed, 
twenty-seven protesters led by Ophir circumvented the roadblocks and entered the 
town and were promptly arrested. While Ophir, Hever and other hard-core members 
relished the experience and the publicity that the incident generated, others were quite 
shaken. As Hever put it, ‘during the court proceedings our spirit was high… the 
prison experience eventually brought some people to the realization that they were not 
ready to pay the price’. Exacerbated by poor organization and a haphazard decision-
making process, the internal divisions contributed to the breakup of the group in 
1992.501 
Some of the planned projects, however, were picked up by a number of 
individual founders. One project aimed at broadening the base of resistance to 
military service beyond selective refusal.  Anat Matar, a member of the communist 
party and Biletzki’s colleague at the Philosophy Department at Tel Aviv University, 
spearheaded the effort to attract recruits and reserve soldiers. Matar, on the board of 
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Yesh Gvul became involved in the Shiministim movement, a group of high school 
seniors planning to refuse military service. When her own son became a conscientious 
objector she joined the Conscientious Objectors Parents Forum (COs Parents Forum), 
declaring that any form of IDF service, not just combat units sent to the territories, 
were ‘accomplices in the crime’. Matar took pride in the fact that some of her students 
went on to refuse military service.502 
The ‘Witnesses to Occupation’ project was taken over by three groups. The 
most prominent of them was B’Tselem - The Israeli Information Centre for Human 
Rights in Occupied Territories co-founded in February 1998 by Daphna Golan-
Agnon, from the Law School at the Hebrew University and Edward (Edy) Kaufman, 
executive director of the university’s Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement 
of Peace. The organization pledged to force the Israeli authorities to treat the 
Palestinians according to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
published dozens of reports on issues as varied as home demolitions, land 
confiscations, treatment of minors during protests and medical conditions under 
occupation. In 1991 B’Tselem created a public stir after releasing a report on torture 
‘The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-Treatment, “Moderate 
Physical Pressure” or Torture?’503 
Somewhat overlapping B’Tselem, two more specialized groups pledged to 
keep the authorities accountable for the occupation emerged. In 1991, Menuhin and 
Avishai Ehrlich, a former Matzpen member who joined the faculty of Tel Aviv-Jaffa 
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Academic College, co-founded the Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), 
which became involved in numerous law suits involving alleged mistreatment of 
Palestinian prisoners. Jeff Halper, a one-time lecturer at Ben-Gurion University who 
was subsequently appointed an associate professor at the Friends World College - a 
college run by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) - founded The 
Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD). Because of Halper’s 
association with the AFSC, ICAHD received regular publicity and financial support 
from the United States. 
Headed by Matar, Bilezki and Rachel Giora, Open Doors was active in 
releasing Palestinian administrative detainees in the 1990s.  Among its signature cases 
was that of Ossama Barham, the longest serving administrative detainee who was 
released in 1999. The organization was credited with a decline in the number of 
detainees from several hundreds to some seventy by the end of the 1999s.  Renamed 
the Israeli Association for the Palestinian Prisoners and, under the leadership of 
Matar, it has fought to change the status of Palestinian security prisoners.504 
Much as these efforts were designed to create the ‘bubble’ for changing the 
domestic public opinion, radical academic activists had few illusions that they could 
be effective without help from the international community. In this sense they 
followed the model unveiled by Davis in his 1983 talk and a subsequent book 
comparing Israel to the apartheid regime in South Africa. In essence, the radical 
scholars wanted to harness the same international dynamics that brought change to 
South Africa. Research on normative changes in international relations based on 
South Africa explained the process. When in 1962 activists proposed a boycott in 
order to undermine the apartheid regime, these so-called ‘norm entrepreneurs’ created 
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a ‘life cycle’ of a normative change. In the first stage of ‘norm emergence’, de-
legitimization of apartheid was embraced as a moral goal;  in the second stage, known 
as a ‘norm cascade’, the anti-apartheid norm became widely disseminated throughout 
the world, followed by the third and final stage called ‘norm internalization’ - when 
the new norm was accepted by the international system. Transition from the second to 
the third stage occurred when the norm reached a tipping point, that is, was accepted 
by a critical mass of states or non-government international agents. Interestingly 
enough, the early stages of the South African ‘life cycle’ were sustained by a 
grassroots coalition of academics, cultural figures and human rights activists. As the 
labelling of apartheid illegitimate became diffused, effective economic sanctions were 
put in place.505 
To replicate the South African experience, Palestinians persuaded Giora and 
some of her colleagues to create a full-fledged Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
(BDS) movement working with similar-minded activists abroad. Giora, one of the 
leaders of Boycott from Within, described the highly important role the group played: 
‘The major role of the Israeli BDS movement has been to support international BDS 
calls against Israel and legitimize them both as clearly not anti-Semitic’. In other 
words, not only did the Israeli academics serve as ‘moral entrepreneurs’ at home but 
they helped defend the non-Jews involved in the BDS from charges of anti-Semitism. 
According to unwritten rules of the academic discourse, Jews, and better still, Israeli 
Jews, have served as ‘moral shields’ to groups taken radical stands against Israel.506 
While the Oslo process silenced many would be ‘moral entrepreneurs’, the 
hard-core post-Zionist community considered the two-state solution yet another form 
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of Israeli domination - as claimed by Zuckermann in the previous chapter. A heated 
debate about the merits of pursuing the Oslo path versus painting Israel as a racist, 
apartheid state took place on the pages of the Journal of Palestine Studies. Embracing 
a Marxist perspective, the author of one article contended that no just solution to the 
Palestinian problem was possible without undermining the perception of Israel as 
democratic and benign. The task of academics and activists thus was to ‘rethink the 
Palestinian question’ and adopt the ‘Israel as an apartheid state paradigm’. The author 
quoted from the work of Davis and offered suggestions on how to change Israel’s 
image in the West; he also presented research indicating that painting Israel as an 
apartheid state would prepare the groundwork for a boycott movement.507 
In planning an appeal to the international community, post-Zionist activists 
could rely on a bourgeoning body of humanitarian law to prove the alleged existence 
of an apartheid regime. As a matter of fact, Palestinians who published the first 
volume on activism and international law as early as 1984 laid the legal groundwork; 
they and the Israeli activists receive help from a growing number of lawyers and legal 
experts who have embraced the apartheid analogy. For instance, Deena Hurwitz, a 
civil rights Jewish-American activist from the California-based Centre for 
Nonviolence who spent extensive periods of time in the Middle East, encouraged the 
apartheid metaphor in a book she edited in 1992. The edited work quoted Israeli 
academics and activists, including Daphna Golan Agnon, who expressed their dismay 
about the apartheid-like policies.508 Arie (Ari) Dayan, a pro-Palestinian activist and 
journalist, quoted B’Tselem statistics indicating that up to June 1991 the police did not 
take action against 42 settlers suspected of killing Palestinians. Israeli and foreign 
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lawyers quoted by Dayan stated that this fact illustrated a key feature of apartheid - a 
dual law system for blacks and whites.509 
In yet another effort to engage international law, Neve Gordon, an activist-
turned-academic became the director of Physicians for Human Rights - Israel (PHR-I) 
founded by Ruhama Marton in 1988. Gordon, who accused Israel of egregious 
violations of human rights, published an edited volume on the subject ‘Humanitarian 
Action in Catastrophe’ based on a work group at the Van Leer Institute in 
Jerusalem.510 To recall Chapter 5, he made good use of PHR-I statistics to show 
alleged bio-power control of the Palestinian population. Gordon was also active in 
organizing conferences on torture and other alleged abuses of the Palestinians, 
appearing with Derek Summerfield, head of Medical Foundation for the Care of 
Victims of Torture (UK), who accused Israeli doctors of supporting torture. After 
years of protest, in 2009 the Israel Medical Association took the unprecedented step 
of severing its relations with PHR-I because of its use of ‘the international arena to 
besmirch and sling mud at Israel’s doctors’.511 
Last but not least, Israeli activists worked with the UNCE Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, known as the Aarhus Convention that was signed on 25 
June 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark.  According to Menuhin, Israeli activists could plug 
into the Aarhus Convention network to voice grievances about water depravation and 
environmental degradation in the occupied territories, yet even before Aarhus Israeli 
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academics used the environmental justice movement to scrutinize water allocation in 
the West Bank and Gaza.512 
That within a decade scholars-activists translated The Twenty First Year’s call 
for ‘total struggle’ into a burgeoning political venture was illustrative of the 
advantages that universities offered. The collapse of the Oslo peace process gave the 
radical faculty a much larger platform for political activism. 
Mobilizing the International Community against Israel   
As shown in the preceding chapters, the Oslo failure and the onset of the al-
Aqsa Intifada radicalized most post-Zionist scholars. Observing the watershed in the 
peace camp, Hermann described the deep despair of mainstream peace activists and 
their feeling that ‘the sky actually fell on the peace movement’. In her view, it was at 
this juncture that the post-Zionists, ‘with no constituency to lose on one hand, and so 
highly confident in their framing of the situation on the other’, concluded that the 
conflict would not be resolved ‘without a radical transformation of the Israeli national 
ethos’.513 
To expedite this process the post-Zionists redoubled efforts to mobilize the 
international community against Israel’s policies, capitalizing on the growing anti-
Israel sentiment fuelled by such international initiatives as the 2001 UN-sponsored 
World Conference against Racism in Durban where hundreds of NGOs pledged to 
fight what they described as a racist and apartheid Israeli state. 
One popular tactic involved appeals to the international community for 
military intervention on behalf of the Palestinians – allegedly confronted with a real 
danger of genocide.  A 2002 manifesto ‘Break the Conspiracy of Silence: Act Before 
it is too Late’ was typical of this pattern. Signed by Gordon, Yiftachel, Biletzki and 
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others, it urged international civil society ‘to take immediate direct action’ to stop 
‘Israel’s all-out war against the Palestinian people’. Evoking the Nazi equivalence, 
Neve Gordon wrote: ‘Examining the architectural similarity and differences between 
the camps Israel has constructed to hold Palestinians and the concentration camps 
Jews were held in during the Holocaust, urges one to ponder how it is that the 
reappearance of barbed wire in the Israeli landscape does not engender an outcry 
among [Holocaust] survivors’. Lev Grinberg amplified this metaphor in an interview 
with a Belgian newspaper where he claimed that Israel was practising ‘symbolic 
genocide’, while Ophir went so far as to urge a NATO strike against Israel to get the 
‘regime’ to give up the territories.514 
A new group, The Campus Shall Not Be Silent, with branches at Tel Aviv and 
the Hebrew universities was set up to draft and circulate scores of petitions to the 
United Nations, the EU, and a host of international organizations highlighting the 
plight of the Palestinians and warning of their imminent expulsion. Reaching 
particular intensity during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, a petition titled 
‘An Urgent Appeal for International Involvement: Save Palestine and Israel’ asserted 
that, under the cover of the American invasion, Israel was gearing to ethnically 
cleanse the entire Palestinian population.  The text claimed that the Palestinian 
presence ‘stands in the way of Sharon’s life-long vision of Greater Israel’ and that 
‘the elimination of the Palestinian national presence west of the Jordan river is 
implicit in the long-term aims of the Israeli right wing’. The expulsion rumour was 
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propagated by the Palestinian Authority and uncritically accepted by the academic 
activists.515 
Universal jurisdiction, a legal concept that gave states the right to claim 
criminal jurisdiction over persons whose alleged crimes were committed outside the 
boundaries of the prosecuting state, even if the crime had no relations to the said state, 
was another source of inspiration. Shortly before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada 
Gordon wrote an article demanding that Yaacov Pery, former head of the Shabak, 
Israel’s internal security service (equivalent of MI5 and the FBI), be tried under 
international jurisdiction for his responsibility for the alleged torturing of Palestinian 
prisoners.516 Defying IDF regulations, in February 2002 Gordon visited Arafat in his 
Ramallah compound to publicize Israel’s alleged war crimes. Two months later he 
published an open-letter labelling Aviv Kochavi, Gaza Brigade commander, a war 
criminal.517 
Coordinating with Yesh Gvul, Matar fingered Maj.-Gen. Doron Almog, CO 
Southern Command, as another war criminal.  Daniel Machover, son of Matzpen co-
founder Moshe and head of civil litigation in the London office of Hickman & Rose 
who represented the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), obtained a warrant 
arrest for Kochavi and Almog. Having flown into London, Almog was tipped off and, 
without disembarking his plane returned home. Kochavi was advised to cancel a 
planned stay at Sandhurst Military Academy. Gordon and Matar were among the 
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signatories of a petition to Western governments urging them to prosecute Israeli ‘war 
criminals’ while cutting off all aid to the Jewish state. 
Internationalizing the issue of Palestinian security prisoners was also a popular 
pursuit. Matar argued that these inmates, serving time after being legally convicted in 
terrorist/terrorist-related attacks, should be considered civil resisters. In an 
introduction to a co-edited book she argued that the label ‘security prisoners’ deprived 
them of their subjectivity, both as individuals deserving personal treatment and 
‘rational and essentially free beings who aspire to realize their freedom’. Treating 
them as a threat ‘erases the fact that they are subjects and turn them into objects: an 
object - like a collapsing roof… a stone hurled from a slingshot, a knife, even a 
fingernail - can pose a threat, a security risk, a source of fear from which we must 
protect our lives’. Matar also repeated her previous claim that Israel de-contextualized 
terrorism, which, in her view needed to be viewed as a resistance movement against a 
long term occupation regime: ‘The long years of occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories, the prevention of livelihood, of freedom of movement, of personal and 
community development’.518 
Highlighting alleged torture was yet another popular way to appeal to the 
international community.  Though the Israeli Supreme Court put a stop to the practice 
of torture in 1999, radical academics used the data provided by the Public Committee 
against Torture in Israel (PCATI), a small watchdog established by Shahak, to insist 
that cruel and inhumane treatment of Palestinian prisoners was still the norm. 
But it was the boycott initiative on which the radical faculty pinned most of its 
hopes on.  As noted in Chapter 5, Yiftachel’s and Gordon’s writings sought to provide 
academic legitimacy to the boycott movement. On the applied side, Giora and her Tel 
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Aviv University colleague, linguist professor Tanya Reinhart, a student of Noam 
Chomsky, organized a boycott appeal in April 2001, writing: ‘We call the world 
community to organize and boycott Israeli industrial and agricultural exports and 
goods, as well as leisure tourism, in the hope that it will have the same positive result 
that the boycott of South Africa had on Apartheid’. After disappointing responses in 
the US, Giora and her colleagues were forced to settle on the less sweeping and more 
doable academic and cultural boycott.519 
Any doubts that universities offered an adequate platform for promoting the 
boycott idea were dispelled when Pappe appealed to British academics to intervene on 
his behalf during the 1999 Tantura affair claiming that his backing of Teddy Katz, 
who admitted to having fabricated a massacre in the Arab village,520 led to his 
academic persecution. Writing to Mona Baker, a pro-Palestinian scholar from 
Manchester University, he asked British academics to boycott the University of Haifa, 
where he was a tenured senior lecturer at the time, along with Bar-Ilan University for 
opening an extension college in Ariel, outside the pre-1967 ‘green line’. The request 
was taken up by a newly organized group of scholars eager to boycott Israeli 
universities which quickly issued a petition ‘endorsing the decision of European 
academics to boycott Israeli academic institutes’.521 
The Palestinian Campaign for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel 
(PACBI), founded in 2004, provided the post-Zionists with a well-endowed and 
highly organized platform. Pappe, Giora and Matar were leading supporters of PACBI 
which, under the skilful leadership of Omar Barghouti, a Qatar-born Palestinian who 
grew up in Egypt and a one-time doctoral student at Tel Aviv University, quickly 
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seized the opportunity to broaden the boycott message in Britain and beyond. In 
December 2004 some 270 academics convened for a conference ‘Resisting Israeli 
Apartheid: Strategies and Principles’ in the School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS) of the University of London to hear Pappe urging a boycott as a means to 
apply moral and political pressure on Israel. Other speakers urged participants to draw 
lessons from the anti-apartheid boycott in South Africa, explaining that scholars and 
intellectuals acted as a vanguard that put the issue of apartheid on the world stage.522 
In 2005 the central committee of the British Association of University Teacher 
(AUT) voted to impose sanctions on Haifa, Bar-Ilan and the Hebrew universities. 
Addressing the organization on the eve of its resolution Pappe, whose (false) claim of 
persecution by his university provided the pretext for the boycott, made an 
impassioned plea for the boycott:  
I appeal to you today to be part of a historical movement and moment that 
may bring an end to more than a century of colonization, occupation, and 
dispossession of Palestinians.... The message that will be directed specifically 
against those academic institutes which have been particularly culpable in 
sustaining the oppression since 1948 and the occupation since 1967 can be a 
start for a successful campaign for peace (as similar acts at the time had 
activated the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa).523 
He repeated this plea shortly afterwards when the AUT leadership, faced with intense 
internal and external opposition, was about to rescind its decision. ‘I believe I am in a 
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better position than many to judge the tactical and moral dimensions of the academic 
boycott of Israel’, he wrote in a widely publicized article in the Guardian. 
My case was singled out by the AUT as the reason for boycotting my own 
university, Haifa. I felt honoured by this attention to my predicament and, at 
the same time, hoped that the general context, the need to end the callous 
occupation, will not be forgotten. In fact, judging from the reactions in Israel, 
after an initial confusion between the principled issue and private case, there 
seems to be a better understanding here of the link between the occupation and 
the silencing of those who oppose it. 
‘The University of Haifa threatens to sue the AUT for libel for false and intentional 
misrepresentation of action taken against me and the MA student Teddy Katz in and 
out of the campus’, he added,  
should the AUT retract its principled and ethical policy of boycott, it will 
inadvertently send a message to all Israelis that the occupation is legitimate 
and immune from any external pressure or condemnation… The AUT can 
choose to stand by and do nothing, or to be part of a historical movement 
similar to the anti-apartheid campaign against the white supremacist regime in 
South Africa… Clearly, someone has to be bold enough to take the lead in 
pressurising Israel through sanctions and boycott in order to avert another 
cycle of the bloodshed that is destabilising the Middle East and undermining 
world security and peace. Who, other than academics and intellectuals, can be 
expected to provide this much needed leadership?524 
While the plea came to a naught as the AUT rescinded  its decision, the Israeli post-
Zionists didn’t desist from their efforts to entice the international community into a 
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boycott. In 2008 Giora, Matar and others organized ‘BOYCOTT! Supporting the 
Palestinians BDS Call from Within’, with a clear cut mission statement: ‘We 
Palestinians, Jews, citizens of Israel, join the Palestinian call for a BDS campaign 
against Israel, inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid... 
encourage BDS actions as a legitimate political activity and a necessary means of 
non-violent resistance. We will act inside and outside Israel to promote awareness and 
support of BDS’. The Boycott! website lists dozen of appeals to academics, 
intellectuals, artists and corporations to terminate contacts with Israel.525 
The anti-Hamas Operation Cast Lead in December 2008-January 2009 
provided the activists with a perfect opportunity to make their case.  Describing Gaza 
as ‘Israel’s Guernica’ Matar and her colleagues published a letter in the Guardian 
urging international sanctions against Israel. In May 2009 Giora urged the congress of 
University and College Union (UCU, that replaced the now-defunct AUT) to boycott 
Israeli universities. In a high profile op-ed in the Los Angeles Times in August 2009, 
Gordon advocated strict sanctions on Israel. Describing his appeal as involving a 
painful personal decision, he argued that as a member of the peace camp for more 
than thirty years he was deeply concerned about what he alleged to be Israel’s steady 
drive towards ‘an apartheid state’.526 Mindful of the need to show Israel’s economic 
gains from its continued presence in the territories, these scholars produced a number 
of reports on the supposed profits of occupation. A spinoff-group, Who Profits from 
the Occupation, began publicizing the names of corporations that operated beyond the 
Green Line with a view of boycotting their products abroad.527 
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Utilizing the generous travel allowance in Israeli universities, post-Zionist 
activists travelled extensively to promote their agenda abroad.  It is beyond the scope 
of this study to analyse the hundreds of conferences, round tables, lectures, seminars 
and media appearances involved in this campaign. Ophir and Azoulay, for instance, 
visited a number of European cities to promote photo exhibitions aimed at creating a 
visual Holocaust-Nakba equivalence. Yiftachel used the substantial network of critical 
political geographers to promote the apartheid theory. Both Zuckermann and 
Zimmermann made frequent trips to Germany to address pro-Palestinian forums 
where their ‘Holocaust deformation’ theory was warmly received.  Sand, whose book 
The Invention of the Jewish People was translated to more languages than any other 
Israeli history book, became an academic celebrity; in addition to lectures in a large 
number of universities, he was a frequent guest on numerous media outlets.  
Radical Academics and the Universities  
A relative newcomer to the academic tradition, Israel has been influenced by 
the German, British and American concepts of academic freedom that, over centuries, 
worked out a balance among the needs of faculty, students and - in public universities 
- the public interest as expressed by its elected officials. As a rule, intramural 
academic freedom allowed scholars to pursue their research - defined by their field of 
specialty - free from interference from university authorities and the state.  Teaching 
was expected to follow the same protocol but, as noted in Chapter 1, in the absence of 
scientific rigor, liberal arts struggled to provide students with ‘truth’. William von 
Humboldt, arguably the leading pedagogical authority in nineteenth century Germany, 
argued that vigorous classroom discussion, including diverse points of view, was the 
most legitimate way of arriving at social truths. The so-called ‘classroom as a 
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marketplace of ideas’ concept had been subsequently adopted by British and 
American universities.528 
Despite its large contingent of Jewish immigrants from Germany, the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem did not follow the Humboldtian tradition and was even less 
inclined to balance the interest of the faculty with that of the Yishuv. To the contrary, 
liberal arts professors embraced the vision of the university’s first president, Judah 
Magnes, of turning the institution into a cultural and secular-spiritual centre for world 
Jewry, which for him was largely associated with the Brit Shalom group and its bi-
national agenda. 
After Magnes’s death it was the Hebrew University professoriate, whose 
relations with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion were stormy, that led the fight against the 
proposed Higher Education Act introduced by the government in June 1952. Based on 
the recommendation of the special committee headed by Yaacov Dori, president of 
the Technion, the bill envisaged the creation of a Council of Higher Education (CHE) 
chaired by the minister of education and comprising a majority of government 
representatives alongside leading scientific figures from Israel and abroad. The Dori 
proposal had the backing of the two technological universities - the Technion and the 
Weizmann Institute - but the Hebrew University faculty was hostile to the 
‘nationalization’ of their intuition and managed to persuade the opposition General 
Zionists Party that chaired the Knesset education committee to reject the bill. Despite 
numerous compromise attempts by the government, it took an unprecedentedly 
prolonged period to pass the Higher Education Act of 1958. 
As noted in the introduction, the law was a triumph for Magnes’s view in that 
it allowed a most expansive form of academic freedom - the ‘liberty to conduct its 
                                                          
528
 Seliktar, Academic Freedom in Israel.  
305 
 
academic and administrative affairs, within the framework of its budget, as it may see 
fit’. As a matter of fact, ‘academic and administrative affairs’ also included 
‘determination of programs of research and teaching, the appointment of the 
authorities of the institution, the appointment and promotion of teachers, the 
determination of a method of teaching and study, and any other scientific, pedagogic 
or economic activity’.529 
Neither the Higher Education Act nor the subsequently-created Planning and 
Budgeting Committee (PBC) dealt explicitly with academic freedom of faculty in an 
intramural or extramural setting. But the broad institutional autonomy clearly implied 
an expansive freedom on the individual level as well, as Haim Gans, a law professor 
at Tel Aviv University and an expert on academic freedom, advocated. Quoting an 
American professor who famously but erroneously declared that ‘academic freedom is 
what faculty thinks it is’ Gans argued that faculty had the right to teach and research 
topics of their choice without the interference of deans or other academic authorities. 
In case of a dispute with the university authorities deans should try persuasion as 
faculty could not be coerced into making changes. Gans vetoed any intervention since 
he felt confident that academic staff, especially senior faculty, could be trusted with 
self-control and ethical conduct. His view of extramural speech and action was also 
equally expansive; echoing Magnes’s conception of academics as ‘philosophers 
kings’ he argued that scholars played a special role in the public discourse and thus 
should be given extra protection not only from the state but also from university 
authorities.530 
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In the first three decades of Israel’s statehood Gans’s doctrine of academic 
freedom reflected prevailing realities. Unlike Germany, Britain and the United States 
where a combination of political and market forces limited extramural and intramural 
faculty rights, there was little to shake the expansive protocols created by the Higher 
Education Act. On the rare occasion that faculty speech or action attracted a public 
reaction, both the universities and the state shied away from action. Yeshayahu 
Leibowitz, who pioneered the Nazi-Israeli equivalence in his Judeo-Nazi imagery, 
was never challenged; his colleague, Israel Shahak, who travelled abroad to lecture on 
the IDF’s Nazi-like behaviour and engaged in illegal meetings with PLO 
representatives suffered no repercussions either. Amnon Rubinstein, then Dean of 
Law at Tel Aviv University and future minister of education, urged the Hebrew 
University to deal with Shahak adding that ‘only in Israel has this concept [of 
academic freedom] attained such an extreme meaning as to become a synonym for 
lawlessness’. He further noted that ‘university tenure’ should not protect a faculty 
member engaged in a ‘hate campaign’ against his country especially when this hate 
campaign was financed by one’s university, as was the case with Shahak whose self-
abnegating foreign travels were paid by ‘taxpayers’ money that supported his 
sabbatical and research abroad’.531 
Hebrew University Rector, Michael Rabin, responded that ‘the disciplinary 
book of rules for academic employees’ did not involve ‘behaviour of a faculty 
member in non-university context’. As for the university’s decision to promote 
Shahak to the rank of associate professor Rabin pointed out that he ‘passed standard 
university procedures; to deprive him ‘of these procedures is a primitive act’. A 
subsequent audit found that Shahak used no university funds for travel since 1972. In 
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a slingshot at Rubinstein, Arie Sachs, a professor in the Department of Theatre 
Studies, described the attack as a ‘witch hunt’. There were outside calls to revoke 
Shahak’s citizenship but the government decided against it. Alan Dershowitz, the 
renowned Harvard University law professor, pointed to the irony that Shahak could 
complain about racism and totalitarianism in Israel precisely because of the freedom 
of speech he enjoyed.532 
A later incident involving Moshe Zimmermann demonstrated the continuous 
reluctance to confront radically outspoken faculty. Having lost a lawsuit against a 
paper reporting his equation between settlers’ children and the Hitlerjugend and IDF 
soldiers and the Nazis, Zimmermann not only faced no censure at the university but 
Rector Haim Rabinowitz demanded an apology from Alexander Brenner, leader of the 
Jewish community in Berlin, who complained that ‘there are professors at the Hebrew 
University who compare the behaviour of the IDF soldiers to the behaviour of SS 
soldiers’.533 
This historical reluctance was compounded by the influx of critical, neo-
Marxist faculty who presented a number of novel challenges due to their neo-
Gramscian combination of scholarship and activism. The extensive effort involved in 
BOYCOTT!, for instance, should have raised questions about permissible political 
activism within university. A study comparing academic freedom in Israel, Germany, 
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Britain and the United States concluded that combination of case law, ethic codes and 
contractual obligations made it virtually impossible for faculty in public institutions to 
advocate boycott. British academic Geoffrey Alderman, a history professor at 
Buckingham University and patron of the UK Council on Academic Freedom & 
Academic Standards, added that during times of war, Britain had a considerable 
amount of restrictions on the freedom of expression.534 In Israel, where traditional 
wars have been overtaken in recent decades by Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), national 
security considerations have never entered the academic freedom debate. 
In the absence of similar constrains neither the state nor the universities had a 
proper protocol to deal with activist professors. In chronicling the history of the 
boycott movement, Giora boasted of dozens initiatives launched by BOYCOTT! 
during and after the 2008-09 Gaza incursion. Upping the ante, Gordon’s 2009 op-ed 
in support of BDS triggered a public firestorm. Despite considerable pressure, Ben-
Gurion University President Rivka Carmi resisted calls from donors and members of 
the public to fire Gordon but the university was forced to adopt an ethics code that 
banned faculty from advocating boycott of their own university (and for that matter 
other Israeli institutions), among others. Undaunted, in July 2010 Giora lauded the 
effects of the BDS on the BOYCOTT! website writing: ‘The BDS movement hit the 
bull’s eye. It managed to undermine Israel’s international status and tarnish its 
legitimacy’.535 
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Giora and Matar’s boycott advocacy confronted Tel Aviv University President 
Joseph Klafter with a similar dilemma. During a May 2010 gathering of the 
international boards of governors Alan Dershowitz delivered a keynote address 
denouncing boycott activism as out of bound. In a subsequent, stormy meeting, a 
prominent American donor argued that, based on the university’s bylaws, the two 
should be fired for ‘breach of discipline’. In what led to a public scandal Klafter cut 
off the vote prompting the donor to resign and pledge his support to Bar-Ilan 
University. Some observers commentated on the financial loss, but Klafter had good 
reasons to avoid confrontation with the faculty. A hastily written petition organized 
by activist professors delivered a strong warning that any steps against Giora and 
Matar would result in a nasty public skirmish.536 
Amid increasingly loud attacks on the ‘McCarthyism’ of the Likud-led 
government at the end of 2010, the CHE held a number of meetings to determine 
whether Article 15 of the Higher Education Act should be revised to combat BDS 
advocacy. But  anticipating political problems a compromise formula was crafted: on 
21 December the Council issued a declaration reaffirming academic freedom as a 
‘supreme value’ but added that calls for boycott by faculty members were 
unacceptable because they constituted a threat to the system of higher learning and to 
society at large. The CHE urged the academic authorities to find ways and means to 
enforce the resolution.537 
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Still, the stiff opposition from many academics and the voluntary nature of the 
resolution prompted right-wing lawmakers to propose an anti-boycott legislation. 
After a stormy public debate about democracy and freedom of speech, the bill - 
roundly decried by much of the academic community as a glaring example of ‘Israeli 
McCarthyism’ - was passed on 11 July 11, 2011.538  
While the legislation dampened the internal pro-boycott drive it did not silence 
hard-core advocates. For instance, Gordon’s Los Angles Time’s op-ed turned up as a 
chapter in a 2012 book on the benefits of boycotting Israel. In the acknowledgements, 
the editor thanked Gordon who helped shape the book in its early stages, but Ben-
Gurion University declined to investigate the issue. In the same year Matar took very 
public credit for dissuading British director Peter Brook from conducting a planned 
workshop at the Chamber Theatre because its actors performed in the West Bank 
town of Ariel. Though these cases represented a violation of the law, none of the 
offenders were disciplined.539 
If the authorities were reluctant to react to the relatively clear-cut case of 
boycott advocacy, they were even less eager to take on the more complex problem of 
choosing research topics to further a political agenda. Embraced by many activists, 
the practice entailed a post-tenure switch from the field of expertise for which they 
were hired to researching and writing on the Arab-Israeli conflict, a field where most 
of them lacked the academic credentials to research. Yehouda Shenhav, for instance, 
appointed to research and teach sociology of organizations admitted to a switch after 
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joining the Rainbow Coalition as indicated in Chapter 4. His book claiming that the 
Mizrahim were actually Arab Jews attempted to provide academic legitimacy to the 
political agenda of creating an anti-Zionist Palestinian-Mizrahi alliance. After signing 
the 2004 Olga Document, a declaration of support for a bi-national state, Shenahv 
went on to write a number of monographs on the subject. Likewise, Adi Ophir spent 
much of his career writing polemics about the conflict or ‘how to do’ books to be used 
in political action. The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli-Rule in the 
Occupied Territories, a book he co-edited with Michal Givoni and Sari Hanafi was 
typical in this respect. Resulting from a series of seminars at the Van Leer Institute the 
book, according to Hanafi, reflected the belief that ‘Israeli educational institutions are 
under an obligation to explicitly oppose the normalization of the occupation’. Calling 
their work ‘subversive’ and focused ‘more on advocacy than academia’ Hanafi and 
Ophir went on a book tour in Europe to highlight the illegality of ‘the occupation’.540 
In the same vein, Zimmermann ‘remade’ himself into a Middle East expert so 
as to publish books highly critical of Israel’s foreign policy, while Zuckermann made 
a similar switch resulting in an extensive list of publications on the alleged Holocaust-
deformed Israeli character. Arguably, Sand’s career move was the most stunning: The 
Invention of the Jewish People, followed by The Invention of the Land of Israel made 
this virtually unknown expert on French cinema and culture world famous despite 
having no qualification, or doing previous research, in the field that bought him this 
fame.  Finally, as noted above, Matar abandoned any pretence of philosophical 
research to write about Palestinian security prisoners.  
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University authorities willing to challenge this practice could have used the 
1982 case of Ilan Rahoum vs. the Hebrew University, which denied him tenure. The 
District Court in Jerusalem ruled against the plaintiff holding that the ‘permanent 
faculty (starting with tenured senior lecturers) give the university its character and its 
scientific-research status’ as well as ‘contribute to the quality of instruction and 
supervision of students’. Since tenure was difficult to revoke, the Court justified the 
extra scrutiny given to the review process to assure that those promoted would 
perform their contractual obligations of teaching and research within the parameters 
of their specialization.541 Though it is difficult to argue that activist professors who 
switched subjects to fields where they had no professional training or research record 
either gave ‘the university its character and its scientific-research status’ or 
contributed to the ‘quality of instruction and supervision of students’, university 
authorities did not avail themselves of the 1982 ruling. Ziva Shamir, former head of 
the History School at Tel Aviv University, suggested that fear of adverse publicity 
prompted academic leaders to ignore these and other breaches of academic freedom.  
In her view, such hands off policy enabled activists not only to engage in research 
aimed at fitting a political agenda but to turn their office into a branch of whatever 
party they belonged to.542 
The post-Zionist narratives presented the academic authorities with a 
potentially more difficult quandary. As discussed in Chapter 3, the New Historians 
produced a variety of accounts of the 1948 war that, to various degrees, reflected their 
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shifting politics. By the early 2000s Pappe, by far the most radicalized of the group, 
had created the narrative of Israel’s history as an unceasing ethnic cleansing from 
1948 to the present; small wonder that he exploited the Katz affair to prod British 
academics to boycott Israeli universities. In his autobiography, Out of the Frame: The 
Struggle for Academic Freedom in Israel - an apparent nod to Edward Said’s Out of 
Place - Pappe accused the-then head of the History School, Yoav Gelber, and 
Humanities Dean Yossi Ben Artzi of a ‘witch hunt’, arguing that after becoming 
‘even more categorical than Katz about the [alleged massacre] conclusion’ he had to 
pay the price of speaking truth to power, becoming a ‘pariah in my own university’. 
He recalled a special disciplinary hearing where ‘I was accused or relentless 
defamation of the University and its institutions, both in written publication and in 
public events in Israel and abroad’, adding that the fear of being fired took an 
emotional toll.543 
Gelber dismissed the ‘witch hunt’ accusation out of hand. In his account, the 
university leadership was greatly reluctant to stand up to Pappe and the ‘mobilized 
academy’ and when the affair exploded ‘did its best to sidestep the issue. It was 
dragged into the judicial case as if possessed to see it through against its will’. Gelber 
strongly implied a reluctance to challenge Pappe for fear of the British academics who 
rushed to condemn the university’s ‘assault on the academic freedom’. Ironically, 
Gelber and Pappe agreed that the university terminated the disciplinary proceedings 
because of international pressure. But while the former complained bitterly about the 
power of the ‘mobilized academy’ the latter took credit for mobilizing it on behalf of 
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Katz and himself. Pappe subsequently attributed the failure to expel him to the 
‘vigorous mobilization of the academic community’.544 
The Katz-Pappe case illustrated yet another facet of the problem that post-
Zionists scholarship presented, namely the existence of the critical, neo-Marxist 
narrative. Gelber, a traditional historian, complained that in the ‘postmodern era little 
was left of traditional or conventional historiography’. Adding that faculty returning 
from sabbatical or graduate students arriving from abroad ‘imported these crazes to 
the Israeli academe’, he urged the restoration of ‘the status of Israeli historiography, it 
is primarily necessary to determine what historical scholarship is’.545 
Since neo-Marxist scholars established a dense network of research and 
publication it was not clear how academic authorities could restore the positivist 
hegemony as per Gelber’s suggestion. As a matter of fact, by the mid-2000s the new 
paradigm had not only successfully competed with positivism but was on its way to 
create its own dominance, according to some traditionalists. Arnon Soffer, a 
prominent geographer from Haifa University and a leading critic of the post-Zionists, 
described in his book, In the Trap of Radicalism in the Academy the ‘diligent 
networking of the group’ that led to its campus prominence. Some faulted the 
promotion process, which, according to one insider, tolerated cronyism at the expense 
of academic excellence. Others blamed double standards whereby the stringent 
requirements for excellence in the natural sciences have never been applied to the 
social sciences and humanities. According to this view the academic leaders including 
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the Israeli Academy of Science considered the liberal arts to be of negligible value 
and not worthy of their scrutiny.546 
Adding to the difficulties, activist scholars tended to impose their paradigm in 
the classroom in violation of the Humboldian pedagogical tenets. In a rare public 
debate on the subject, Amnon Rubinstein, by then a law professor at the 
Interdisciplinary Centre in Herzliya, urged to embrace a more diverse perspective in 
the classroom in order to turn it into a ‘marketplace of ideas’. Ephraim Yuchtman-
Yaar, a former dean of social sciences at Tel Aviv University, was another harsh critic 
of radical scholars, accusing them of totally ignoring positivist scholars and noting 
that not a single work of Eisenstadt was offered in an introductory course in Israeli 
sociology at Tel Aviv University. By using their academic position to exclude 
material that did not fit their paradigm, in his view, they conveyed to students a uni-
dimensional picture of reality and worse - depriving them of an opportunity to 
exercise critical thinking in pursuit of truth.547 
Ziva Shamir was especially scathing. ‘I am aware of the fact that it is difficult 
to go back to the era of positivism, and that the new trends in critical scholarship give 
the instructor more political leeway’, she wrote. ‘However, as member of a promotion 
committee I came across teaching evaluation forms with students’ complaints about 
their “missionary” professors whose main goal was to convey their political message.  
The contemporary “missionary” faculty is doing damage to the teaching process… 
these instructors also contribute to hypocrisy in the classroom; on the one hand they 
speak about academic freedom but on the other, their teaching does not encourage 
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pluralism and a free exchange of ideas’. Soffer described how, despite numerous 
complaints about what he considered a breach of academic freedom by radical 
scholars, the administration of his own university failed to act.548 
Much as these observations were heartfelt, there was little indication that 
academic leaders were willing to tackle the complex and potentially explosive topic of 
evaluating the merits of critical, neo-Marxist scholarship. Tellingly, Shamir admitted 
to publishing her essay after retiring to avoid the ‘public scolding orchestrated by 
radical scholars and their allies in the media’ meted out to ‘McCarthy faculty’. Soffer 
described how, despite numerous complaints about radical scholars at Haifa 
University, the administration refused to act in order to avoid a public fracas.549 
Paradoxically, it was a routine evaluation of the Department of Politics and 
Government at Ben-Gurion University ordered by the CHE as part of an overall 
review of political science departments in Israel that proved how costly challenging 
critical scholars could be. The department - home of many radical activists - had a 
troubled academic history. In 2001 the CHE appointed a two member committee to 
evaluate its request to offer a BA program. Professor Zeev Maoz, a leading political 
scientist and a former head of the Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv 
University, found that the department did not offer core political science courses and 
that its faculty, who specialized in topics marginal to the discipline, were ill equipped 
to fill the void. He recommended closing the department but the second evaluator, 
Avner de Shalit of the Hebrew University, disagreed and, in November 2003, the 
CHE appointed a new committee under de Shalit.  In March 2004, the new committee 
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decided that the department offered a ‘unique program’ and urged the CHE to 
strengthen ‘pluralistic approaches’ to political science. 
But the International Committee for Evaluation of Political Science and 
International Relations Programmes, chaired by Professor Thomas Risse of Berlin’s 
Free University, seemed to side with Maoz.  Delivered in September 2011, the ‘Ben-
Gurion University Department of Politics and Government Evolution Report’ 
identified serious problems in the department: weakness of core political science 
offerings as well as excessive ‘community activism’ and lack of balanced views in the 
curriculum and the classroom. In the words of the report, ‘political science instructors 
should see to it that their own opinions are expressed as personal views so that 
students can take critical perspective and that there is a broad exposure to alternative 
perspectives in order to widen and deepen their own understanding’. The report urged 
improving the research and publication record of the faculty, noting that most have 
not published in mainstream presses and journals. Indeed, it recommended to the 
university ‘spelling out more clearly individual performance for tenure and promotion 
criteria, in line with MALAG [CHE] criteria’. The concluding section reiterated that 
‘common standards of scholarly achievement and excellence [should be] emphasized 
in the process of hiring and promotion’.  In an unprecedented move, the report stated 
that ‘if these changes are nevertheless not implemented, the majority of the 
Committee believes that, as a last resort, Ben-Gurion University should consider 
closing the Department of Politics and Government’.550 
The Risse Report was the first official statement about the questionable value 
of critical, neo-Marxist scholarship. Yaacov Bergman, a leading expert on higher 
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education, explained that, based on the Institute of Scientific Information - Social 
Science Index (SSCI), international ranking of social science departments favoured 
mainstream publications. He noted that Israeli social sciences trended 30 per cent 
below standard in contrast to the precise and life sciences that ranked constantly 
above average. One possible explanation for such poor performance was the 
preponderance of critical scholarship. Critical journals and presses such as Pluto, 
Verso, Zed or Zone - self-proclaimed ‘progressive’ or Marxist publishing houses - 
favoured by the radical scholars were not included in the SSCI; as the Risse Report 
stated, such venues were not part of the CHE criteria for hiring and promotion.551 
But these arguments did little to stop departmental members and their 
numerous supporters from charging the government with a McCarthy-style witch-
hunt. Some accused certain unspecified members of the International Evaluation 
Committee of harbouring ‘extreme right views’. Others took issue with the ‘misplaced 
faith’ in the objective criteria used by the SSCI that, in their view, provided only an 
‘illusion of objectivity’. To recall Chapter 1, the discourse on the department followed 
closely the larger debate between the two paradigms.552 
Without addressing the report’s findings, Ben-Gurion University defended the 
department while promising to introduce the recommended changes. The 
administration made available three new slots to strengthen the core discipline but the 
department hired only one new faculty, an expert in quantitative methods, that 
                                                          
551
 Science in Israel, 1998-2002, The Institute of Scientific Information – Social 
Science Index (SSCI)  http://www.in-cites.com/research/2004/february_2_2004-
1.html 
552
 Tamar Trabelsi-Hadad, ‘Recommendation: Shut Down ‘Leftist’ Department’, 
Ynet, November 23, 2011; Oded Goldreich ‘On the Quality Evaluation Committees of 
Malag’, January 4, 2012, Israeli Social Science Net  
http://socialscienceisrael.org/archives/306 Hebrew; ‘Objective Content Blind Measure 
versus Subjective Evaluations’, The Forum Protecting Public Education, August 18, 
2012  (Hebrew) http://www.publiceducation.org.il/2012/08/1099  
319 
 
comported to the CHE specifications. Of the two other hires, Michal Givoni was a 
student of Ophir specialized in radical humanitarian witnessing and testimony, while 
Ayelet Harel-Shalev was student of Gad Barzilai, Dean of the Law School at Haifa 
University appointed to be the ‘the sole external supervisor of the corrections in the 
department’.  According to Bergman, ‘Barzilai was in a serious conflict of interests 
when he supervised the hiring of his own former student’.553 Moreover, Harel-
Shalev’s research on Israel’s alleged mistreatment of its religious minorities could 
hardly qualify as core political science. Likewise, the department’s choice of affiliated 
scholars in 2011-21 replicated past preferences.  Hagar Kotef, a graduate student of 
Ophir took up the study of ‘the checkpoints regime’ in the West Bank while James 
Ron, a veteran political activist, had a strong history of criticizing Israel. 
The changes failed to satisfy the Subcommittee for Quality of the CHE which 
announced its recommendations on 5 September 2012. These noted that the 
‘reservations expressed by members of the International Evaluation Committee with 
regard to the implementation of recommendations made by the committee regarding 
the broadening of methodologies and theoretical approaches being taught in the 
Department of Politics and Government’ were not met. The subcommittee’s 
recommendations were harsh: 
[The] Council expresses its dissatisfaction with the fact that the department of 
Politics and Government did not exploit this opportunity to recruit new faculty 
members in order to expand upon the methodological approaches employed by 
faculty in the department in a way that would reflect the pluralism of the 
discipline, as recommended by the International Evaluation Committee.  
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Specifically, this relates to the absence of the positivist approach in Political 
Science among faculty of the department. The recruitment of faculty, the 
majority of whom represent a sub-field within the Interpretive Approach to 
political research (critical theory), which is already over-represented in the 
department, does not follow the recommendations made by the International 
Evaluation Committee. 
A drastic recommendation was made that ‘in the current situation’ the department 
would not be allowed to enrol students for the 2013-14 academic year.554 
 Leaked to the media, the decision created an academic firestorm. President 
Carmi and top Ben-Gurion University officials accused the CHE of political bias and 
urged the international academic community to send letters of protest. In a private 
email that surfaced in Israel Hayom newspaper, David Newman, Dean of Social 
Sciences and former founding head of the department, wrote in an internal memo to 
his colleagues that 
I am in favour of applying international pressure - in proper measure - together 
with a trickle of letters from a number of associations and people with 
international reputations - some of which will reach the media - in parallel 
with all the other kinds of pressure that are being applied today to the Council 
for Higher Education by lawyers and the activity of the president and the 
rector. It is not a 100-percent match to the policy that we set until now, but it 
                                                          
554
 ‘Recommendation of the Sub-Committee for Quality Control with Regard to the 






seems to me that they are under pressure now and we need to keep up the 
pressure and not let up.555 
In an unprecedented mobilization of international academic circles, dozens of 
professional associations in political science, sociology and geography in the United 
States and Britain - as well as international associations representing thousands of 
scholars worldwide - sent letters of protest to the CHE and the ministry of education. 
The European Consortium for Political Research, the London School of Economics, 
and hundreds of individual scholars joined in, ignoring the international committee’s 
damning findings and repeating the charge that closing the department was a 
politically motivated move that would damage Israel’s academic standing in the 
world.556 
Israeli faculty took a particularly active role in the campaign. Letters 
condemning the move were dispatched by virtually all relevant professional 
associations and many individual scholars, including a Noble Prize winner. Maoz was 
virtually alone in defending the CHE; having publicly disclosed his role in the 2002 
evaluation he put much of the blame on the CHE’s decision to accredit the program in 
the first place. But he also criticized Carmi for tolerating a seriously flawed 
department and allowing it to hire faculty that represented ‘more of the same’.  
Convinced that the department could not right itself, Maoz urged the creation of an 
academic receivership to correct the problems. And by way of fending off charges of 
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political prejudice on his part he felt obliged to describe himself as a leftist in good 
standing.557 
      But Maoz’s appeal made no impact on the Israeli academic community as it 
prepared to increase pressure on the CHE ahead of its meeting of 31 October 2012. A 
week before the meeting the prestigious Israel Democracy Institute organized a 
roundtable titled ‘The Council of Higher Education: Legitimate Regulations or 
Infringement on Academic Freedom?’ Predictably, there was a virtual consensus that 
the evaluation of the department was politically motivated with participants taking 
turns to condemn the CHE for gravely undermining academic freedom.558 
Taken aback, the CHE was forced to defend its actions. In a public letter its 
director, Moshe Vigdor, complained about ‘the unprecedented attack against the 
CHE’ and accused the critics of actions where ‘red lines were crossed’.  He took 
special umbrage at Carmi and others who appealed to the international community: ‘it 
is unheard of that a letter by the head of an Israeli academic institution is forwarded to 
elements abroad, including professors, professional unions and institutions against the 
CHE and the state - this and more, even before the CHE discussed the issue and 
before it resolved the issue’.  Describing the attack as ‘imported’, he pleaded for the 
‘foreign interference’ to stop.559 
Following the huge build-up, the 31 October meeting was somewhat 
anticlimactic. Professor Risse, who was at attendance, told the university’s 
representatives that only one of the three new hires comported with the original 
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recommendation, concluding that the department ‘still lacks the necessary faculty in 
core topics’ as suggested by the report. The university was given three weeks to 
furnish a detailed plan for addressing the request but the threat of closure was 
subsequently removed. As reported in the Israeli press, ‘Meretz MK Tamar Zandberg, 
a PhD candidate at the department, told Ynet: “The decision today uncovered the fact 
that the attempts to shut down the department were driven by political interests and 
had nothing to do with academic achievements”’. Moreover, ‘the efforts to close the 
department backfired at those who vigorously advocated its closing once the 
academic excellence and professional conduct of the department became clear’.560  
      Coming a decade after the Pappe-Katz incident, the unprecedented intervention of 
foreign academics in what was a prerogative of a sovereign state to oversee the public 
higher education system it funded made it clear that imposing common standards on 
radical academics - the suggestion made by the international Risse Committee - was 
fraught with considerable perils. Though few in the CHE would have accepted the 
comment about the ‘excellence of the Department’ they were likely to agree with the 
‘backfire’ metaphor. Indeed, the CHE was subsequently much more cautious when 
dealing with the critical scholars in the Sociology Department at Ben-Gurion 
University as part of its routine evaluation of sociology departments decided upon in 
2009. 
In January 2012, the CHE convened a committee of evaluation chaired by 
Professor Seymour Spilerman of Columbia University. Echoing the Risse committee 
the report on the Ben-Gurion University sociology department submitted in August 
offered a scathing critique of the dominance of the critical approach and the paucity of 
methodically oriented courses: ‘It is the view of the Committee that a sociology 
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department at a major university should not have the majority of its faculty working 
within conceptual perspective that is not mainstream in the profession’. The report 
urged to broaden the faculty to ‘include other intellectual approaches as well as in the 
range of subfields covered by the department’. Referring to the faculty, the committee 
concluded that ‘it is our majority drew extensively upon critical studies in their own 
research.  Future hiring should therefore to be oriented to brining into the department 
sociologists who work primarily from a rigorous empirical perspective’.561 
For reasons not fully explained by the CHE, the Spilerman Committee 
submitted a second toned-down report in October 2012. Still, the new version took a 
negative view of the department  stating: 
The Committee is convinced that critical studies, with its orientation toward 
critiquing and changing society, has a contribution to make in the discipline 
and should remain a valued specialty in the Ben-Gurion Department. 
Moreover, much of what is labeled as critical sociology by the BGU faculty 
would elsewhere be considered political/historical sociology, which is a well-
established subfield of the discipline. However, the faculty should be 
broadened to increase the representation of other intellectual approaches, as 
well as in the range of subfields covered by the department. 
In other words, the department offered political-historical sociology labelled as 
sociology. On the same note, the committee found that  
in its mission statement the department notes that students are taught to 
comprehend society and culture from a critical perspective, and not take for 
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granted the conventional assumptions of their society. While this intent is 
laudable, and helps to distinguish the Ben-Gurion department from other 
sociology-anthropology departments in Israel, the Committee is of the opinion 
that the objective of the department’s programs should be, first and foremost, 
to familiarize students with the variety of theories, conceptual approaches, and 
methodologies used by sociologists and anthropologists to analyse social 
structures, cultures, and the functioning of social systems.562 
It recommended that ‘courses should be broadened further to include additional 
research from quantitatively oriented perspectives’. The Committee expressed 
concern that ‘not all of the core fields of the two disciplines are covered adequately. 
For sociology there did not appear to be courses offered in basic topics such as work 
and occupations, social stratification, or family/life course studies’. Other core 
courses (e.g. historical sociology, religion) are listed as taught by adjuncts or retired 
faculty, which is a concern’. 
In addition to the paucity of faculty capable of teaching empirically oriented 
and quantitative core courses, the committee identified other problems created by the 
imbalance between critical and positivist perspectives. In the MA program, the critical 
studies track had a very small enrolment as opposed the much more popular 
organizational sociology. As a result, ‘faculty who work from a critical perspective 
also teach in the organizational sociology track - which raises issues about the 
minimal exposure of students in this track to empirical and quantitative materials.  In 
general, we remain concerned about the mal-distribution of the faculty over 
specialties in light of the student enrolment, among other reasons’. 
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Finally, while faculty ‘consists of active researchers with strong publication 
records’ with ‘few exceptions, the sociologists have not published in the most 
influential journals of the profession, especially the American Sociological Review, 
the American Journal of Sociology, the British Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, 
the European Sociological Review and the Annual Review of Sociology’. The 
orientation of these journals is to publish papers that are rigorously evidenced-based, 
while critical studies leans more in the theoretical direction and towards a public-
oriented sociology.  As a result of not publishing in top, general interest journals, the 
visibility of the department within the profession is lessened’. 
Whether the critical orientation of the faculty was related to the department’s 
difficulty in raising competitive grants was not clearly articulated, but the committee 
urged the university to provide help in this endeavour.  That the committee had little 
faith in the department to reform itself was also clear in other ways. For instance, in 
urging the department to hire more quantitatively oriented faculty the committee 
recommended that an outside scholar be involved in the process.563 
Even though the October version of the report was modified, it represented a 
stinging rebuke of Uri Ram, the chair of the department and, as noted earlier, the 
leading critical sociologist after Kimmerling’s demise. For Ram the difference 
between positivist sociology - in his words ‘institutional sociology’ - recommended 
by the committee and his vision was dramatic. He vigorously objected to the notion of 
sociology that presented ‘itself as a neutral positive science, the role of which is to 
provide explanations and predictions’. While it stresses objective science it ‘serves the 
authoritarian and unequal order’. Critical sociology, on the other hand, ‘views 
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sociology as a social activity’ aimed at furthering specific values, ‘the values of 
freedom and human equality’.564 
At a minimum, if implemented, the recommendation would undermine Ram’s 
vision. Whether the CHE will be able to impose the recommendation on the 
Sociology Department, however, is not entirely clear. While rarely admitted, the 
Department of Politics and Government’s affair contributed to an intellectual 
understanding that post-Zionists were protected by a larger international network of 
scholars. In essence, a symbiotic relationship has developed between the two: the 
former generated research and activism that the latter could use to justify their anti-
Israel actions. In an intellectual climate sensitive to claims of anti-Semitism, Jewish 
and, especially, Israeli academics were a virtually required presence.    
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Operating within the critical, neo-Marxist paradigm post-Zionist academics 
operating within the critical, neo-Marxist paradigm have transformed the marginal 
anti-Zionist ideology of Matzpen, into a tool of delegitimization.  The positivist view 
of Israel as liberal democracy based on a market economy was replaced by a narrative 
that offered a ferocious critique of all facets of Israeli history and society, hand-
tailored to undermining its legitimacy in a number of ways: 
• ‘New historians’ have turned the saga of Israel’s creation upside down so as to 
cast the Jewish state as ‘born in sin’ - a colonialist outpost of western 
imperialism established through massive ethnic cleansing of the indigenous 
population. 
• A revisionist historian has cast the Jewish people as a recent Zionist invention 
aimed at establishing a false historical link between Jews and the Holy Land 
so as gain international legitimacy for the dispossession of the Palestinians. 
• ‘Critical sociologists’ depicted Israel as an apartheid society dominated by an 
Ashkenazi-capitalist elite that has subjugated minorities, women and the 
working classes. In a twist of the Zionism-as-colonialism theory, the Mizrahim 
were reclassified as Arab Jews who - like their ‘Palestinian brethren’ - have 
allegedly been reduced to third class existence.  
• ‘Critical political scientists’ have worked hard to discredit Israel’s democratic 
credentials, with some of them going so far as to present the Jewish state as a 
fascist-like, apartheid state. 
• ‘Revisionist approaches’ to the Holocaust, the most traumatic event in modern 
Jewish history, have generated a gamut of delegitimizing conclusions: that 
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Israel has turned Holocaust worship into a civil religion designed to exploit 
Western guilt feelings in order to dispossess the Palestinians in 1948 and to 
hold on to the territories conquered in the 1967 war. At the deeper level the 
Holocaust is said to have perverted Israelis’ perception of reality and morality 
in a way that entrenched them in a self-righteous victim mentality while 
committing Nazi-like atrocities against the Palestinians.   
Needless to say, this ‘critical’ de-legitimizing endeavour has been marred with serious 
methodological flaws. These range from the use of unsubstantiated and/or single-
source assertions while straining interpretation beyond available evidence, to failure 
consider contradictory evidence and to spell out important procedural approaches, to 
selective use of data to prove particular points and the use of data out of chronological 
or factual context. For their part post-Zionist scholars often dismissed the positivist 
scientific method as reflecting the ‘dominant narrative’, maligning their critics as 
agents of right-wing nationalism, colonialism or racism. Some have even presented 
their work as being, in the words of Ophir, outside the ‘academic consensus’ and thus 
impervious to criticism. 
Last but not least, virtually all post-Zionists analysed in this study have 
insisted on being duty-bound to do research that is filtered through a 
contemporaneous political reality. In other words, as political reality changes - or 
more precisely the scholar’s perception of this reality, so does the respective narrative. 
As this work indicates, the failure of the Oslo process radicalized the post-Zionists at 
the personal level leading in many case to the rewriting of their ‘pre-Oslo narrative’. 
Ilan Pappe, Avi Shlaim and Baruch Kimmerling, to give a few prominent examples, 
produced new narratives demonstrating a virtual sea-change from their original 
accounts. Kimmerling, in particular, traversed the research terrain in a dramatic 
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fashion, shifting from a positivist sociologist lauding Israel for holding on to 
democracy in extremely difficult circumstances to a scathing critic deriding Israel as a 
militarist, fascist and apartheid state. Benny Morris travelled in the opposite direction. 
Deeply dismayed by the perceived Palestinians intransigence during the peace 
negotiations he modified the narrative of the 1948 war with a view to shifting the 
blame away from the Israelis and onto the Palestinians, again indicating the 
politicized basis of his work.  
Certain features of the Israeli academy account for the rapid dissemination of 
the post-Zionist themes in the liberal arts in general and social sciences in particular. 
Compared to tertiary education in the West, Israeli faculty has been granted expansive 
academic freedom - a tradition created by the Hebrew University determined to carry 
out the vision of its founder, Judah Magnes. Despite several efforts at reform the state 
did not manage to limit this broadly conceived right, leaving an operational 
environment conducive to the flourishing of post-Zionism. Consequently, activist 
faculty have not only engaged in intense political work, often using campus facilities 
as a base, but many switched to writing on subjects related to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict regardless of their original specialization. 
In yet another manifestation of this pattern, the university authorities have 
accepted such research – often published in the “alternative” critical outlets, as a base 
of promotion.   
The international committee of evaluation of the Department of Politics and 
Government at Ben-Gurion University offered a scathing indictment of such 
practices.   The review made clear that “alternative” critical network of publishing 
venues does not comport to the academic standards of mainstream publications, and 
urged the department to abide by accepted standards of hiring and promotion.  Faced 
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with the prospect of being closed down, the department and its vast network of 
domestic and international supporters effectively derailed the committee’s 
recommendation.   The uproar had a chilling effect on the Council of Higher 
Education that had ordered the review.  A year later, a different evaluation committee 
censured the highly politicized Department of Sociology at Ben Gurion University for 
its heavy reliance on critical scholars and urged to hire more mainstream positivist 
faculty, the Council sanitized the report, apparently to avoid another international 
outcry.   
Considered in conjunction with the Pappe-Katz-Tantura incident, where the 
actions of the University of Haifa triggered a call of academic boycott, these 
developments reveal a broad engagement of the scholarly international community in 
nourishing and protecting post-Zionist faculty. 
Though beyond the scope of the present study, there is considerable evidence 
to demonstrate that activist academics receive extensive financial support. Some of its 
direct, in form of grants from foundations and foreign governments.  Other is indirect,    
through visiting positions, often at elite universities, invitations to conferences, 
workshops and other academic conclaves.   Quite possible, the newly invigorated 
push for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions will further enhance the standing of 
activist faculty whose writings became part of the canon legitimizing the movement.  
By the same token, the threat of boycott will probably have a chilling effect on the 
willingness of the state and/or the university authorities to curb this activism. 
Clearly, the thesis has the potential to impact the ongoing discourse on the 
post- Zionist scholars at three different levels.  Most important, the systematic and 
comprehensive analysis of the key post-Zionist texts illustrates in great details the 
many methodological shortcomings involved.  The blurring of the lines between 
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political polemics and bone fide research is celebrated among the disciples of Antonio 
Gramsci, but should not be tolerated in research universities.  Institutions of higher 
learning are beholden to standards of objectivity and dispassionate pursuit of 
knowledge - tenet of positivist philosophy.  By violating this principle, post-Zionists 
have produced ever- changing narratives on a variety of topics, be it the Israeli 
authority system or the history of the 1948 war, to suit their political cause du jour.   
As noted, polemics masquerading as scholarship have helped to delegitimize Israel in 
the international arena.  But it also undermined the standing of social sciences as 
measured by rigorous indices like Social Science Citation Index.  Both of the Ben 
Gurion University evaluation reports touched upon this issue, but the present work 
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